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ROYAL WARRANTS
I.
Dated Jth August, 1036.
ED W ARD  R .I.
E d w a r d  the E i g h t h ,  by  the Grace of God, of Great Britain, 
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas KINGi 
Defender of the F aith , E m peror of India: To our Right Trusty I 
and R ight W ell-beloved Cousin and Counsellor William Robert 
Wellesley, E arl Peel, K night G rand Comm ander of O u r Most 
Exalted Order of the S tar of India, K night Grand Cross of Our 
Most Excellent O rder of the British Em pire, Our Right Trusty 
and W ell-beloved Counsellor Sir H orace George Montagu 
R um bold ,B aronet,K night G rand Cross of O ur Most Honourable 
O rder of the B ath , K night G rand Cross of O u r  Most I 
D istinguished O rder of St. Michael and St. George, M em ber of 
Our Royal Victorian O rder, Our T rusty  and  W ell-b e lo v e d  Sir I 
E gbert Laurie Lucas H am m ond, K night Commander of Our I 
Most Exalted O rder of the S tar of India, Commander of Our I 
Most Excellent O rder of the British Em pire, Our T ru s ty  and I 
W ell-beloved Sir W illiam Morris C arter, K night, C o m m a n d e r of I 
Our Most Excellent O rder of the British Em pire, O u r  Trusty I 
and W ell-beloved Sir H arold Morris, K night, Member of Our I 
Most Excellent O rder of the British Em pire, One of Our Counsel! 
Learned in the Law, an d  O ur T rusty  and Well-beloved Reginald I 
Coupland, Companion of Our Most Em inent O rder of th e  Indian| 
Em pire, Greeting:
W h e r e a s  We have deemed it expedient tha t a  Commission |  
should issue forthw ith to ascertain the underlying c a u se s  of t 
disturbances which broke ou t in Palestine in the m iddle 
A pril; to enquire into the m anner in which the M an d a te  fori 
Palestine is being im plem ented in relation to Our obligations! 
as M andatory tow ards the A rabs and the Jews respectively,f  
and  to ascertain w hether, upon a  proper construction of the! 
term s of the M andate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any| 
legitimate grievances upon account of the way in w hich 
M andate has been, o r is being im plem ented; and if  the  Com-I 
mission is satisfied th a t any such grievances are w e ll founded! 
to  m ake recommendations for their rem oval and fo r  the pre-j 
vention of their recurrence :
N ow  know ye th a t W e, reposing great trust and confidents 
in your knowledge and ability, have authorized and appointe! 
and do by these presents authorize and  appoint y o u  the sail 
W illiam R obert W ellesley, E arl Peel (C hairm an), S ir Horacfj 
George M ontagu Rum bold, B aronet (Vice-Chairman), S11 
E gbert Laurie Lucas H am m ond, Sir W illiam M o r r i s  Carter! 
Sir H arold Morris and Reginald Coupland to be O u r  C oirm,: 
sioners for the purposes of and to m ake such enquiry.
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An d  We do hereby authorize and require you w ith all co r h  
venient despatch and by  all lawful means to enter upon, and to 
collect evidence respecting the subject m atter of, such enquiry, 
and to render a  R eport and make recommendations in accord­
ance w ith  the term s of this Our Commission.
An d  We do further require you to conform in all things to 
such instructions as shall be addressed to you through one of 
Our Principal Secretaries of State.
An d  W e  do hereby charge and command all Our Officers, 
Civil a n d  M ilitary, and  all Our faithful subjects and  all others 
inhabiting Palestine th a t in their several places and according 
to their respective powers and opportunities they be aiding 
to you in  the execution of this Our Commission.
An d  We do further ordain tha t you have liberty to report your 
proceedings under this O ur Commission from time to tim e if 
you shall judge it expedient so to do.
Giv e n  a t Our Court a t Saint Jam es's this Seventh day of 
August, One Thousand Nine H undred and  Thirty-Six, 
in the F irst Y ear of O ur Reign.
By His M ajesty's Command, 
M a l c o l m  M a c D o n a l d .
II.
Dated i j th  December 1936.
GEORGE  R .I.
George the S i x t h ,  by  the Grace of God, of G reat B ritain, 
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas KING, 
Defender of the Faith , to all to whom these Presents shall come,
Greeting !
W hereas it pleased Our Royal Predecessors from time to 
e to issue Royal Commissions of Enquiry  for various purposes 
erein specified :
And whereas in the case of certain of these Commissions, 
amely, those known as—
Ancient M onuments (England) Commission,
Ancient and  Historical Monuments (Scotland) 
Commission,
Ancient M onuments (Wales and M onmouthshire) 
Commission,
Historical M anuscripts Commission,
Local Government on Tyneside Commission,
Palestine Commission,
Royal Fine A rt Commission for England,
Royal Fine A rt Commission for Scotland, and the 
Safety in Coal Mines Commission,
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the  Commissioners appointed by Our Royal Predecessors or such 
of them  as were then acting as Commissioners, were at the late 
Demise of the Crown still engaged upon the business entrusted 
to  them :
And whereas W e deem it expedient th a t the said Commis­
sioners should continue their labours in connection with the said 
enquiries notw ithstanding the late Demise of the Crown:
Now know ye th a t W e, reposing great trust and confidence 
in the zeal, discretion and ability of the present members of each 
of the said Commissions, do by these Presents authorize them 
to continue their labours, and  do hereby in every essential 
particular ratify  and confirm the term s of the said several 
Commissions.
A nd We do further ordain th a t the said Commissioners do 
report to Us under their hands or under the hands of such of 
their num ber as m ay be specified in the Commissions respectively, 
their opinion upon the m atters presented for their consideration; 
and  th a t any proceedings which they o r any of them m a y  have 
taken under and in pursuance of the said Commissions since 
the late Demise of the Crown and  before the issue of these 
Presents shall be deemed and adjudged to have been taken under 
and in virtue of this Our Commission.
Given a t O ur Court a t Saint Jam es's the seventeenth day 
of December, 1936; in the F irst Y ear of Our Reign.
B y His M ajesty’s Command.
J o h n  S imon.
The minutes of the Public Evidence taken by the Royal 
Commission and a volume of M emoranda prepared by the 
Government of Palestine for the use of the Royal Commission I 
are being published separately by  His M ajesty's Stationery Office | 
in the N on-Parliam entary series of publications.
N o t e . — The U nited  K ingdom  share of the cost o f the R oyal Com m is®  I 
is estim ated  a t approxim ately £4,050. The cost of printing and publishing |  
th is R eport is estim ated b y  th e Stationery Office at £815 10s. od.
TO THE K IN G 'S MOST EX C ELLEN T M AJESTY.
May it  p l e a s e  Y o u r  M a j e s t y ,
We were appointed by W arrant under the Sign Manual of 
His F o r m e r  Majesty King Edw ard V III  on the 7th August, 
1936, as Commissioners with the following Term s of
R eferen ce:—
" T o  ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances 
w hich  broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to 
inquire into the m anner in which the M andate for Palestine 
is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the 
Mandatory towards the A rabs and the Jews respectively; 
and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the 
terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jew s have 
any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which 
the Mandate has been, or is being implemented; and if the 
Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well 
founded, to m ake recommendations for their rem oval and 
for the prevention of their recurrence.”
We n o w  humbly beg leave to subm it to Y our Majesty the 
following Report.
PR EFA C E.
A lthough appointed on the 7th August last, we were com­
pelled, owing to continuance of the “  disturbances " ,  to post­
pone for nearly three m onths our actual departure for Palestine. 
The interval was not, however, entirely without value, since we 
were enabled to examine some of the numerous official reports 
relating to the M andatory Administration and to study an 
invaluable series of descriptive and statistical m em oranda 
supplied at our request by the Palestine Government. At our 
first m eeting , held privately in London on the 6th October, it was 
decided that no witnesses should be heard until we arrived in 
Jerusalem. We determined that, while we might in the m ean­
time a cq u ire  some knowledge of the historical background and 
of essential facts and figures, we should apply to the evidence 
to be h e a rd  in Palestine minds so far as possible free from 
prejudice or preconceived ideas.
2. The strike in Palestine came to an end on the 12th October. 
We left London on the 5th November, sailing from  Marseilles 
y the s .s . Cathay for Port Said on the following day, and 
rriving in  Jerusalem  on the m orning of the n t h  November.
3- A ceremonial opening session was held a t Government 
ouse on the 12th November, attended by  a large assembly of 
otables and civil and m ilitary officials. The Royal Commission
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10. On the gth Jan u ary  three of us visited Trans-Jo rd a n  as 
guests of the British Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel C. H . F. Cox. 
The Commissioners were most hospitably entertained by  His 
H ighness the Amir Abdullah, with whom they had a long  dis­
cussion a t a  private audience. They spent the night at Amman 
and returned to Jerusalem  on the following day.
11. W e left Jerusalem  on various dates in the week beginning 
the 17th Jan u ary  and, after a few days devoted to discussions at 
H elouan in Egypt, sailed from  P ort Said by  the s.s. Cathay on 
the 24th January , arriving back in London on the 30th 
January .
12. In  London, after our return, we held one public session, 
a t which we heard  evidence from two witnesses; and seven 
private sessions, a t which we heard eight witnesses. T h e  latter 
were all persons who had  held official positions or high offices 
of State.
13. Separate volumes have been prepared to accompany our 
R eport, containing (1) M emoranda supplied by the Palestine 
Government; (2) Minutes of the Public Evidence and the  text 
of the speeches delivered a t our opening session in Je ru sa lem .
PART I
THE PROBLEM
Chapter I. 4
5 . The next phase opens with the conquest of Palestine by 
the Seleucid rulers of Syria and its sequel, the first persecution 
of the Jew ish faith. Hellenism was now in the ascendant, and 
an  attem pt was m ade to force the Jew s to abandon the rule of 
the Torah and adopt Greek gods and ways of life. L e d  by the 
H asm onaean fam ily, of whom Judas Maccabaeus and John 
H yrcanus were the outstanding figures, the Jew s successfully 
revolted; and from  about 150 B .C . onwards they not only 
recovered the long-lost independence of Judaea but extended 
their rule north , south and east till it reached something like 
the limits of the realm  of D avid and Solomon. B ut th e  next 
of the m any conquests of Palestine was now imminent; and 
against the m ight of the expanding Rom an Em pire the Jews 
could not m aintain their freedom. In  63 B .C . Pompey stormed 
Jerusalem . Never since then has Palestine been an independent 
State.
6. Though the form  of governm ent varied and tributary 
native rulers, like H erod, were allowed to bear the nam e of 
K ing, Palestine was now virtually a Rom an Province. That 
•it proved unruly was partly  due to the oppression and extortion 
of some of its Rom an overlords; bu t so strong on the on e  hand | 
was the national spirit of the Jew s and so bitter on th e  other I 
the feuds tha t grew up am ong them  tha t the best of governm ents j 
would have found Palestine difficult to keep at peace. A century 
of constant strife culm inated in a general revolt in 64 A.D., I 
which was only repressed after years of bitter fighting w hen, in 
70 A .D ., Jerusalem  was taken and  sacked by Titus, an d  the 
Temple, the scene of the last resistance, bu rn t to the ground. 
B ut the Jew s were not yet crushed. They rebelled again in 115 
A.D. and in 132 A .D. This la tter rising was so successful that 
Rome determined to m ake its repetition quite impossible. In | 
135 A .D . Jerusalem  was destroyed and its site ploughed up, 
M any of the population were pu t to death, and many morel 
carried off to slavery. F rom  tha t time onwards Palestine steadily |  
sank into obscurity. Its diminished population dwindled 
further. W hile the Jew s who had  spread themselves over I 
most of the rest of the world increased and multiplied, there |  
were soon only a  few thousand of them  left in their o ld  ' 
land.
7. The history of Jew ish Palestine, thus ended, h a d  
enacted for the m ost p a rt in a country about the size o f  Wales: 
bu t it constitutes one of the great chapters in the story of man-1 
kind. By two prim ary achievements—the development of the I 
first crude worship of Jehovah into a highly sp ir itu a l mono-1 
theism , and the embodiment of this faith and of the so c ia l and! 
political ideals it inspired in im m ortal prose and p oetry—the! 
gift of H ebraism  in ancient Palestine to the m odem  w o rld  must! 
ran k  with the gifts of ancient Greece and Rome. Christians J
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moreover, cannot forget tha t Jesus was a Jew  who lived on 
Jewish soil and founded His gospel on a basis of Jewish life 
and thought.
2. The Arabs in Palestine.
8. F o r  five hundred years Palestine rem ained under Rom an 
and Byzantine rule, and then in the seventh century A.D. it 
underwent yet another conquest. Inspired by the rise of Islam , 
the third great monotheistic faith to be born in the stretch of 
Semitic country between the Persian Gulf and the M editerranean, 
the A rab s broke out from  the A rabian desert and started on a 
career of conquest almost as rem arkable as that of Macedon or 
Rome. Between A .D. 632 and 713, they invaded and occupied 
in qu ick  succession Syria, ‘Iraq , Persia, Egypt, the whole 
length of the north African coast, and finally Spain. W hen their 
further penetration of Europe was stopped in 678 and 717 by 
the resistance of Constantinople and in 732 by the victory of the 
Franks at Poitiers, the whole of the M editerranean seaboard, 
with m u ch  of its interior, curving round from the Pyrenees in 
the w est to the Taurus in the east, had fallen, and  for three 
centuries was to rem ain, under Arab rule. This was the golden 
age of th e  Arabs. Their sea-power commanded the Indian 
Ocean and contested the com mand of the M editerranean. Their 
trade extended from Cadiz to Cairo, Baghdad and Zanzibar and 
beyond to India and China. They took the lead in civilization. 
Their chief centres of population and wealth were also nurseries 
of the sciences and arts. Scholars from  Central and N orthern 
Europe, still in the D ark Ages, came to Arab universities for 
learning, and it was through Arabic translations of the classics 
that Hellenism was preserved and handed on to inspire the 
Renaissance and the b irth  of the m odem  age.
9. In all this activity and achievement Arab Palestine took
0 great part. Jerusalem  had  been rebuilt, and the conquering
abs established there a university which became a local centre 
f Arab learning; but, secluded among its stony hills, Jerusalem  
ould n e v e r  compete in wealth or culture with the cities in the 
erffle plains and valleys of ‘Iraq , Egypt, and Spain. Only one 
r two lesser figures in the great com pany of Arab men of learn- 
gwere Palestinians; and the only great work of a rt which has 
urvived from the age of A rab independence is the Dome of 
e R ock , a magnificent mosque erected towards the end of 
e seventh century in the centre of the wide stone platform  
hich once had borne the Jew ish Temple. B ut in one respect 
emsalem attained a  higher place in the A rab world than Bagh- 
ad or Cairo or G ranada. On tha t sacred platform , the Haram  
sh Sharif, besides the Dome of the Rock stands the Mosque al 
qsa, w h ith e r  Mohammed is recorded to have been conveyed by 
od, and  Moslems believe tha t from  the Rock itself the Prophet 
ok flight on his magic steed to heaven. The Haram esh Sharif,
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therefore, ranks with Mecca and Medina as one of three para­
m ount “  Holy Places ”  of Islam . Indeed it preceded Mecca 
as the Qibla or point to which Moslems turn in prayer.
10. In  the course of three or four hundred years th e  Arab 
Em pire began to decay and disintegrate, and the A rabs of 
Palestine, like the Jew s before them , were exposed to  alien 
conquest and subjection. In  the eleventh century a ll  th e  Arab 
states in the N ear E ast were reduced by the Seljuk Turks. 
F rom  1095 onwards Palestine was exposed to a series of inter- I 
m ittent invasions from  Christian Europe, known as the Crusades, 
which, inspired partly  by  the vision of recovering th e  Holy I 
Sepulchre and  partly  by  more m aterial aims, succeeded in I 
m aintaining a precarious Kingdom of Jerusalem  till th e  latter I 
part of the twelfth century and a foothold on the coast fo r  another I 
century, after which the whole of Palestine reverted to  Moslem I 
rule. For most of the next 200 years it was subject w ith  Syria I 
to  the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt, and during that p e r io d  it was I 
subjected to the devastating Mongol raids of H alagu and Tam er-1 
lane. In  1517 it was conquered, with Syria and Egypt, by the I 
Ottoman Turks : and in the hands of the Ottoman Sultans at I 
Constantinople it rem ained, except for the few m onths of I 
Napoleon’s invasion and  the few years of Mohammed Ali's I 
occupation, till the W orld W ar of 1914. I
11. In  the twelve centuries and more tha t had p a sse d  since I 
the A rab conquest Palestine had  virtually dropped out of history; I 
One chapter only is remembered—the not very noble romance I 
of the Crusades. In  economics as in  politics Palestine la y  outside I  
the m ain stream  of the w orld’s life. In  the realm o f thought, I  
in science or in letters, it m ade no contribution to modern I  
civilization. Its last state was worse than its first. In 1914 the I  
condition of the country was an outstanding e x a m p le  of the I  
lethargy and m aladm inistration of the pre-w ar Ottoman regime. I  
The population, still overwhelmingly Arab in character, eked I  
out a  precarious existence m ainly in the hills. On th e  plains, 1 
where life and property were less secure, such irr ig a tio n -w o rb l 
as had  existed in ancient times had long disappeared. Oranges 1 
were grown round Jaffa, bu t most of the maritime belt w as only I  
sparsely populated and only thinly cultivated. E sd ra e lo n  fo ri 
the most part was m arshy and m alarious. Eastwards beyond I  
Jo rdan  nothing rem ained of the Greek cities of classical times I  
save one or two groups of deserted ruins. Southwards in  Beer-1  
sheba, once the site of several prosperous towns, all trace o f!  
u rban  life had long lain buried under the encroaching sand. I
12. B ut, poor and neglected though it was, to the Arabs who! 
lived in it Palestine—or, more strictly speaking, Syria, oil 
which Palestine had been a p art since the days of Nebuchad- 1  
nezzar—was still their country, their home, the land in which ■  
their people for centuries past had  lived and left their graves. ■
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3. The Diaspora.
13- Jewish histoiy, meantime, had  ceased to be the history 
of P a le stin e ; but, though the problem of Palestine is the subject 
of this Report, th a t problem  is so inextricably linked with the 
Jewish problem as a whole that it seems desirable to describe, 
in the briefest outline, the fate of the Jew s in the outer world.
14. A  number of them  (as will appear later) had  clung 
throughout the centuries of Moslem occupation to w hat h ad  once 
been th e ir national soil; bu t the vast m ajority of the race had 
spread themselves over the rest of the world. This Dispersion 
(Diaspora) had begun long before the disaster of 135 A.D. In  
'Iraq, fo r example, a large Jew ish community had  grown out 
of the group of exiles who did not return to Jerusalem  in 
538 B .C . A prosperous and influential body, perm itted to 
maintain a  kind of com munal autonom y, equipped with two 
famous academies for the study and exposition of the Hebrew 
tradition, it shared fully in the great days of the A rab Caliphate 
at B a g h d ad ; and it was not till the eleventh century th a t the 
process o f decline began. In  Egypt, similarly, there was a  
flourishing community of Jew s, active in all fields of Egyptian 
Me, rising to high posts in the arm y and  adm inistration, and 
participating in the cultural achievements which m ade the fame 
of A lexandria . I t  is significant that those Egyptian Jew s, unlike 
the founders of the H asm onaean State, did not resist "  assimila­
tion ” , O n the contrary they became completely “  Hellenized ” , 
abandoning their ancient tongue for Greek and adopting Greek 
names. The Septuagint or Greek translation of the Hebrew 
Testament was their work.
15. B y  the time of the final destruction of Jerusalem  in 
135 A .D . successive waves of emigration had  swelled the size 
of the communities in ‘Iraq  and E gypt and flowed also into 
yria a n d  the Yemen and  across the M editerranean to Greece
d Ita ly . Five o r six centuries later another wave followed 
n the heels of the A rab conquest along the north-west of 
ca a n d  into Spain; and it was in Spain that Jew ish life 
ttained the highest point it had  reached since the loss of its 
Id h om elan d . All walks of life were open to them , ru ra l as 
ell as u r b a n . W hen A rab Spain led the world, they were 
eaders in  Arab Spain—secretaries or viziers of the Caliph, 
plomatists, financiers, scientists, physicians, scholars. There 
ued a  great revival of Hebrew literature, especially religious 
etry, a n d  Hebrew learning. Maimonides (1135-1204 A.D.) ,  
m in  Cordova and later resident in Cairo, was perhaps the 
eatest scholar of his age. I t  appears, indeed, tha t in those 
ys in S p a in  the relations between A rab and Jew  were quite 
rmonious : but it is significant again that the Spanish Jew s, 
e the Egyptian, accepted assimilation in almost everything
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but religion. They spoke Arabic, took Arab names, adopted 
Arab ways. In  those circumstances such force as there was 
in the common Semitism of the two peoples could operate 
unhindered.
16. The era of persecution, which was wholly to transform 
the conditions of Jew ish life in the D iaspora, began n o t in the 
Moslem world but in the Christian. From  the time w hen the 
Rom an Em pire accepted Christianity, Judaism  had always been 
less tolerantly treated by Christian than by Moslem rulers; 
and the Jew s who had  penetrated into Ita ly  and Gaul and, after 
the fall of the Em pire, into Germany and England were exposed 
to various restrictions and prohibitions which tended to  mark 
them  off as a distinct and inferior people. Social factors widened 
the gulf. In  the feudal Europe of the D ark Ages the immigrant 
Jew  could find no place on the land or in  the industrial guilds: 
he inevitably became the middleman, whether merchant or 
pedlar. And, since usury was forbidden to Christians by the 
Church, the Jew  inevitably also became the money-lender—an 
unpopular profession. Jewish life, therefore, tended to b e  almost 
exclusively urban, and Jew ish energies were directed m ore and 
more as time went on into commerce and  finance. T h e  Jews 
took an early share in the banking-system. Some of th em  accu­
m ulated fortunes. Christian rulers came to look to th em  when 
they w anted money. But, despite their usefulness, th ey  were 
never liked. Popular instinct draws aw ay from w hat is  strange, 
and the Jews—foreigners, foreign-looking, keeping to  them­
selves, clinging to their peculiar faith—were strange. In the eyes 
of the Church, moreover, they were the worst of h e re tic s . They 
did not seek, it was true, to convert others, but none refused so 
obstinately to be converted. And behind that was th e  general 
idea tha t on all Jew s, in all times and places, lay the g u ilt of the 
Crucifixion.
17. This complex of ill-feeling came to a head in th e  period 
of the Crusades. The w rath of the Crusaders fell as m uch on 
Jew  as on Moslem; and it soon seemed as much a n  act of 
piety to kill Jew s in Europe as to kill Saracens in the Holy 
Land. A wave of persecution, increasingly cruel in its methods, 
spread all over W estern Europe. F irst in England, then in 
France, Jew s were expropriated, tortured, massacred, and 
f in a lly  expelled from  the country. F or a time there was less 
brutality  in Spain, whence, except from G ranada, the A rabs had 
been driven out a t the end of the twelfth and the beginning of 
the thirteenth centuries : bu t in the second half of th e  fifteenth 
century the Inquisition took up its task of scenting o u t and  burn­
ing heretics, and in 1492 all Jew s who refused to b e  c o n v er ted  
were expelled. Another Jewish migration was thus set going, 
this time from  W est to East. The refugees from Southern 
Europe, especially from  Spain, found shelter m o stly  in th
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Mediterranean provinces of th e  Turkish Em pire, in the Balkans, 
in Egypt, in Asia Minor, in Constantinople itself. From  this 
time dates the im portant settlement of Spanish Jew s or 
S e p h a r d im  a t Salonika. A certain num ber of Jews got back 
to Palestine. They were relatively safe in the N ear E ast from 
the worst forms of persecution. Some Jews, indeed, rose to high 
positions, especially in the diplomatic field, a t the Sultan’s 
court. But, generally speaking, they never recovered the status 
they had enjoyed in Spain. If Moslems, Turk or A rab, were 
more tolerant than Christians, they regarded Jews as their in­
feriors, to be kept strictly below the rank of a Believer.
18. I n  Central Europe and Ita ly  there were massacres of 
Jews as elsewhere, bu t no wholesale expulsion. Henceforth, 
however, they were kept rigidly apart from Christians, confined 
to particular quarters of the towns they lived in, known as 
ghettos, and often obliged to w ear a yellow badge to distinguish 
them fro m  other people. Many of them , especially in Germany, 
left the ir homes and with those expelled from  France and 
England sought refuge on the then only half-developed eastern 
fringes of an expanding Europe, in L ithuania, Poland and H un­
gary—a process which continued until a good deal more than 
half the Jews in the world were congregated in that belt of 
country. The Polish kings a t first protected them , bu t the 
respite was short-lived. W ith the middle of the seventeenth 
century came Cossack conquest and, later on, Russian rule. 
A sort of territorial ghetto, the “  Pale of Settlement ” , was 
established from the Baltic north of W arsaw to the Black Sea 
near O dessa  to keep the Jew s from perm eating Russia, and 
throughout this area the urban  ghetto system was imposed.
19. If the brutality of this medieval persecution is astonishing 
to most m o d e m  minds, still more astonishing, perhaps, is the fact 
that the Jews survived it. Their num bers were greatly reduced. 
No certain  figures are available; bu t there were perhaps about 
four m illion Jews in the early days of the Diaspora and probably 
about one and a half million in 1700. B ut they had  not been 
eliminated either by massacre or by  conversion. Judaism , it 
seemed, was indestructible. And, w hat it lost in num bers and 
in wealth from persecution, it gained in intensity. The ghetto 
I system, in  particular, made the "  peculiar people ”  more pecu­
liar, I t  widened the gulf between them  and other peoples. 
I Herded together within the ghetto gates, they clung with a new 
I passion to  the history and tradition, the ceremonies and customs, 
I which h a d  made them  Jew s. I t  was a  “  hot-house "  
I nationalism, and somewhat unhealthy, as indeed all the fife 
I  of the ghetto was bound to be; but it enabled the Jew s to 
I maintain their self-respect, to console themselves for their
I  im poverishm ent and subjection, and to defy the hostile world 
■outside.
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20. The next chapter swings the hope of the D ia s p o ra  back 
again from  E ast to W est; for it was in France and England 
once leaders in persecution, that a  new spirit of tolerance first 
developed. I t  w as aided by  the infiltration of an enlightened 
type of Spanish Jew , the so-called Marranos, descendants of 
those who, in outw ard form  if no t in secret conviction, had 
"  bowed the knee ”  to the Inquisition. They quickly established 
themselves and proved their usefulness, and so paved th e  way 
for the entry of other more open and obvious Jews. In  the 
centres of business, such as London, H am burg, Am sterdam , 
Jew s were soon again to the fore. The House of Rothschild’ 
bom  in the Frankfort ghetto, became a  growing power in  inter­
national finance. Thus the ideas of the American and French 
Revolutions were sown on no t altogether uncongenial soil. The 
Jew s were “  em ancipated " ,  i.e. were freed from all restrictions I 
not im posed on other citizens, in the United States in 1787, and 
in France in  1790. In  H olland, Germany, Italy , the invading 
arm ies of the Republic broke down the ghetto gates. Napoleon 
set up  a kind of com m unal self-government for the Jew s of 
the Em pire. In  Central Europe there was a  marked reaction 
after 1815, bu t the cause of toleration kept pace with th e  cause 
of constitutional governm ent, and the process of Jewish emanci-I 
pation was completed in Ita ly  in 1870 and in Germany in 1871. 1 
In  E ngland the pace was slower, because the old restrictions I 
were less severely felt. In  1890, when the last inequality in  form I 
was removed, there had  long been little inequality in  fact. I 
Disraeli, it is true, had  ceased in early life to profess the Jewish I 
faith ; bu t it was a  great event for Jew ry when he b e c a m e  Prime I 
M inister in  1868. In  1858 B aron Lionel de Rothschild, a pro-1 
fessing Jew , had  become a  Member of the House of Commons, I  
and in 1885 his son, Nathaniel, took his seat in the House of I  
Lords. How fully Jew s since then have shared in B ritish  life I  
is common knowledge. Jewish Cabinet Ministers, financiers,! 
industrialists, scientists, philosophers, authors—during the War I  
a divisional com m ander, and  after it a Chief Justice of England,! 
who became Viceroy of India , a  Governor-General of a I  
Dominion, and more than one Colonial Governor—it is evident! 
tha t in the British world (and much the same could b e  said of I  
France) the Jew s h ad  attained within the last h alf-cen tury  a I  
pre-eminence out of all proportion to their numbers. I
21. B ut Jew ry has been fated never to attain freed o m  and! 
security for all its people a t one time. In  reaction, perhaps, ■  
against their recovery in the W est, a new enemy appeared  a  I  
“  Anti-Semitism " —new because now, in the nineteenth century, ■  
the attack was not on grounds of creed but on grounds of race-B 
The m ovement began in Germany about 1880 a n d  spread ■  
through Central Europe. The Dreyfus Case was p ro o f  enough ■  
of the hold it obtained in France. And, meanwhile, it hadB
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r ev iv e d  and reinforced the old intolerance of Russia. From  1881 
o n w a rd s the plight of the Jew s in Russia was almost as bad  as 
it had been in W estern Europe a t the time of the Crusades. 
Their exclusion from  all Russia except Poland was the least 
of their misfortunes. A series of pogroms—massacres deliber­
ately in c i te d  by anti-Jewish fanatics and  acquiesced in, if not 
c o n n iv e d  at, by the Government—was initiated and  repeated 
from t im e  to time till as late as 1910. Tens of thousands of 
jews w e r e  m urdered. More were rendered homeless and 
destitute. Again, therefore, there was a mass-migration west­
wards. Between 1880 and 1910 a t least three million Jew s fled 
from E a s te r n  Europe. Many found refuge on British soil, in  
England, Canada, A ustralia, and South Africa; b u t the great 
majority made for the United States. In  1870 the num ber of 
American Jews w as roughly about a quarter of a  million; it is 
now a b o u t four and  a half million. Of the other twelve million 
Jews in  th e  world, some ten million are in Europe and of t h e s e  
about nine million are in Central and Eastern Europe.
4. Zionism.
22. W h ile  the Jew s had thus been dispersed over the world, 
they h a d  never forgotten Palestine. If Christians have become 
familiar through the Bible with the physiognomy of the country 
and its place-names and events th a t happened more than two 
thousand years ago, the link which binds the Jew s to Palestine 
and its past history is to them  fa r closer and more intim ate. 
Judaism and its ritual are rooted in those memories. Among 
countless illustrations it is enough to cite the fact that Jew s, 
wherever they m ay be, still p ray  for rain a t the season it is 
needed in  Palestine. And the same devotion to the L and of 
Israel, Eretz Israel, the same sense of exile from  it, permeates 
"ewish secular thought. Some of the finest Hebrew poetry 
written in  the Diaspora has been inspired like the Psalm s of the 
Captivity by the longing to retu rn  to Zion.
23. N o r has the link been merely spiritual or intellectual, 
ways o r almost always since the fall of the Jew ish State some 
ews h av e  been living in Palestine. U nder A rab rule there 
ere substantial Jew ish communities in  the chief towns. In  
e period of the Crusades and again in  the Mongol invasions 
ey were nearly but not entirely blotted out. U nder Ottoman 
'■e they  slowly recovered. Fresh im migrants arrived from 
~e to tim e , from Spain in the sixteenth century, from  E astern 
urope in  the seventeenth. They settled m ainly in  Galilee, in 
umerous villages spreading northw ards to the Lebanon and in 
e towns of Safad and Tiberias. Safad, which according to 
ewish tradition contained as m any as 15,000 Jew s in the six- 
eenth c e n tu ry , becam e a centre of Rabbinical learning and 
xercised a profound influence on Jewish thought throughout
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the D iaspora. There was no schism between those Jews in 
Galilee and the Moslem and Christian peasants amongst whom 
they lived. They spoke Arabic; except in their descent and 
their religion there was little to distinguish them from their 
neighbours; and they were equally exposed to the raids of 
m arauding tribesmen from the Lebanon or from across the 
Jo rdan . These inroads multiplied as public security deteriorated. 
Galilee steadily declined. A hundred years ago there were 
only some 4,000 Jews in Safad and some 3,000 in Tiberias. 
In  the whole of Palestine there were not more than 1 2 , 0 0 0  Jews 
in 1845. But, small though their num bers were, the continued 
existence of those Jew s in Palestine m eant much to all Jewry. 
Multitudes of poor and ignorant Jew s in the ghettos of Eastern 
Europe felt themselves represented, as it were, by this remnant 
of their race who were keeping a  foothold in the land against 
the day of the coming of the Messiah.
24. This belief in the divine promise of eventual re tu rn  to 
Palestine largely accounts for the steadfastness with w hich the 
Jew s of the D iaspora clung to their faith and endured persecu­
tion. The excitement caused throughout Jew ry by the occasional 
appearance of a “  false Messiah "  shows how real and strong 
it was. B ut am ong educated Jew s, a t any rate, a change set 
in with the nineteenth century. On the one hand, u n der the 
influence of “  modernism ” , the old prophecies to o k  on a 
symbolic rather than  a  concrete meaning. The Messianic re s to r­
ation would be a renascence of the Jew ish faith and its  spread 
am ong the Gentiles. The Temple would be rebuilt, bu t not 
with hands. On the other hand, the emancipation of the Jews 
in the western world seemed to remove the need for anything 
more than a spiritual home in Palestine. Jew s, it w a s  thought, 
would merge themselves in the life of the countries w here  they 
lived. In  all bu t faith and race they would become Englishmen, 
Frenchm en, Germans, Americans. And this process o f enfran­
chisement and assimilation, it was hoped, would p resen tly  be 
extended over Eastern Europe.
25. In  the second half of the century it became clear that the 
Jew ish problem was not to be solved so easily. The rise and 
spread of Anti-Semitism culminating in the Dreyfus Case and 
the Russian pogroms showed that even in the West the new 
status of the Jew s was not secure and that in the East their 
case was little better than  it had been in the Middle Ages. For 
the Jew s in Eastern Europe, then as now the great majonty 
of W orld Jew ry, the only hope of deliverance seemed again to 
lie in  physical escape, in large-scale emigration. The vast I 
m ajority of refugees, as has been seen, went westwards : but a I 
m inority followed the old call of their faith, and m ad e  their I 
w ay to Palestine. The movement originated in Russia, but I 
it was backed by W estern Jew ry. As early as i860 th e  Alliance I
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Israélite  Universelle was founded in France for the assistance 
of persecuted Jews and some years later it opened an agricultural 
school near Jaffa. A similar Anglo-Jewish Association was 
created  in 1871. B ut the most effective aid to the settlement 
of Jews in Palestine was rendered by the munificence of Baron 
Edmond de Rothschild, who between 1883 and 1900 m ade 
himself responsible for a  group of seven pioneer *' colonies "  
and established a fund for m aintaining and extending the process 
of colonization.
26. The result of this new movement was a substantial increase 
in the number of Jews in Palestine. In  1881 there were about 
25,000 of them : in 1914 there were over 80,000. The bulk of 
the immigrants settled in Jerusalem ,. H aifa, Jaffa and their 
suburbs: but nearly 12,000 of them  were on the land, distri­
buted among forty-three “  colonies ” . W hether urban  or 
agricultural, there was a difference between the newcomers and 
the old Jewish residents in Palestine—a difference which was to 
become more marked in later years. The old residents, especially 
in the “ holy cities ” in the hill-country—H ebron in the south, 
Safad and Tiberias in the north—had long adapted themselves 
to life among the Arabs. B ut the new immigrants brought with 
them a new idea. They were not going to merge themselves in 
the life of Palestine as they found it. They were going to 
make a distinct life of their own, to build up a Jewish society, 
and to make it the vehicle of a revival of Jew ish culture. This 
new idea was known as Zionism.
27. Zionism on its negative side is a  creed of escape, but not so 
much escape from the physical dangers as from the psychological 
drawbacks of Jewish life in the D iaspora. I t  appealed, indeed, 
with special force to em ancipated intellectual Jews in western 
countries where their life and liberty were perfectly secure. 
The origin of it was a  growing conviction that enfranchisement 
and assimilation would never solve the Jewish Problem . T hat 
twofold process had already provoked an alarming reaction ; 
and continental Anti-Semitism m ight conceivably spread across 
the Channel and over the Atlantic. But, quite apart from  that, 
ven in England or the United States, there were m any Jews, 
ough by no means all, who felt that, w hatever equality 
ere accorded them and however high they rose, they were 
°t in the fullest sense adm itted into the society in which they 
ved. A Jew remained somehow different and apart. However 
uch he might be liked and respected, he was always thought 
f and spoken of as a Jew . And, as long as the Jew s, instead 
f being completely absorbed in a larger community, rem ained 
distinct group within it, they would always be a  minority 
0UP- In that respect, even if all gentile nations became
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tolerant and friendly to the Jews, the world would still be one 
vast ghetto. And it was this minority-status, it seemed, which 
as much as their race and faith, m arked the Jew s off from  other 
men. All other civilized peoples had  a  homeland somewhere 
in  which they were the overwhelming m ajority, a c o u n try  they 
could call their own, a State which gave those of them w ho lived 
as a m inority in other States a more equal footing b eside  
citizens.
2 8 . Zionism had  also its positive side. E s c a p e  from 
"  m inority life ”  would give the Jew s a  chance to show  what 
they could do as Jew s, as a  Jewish community, as a  Jewish I 
nation. They h ad  once m ade histoiy. Given a land of their I 
own, they m ight m ake it again. A nd for most Zionists th a t land I 
could only be Palestine. T hat little country, it was tru e , could I 
not hold m ore than a  fraction of W orld Jew ry; but th ere  was I 
never any question of all the Jew s “  going home ” . E xtent oil 
territory was in those days a secondary consideration. The I 
psychological need would be m et, the inferiority of status! 
redressed, if the Jew s who did return to Palestine were enabled! 
to lead a national life, however small its scale. That national! 
life, it went without saying, was to be truly, intensely national.! 
Hence from  the very outset Zionism was associated with the! 
revival of Hebrew as a  spoken and popular language. A year I 
o r so before the W ar, when the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden, I 
a  similar society to those established in France and England,! 
pressed the claims of German as the language of instruction  io| 
its Palestinian schools, m ost of the teachers “  struck ", 
of the children were withdrawn, and new schools w e re  create 
of a purely Hebrew kind. From  the first, therefore, the difference 
between the new Jew ish community and  the old Jewish 
dents in Palestine was plain.
29. Zionism entered the field of practical politics when 
1897 Theodor H erzl, a  Viennese playwright and joum a" 
spurred to action by the Dreyfus Case, convened a  cong 
of W orld Jew ry a t Basle and founded the Zionist Organisation. 
As its first President he set himself to obtain a  charter for 
Jew ish colonization in Palestine from  the Sultan o f Turkey;! 
but, as the Turks had  already shown a m arked d islik e  of f“ 
increase in Jewish immigration since the early 'eighties, 
realized the necessity of obtaining the backing of a  powi 
E uropean Government, and for tha t he turned to E n g la n d , 
idea of re-establishing the Jew s in Palestine h a d  attracte 
more attention there than  elsewhere. As long ag o  as i&j 
Lord Shaftesbury had  proposed a scheme of Jewish colonizatioi 
under international guarantee as a means of utilizing t 
*' wealth and industry of the Jew ish people ”  for th e  econon 
development of a  backw ard area. George Eliot a n d  Laurencj 
O liphant had clearly stated and warmly advocated th e  Zion-
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ideal. Among English Jew s its most prom inent champions 
had b een  the young Disraeli and Sir Moses Montefiore. But 
the B ritish  Government was not in  a position to force Zionism 
on the Sultan; and, apart from the sending of an expedition to 
explore th e  part of Sinai which lay within the Egyptian frontier, 
no p ractica l advance was m ade till in 1903, a t the instance of 
Mr. Joseph Cham berlain, then a t the Colonial Office, the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, was authorized to offer the Zionists 
tract o f  country in the highlands of British E ast Africa for the 
c re a tio n  o f  a Jewish colony with full powers of local autonomy 
under th e  British Government’s “  general control I t  was
remarkable offer, and it tem pted m any Zionists. B ut the 
majority vehemently opposed it. To them  it was inconceivable 
that th e Jews could re-establish their national life in any 
other country than the old hom eland; and, assisted by a  not 
very f a v o u r a b le  report on the conditions in E ast Africa, they 
easily c a r r ie d  the day.
30. Thus it was still on Palestine and only on Palestine that 
the hopes of Zionism were fixed when the W orld W ar broke out 
and when the entry into it of the Turkish Em pire on the side 
of the Central Powers m ade it evident that, by  the end of the 
fighting, the control of Palestine and its destinies m ight have 
passed from Turkish into other hands.
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Persia up to  th e  Gulf o f Basra; on th e  south , b y  th e Indian Ocean L 
w ith  th e  exception  o f the position of A den to  remain as it jj l  
on th e  w est, b y  th e  R ed Sea, th e  M editerranean Sea up to Mersina "i
This claim, of course, went far beyond the already promised! 
independence of the A rabian Peninsula. I t  embraced almost! 
the whole A rab world in Asia. I t  was clearly inspired to nol 
slight extent by  the ideas of Syrian nationalism. S ir  Hemyl 
McMahon, in a  friendly and encouraging reply, d e c la r e d  that! 
the discussion of boundaries was prem ature.
5. A few weeks earlier the Allied cause had received a senousl 
set-back. On 10th August the British attack on Sari Bair from! 
Suvla B ay broke down. The fall of Constantinople seemedl 
indefinitely postponed. The risks to which the Arabs would bel 
exposed if they openly revolted were obviously increased.! 
There was consequently a change of tone in the Sherif’s second! 
letter to Sir H enry McMahon, written on the 9th September.
“ Y our E xcellency w ill pardon m e and perm it m e to  say clearly I 
th a t th e  coolness and hesitation  displayed in  th e  question of the limits!
and b o u n d a r ie s .........................m ight be taken to  infer an estrange-1
m ent or som ething of th a t so rt.”
About the same time as Sir H enry McMahon received this letterl 
he was also inform ed of conversations which had b e e n  carried I 
on with a  representative of the Syrian Nationalist Com m ittee! 
who m ade it clear th a t the A rabs’ choice between the Central! 
Powers and the Allies would be determined by the natu re  oil 
B ritish assurances as to their future independence. H e  asserted! 
th a t, while the A rabs w anted all the A rab countries to  be  freej 
they adm itted the existence of British interests in 'I r a q  
French interests on the Syrian coast. They would in s is t , how-| 
ever, on the independence of the Syrian interior—the district 
of Dam ascus, Aleppo, H am a, and Homs. Sir Henry McMahonl 
communicated this inform ation, together with the Sherif’s letter, f 
to  Sir Edw ard Grey a t the Foreign Office, and he was authorizedj 
to  reply to the Sherif on the lines he [Sir H enry McMahon] 
himself suggested. On the 24th October, accordingly, h e  wrote 
the following letter to the Sherif:—
" I  have received your letter [o f 9th Septem ber] w ith  much pleasure; I 
and your expressions of sincerity and friendliness have given ml 
th e  greatest satisfaction . I
" I  regret th a t you  should have received from  m y last letter the I 
im pression th a t I  regarded th e  question of th e  boundaries with cold-1 
ness and hesitation; such w as n ot th e  case, b u t i t  appeared to ml 
th e  m om ent had n ot arrived when th ey  could b e profitably discussed. I 
" I h ave realized, how ever, from your last letter, that you regaidl 
th is question as one of v ita l and urgent im portance. I  have thereto! 
lo st no tim e in  inform ing th e  G overnm ent o f Great B ritain of the I 
contents o f your letter; and it  is w ith  great pleasure th a t I coo-1  
m unicate to  you  on their behalf th e  follow ing statem ent which, I an I 
confident, you  w ill receive w ith  satisfaction :—  I
" The districts o f M ersina and A lexandretta and the portions cf| 
Syria ly in g  to the w est of the d is tr ic ts  of Damascus, H om s, Ham  m 
A leppo  cannot be said to  be purely Arab, and should be excluded
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from the proposed lim its and boundaries. W ith th e  above m odifica­
tion, and w ith ou t prejudice to  our existing treaties w ith  Arab chiefs 
we accept these lim its and boundaries, and in regard to those portions  
o f t h e  territories therein- in which G reat B rita in  is free to  ac t w ith o u t  
d e t r i m e n t  to  the in terests of her a lly , France, I  am  em powered in  th e  
name of th e  G overnm ent of G reat B ritain to  give th e follow ing assur­
ances and make th e  follow ing reply to  your letter : —
“ Subject to  th e  above m odifications, Great B ritain  is  prepared to  
recognize and support th e  independence of th e  Arabs w ith in  th e  terri­
tories included in  th e lim its and boundaries proposed b y  th e  Sherif 
of Mecca. Great B ritain  w ill guarantee th e  H oly  P laces against all 
external aggression and w ill recognize their inviolability .
“ When th e situation  adm its. Great B ritain  w ill give to  the Arabs 
her advice and w ill assist th em  to  establish  w hat m ay appear to  be  
the most suitable form s o f governm ent in those various territories.
“ On the other hand, i t  is understood th a t th e  Arabs h ave decided  
to seek the advice and guidance of Great B ritain  on ly , and th a t such  
European A dvisers and officials as m ay be required for th e  form ation  
of a sound form of adm inistration w ill b e B ritish.
“ W ith regard to  the v ila yets of B agdad and Basra, th e  A rabs w ill 
recognize th a t th e  established position and interests of Great B ritain  
necessitate special measures of adm inistrative control in order to  secure 
these te rrito ries from foreign aggression, to  prom ote th e  w elfare o f th e  
local population and to  safeguard our m utual econom ic interests.
“ I  am convinced th a t th is declaration w ill assure you  beyond all 
possible doubts o f the sym path y  of Great B ritain  tow ards th e  aspira­
tions of her traditional friends, th e Arabs, and w ill result in a  firm  
and lasting alliance, th e  im m ediate results of w hich w ill be th e  
expulsion of th e  Turks from  th e  Arab countries and th e  freeing of 
the Arab peoples from th e  Turkish yoke w hich, for so m any years, 
has pressed h eavily  upon them  . . .”
f the p a s sa g e s  we have italicized, the second is significant in 
M on to  the claim  which had been m ade by the French 
ovemment in March, 1915 to the ultim ate control of all Syria 
icluding Palestine. B ut it is the first passage on which the 
lbsequent controversy has centred.
6. The map inserted a t this page shows that under Turkish 
ole the territory under discussion was divided into three 
dministrative areas, the Vilayets of Aleppo, Syria, and  Beirut. 
Tie Vilayet of Syria extended southwards to include the area 
ow called T rans-Jordan. The Vilayet of B eirut extended 
onthwards to  within a short distance of Jaffa. The rest of 
’destine, including Jerusalem , was not included in any of the 
fflayets: it was an "  independent Sanjak
/■ The Arab case, which was fully stated in the evidence sub­
rotted to u s  by the A rab H igher Committee, has always been 
N  Palestine was included in the area in which Sir H enry 
M ahon promised th a t A rab independence would be recog- 
W . T he two m ain points are (1) that, since p a rt of the 
Mem boundary of the independent area proposed by  the 
r erif was the M editerranean, the exclusion of the whole of the 
Mediterranean coast from  th a t area could not have been
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intended, and (2) tha t Damascus was the most southerly pomt 1 
mentioned and  tha t Palestine could not be regarded as lying tn I 
the west of it. " 1
8. W e have not considered tha t our terms of reference 
required us to undertake the detailed and lengthy research 
am ong the documents of 20 years ago which would b e  needed 
for a full re-exam ination of this issue. W e think it sufficient for 
the purposes of this R eport to state that the British Government 
have never accepted the A rab case. W hen it was f ir s t  formally 
presented by  the A rab Delegation in London in 1922, th e  Secre­
ta ry  of State for the Colonies (Mr. Churchill) rep lied  as| 
follows :—
“ T hat letter [Sir H . M cMahon’s  letter of th e  24th October, 1915]! 
is quoted as conveying th e  promise to  th e Sherif o f Mecca to recognize I 
and support th e  independence of th e Arabs w ithin the territories I 
proposed b y  h im . B u t th is promise w as given subject to a reserva-l 
tion  m ade in  th e  sam e letter, w hich excluded from its  scope, among! 
other territories, th e  portions of Syria ly in g  to  th e w est of the dis-| 
tr ict of D am ascus. T his reservation has alw ays been regarded by His| 
M ajesty’s G overnm ent as covering the v ila y et of Beirut and the| 
independent Sanjak o f Jerusalem . The w hole of Palestine west 
th e  Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H . McMahon’s pledge."
9. I t  was in the highest degree unfortunate that, in  the! 
exigencies of w ar, the British Government was unable to  make| 
their intention clear to the Sherif. Palestine, it will h a v e  
noticed, was not expressly mentioned in Sir H enry McMahon's! 
letter of the 24th October, 1915. Nor was any later reference! 
m ade to it. In  the further correspondence between Sir Henry! 
McMahon and the Sherif the only areas relevant to the present! 
discussion which were mentioned were the Vilayets of Aleppo! 
and Beirut. The Sherif asserted th a t these Vilayets w e re  purelyf 
A rab; and, when Sir H enry McMahon pointed out that FrencM 
interests were involved, he replied tha t, while he did n o t recedej 
from  his full claims in the north , he did not wish to in ju re  " 
alliance between B ritain and France and would not a sk  “ foij 
w hat we now leave to France in Beirut and its co as ts  ” 
after the W ar. There was no more bargaining over boundaries! 
I t  only rem ained for the British Government to sup p ly  thej 
Sherif with the m onthly subsidy in gold and the rifles, ammuj 
nition and foodstuffs he required for launching and sustaining] 
the revolt.
xo. Meantime the French interest in Syria had been 
affirmed. In  N ovem ber, 1915, shortly after Sir Henry McMahod 
had given his “  pledge ”  to the Sherif, Sir Edw ard G rey  gavj 
instructions tha t negotiations should be opened in L o n d o n  wmr 
M. Georges Picot, representing the French G o v e rn m e n t, with 
a  view to reconciling British, French and  Arab c la im s in th| 
Syrian area. M. Picot insisted a t the outset tha t the whole 01
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Syria down to the E gyptian frontier m ust be assigned to France. 
After consultation with his Governm ent he agreed to the Syrian 
in te rio r being adm inistered by  Arabs under French influence. 
F u r th e r  negotiations were carried on by M. Picot and Sir Mark 
Sykes, who consulted the Russian Government. Finally, in 
Kay, iyi6, an agreem ent was concluded, commonly known as 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Arab area north 
of th e  Arabian Peninsula in the following m anner:—
(1) A coastal belt from a little north of H aifa to a little 
West of Mersina was to be controlled by France.
(2) Southern ‘Iraq , from  the Persian Gulf to a little north 
of Baghdad, together w ith a small enclave round H aifa, 
was to be controlled by Britain.
(3) “ W ith a  view to securing the religious interests of 
the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the H oly Places, is to 
be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a  
special regime to be determ ined by  agreem ent between 
Russia, France and Great B rita in ."
(4) The rest of the territory under discussion was left to 
“ the Arab State o r Confederation of States ” . In  the 
Syrian interior such advice and adm inistrative assistance 
as were wanted by the A rabs would be supplied by France, 
in northern ‘Iraq  and the country east of the Jo rdan  by 
Britain.
11. T h is  agreement was kept secret till in Novem ber, 1917, 
the R ussian  Bolshevik Government published a copy of it, found 
in the archives of the Foreign Office a t Petrograd. I t  was 
thus in ignorance of any other com pact than the “  McMahon 
Pledge ” that in June, 1916, the Sherif declared w ar against 
e Turks. The story of the Arab Revolt is too fam iliar from 
e fame and writings of T. E . Lawrence to need re-telling. Its 
in features m ay be sum m arized as follows. By the end of 
916 the Arabs of the H edjaz had easily overcome the isolated 
urkish posts in the south of their country, bu t they were unable 
dislodge the garrison a t Medina, which was linked by the 
edjaz railway with the m ain Turkish forces in the N orth, 
uring 1917 the Turkish posts along the line were continually 
ded an d  stretches of the railway repeatedly destroyed. W hen 
British army invaded Palestine in the autum n of 1917, the 
bs, a  few thousand of whom had been trained as a regular 
wee, operated beyond the Jo rdan  on the outer flank of the 
ivance. Their co-operation was unquestionably a factor in 
e success of the cam paign which culm inated in the capture of 
erusalem on the gth December, 1917, and in the final expulsion 
the Turkish forces from Palestine in the following autum n. 
e open revolt of the Sherif, m oreover, had a m arked effect 
a the wavering sym pathies of other Arab tribes than those of 
e Hedjaz.
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accept a  scheme on those lines; but, before the concessions were 
finally confirmed in Constantinople, Palestine was in General 
A llenby's hands.
19. The fact tha t the B alfour Declaration was issued in 1917 
in order to enlist Jew ish support for the Allies and the fact that 
this support was forthcoming are not sufficiently appreciated in 
Palestine. The A rabs do not appear to realize in the first place 
th a t the present position of the A rab world as a  whole is mainly 
due to the great sacrifices m ade by the Allied and Associated 
Powers in the W ar and, secondly, tha t, in so fa r as the Balfour 
Declaration helped to bring about the Allies' victory, it helped to 
bring about the em ancipation of all the A rab countries from 
Turkish rule. If  the Turks and their German allies had won the 
W ar, it is im probable that all the A rab countries, except 
Palestine, would now have become or be about to become 
independent States.
20. W e m ust now consider w hat the Balfour D eclaration  
m eant. We have been perm itted to examine the re c o rd s  which 
bear upon the question and it is clear to us that the w o rd s  "  the 
establishm ent in Palestine of a N ational Home "  were the 
outcome of a compromise between those Ministers w ho  con­
tem plated the ultim ate establishment of a Jewish State and 
those who did not. I t is obvious in any case tha t His M ajesty's 
Governm ent could not commit itself to the establishment of a 
Jew ish State. I t  could only undertake to facilitate the growth 
of a Home. I t  would depend m ainly on the zeal and enterprise 
of the Jew s whether the Home would grow big enough  to 
become a State. Mr. Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister 
a t the time, inform ed us in evidence th a t:—
" T he idea w as, and th is w as th e  interpretation put upon it at the 
tim e, th a t a  Jew ish S tate w as n ot to  be se t up im mediately by the 
P eace T reaty  w ith ou t reference to th e w ishes o f the majority of the > 
inhabitants. On the other hand, it  was contem plated that when the 
tim e arrived for according representative institutions to  Palestine, if 
th e  Jews had m eanw hile responded to  th e opportunity afforded them 
b y th e idea of a national hom e and had becom e a definite majority 
of the inhabitants, th en  P alestine would thus become a Jewish 
C om m onw ealth. ’ ’
21. Thus His M ajesty’s Governm ent evidently realized that a 
Jew ish State m ight in course of time be established, b u t  it was I 
not in a position to say tha t this would happen, still less to bring I 
it about of its own motion. The Zionist leaders, for th e ir  part, I 
recognised that an ultim ate Jew ish State was not precluded by the I 
term s of the D eclaration, and so it was understood elsewhere. I 
"  I  am  persuaded " ,  said President Wilson on the 3rd March, I 
1919, “ that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our I 
own Governm ent and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall I 
be laid the foundations of a  Jew ish Commonwealth ” . General I
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Smuts, who had been a  m em ber of the Im perial W ar Cabinet 
when th e  Declaration was published, speaking a t Johannesburg 
on th e 3rd November, 1919, foretold an  increasing stream  of 
Jewish immigration into Palestine and “  in generations to come 
a great Jewish State rising there once m o r e  ” . Lord Robert 
Cecil in  1917, Sir H erbert Samuel in 1919, and Mr. W inston 
Churchill in 1920 spoke or wrote in term s that could only mean 
that th e y  contemplated the eventual establishment of a Jewish 
State. Leading British newspapers were equally explicit in 
their comments on the Declaration.
22. It remains to describe the reaction of the Balfour D eclara­
tion on Arab opinion.
Most of the A rab parts of the Turkish Em pire, including 
'Iraq, Syria and Palestine were in British m ilitary occupation 
when fighting w ith the Turks was ended by the Armistice of 
the 30th October, 1918 : and  the Arabs had  been encouraged 
to hope that victory would m ean the full realization of their 
independence. A lready, in the previous January , one of the 
" fourteen points ”  laid down by  President W ilson as the basis 
of peace, and one which the Allied Powers had  accepted without 
reservation, included the following words :—
“ The Turkish portions o f th e present Ottom an Em pire should be 
assured a secure sovereignty, b u t th e other nationalities w hich are 
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of 
life and an absolutely unm olested opportunity of autonom ous 
development.”
23. On the 7th November the British and French Governments 
issued a joint D eclaration of which the essential passages were 
as follows : —
“ The object aim ed a t b y  France and Great B ritain in  prosecuting  
in the E ast th e war le t  loose b y  German am bition is th e  com plete and  
definite em ancipation of the peoples so long oppressed b y  th e  Turks, 
and the establishm ent of N ation al G overnm ents and adm inistrations 
deriving their authority  from th e  in itia tive and free choice of the  
indigenous populations.
" In order to  carry out th ese intentions France and Great B ritain  
are at one in encouraging and assisting th e  establishm ent of indigenous 
Governments and adm inistrations in Syria and M esopotam ia, now  
liberated b y th e  A llies, and in territories th e  liberation o f w hich th ey  
are engaged in securing, and in recognizing these as soon as th ey  are 
established. F ar from w ishing to  im pose on th e  populations of these  
regions any particular institutions, th ey  are only concerned to  secure b y  
their support and b y  adequate assistance th e  regular working of 
Governments and adm inistrations freely chosen b y  th e  populations 
themselves. ’ ’
Since the Arabs had  always regarded Palestine as included in 
Syria, this announcement seemed to promise all they w anted; 
and their disappointment was the greater when they learned 
jhat the victorious Powers proposed not only to separate 
Palestine from Syria bu t to place it under a special form of
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governm ent in  o rder to im plem ent the policy of the Balfour 
Declaration. B y the Sherif Hussein and his son, the Emir 
Feisal, who had  led the A rabs of the H edjaz in the W a r, this 
policy was regarded as a breach of the “  McMahon P ledge  ” , 
the only compact of which they had hitherto known. And, 
even if they had interpreted the Pledge as meaning that Palestine 
would not be independent bu t reserved for French o r  British 
or international control, they could not have foreseen th a t  such 
control m ight cover the establishm ent of a  Jewish National 
Home.
24. Palestine, however, was a relatively small slice of terri­
tory and, as m atters stood a t the end of 1918, the S h e rif  and 
his family had gone far to realize their ambitions. T h e  whole 
of the Arab world had been freed from Turkish despotism. The 
prestige of the O ttom an Caliph had been dimmed, w hile  the 
Sherif of Mecca had been proclaim ed King of the Hedjaz, which 
was recognized as a Sovereign State and was a b o u t  to  take 
part, with the E m ir Feisal as its chief representative, in the 
Peace Conference a t Paris. Northw ards the future m igh t be 
still uncertain, bu t the A rab position at the moment was de facto 
a  strong one. The Em ir Feisal had ridden into D a m a sc u s  at j 
the head of the A rab horsemen in the first week of O c to b e r  and, 
with General A llenby’s permission, had hoisted the A ra b  flag.
25. W hen, therefore, the Em ir Feisal came to L o n d o n  and 
Paris he was persuaded not merely to accept b u t to 
welcome the policy of the B alfour Declaration. At h is  camp 
east of the Jo rdan  in the previous summer he had m e t Dr. 
Chaim W eizmann, who had  done great service by his chemical 
discoveries to the Allied cause in the W ar and had taken a lead­
ing part in the Zionist movement and the discussion of the 
Balfour Declaration. H e had been able to convince th e  Emir 
of the benefits which the Jewish N ational Home would bring  to I 
Palestine as a whole; and a m em orandum  which th e  Emirj 
presented a t the Paris Conference was highly conciliatory:—
" In P alestine th e  enorm ous m ajority of th e people are Arabs. Thel 
Jew s are very close to  th e Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of I 
character betw een the tw o races. In  principles we are absolutely at I 
one. N evertheless, th e  Arabs cannot risk assum ing the responsibility! 
of holding level th e scales in th e  clash of races and religions tha t have,! 
in th is one province, so often  in volved  the world in  difficulties. They I 
would w ish for th e eSective super-position of a great trustee, so long! 
as a representative local adm inistration com m ended itself by actively! 
prom oting th e m aterial prosperity o f th e  cou n try .”
Still weightier evidence of good understanding was th e  agree-l 
m ent which was signed on the 3rd Jan u ary , 1919, b y  the Emirl 
Feisal, "  representing and acting on behalf of the A ra b  KingT 
dom of H edjaz ” , and Dr. W eizmann, “  representing a n d  acting 
on behalf of the Zionist Organisation ” . I t  pledged the  partie.1.
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to cordial co-operation between "  the A rab State and Pales­
tine  ", to the acceptance of the Balfour D eclaration, and to the 
encouragement of the immigration of Jew s into Palestine on a 
la rg e  scale and their rapid settlement on the land. The Em ir 
a d d e d  a note of reservation to this Agreement to the effect that 
its execution was dependent on the fulfilment of the claims for 
A ra b  independence which he submitted to the Peace Conference.
" If changes are m ade, I  cannot be answerable for failing to  carry 
out this agreem ent.”
26. The Em ir Feisal, in concluding this agreement in his 
father's name, was not, it is true, directly representing the Arabs 
of Palestine; bu t the Arabs, as has just been pointed out, 
regarded Syria as one country, and in Syria the E m ir’s leader­
ship h a d  been accepted. If  his hopes, indeed, had  been ful­
filled, th e  development of the situation in Palestine might have 
been fa r  more peaceful than it has been. As it was, the Agree­
ment marks the one brief mom ent in the whole story at which a 
genuine harm ony was established between Arab and Jewish 
sta tesm an sh ip . If K ing Hussein and the Em ir Feisal secured 
their b ig  Arab State, they would concede little Palestine to the 
Jews.
27. Eighteen months later, on the 12th July , 1920, Lord 
Balfour in an often-quoted speech reiterated the idea of a com­
promise on that sort of basis. Referring to the difficulties in the 
path of Zionism, he said: —
" Among these difficulties I  am  not sure th a t I  do n ot rate highest, 
or a t all events first, th e  inevitable difficulty of dealing w ith  th e  Arab 
question as i t  presents itself w ithin th e  lim its of Palestine. I t  w ill 
require tact, i t  w ill require judgm ent, it  w ill require above all 
sympathetic good w ill on  th e  part both  o f Jew and Arab. So far 
as the Arabs are concerned— a great, an  interesting and an attractive  
race—I hope th e y  w ill rem em ber th a t . . . the Great Pow ers, and  
j among all th e Great Powers m ost especially  Great B ritain , has freed
1 them, the Arab race, from th e tyranny of their brutal conqueror,
j; who had k ept th em  under h is heel for these m any centuries. I  hope
; they will rem em ber th a t it  is we w ho have established the independent
I Arab sovereignty of th e  H edjaz. I  hope th ey  w ill rem em ber th a t
|: it is we w ho desire in  M esopotam ia to  prepare th e w ay for the future
1; of a self-governing, autonom ous Arab State. And I hope th at,
I remembering all th at, th ey  w ill n o t grudge th a t sm all notch— for it
is no more geographically, w hatever it  m ay be h istorically— th at sm all 
I notch in w hat are now Arab territories being given to  th e  people w ho
I for all these hundreds of years h ave been separated from  i t .”
I 28. Lord Balfour did not mention Syria. At the time of his 
I speech the chance of an agreed settlement based on the co-opera- 
Ition of King Hussein and the Em ir Feisal was being nullified by 
I  the policy of the French Government, which had never been 
I  bound by the “  McMahon Pledge ” , and was vehemently 
I  opposed to the establishment of an A rab State under the Em ir 
I  Feisal's control a t Damascus. The Em ir for his part, backed by
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strong popular feeling in Syria, had  determined to resist the 
claims of France. In  March, 1920, he had been proclaimed 
King of Syria and Palestine by a congress of Syrian notables. By 
the end of August Damascus had been occupied by a French 
arm y, and  the Em ir expelled from Syria. A year later he was 
m ade King of 'Iraq , and in the meantime his brother, Abdullah, 
had become Em ir of the p art of historic Palestine east of the 
Jo rdan  which was allotted under the nam e of Trans-J o rd a n  to 
the area of Arab independence, in accordance with the 
"  McMahon Pledge ” . Thus, in the end, the royal fam ily  0 
the H edjaz had not fared ill; bu t such hope as there h a d  been 
of settling the problem  of Palestine by  consent was d e a d .  The 
Feisal-W eizmann Agreement could not operate : the condition 
attached to it had  not been fulfilled. So the old hostility of the 
Syrian Arabs to the division of the country and the execution 
of the Balfour D eclaration flared up again. In  1920 a n d  again 
in 1921, as will be recorded in the next chapter, violent Arab 
outbreaks against the Jew s occurred in Palestine. The conflict 
between A rab and Jewish nationalism had begun.
3. The Period of Delay.
29. Meantime the “  special regime ”  under which Palestine 
was to be governed had not yet taken precise and leg a l form. 
On the 30th January , 1919, the Supreme Council of th e  Peace 
Conference had decided th a t the conquered Arab provinces 
were not to be restored to Turkish rule. On the 3rd February 
the Zionist Organisation presented a draft resolution embody­
ing its scheme for the execution of the Balfour Declaration. 
On the 27th F ebruary  its leaders appeared before the Supreme 
Council and explained the scheme. A more d e ta i le d  plan, 
dated the 28th March, was drafted by  Mr. Felix Frankfurter, 
an em inent American Zionist. From  these and other docu­
ments and records it is clear that the Zionist project h a d  already 
in those early days assumed something like the s h a p e  of the 
M andate as we know it. The right of the Jews on  historic 
grounds to re-establish their N ational Home in P a le s tin e  was 
affirmed. Jewish im m igration and close settlement on the land 
were to be promoted. A body representing the Jews of Palestine 
and the world at large should co-operate w ith the Mandatory. 
Jewish education should be in Jewish hands. L o ca l self- 
governm ent should be encouraged.
30. I t  was never doubted that the experiment would have to 
be controlled by  one of the G reat Powers ; and to that end it 
was agreed, in accordance with the Em ir Feisal’s notion of a 
“  great trustee ”  and with Zionist wishes, th a t Palestine shouK 
have its place in the new M andate System which was one 0 
the most striking features in the Covenant of the League ot
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Nations. The principles of it were formulated in Article 22, 
which reads as follows: —
“ To those colonies and territories, w hich as a consequence of the  
late war have ceased to  be under th e  sovereignty of th e  S tates which  
formerly governed th em , and w hich are inhabited b y  peoples not 
yet able to  stand b y  them selves under th e  strenuous conditions of 
the modem world, there should be applied th e principle th a t th e  w ell­
being and developm ent of such peoples form a sacred trust o f civilisa­
tion, and th a t securities for the perform ance o f th is tru st should be 
embodied in  th is Covenant.
" The best m ethod of g iv ing practical effect to  th is  principle is 
that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to  advanced  
nations who, b y  reason of their resources, their experience, or their 
geographical position, can b est undertake th is responsibility, and w ho 
are willing to accept it , and th a t th is tu telage should be exercised  
by them as M andatories on  behalf of th e  League.
“ The character o f th e  M andate m ust differ according to  the stage  
of the developm ent o f th e  people, th e geographical situation  of th e  
territory, its econom ic conditions and other sim ilar circum stances.
“ Certain com m unities form erly belonging to  the Turkish Em pire 
have reached a stage of developm ent where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to  th e  
rendering of adm inistrative advice and assistance b y  a M andatory 
until such tim e as th ey  are able to  stand alone. The w ishes o f these  
communities m ust be a principal consideration in  th e selection of th e  
Mandatory.
" Other peoples, especially  those of Central Africa, are a t such a 
stage that the M andatory m ust be responsible for th e adm inistration  
of the territory under conditions w hich will guarantee freedom of 
conscience and religion, subject on ly  to  th e m aintenance of public order 
and morals, th e  prohibition o f abuses such as th e slave trade, th e  
arms traffic and th e liquor traffic, and the prevention o f th e establish­
ment of fortifications or m ilitary and naval bases, and of m ilitary  
training of the n atives for other than  police purposes and th e defence 
of territory, and w ill also secure equal opportunities for th e trade and  
commerce of other M embers of th e  League.
" There are territories, such as South-W est Africa and certain of 
the South Pacific Islands, w hich, ow ing to  th e sparseness o f their  
population, or their sm all size, or their rem oteness from  the centres 
of civilisation, or their geographical contigu ity  to  th e  territory of 
the Mandatory, and other circum stances, can be best adm inistered  
under the law s of the M andatory as integral portions o f its territory, 
subject to  the safeguards above m entioned in th e  interests of th e  
indigenous population.
" In every case o f M andate, th e  M andatory shall render to  th e  
Council an annual report in  reference to  th e  territory com m itted to  
its charge.
“ The degree o f authority, control, or adm inistration to  be exercised  
by the M andatory shall, if  not previously agreed upon b y  th e  
Members of th e League, be exp licitly  defined in  each case b y  th e  
Council.
" A perm anent Commission shall be constituted  to  receive and  
examine the annual reports o f th e M andatories and to  advise th e  
Council on all m atters relating to  th e  observance of the M andates.”
31- The Treaty of Versailles and  the Covenant were signed 
n the 28th June, 1919; bu t progress in settling the affairs of 
destine was checked, partly  by the opposition of influential
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non-Zionist Jew s in England and France to the policy of the 
Balfour D eclaration, bu t m ainly by  international com plications 
and especially the obstacle created by events in Syria to  easy 
co-operation between the French and British Governments. 
One vital point, however, was settled, namely, who was to 
be the M andatory. The fourth paragraph of Article 22 of the 
Covenant prescribed tha t, for “  certain communities formerly 
belonging to the Turkish Em pire ” , “  the wishes of th ese  com­
munities m ust be a principal consideration in the se lec tion  of 
the M andatory and President Wilson pressed for the dispatch 
of an inter-Allied Commission to Syria and Palestine to  discover 
the wishes of their peoples. This project failing, h e  sen t an 
unofficial American Commission, which toured both countries 
in June and Ju ly , 1919, and privately reported that th e  Arabs 
w anted complete independence for a united Syria and Palestine, 
but, if supervision were necessary, their first choice w as the 
U nited States, their second G reat B ritain. The Z io n is ts  had 
m ade their wishes known a t an earlier stage. On th e  18th 
December, 1918, the American Jewish Congress had adopted 
a resolution asking for “  the trusteeship of Great B rita in  ", 
and the same request was m ade in the scheme s u b m itte d  by I 
the Zionist Organisation to the Supreme Council on th e  3rd | 
F ebruary , 1919:—
“  T he selection  of Great B ritain as M andatory is urged on the I 
ground th a t th is is th e w ish o f the Jew s of the world, and the League [ 
of N ations in selecting a M andatory w ill follow , as far as p 
th e  popular w ish o f th e  people concerned.”
32. Though the acceptance of this request would g re a t ly  alter 
the situation in the Eastern M editerranean as c o n te m p la te d  in 
the Sykes-Picot Arrangem ent, the French G overnm ent 
acquiesced, and on the 25th April, 1920, the Supreme Council 
a t San Remo allotted the M andate for Syria to France a n d  the 
Mandates for Mesopotamia (‘Iraq) and  Palestine to Great 
B ritain, who was to be responsible for giving effect to the J 
Balfour Declaration.
33. The next step was the signature on the 10th A ugust of 
the T reaty of Sèvres. I t  confirmed the de facto excision of the 
Turkish Provinces from the Turkish Em pire ; but a s  to  their 
future governm ent it differentiated between Syria a n d  'Iraq 
on the one hand and Palestine on the other. In  A rtic le  94 the 
two form er territories were to be provisionally re co g n ize d  “  in 
accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22 ” of the 
Covenant “ as independent States subject to the rendering  of 
adm inistrative advice and assistance by  a M andatory u ntil such 
tim e as they are able to stand alone ” . In  Article 95 it wasj 
agreed “ to entrust, by  application of the p rov isions off 
Article 22, the adm inistration of Palestine ”  to a Mandatory,] 
who would be “  responsible for putting into effect th e  declara­
tion originally m ade on November 2, 1917, by th e  B n h
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Government, and adopted by  the other Allied Powers " ,  and 
there followed the full text of the Balfour Declaration. This 
Treaty was never ratified. I t  was superseded in Ju ly , 1923, 
by the Treaty of Lausanne, which om itted all reference to the 
Mandates.
3 4 . Nearly two years elapsed after the signature of the Treaty 
of Sèvres before the draft of the Palestine M andate was sub­
mitted to the Council of the League. This time the delay was 
largely due to the intervention of the United States Govern­
ment. In a note of the 20th November, 1920, it claimed that 
the participation of the U nited States in the W ar entitled it to 
be consulted as to the terms of the Mandates. The British 
Government a t once agreed. The draft of the Palestine 
Mandate, together with those of the other British Mandates, 
was submitted to the United States Government, and at its 
request certain minor alterations were made in it. The main 
point under discussion was economic. W hereas with regard 
to all other Mandates the U nited States Government insisted on 
the application of the principle of equal economic opportunity 
for all States Members of the League and the United States, 
it waived this claim with regard to Palestine in recognition of 
its “ special situation ”  and the interests of the Jewish National 
Home. In thus showing its sym pathy with Zionist aspirations 
the Government reflected the opinion of the Legislature. On 
the 30th June, 1922, the following joint resolution was adopted 
by Congress:—
" Favoring th e  establishm ent in  Palestine of a national hom e for 
the Jewish people.
" Resolved b y  the Senate and  House of R epresen ta tives  of the 
United S tates of America in Congress assembled, T hat the U nited  
States of America favors the establishm ent in Palestine of a national 1 
home for th e Jewish people, it  being clearly understood th a t nothing  
shall be done w hich m ay prejudice th e civ il and religious rights of 
Christian and all- other non-Jew ish com m unities in P alestine, and  
that the ho ly  places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine  
shall be adequately protected ."
35. Agreement having been reached as to the term s of the 
Mandate, negotiations were opened for the conclusion of a 
treaty safeguarding American interests in Palestine for the 
future. The outcome was a “  Convention between the U nited 
Kingdom and the United States of America respecting the Rights 
of the Governments of the two Countries and their respective 
Nationals in Palestine ” , which was signed on the 3rd December,
11924, and ratified in due course*.
I 36. This Convention recites the whole text of the Palestine 
I Mandate, including the pream ble. Most of the eight articles of
I tile Convention are concerned with the rights of American
* Cmd. 2559.
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nationals, property and institutions in Palestine. Only three 
need be quoted here : —
A rticle  1.
" Subject to  the provisions of th e  present convention the United 
S tates consents to  th e  adm inistration of Palestine by  His Britannic 
M ajesty, pursuant to  th e m andate recited above.
A rticle  2.
*' The U nited  S tates and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the 
rights and benefits secured under th e term s of th e  mandate to 
mem bers of th e  League of N ations and their nationals, notwithstanding 
th e  fact th at th e  U nited  States is n ot a  mem ber of the League of 
N ations.
A rticle  7.
‘ ‘ N oth ing contained in th e  present convention shall be affected by 
a n y  m odification w hich m ay be m ade in  th e term s of the mandate, 
as recited above, unless such m odification shall have been assented 
to  b y th e  U nited  S ta tes.”
37. Meanwhile, on the 24th Ju ly , 1922, the draft M a n d a te  for 
Palestine had  been confirmed by  the Council of the League. 
Between tha t event and the issue of the Balfour Declaration 
nearly five years had  passed, and in thàt long interval one 
aspect of the question, somewhat neglected a t the outset, hat 
come to the front. The Balfour Declaration had recognize 
that the establishment of the Jewish N ational Home must no 
prejudice the rights of the existing population of P a le s tin e ;  bu 
little seems to have been known a t that time about the size ant 
character of tha t population. The Declaration spoke only of 
“  existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine ” , a  phrase 
which suggested that there were a num ber of groups, such as 
Moslem A rabs, Christian A rabs, Armenians and other lesser 
communities, which were more or less on the same fo o tin g . By 
1922, however, it was clear that the param ount c o m m u n ity  in 
Palestine was the A rab community, over half a million in  num­
ber and all A rab in speech and A rab in their national aspira­
tions. I t  was clear also, as will be seen, that the leaders of 
this community were vehem ently opposed to the Z io n is t policy 
and could incite the rank and file of their people to  murderous 
attacks upon the Jews. In  F ebruary , 1922, a de legation  of 
Arab leaders inform ed the Colonial Office tha t “  the people of 
Palestine ”  could not accept the Balfour Declaration or the 
M andate and dem anded their national independence.
38. In  those circumstances the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Mr. W inston Churchill, published in June, 1922, a 
statement of “  British Policy in Palestine I t  in c lu d e d  the 
following interpretation of the Balfour Declaration: —
“ So far as the Jew ish population o f P alestine are concerned, it 
appears th a t som e am ong them  are apprehensive th a t His Majesty's 
G overnm ent m ay depart from  th e  policy em bodied in  the Declaration 
of 1917. I t  is necessary, therefore, once more to  affirm that these 
fears are unfounded, and th a t th a t D eclaration, re-affirmed by the 
Conference o f th e Principal A llied Powers a t San Remo and again 
in  the T reaty o f Sèvres, is n ot susceptible of change.
* Printed in  Cmd. 1700 (pages 17-21), also in  Cmd. 3530 (Appendix V).
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" During th e  last tw o  or three generations th e  Jew s have recreated  
in Palestine a  com m unity, now num bering 80,000, of w hom  about 
one-fourth are farmers or workers upon th e  land. T his com m unity  
has its own political organs; an elected assem bly for th e  direction of 
its domestic concerns; elected  councils in  th e tow ns; and an organisa­
tion for th e control o f its schools. I t  has its  elected  Chief R abbinate  
and Rabbinical Council for th e  direction of its  religious affairs.* Its  
business is conducted in H ebrew  as a vernacular language, and a  
Hebrew Press serves its  needs. I t  has its  d istinctive intellectual life  
and displays considerable econom ic activ ity . T his com m unity, th en , 
with its  tow n and country population, its political, religious and  
social organizations, its  ow n language, its  own custom s, its own life, 
has in fact ‘ national ' characteristics. W hen it  is asked w hat is  
meant b y  th e developm ent o f th e  Jew ish N ational H om e in  P alestin e, 
it may be answered th a t it  is  not th e  im position o f a Jew ish  
nationality upon th e  inhabitants of P alestine as a  w hole, b u t th e  
further developm ent o f th e  existing Jew ish com m unity, w ith  th e  
assistance of Jew s in  other parts of the world, in  order th a t  it  m a y  
become a centre in w hich th e  Jew ish people as a w hole m ay ta k e , 
on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. B u t in- 
order th a t th is com m unity should have th e b est prospect of free 
development and provide a fu ll opportunity for th e Jew ish people to- 
display its  capacities, it  is  essential th a t it  should know  th a t i t  is 
in Palestine as of r igh t and not on  sufferance. T h at is th e  reason  
why it  is necessary th a t th e  existence o f a Jew ish N ational H om e 
in Palestine should b e in ternationally  guaranteed, and th a t i t  should! 
be formally recognized to  rest upon ancient historic connection ,
" This, then , is th e  interpretation w hich H is M ajesty’s Govern­
ment place upon th e  D eclaration of 1917, and, so understood, th e  
Secretary of S tate is o f opinion th a t i t  does n o t contain or im ply  
anything w hich need cause either alarm to  th e  Arab population  of 
Palestine or disappointm ent to  th e  Jew s.”
39. This definition of the N ational Home has sometimes been 
taken to preclude the establishment of a Jew ish State. B ut, 
though the phraseology was clearly intended to conciliate, as 
far as might be, A rab antagonism  to the N ational Home, there 
is nothing in it to prohibit the ultim ate establishment of a  Jewish 
State, and Mr. Churchill himself has told us in evidence that 
no such prohibition was intended. This view was naturally  
shared by the Zionist Organisation, whose Executive, after ex­
amining the Statem ent of Policy, declared th a t “  the activities 
of the Zionist Organisation will be conducted in conformity with 
he policy therein set'forth  ” . One reason why no public allu­
sion to a State was m ade in 1922 was the same reason why no 
such allusion had been m ade in 1917. The N ational Home was 
still no more than an experiment. Some 16,000 Jew s had entered 
Palestine in 1920 and 1921. The A rab population was about
100,000. I t  would be a very long time, it seemed, before the 
Jews could become a m ajority  in the country. Indeed, as late 
as 1926, a leading Zionist stated that there was “  still little 
’respect of the A rabs being overtaken in a numerical sense 
within a measurable period of time I t  was not till the great
*Mr. L. Stein, in  S u rvey  of In ternational Affairs, ig2fj, (Oxford, 1927).
• I’ P- 392, note 2.
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rise in the volume of Jew ish im migration in the last few years 
th a t the prospect of a  Jew ish State came within the horizon. In 
1922 it lay far beyond it.
4. The Mandate.
40. W e need only cite here the text of the Preamble of the 
M andate and of those Articles which have a direct bearing on our 
inquiry. The text of the rem aining Articles is given in 
Appendix I a t the end of this Report.
P ream ble .
T he Council of th e  L eague o f N ations :
W hereas the Principal A llied Pow ers have agreed, for the purpose 
of giving effect to  th e  provisions of A rticle 22 of th e  Covenant of the 
L eague of N ations, to  entrust to  a M andatory selected by the said 
Pow ers th e  adm inistration of th e  territory o f P alestine, which formerly 
belonged to  th e  Turkish Em pire, w ith in  such boundaries as may be 
fixed  b y  them ; and
W hereas th e  Principal A llied Pow ers h ave also agreed th a t the 
M andatory should be responsible for puttin g into effect the declaration 
originally  m ade on N ovem ber 2nd, 1917, b y  th e  G overnm ent of His 
B ritannic M ajesty, and adopted b y  th e  said Powers, in favour of the 
.establishm ent in P alestine of a national hom e for the Jew ish people, 
i t  being clearly understood th a t nothing should be done which might 
prejudice th e  civ il and religious rights of existing non-Je  wish com­
m un ities in P alestin e, or th e rights and politica l status enjoyed by 
Jew s in an y  other country; and
W hereas recognition has thereby been given  to  th e  historical con-' I 
nection  o f th e  J ew ish people w ith  P alestine and to  the grounds for [ 
reconstitu ting their national hom e in  th a t country; and
W hereas th e  Principal A llied  Powers have selected H is Britannic j 
M ajesty as th e  M andatory for P alestine; and
W hereas th e  m andate in respect o f P alestine has been formulated I 
in  th e  follow ing term s and subm itted to  th e  Council of the League for I 
approval; and
W hereas H is B ritannic M ajesty has accepted the mandate ini 
respect o f P alestine and undertaken to  exercise it  on behalf of the I 
L eague o f N ation s in  conform ity w ith  th e  follow ing provisions; and I
W hereas b y  th e  afore-m entioned A rticle 22 (paragraph 8), it is I 
provided th a t th e  degree of auth ority , control or administration to be I 
exercised b y  th e  M andatory, n ot having been previously agreed upon I 
b y  th e  M embers o f th e  L eague, shall b e exp lic itly  defined by the I 
Council o f th e  L eague o f N ations;
Confirming th e  said m andate, defines its  term s as follows :
A rticle  1.
T he M andatory shall have fu ll powers o f legislation and of admin-1 
istration, save as th ey  m ay be lim ited  b y  th e  term s of th is mandate.^
A rticle  2.
T he M andatory shall be responsible for placing th e  country under! 
such p olitical, adm inistrative and econom ic conditions as will secure! 
th e  establishm ent of th e  Jew ish national hom e, as la id  down in ther 
pream ble, and the developm ent o f self-governing institutions, and alsol 
for safeguarding th e  c iv il and religious rights of all the inhabitants oa 
P alestine, irrespective of race and religion.
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A rticle  3.
The M andatory shall, so far as circum stances perm it, encourage 
local autonom y.
A rticle  4.
An appropriate Jew ish agency shall be recognised as a  public body  
for the purpose of advising and co-operating w ith  the A dm inistration  
of Palestine in  such econom ic, social and other m atters as m ay affect 
the establishm ent of th e  Jewish national hom e and the interests of the  
Jewish population in P alestine, and, subject alw ays to  th e  control of 
the Adm inistration, to  assist and take part in  th e  developm ent of th e  
country.
The Zionist organisation, so long as its  organisation and constitu ­
tion are in the opinion of th e  M andatory appropriate, shall be recog­
nised as such agency. I t  shall take steps in consultation w ith  H is  
Britannic M ajesty’s G overnm ent to  secure th e co-operation of a ll Jews 
who are w illing to  assist in  th e  establishm ent of the Jew ish national 
home.
A rticle  6.
The Adm inistration of Palestine, w hile ensuring th a t th e  rights and  
position of other sections of th e  population are n ot prejudiced, shall 
facilitate Jew ish im m igration under suitable conditions and shall 
encourage, in co-operation w ith  th e  Jew ish agency referred to  in  
Article 4, close settlem en t b y  Jews on the land, including S tate lands; 
and waste lands not required for public purposes.
A rticle  7.
The A dm inistration of P alestine shall be responsible for enacting; 
a nationality law . There shall be included in th is law  provisions- 
framed so as to  facilita te  th e acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by- 
Jews who take up their perm anent residence in  Palestine.
A rticle  9.
The M andatory shall be responsible for seeing th a t th e  judicial 
system established in P alestine shall assure to  foreigners, as w ell as to  
natives, a com plete guarantee o f their rights.
Respect for th e  personal statu s of th e  various peoples and com ­
munities and for their religious interests shall be fu lly  guaranteed. In  
particular, th e  control and adm inistration of W akfs shall be exercised  
in accordance w ith  religious law  and th e  dispositions of th e  founders.
A rticle  11.
The A dm inistration o f P alestine shall take all necessary m easures 
to safeguard th é interests of th e  com m unity in  connection w ith  th e  
development o f th e  country, and, subject to  any international obliga­
tions accepted b y th e  M andatory, shall have fu ll power to  provide for 
public ownership or control of any o f th e  natural resources o f th e  
country or o f th e  public works, services and utilities established or to  
be established therein. I t  shall introduce a land system  appropriate 
to the needs of th e  country, having regard, am ong other th ings, to  th e  
desirability of prom oting th e close settlem ent and in tensive cu ltivation  
of the land.
The A dm inistration m ay arrange w ith  th e  Jew ish agency m entioned  
in Article 4 to  construct or operate, upon fair and equitable term s, 
any public works, services and utilities, and to  develop any of th e  
natural resources o f th e  country, in so far as these m atters are n ot 
directly undertaken b y  th e A dm inistration. A ny such arrangements- 
shall provide th at no profits d istributed b y  such agency, directly  or 
indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on th e  capital, 
and any further profits shall be u tilised  b y  it  for th e benefit o f the- 
country in a m anner approved b y th e  A dm inistration.
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A rtic le  1 3 .
A ll responsib ility  in connection w ith  th e H oly  P laces and religious 
buildings or sites in  P alestine, including th a t of preserving existing 
rights and of securing free access to  th e  H oly  P laces, religious build­
ings and sites and th e  free exercise of worship, w hile ensuring the 
requirem ents of public order and decorum , is assumed by the 
M andatory, w ho shall be responsible solely  to  th e  League of Nations 
in a ll m atters connected herew ith, provided th a t nothing in this 
article shall prevent th e  M andatory from entering into such arrange­
m ents as h e m ay deem  reasonable w ith  th e  Adm inistration for the 
purpose o f carrying th e  provisions o f th is article in to  effect; and  pro­
v id ed  also th a t nothing in th is m andate shall be construed as con­
ferring upon th e  M andatory au th ority  to  interfere w ith  the fabric or 
the m anagem ent of purely M oslem sacred shrines, the immunities of 
w hich  are guaranteed.
A rticle  15.
T h e M andatory shall see th a t com plete freedom  of conscience and 
th e  free exercise o f a ll form s of worship, subject only to  the main­
ten ance o f public order and m orals, are ensured to  all. N o discrimina­
tio n  o f an y  kind shall be m ade betw een th e  inhabitants of Palestine 
on th e  ground o f race, religion or language. N o person shall be 
exclu ded  from P alestine on th e  sole ground of h is religious belief.
T h e right of each com m unity to  m aintain its  own schools for the 
education of its  own m em bers in  its ow n language, while conforming 
to  such educational requirem ents of a  general nature as the Administra­
tio n  m ay im pose, shall n o t be denied or im paired.
A rticle  16.
T h e M andatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision 
over religious or eleem osynary bodies o f a ll faiths in P alestine as may 
be required for th e  m aintenance of public order and good government. 
Subject to  such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine 
to  obstruct or interfere w ith  th e  enterprise o f such bodies or to 
discrim inate against an y  representative or mem ber o f them  on the 
ground o f h is religion or nation ality .
Article  18.
T he M andatory shall see th a t there is  no discrim ination in Palestin 
against th e  nationals o f any State Member of th e League of Natur 
(including com panies incorporated under its  laws) as compared wi 
those o f th e  M andatory or o f any foreign State in matters concemin 
ta xa tio n , com m erce or navigation, the exercise of industries or pi 
fessions, or in  the treatm ent of m erchant vessels or civil aircraf 
S im ila rly , there shall be no discrim ination in Palestine against go 
originating in or destined  for any of th e  said S tates, and there s' 
be freedom  of transit under equitable conditions across the mandate 
area.
Subject as aforesaid and to  th e  other provisions of th is mandat 
th e  A dm inistration o f P alestine m ay, on th e  advice of the Mandate 
im pose such ta xes and custom s duties as it  m ay consider necessa 
and take such steps as it  m ay th ink b est to  prom ote the developme 
of the natural resources of th e country and to  safeguard the interes 
of the population. I t  m ay also, on th e  advice of the Mandato 
conclude a  special custom s agreem ent w ith  an y  State the tern to 
of w hich in 1914 w as w holly  included in  A siatic Turkey or Arabia.
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A rticle  22.
English, A rabic and  Hebrew shall be the official languages of 
Palestine. A n y  statem ent or inscription in  Arabic on stam ps or 
money in  P alestine shall be repeated in H ebrew, and an y  statem en t 
or inscription in  H ebrew  shall be repeated in  Arabic.
A rticle  23.
The A dm inistration of Palestine shall recognise th e  h o ly  d ays of th e  
respective com m unities in  P alestine as legal days o f rest for th e  
members of such com m unities.
A rticle  25.
In the territories ly in g  betw een th e  Jordan and the eastern boundary  
of Palestine as u ltim ately  determ ined, th e M andatory shall be en titled , 
with the con sen t of th e  Council o f th e L eague of N ations, to  post­
pone or w ithhold  application of such provisions of th is m andate as 
he m ay consider inapplicable to  th e  existing local conditions, and  
to make such provision for th e  adm inistration o f th e territories as he  
may consider su itable to  th ose conditions, provided th a t no action  
shall be taken w hich is inconsistent w ith  th e  provisions o f A rticles 
15, 16 and 18.
A rticle  27.
The consent o f th e  C ouncil of th e  L eague of N ations is required for 
any m odification of th e  term s of th is m andate.
A rticle  28.
In the even t o f th e  term ination of th e  m andate hereby conferred  
upon the M andatory, th e  Council o f th e L eague o f N ation s shall m ake 
such arrangements as m ay be deem ed necessary for safeguarding in  
perpetuity, under guarantee o f th e  League, th e  rights secured b y  
Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its  influence for securing, under th e  
guarantee of th e  League, th a t th e G overnm ent o f P alestine w ill fu lly  
honour th e  financial obligations legitim ately  incurred b y  th e A dm inis­
tration of P alestine during th e  period o f th e  m andate, including th e  
rights of public servants to  pensions or gratuities.
41. On the 16th September, 1922, the Council of the League 
approved a m em orandum  subm itted by the British Government 
which recited Article 25 of the M andate, defined the limits of tha t 
part of Palestine which was known as T rans-Jordan , and invited 
the C o u n c il to agree tha t recitals 2 and  3 of the Pream ble, 
Articles 4, 6 ,1 3 ,1 4 , 22 and 23, the sentence in Article 2 referring 
to the Jewish National Home, the second sentence in Article 7 , 
and all Article 11 except the first sentence were not applicable to 
Trans-Jordan. The m em orandum  further stated tha t His 
Majesty’s Government accepted full responsibility as M andatory 
tor T rans-Jo rdan  and tha t the provisions of the M andate which 
were no t inapplicable would be observed in its adm inistration.
42. From a close study of these texts and from w hat we have 
read and heard in  evidence the following m ain points emerge : —
(1) Recital 3 of the Pream ble adds an im portant rider to 
the Balfour D eclaration cited in recital 2. I t declares tha t 
in adopting the policy of the Declaration the Principal Allied 
Powers gave recognition to “  the historical connection of the 
Jewish People with Palestine and to the grounds for recon­
stituting their national home in th a t country ” .
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(2) The M andate is of a  different type from the Mandate for 
Syria and the Lebanon and the draft M andate for ‘Iraq. These 
latter, which were called for convenience “ A ” M andates 
accorded with the fourth paragraph of Article 22. T h u s  thé 
Syrian M andate provided that the governm ent should be based 
on an organic law which should take into account the rights, 
interests and wishes of all the inhabitants, and that m easures 
should be enacted “  to facilitate the progressive d e v e lo p m e n t of 
Syria and the Lebanon as independent States ” . T h e  corre­
sponding sentences of the draft M andate for ‘Iraq  were th e  same. 
In  compliance with them  N ational Legislatures were established 
in due course on an elective basis. Article 1 of the Palestine 
M andate, on the other hand, vests “  full powers of legislation 
and of adm inistration ” , within the limits of the Mandate, in  the 
M andatory.
As to the claim , argued before us by A rab witnesses, th a t  the 
Palestine M andate violates Article 22 of the Covenant because 
it is not in accordance with paragraph 4 thereof, we w o u ld  point 
out {a) that the provisional recognition of “  certain com m unities 
form erly belonging to the Turkish Em pire "  as independent 
nations is permissive ; the words are “  can be provisionally 
recognised ” , not “  will ”  or “  shall ” : (b) tha t the penultim ate 
paragraph of Article 22 prescribes tha t the degree of a u th o rity  to 
be exercised b y  the M andatory shall be defined, at need, by  the 
Council of the League: (c) tha t the acceptance by th e  Allied 
Powers and the U nited States of the policy of the Balfour 
D eclaration m ade it clear from  the beginning that Palestine 
would have to be treated differently from Syria and ‘I r a q ,  and 
th a t this difference of treatm ent was confirmed by the Supreme 
Council in the T reaty  of Sèvres and  by  the Council of th e  League 
in sanctioning the M andate.
This particular question is of less practical importance than it I 
m ight seem to be. F o r Article 2 of the M andate re q u ire s  "  the I 
development of self-governing institutions ” ; and, read in the I 
light of the general intention of the M andate System (of which I 
something will be said presently), this requirem ent im plies, ini 
our judgm ent, the ultim ate establishm ent of independence.
(3 )  The field in which the Jew ish N ational Home w as to bel 
established was understood, a t the time of the Balfour Déclara-1 
tion, to be the whole of historic Palestine, and the Z io n ists  were I 
seriously disappointed when T rans-Jordan  was cut a w a y  froml 
tha t field under Article 25. This was done, as has b e e n  seen,I  
in obedience to the McMahon Pledge, which was an teceden t to i 
the Balfour Declaration. I
(4) Of the specific obligations imposed on the Mandatory and! 
the A dm inistration, we regard four as of m ajor importance:— I
(i) the obligations under Articles 2 and 6 with reference! 
to the Jew ish N ational H om e; I
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(ii) the obligation in the same articles to safeguard the 
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine and in particular 
those of non-Jew s;
(iii) the obligation in Articles 2 and 3 to develop self- 
governing institutions and  encourage local autonom y;
(iv) the obligations undertaken with regard to the Holy 
Places in Article 13.
The fourth of these obligations applies to Jew s and A rabs alike 
and to many other peoples of the world. The th ird  applies 
equally to Jews and Arabs. B ut the first is an obligation 
towards the Jewish People only and the second an obligation 
mainly towards the A rabs. I t  was pointed out to us by Jewish 
witnesses that the first is a positive, the second a negative obliga­
tion, but they adm itted, of course, tha t positive and negative 
obligations are equally binding. U nquestionably, however, the 
primary purpose of the M andate, as expressed in its preamble 
and, its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish 
National Home.
(5) Articles 4, 6 and 11 provide for the recognition of a Jewish 
Agency “ as a public body for the purpose of advising and 
co-operating with the Administration ”  on m atters affecting 
Jewish interests. No such body is envisaged for dealing with 
Arab interests.
(6) While Article 7 provides for a  Palestinian citizenship 
common to Arabs and Jew s, Articles 15 and 22 recognize and 
tend to  confirm the difference between A rab and Jew ish 
nationality by  prescribing th a t Arabic and Hebrew shall both be 
“ official languages "  and tha t each community shall be entitled 
“ to maintain its own schools for the education of its own 
members in its own language.”
(7) Article 28 contemplates the possible term ination of the
Mandate.
43. We have been dealing so far with those specific obliga­
tions which are defined in the text of the M andate. B ut there 
are also general obligations attached to every M andate. These 
are not always rem em bered in the present controversy, nor is 
the first recital of the Pream ble so often quoted as those which 
are concerned with the Jew ish N ational Home. The first 
recital declares tha t Palestine is entrusted to a  M andatory “  for 
the p u rp o se  of giving effect to Article 22 of the Covenant ” . 
The full text of Article 22 has been given on an earlier page 
and it is sufficient to repeat its opening paragraph : —
"To those colonies and territories, w hich as a consequence o f th e  
late war have ceased to  be under th e  sovereignty of th e  S tates which  
formerly governed them , and w hich are inhabited b y  peoples not 
yet able to  stand b y  them selves under the strenuous conditions of
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th e  m odem  world, there should be applied th e  principle th a t the well­
being and developm ent o f such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisa- 
tion , and th a t securities for th e  perform ance of th is tru st should be 
em bodied in  th is C ovenant."
44. The intention of this governing paragraph of Article 22 
cannot be fully understood w ithout a  knowledge of how and 
for w hat purpose the M andate System was invented.
45. While the British tradition of trusteeship for backw ard I 
peoples had a good deal to do with it, the M andate System was 
m ainly the outcome of American ideas. F rom  the moment 
tha t the United States entered the W ar President Wilson made 
it clear tha t in his view such territorial readjustm ents as might 
result from  victory should be m ade on different principles 
from those which had  been followed a t the close of previous! 
w ars. There were to be “  no annexations ”  against the wishes 
of the people concerned. The principle of “  national self- 
determ ination”  should be applied as far as possible. “  Peoples! 
and provinces are not to be bartered about from  sovereignty! 
to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and p a w n s  in a [ 
g a m e . ”
46. I t  was in order to apply these principles to the disposition! 
of the ex-German colonies and ex-Turkish provinces th a t  thel 
M andate System was established. In  earlier days the simple! 
annexation of such “  prizes of w ar ”  had been a m atter-of I 
course. Now they were to be governed not as the “ poss-l 
essions ”  of this or tha t victorious Power, bu t as a  “  sacred I 
trust of civilisation ”  under regulations laid down by  the League] 
of Nations and under its constant supervision.
47. As applied to Palestine the M andate System meant that I 
"  the well-being and development ”  of its existing population! 
were to be prom oted. I t  also im plied tha t in course of time! 
this population would be enabled to stand by  themselves. In I 
1919, when the Covenant was signed, the vast m ajority of thel 
population was A rab. I t  was those half million Arabs, with I 
a small m inority of 65,000 Jew s, who had been removed froml 
Turkish rule and were now to be entrusted to Mandator}7 ad-| 
m inistration.
48. B ut Palestine was different from the other ex-Turkistl 
provinces. I t  was, indeed, unique both as the Holy Landofl 
three world-religions and as the old historic homeland of the| 
Jews. The A rabs had  lived in it for centuries, but they  ' 
long ceased to rule it, and in view of its peculiar character t 
could not now claim to possess it in the same w ay as th e y  coulai 
claim possession of Syria or ‘Iraq . Speaking in the House ofl 
Lords on the 27th June, 1923, Lord Milner declared himse|
“  a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy.”  “  I  believe in tt
independence of the A rab countries.............. I look forward I
an A rab Federation .”  B ut, he went on,
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" Palestine can never be regarded as a country on th e  sam e footing  
as the other Arab countries. Y ou cannot ignore all h istory and  
tradition in th e m atter. Y ou  cannot ignore th e  fact th a t th is is th e  
cradle of tw o of th e great religions of th e world. I t  is a sacred land  
to the Arabs, b u t it  is also a  sacred land to  the Jew  and the Christian; 
and the future o f P alestine cannot possib ly be le ft to  be determ ined  
by the tem porary im pressions and feelings of th e Arab m ajority in  th e  
country of the present d a y .”
4 9 . Therein lay the justification for combining the general 
ob ligations of the Mandate System with the specific obligations 
of the Palestine M andate. The recognition of Jewish rights was 
thereby linked with the recognition of A rab rights. Jew s were 
admitted to be in Palestine b y  right. The little Jew ish m inority 
was to  be helped to grow by im migration. To facilitate the 
esta b lish m en t of the Jewish N ational Home was a binding inter­
national obligation on the M andatory. The M andate also im­
posed specific obligations towards the Arabs. Their civil and  
religious rights and their position as affected by im migration 
and land-settlement were not to be prejudiced. B ut the accept­
ance o f  these specific and  negative obligations tow ards the A rabs 
did n o t, of course, release the M andatory from the general and 
positive obligations implicit in the first recital of the Pream ble 
and in  the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant. If 
Arab claims in Palestine were subject to the rights of others, 
so w ere Jewish claims.
50. It is clear, then, tha t the policy of the Balfour D eclara­
tion was subjected to the operation of the M andate System in 
1919 in the belief that the obligations thereby undertaken to­
wards the A rabs and the Jews respectively would not conflict. 
And this belief was still held when the draft M andate was con- 
;rmed by the Council of the League in 1922. A lready by then
e Arab leaders had displayed their hostility to the M andate 
d a ll it involved; b u t it was thought that this hostility would 
resently  weaken and die aw ay. Mr. Churchill spoke of his 
' Statement of Policy ”  as a basis on which he believed that a 
' spirit of co-operation ”  m ight be built up. And the ground 
f this belief in the com patibility of the obligations was no less 
lear. I t  was assumed that the establishment of the N ational 
rome would m ean a great increase of prosperity for all Pales- 
e. I t  was an essential p art of the Zionist mission to revivify 
e c o u n t ry ,  to repair by  Jew ish labour, skill and capital the 
mage it had suffered from  centuries of neglect. A rabs would 
enefit therefrom as well as Jews. They would find the country  
ey h a d  known so long as poor and backw ard rapidly acquir- 
ig the material blessings of W estern civilization. On that 
ccount it was assum ed tha t Arab fears and prejudices would 
adually  be overcome.
5i- It must have been obvious from the outset tha t a very  
wkward situation would arise if tha t basic assumption should
Chapter I I . 42
prove false. I t  would evidently m ake the operation of the Man­
date a t every point more difficult, and it would greatly com­
plicate the question of its term ination. To foster Jewish immi­
gration in the hope th a t it m ight ultim ately lead to the creation 
of a Jew ish m ajority and the establishment of a Jewish State 
with the consent or a t least the acquiescence of the Arabs w a s  one I 
thing. I t  was quite another thing to contemplate, however I 
rem otely, the forcible conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State I 
against the will of the Arabs. F o r tha t would clearly violate I 
the spirit and intention of the M andate System. I t  would mean I 
tha t national self-determination had  been withheld w h e n  thel 
A rabs were a m ajority in  Palestine and only conceded w h e n  the| 
Jew s were a  m ajority. I t  would m ean th a t the Arabs h a d  
denied the opportunity of standing by  themselves: t h a t  they I 
h ad , in fact, after an interval of conflict, been bartered abouti 
from Turkish sovereignty to Jew ish sovereignty. I t  is t r u e  that! 
in the light of history Jew ish rule over Palestine could n o t bel 
regarded as foreign rule in the same sense as Turkish; b u t  the| 
international recognition of the right of the Jews to re tu rn  1 
their old hom eland did not involve the recognition of th e  right! 
of the Jew s to govern the A rabs in it against their will. T h e  easel 
stated by  Lord Milner against an  A rab control of Palestinej 
applies equally to a Jewish control.
52. The essential points of this chapter m ay be summarized! 
as follows: —
(1) The A rabs understood, before and after the outbreak! 
of the H edjaz Revolution in 1915, that, in the event of an! 
Allied victory, Palestine would be included in the sphere) 
of A rab independence.
(2) In  1917 the British Governm ent promised to  facili-| 
ta  te the establishment of a N ational Home for the Jev ' ' 
People in Palestine provided th a t the civil and religion! 
rights of the A rabs and other non-Jews were no t p re jud iced! 
and the Jew s understood that, if the experiment succeeded,j 
the N ational Hom e would develop in course of tim e  into: 
Jew ish State.
(3 )  The M andate system was adopted as the v eh ic le  foij 
the execution of this policy. I t  involved c e r t a i n  genen' 
obligations, m ainly tow ards the Arabs. The M a n d a te  itselij 
involved certain specific obligations, mainly toward 
the Jew s.
(4) The association of the Balfour Declaration policjj 
with the M andate System implied the belief t h a t  Aral* 
hostility to the form er would sooner or later be overcome! 
If  this belief should prove false it would be very difficul|
.to  operate or to term inate the M andate.
If
F
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C H A PTE R  I I I  
PALESTINE FROM 1920 TO 1936
1.— 1920 to 1925
i. It was deemed advisable th a t the British M andate for 
Palestine and the French M andate for Syria should be p u t into 
force at the same time. Since, therefore, the prom ulgation of 
the la tte r  was delayed b y  F ranco-Italian discussions, it was not 
till September 29, 1923, tha t the two M andates came into opera­
tion. In Palestine, however, the m ain provisions of the Man- 
ate h a d  already been applied ; and  the history of its execution 
ay b e  said to have begun when in the sum m er of 1920 a  Civil 
dministration was established in place of the m ilitary regime, 
he first holder of the H igh Commissionership—a title intended,
0 d o u b t, to m ark the m andatory character of the territory, 
ough Governorships were instituted for the African Mandates—  
as Sir H erbert Samuel. The governm ent he headed was a  gov- 
mment of a simple "C row n C olony" type. There was a small 
xecutive Council of officials, and  an Advisory Council con- 
ting (besides the H igh Commissioner) of ten officials and 
en nominated non-officials, of whom four were Moslem A rabs, 
Tee Christian A rabs, and three Jews— a distribution which 
ave the minority communities more than their due representa- 
'on, since of the population as estim ated in 1922, 589,000 were 
oslem s, 83,000 Jew s, and 71,000 Christians. The senior 
finals both in the central departm ents and in the districts 
?ere British, mostly ex-officers of the Army who had  served 
nder th e  m ilitary regime. F rom  the first the junior posts 
ere filled by Palestinians, A rab and  Jew . The police were 
alestinian with British officers, b u t a special British gendar- 
erie, numbering originally 762, were enlisted in 1922, mostly 
om Ireland. As to the judiciary, British judges were presi- 
ents of the two sections of the C ourt of Appeal, of each of the 
our Districts Courts, and  of two Land Courts. The rest of 
e jud ges and m agistrates were Palestinians. Cases of religious 
w and personal status were determ ined by Moslem and Jewish 
’bunals.
2. Though the specific and positive obligations of the Palestine 
andate were m ainly concerned with the establishm ent of the 
'ational Home, the first principle of m andatory governm ent 
to promote, as we have explained in the preceding chapter, 
‘ the well-being and  developm ent ”  of the people of the m an- 
ted territory as a whole. A nd for the well-being and  develop­
ed of the A rabs, who constituted the overwhelming m ajority  
fthe Palestinian people, there was much tha t needed doing.
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3 . In  1 9 2 0  the structure of A rab society in Palestine w a s  still 
quasi-feudal. At the top of it was a  small aristocracy o f  land­
owners, who had been adm itted long before the W ar to  the 
effendi or governing class of the Turkish Em pire. Many of 
them  were w ealthy and most of them well-educated men, who 
from college-life a t Beirut or elsewhere or from travel had 
acquired the outw ard forms of European culture. The cohesion 
of this ruling class was somewhat im paired by  trad itional 
rivalry between its leading families, of which the two foremost 
a t this time were the Husseini and the Nashashibi. Next in the 
social scale came a  middle-class of professional and b u s in e s s  men 
in the towns—there were a  few small industries, notably soap- 
m aking a t Nablus—and of the more prosperous ow ner-culti- 
vators in the plains. B ut this class was small; and the great 
m ajority of the A rab population were peasantry or fellaheen, 
some of them  owners of their little plots of land, but mostly 
tenants or cultivators on the estates of the effendi, who in  many 
cases were “  absentee landlords A t the lowest level were 
the Bedouin, nom ads from the desert, still largely pastoral, 
bu t also engaged in prim itive agriculture. Their number was 
estimated, probably too highly, in 1 9 2 2  as a  trifle over 100,000.
4. The outstanding characteristic of the peasant c la s s  was 
its poverty. F or this there were several reasons—the poor­
ness of the soil, especially in the stony hills where most o f  their 
villages were situated, and the lack of w ater; the heavy load 
of debt which robbed them  of most of their earnings and 
deprived them  of the capital required for the better irrigation 
of their land or the im provement of its crops ; the lack o f  know­
ledge of intensive methods of cultivation; the cramping effect 
of the antiquated land-system and the general in se c u r ity  oil 
tenure; the limited m arkets for country produce and  the badness I 
of the means of access to towns. The birth-rate, however, was! 
high, and, despite prim itive sanitation and a  wholly inadequate I 
system of public health, the peasant population was steadily I 
increasing. As a  result, moreover, of the ending of Turkish I 
rule, those younger males in every family who had  formerly been I 
drafted out to compulsory service in the arm y, usually never I 
to return, were now available for work a t home. Emigration I 
overseas, too, had  been checked by  the post-war restrictions on I 
immigration. In  every village, therefore, the am ount o f  labour I 
available was greater than  it h ad  been before the War; but I 
this could not in itself do much to raise the standard of life. I 
I t  m ight, indeed, depress it unless the other factors n eed ed  fori 
development were forthcoming. I
5 . Considering the limited resources available, the progress I 
m ade between 1 9 2 0  and 1 9 2 5  in dealing with this complicated! 
problem was substantial. P a rt of the country was s u r v e y e d  and I  
m apped as a prelim inary to land-settlement. Including money!
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ad vanced  before 1920, a  sum of over half a million 
pounds was lent, mostly in small am ounts, to cultivators. 
Expert advice was provided for the im provement and  pro­
tection of crops. N early 200 prim ary schools were estab­
lished in the country districts. B y drainage and other 
m easures m alaria, which in 1920 was rife not only in low-lying 
rural areas but even in the towns, was eliminated from all the 
larger towns except H aifa and  from  wide stretches of the plains. 
A sim ila r  campaign was launched against eye-disease. New 
hospitals were built, child-welfare centres and clinics opened, 
training for nurses and mid wives provided. Jerusalem  
obtained a proper water-supply. H undreds of miles of road 
were laid, facilitating omnibus services and a great increase in 
other m o to r  traffic. The railway system was re-organized and 
renovated. In  all these and in other ways a vigorous beginning 
had b e e n  made by  1925 in providing backw ard Palestine with 
the material equipment of a m odem  state.
6. Much of the work summarized above was done by  other 
agencies than Government. Christian missions and other 
"uropean philanthropic bodies, some of which had been estab- 
'shed in Palestine long before the W ar, took, as they still 
ke, a n  im portant p art in the provision of social services, 
pecially in health and  education. There were some social 
rvices, moreover, and  in particular education, which the 
ews from the outset desired to provide for themselves in their 
wn way and, if need be, a t their own cost. A nd for such 
xpenditure the Zionist Organisation and other bodies could 
om m and large sums of money. In  the result, m uch of the 
ork mentioned above was done by the Jew ish immigrants 
em se lves , partly by  their own efforts, partly  with Jewish help 
rom Europe and America. The work of the H adassah Medical 
rganisation, a strong and efficient body established by  
~ encan Zionists, deserves particular m ention: and, like the 
aining of swamps by  Jewish colonists, it benefited A rab as 
ell as Jew.
7. I t  should be frankly recognized tha t, while the social 
ctivities of Government were directly or indirectly beneficial to 
e co u n try  as a  whole, they were more to the advantage of 
e A rabs than the Jew s. This was reasonable enough, apart 
om the  fact tha t the A rabs constituted the overwhelming 
ajority of the population. There could be little prospect of 
at rapprochement and  co-operation between the races on 
hich the  ultimate success of the whole experim ent depended, 
'ess e v e ry  effort were m ade in every walk of life to close the 
p betw een  them. B ut even under the m ost favourable con­
tions, even if the financial resources available had  been far 
eater th a n  they were, the closing of the gap, the lifting of 
ab standards of knowledge, skill and enterprise tow ards the
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Jew ish level, could only be a very slow business; and, if in | 
1925 a new era of progress had  evidently begun, the Arabs were 
still living in the atmosphere of the past, still separated, almost, 
it m ight seem, by  centuries, from the educated, resourceful' 
W estern-minded section of the Jew s now entering the country 
in increasing numbers.
8. To "  facilitate ”  this inflow "  under suitable conditions"! 
was one of the specific duties imposed by  the Mandate. Stimu-I 
lated by the Balfour Declaration, the tide of Jew ish im m igrants] 
was now gathering mom entum from the restoration o f peace I 
and  order; and the Governm ent’s first duty was w h a t Sir I 
H erbert Samuel rightly called “  the invidious ta sk "  o f pre-l 
venting this tide from swamping Palestine. A special depart-1 
ment was established to deal with immigration and an Ordinance I 
was passed to regulate it.* The result was that th e  Jewish I 
population, which was reckoned a t about 55,000 in 19 18 , had! 
risen by M arch, 1925, to 108,000. This increase m e a n t  morel 
than  a difference in num bers: it m eant a difference in c h a ra c te r! 
There was more variety now not only in the provenance of thel 
im m igrants but in their type and outlook. To quote fro m  Sirj 
H erbert Sam uel's review of his five year’s administration :
“  There are rabbis and laym en to  w hom  th e ancient religion is alone I 
of im portance, and in  whose lives th e  stud y of the Law and ritual I 
requirem ents are th e chief concern. . . . There are eager yon'ngl
workers, essentially  m odem , w ho h ave rejected th e  letter, though they I 
often  retain th e spirit, of th e  religion; intellectual, they are neverthe-l 
less keen to  engage in m anual work in  th e  upbuilding of the  country;! 
th ey  m ay be inspired b y  th e past, b u t th ey  live actively  in the present, F 
and are m oving consciously tow ards a planned future. Between these I 
ty p es there is every gradation and com bination of creed and outlook. I 
“ There are in  P alestine Oriental Jew s from Bokhara and Penial 
and ‘Iraq, and there are U niversity  men and wom en from New Yorkl 
and Chicago. There are Jew s from the Y em en . . . good crafts-1
m en in silver and ivory or good labourers on the farms; and there! 
are agricultural experts from  th e colleges of France, engineers from I 
G erm any, bankers from H olland, m anufacturers and merchants from! 
Poland and R ussia. There are students and writers, doctors and! 
law yers, architects and m usicians, organisers and social workers, froml 
Eastern Europe and W estern, from  A sia and America. . . •
" T aking a general v iew , it  m ay be said th a t a t least one-half oil 
th e  present Jew ish population com e from Eastern Europe; that those! 
who are strictly  orthodox in  religion are a m inority, those who are! 
w holly irreligous are also a m inority, and the mass lie between; that! 
th e  m ajority are politically  inclined, and progressive in their views;! 
th a t com m unists are few , and those w ho m ay be regarded as revom-l 
tionary or ‘ B olsh evist ’ are a group negligible in  numbers; and thatl 
three-fourths o f th is population liv e  a t present in  the towns and one^  
fourth in  th e agricultural colonies."
Thus already the unique character of Jewish colonization ml 
Palestine was plain. The colonies of the New World were|
* For details o f th e  im m igration system  see Chapter X . below.
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mostly founded by  settlers of a  single nation, draw n m ainly 
from th e  working or lower middle class and not of very varied 
o c c u p a t i o n s .  The Jewish im m igrants came from  a variety of 
different countries, and  represented all classes and activities. 
Their settlement resembled tha t colonization by a complete society 
in m in ia tu re—a slice through all its strata—which t h e  Colonial 
Reformers in England in the early nineteenth century dream ed 
of but never realized. I t  was unique, too, in the preparations 
made fo r  i t .  Not only had most of the im migrants been carefully 
selected by the Zionist Organisation, bu t a num ber of them  had 
undergone a three-years' course of training, mostly for agri­
culture but also for industry and handicrafts, in twenty centres 
established in various European countries. All those trained 
men a n d  women were young and belonged for the most part 
to the organization called the Halutzim  or Pioneers.
9. An elaborate Jewish m achinery for financing and con- 
olling this colonization was already in operation. A Jewish
Agency, known a t this time as the Zionist Executive, repre­
senting the Zionist Movement throughout the world, had  been 
established in accordance with the M andate, and was co­
operating with the Administration, especially in the work of 
settlement. Another body, distinct from the Zionists, the 
Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (Pica), successor of 
Baron Edmond de Rothschild’s society, had  also been engaged 
or some time past in land-purchase and settlement. The 
nglo-Jewish Association and the Alliance Israélite Universelle 
ere continuing their pre-w ar work, especially in agricultural 
J ing; and several other societies had been founded or were 
out to be founded, especially in the United States, to assist 
the building of the N ational Home.
10. The land required for the colonists had been purchased 
y by the Jewish National Fund, or Keren Kayemeth, main-
:~ed by the voluntary contributions of Jews all over the world, 
d partly by the “  Pica Another fund, the Foundation 
und or Keren Hayesod, had been created to finance the cost of 
ttlement. Altogether roughly £6,000,000 had already been 
nt on the National Home since the W ar. 944,000 dunums* 
f land had been purchased and about 100 villages had 
n established, containing some 25,000 settlers. Some of the 
lonies were in the hills of Galilee, but the great m ajority 
ere in the Maritime Plain and the Plain of Esdraelon. The 
aversion of the latter from a swampy and thinly-peopled area 
to healthy and highly cultivated farm -land, a t the cost of 
uch suffering and m ortality from m alaria, had  been a  par- 
cularly notable achievement from  the Jewish point of view.
* A dunum  is roughly one-quarter o f an acre.
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11. F rom  the first, too, the social organization of the colonies 
was as varied as it is to-day. There were orange-plantations 
in  private ownership ; there were settlements of individual 
farm ers or small-holders ; there were co-operative settlem ents, 
some working the land on an individual basis, others working 
it in common; and  there Were a  few communal settlem ents, 
where no wages were paid but work was distributed and needs 
supplied on the collective principle.
12. In  some rural districts the pre-w ar Jewish villages were 
growing into little country-towns. The area of Petah Tiqva had I 
grown from  700 to 5,000 acres, and its population from 125 to
4,000. Rehovot in 1890 was a village of less than 300 inhabi­
tants : in 1925 they num bered over 1,400.
13. For the urban population new suburbs had sprung up at 
Jerusalem  and H aifa; and Tel Aviv, on the northern out-l 
skirts of Jaffa, which in 1914 consisted of less than 200 houses 
with 2,000 inhabitants, was now a sea-side town of over 2,oool 
houses and 30,000 people— “  the only town in the world which! 
is wholly Jewish ’ . To m aintain these town-dwellers new! 
industries had been established—four big-scale factories fori 
cement, bricks, flour, and oil and soap, involving between theml 
a capital expenditure of over £500,000, and more than 100I 
smaller businesses. To assist these industrial developments a l 
com pany headed by Mr. R utenberg, a Russian-Jewish electrical 
engineer, had constructed an  electric power station run by oil 
a t Tel Aviv, while another com pany under the same le a d e rs h ip !  
had begun the work of harnessing the waters of the Jo rd a n l 
and the Y arm uk, a t a  point some five miles south o f  Laiel 
Tiberias—an enterprise intended to supply the greater p a r i  
of Palestine with power a t the cost of about £1,000,000. I
14. A lready, again, the im m igrant community had developedl 
an elaborate social and political organization. Most of the 
industrial workers were enrolled in various branches of the 
General Federation of Jewish L abour or Histadruth, w h ich  noi 
only provided social services on a  co-operative basis but am 
tendered for contracts for building and other work. On the  
political side, a  General Assembly had  been established of 3*  
m em bers, elected b y  the votes of all adult Jew s of both sex™ 
and divided into num erous party  groups; and a National Exec* 
tive Council, or Va ad Leum i, chosen by the Assembly, co* 
stituted, so to speak, the responsible governm ent of the Nation* 
Home. Locally, Tel Aviv had its elected Town Council, anfl 
every small tow n and  every village of any size had its e le c t*  
Committee. The religious affairs of the whole community w e *  
dealt with by  a  Rabbinical Council. B y regulations made *  
1927 under the Religious Communities (Organisation) Ordinance 
all those bodies were recognized and regulated. T h en ce fo r w a iS  
the Va’ad Leum i and the Committees were entitled by law ■
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levy taxation by annual budgets and  to m aintain social services, 
of which the most im portant were public health and education. 
The regulations provided, of course, for the control of those 
bodies by the Government of Palestine, especially w ith regard to 
finance; but, none the less, it would be difficult to find in history 
a precedent for the establishment of so distinct an imperium in 
imperio.
15. In its culture, lastly, this little society of 100,000 Jews 
already reflected the post-W ar life of the W estern world. A 
creative spirit was apparent in local a rt and literature. Bialik, 
ihe greatest Hebrew poet of m odern times, was soon to spend 
the la s t years of his life a t Tel Aviv. A form er conductor of 
Grand Opera in Petrograd and  Moscow had  trained an orchestra 
which played to crowded audiences. The only cultural difference, 
in fact, between this young community and its elders in Europe 
r America was a  difference of intensity. In  the first place, 
owing to the system of im migration, a quite unusual proportion 
f the community were young and  highly-educated. Secondly, 
e g re a t m ajority of them  were almost passionately conscious 
f a national mission. They were the builders or re-builders 
f the National Home. How intense the spirit of nationalism  
an be has been manifest, not always with happy  results, in 
any quarters of the world in recent tim es; bu t nowhere was 
t in those early days of colonization, and nowhere is it now, 
ore intense than among the Jew s in Palestine. The most 
triking feature of it was and is the revival of the Hebrew
guage. This, as has been seen, had always been one of the 
rdinal points of Zionism, and from the time of the Balfour 
eclaration onwards it had  been regarded as essential for this 
urpose first that Hebrew should be recognized as an  “  official 
guage "  in Palestine and, secondly, tha t the education of 
e colonists should be in Jew ish hands. Thus already by  1925 
complete fram ework of Jew ish education h ad  been erected— 
rimary schools, secondary schools and technical schools 
and in  the spring of th a t year the structure had  been 
owned by the opening by  Lord Balfour of the Hebrew
niversity at Jerusalem . In  the prim ary  schools Hebrew
as intensively taught and  a t a l l  the higher stages the 
anguage of instruction was H ebrew. As the result a  
“guage which a generation earlier had only been spoken 
or ritual recitation was now  the living everyday language
f all the younger, if no t yet quite all the older, of
e Jews in Palestine. All the Jew ish new spapers were 
™ted in  Hebrew, and  a growing body of Hebrew  literature 
as soon to issue from  the local presses.
16. To sum up , it m ay be said tha t already in 1925 the 
ational Home h ad  developed all the m ain features which dis- 
gttish it to-day. But, despite the results it had  already achieved
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and the enthusiasm of its pioneers, it was still generally regarded 
as an experim ent which m ight or m ight not in the end succeed— 
and  not by  gentile critics only. So far the funds needed for 
land-purchase and settlement and for essential social services 
had  been m ainly subcribed in small am ounts by the poorer class 
of Jews throughout the world. Much of the expenditure h a d  been 
uneconomic. F or some of the capital provided no return 
could be expected; for the rest only a small and possibly long- 
delayed return. The financing of the N ational Home, in fact, 
had  been in the nature of donations to a  missionary enterprise. 
B ut, if it was to realize its prom oters’ dream s within m easurable 
time, it would need a more norm al economic basis; it would 
need to be regarded as a  "  sound proposition ” and attract 
investm ent in the usual w ay of business.
17. The Jew ish N ational Home is only one side of the picture, 
and in the course of 1925 the other side of it was illuminated 
by  a significant incident. F o r the Jew s the coming of Lord 
Balfour to Palestine and his opening of the Hebrew University I 
were the happiest of omens. To the Arabs they were anathem a, 
and they celebrated Lord B alfour's visit by  m a in ta in in g  an 
effective “ general strike In  fact the Arab opposition to the 
policy implicit in the N ational Home had  lost nothing of its 
force. In  the early years, indeed, it had been marked by  .the 
first two of those violent outbreaks which were to recu r at 
intervals up  to 1936. Despite the presence of a substantial 
num ber of British troops in the country, a serious outbreak 
of rioting and looting occurred in April, 1920, in Jerusalem. I 
Savage attacks were m ade by  A rabs on Jew s, and firm action of I 
the troops was required to restore order. F ive Jew s w e re  killed I 
and no less than 211 w ounded, including several women and I 
children. Of the A rabs, four were killed and twenty-one I 
wounded. I t  appeared on investigation tha t the causes of thel 
trouble had been (1) the A rabs' disappointm ent a t  th e  non-1 
fulfilment of the promises of independence which they believed I 
to have been given them  in the W ar: (2) the A rabs' belief thatl 
the Balfour D eclaration implied a denial of the right of self-1 
determ ination, and their fear tha t the establishment of thel 
N ational Home would m ean a great increase of Jewish immigra-1 
tion and would lead to their economic and political subjection  to I  
the Jew s : (3 ) the aggravation of those sentiments on the one! 
hand by propaganda from outside Palestine associated with thel 
proclam ation of the E m ir Feisal as K ing of a r e -u n i te d  Syria ■  
and with the growth of Pan-A rab and Pan-Moslem ideas! 
and on the other hand by  the activities of the Z io n is t Com-I 
mission, supported by the resources and  influence of J e w s  in the! 
world a t large. I t  was pointed out that Jew ish i m m i g r a t i o n !  
before the W ar h ad  not unduly alarm ed the Arabs and  that! 
there were some among them  who recognized the e c o n o m ic !
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value to the country of a reasonable num ber of Jewish residents. 
But, a s  an influential A rab rem arked a t  the time, “  W ho that 
■wants salt empties the whole cellar into his plate? ”
18. A year later, in May, 1921, there was another alarm ing 
outbreak. Excited by  disturbances arising from  an internal 
Jewish quarrel between the Bolshevik group and the orthodox 
Labour Party , the A rabs of Jaffa made a m urderous attack on 
the Jewish inhabitants of the town; and on subsequent days 
destructive A rab raids were made on five of the Jew ish rural 
colonies. In  the course of the trouble 47 Jew s were killed and 
146 wounded, mostly by  Arabs. Of the Arabs, 48 were killed 
and 73 wounded, mostly by  the police and m ilitary in suppress­
ing the disorders. The report of the inquiry into these events 
conducted by Sir Thom as H aycraft, Chief Justice of Pales­
tine, and two officials, revealed to the public for the 
first time the strength of the A rab antagonism  to the 
National Home and the reasons for it. “  The fundam ental 
cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of vio­
lence ” , wrote the Commissioners, “  was a feeling am ong 
the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jew s, 
due to political and economic causes, and connected with 
Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist 
policy as derived from  Jew ish exponents ” . In  reply to the 
Jewish argum ents th a t A rab antagonism  was directed more 
against British rule than against Zionism and had  been arti­
ficially stimulated am ong the uneducated mass of the A rab popu­
lation by effendi, discontented with the loss of the profitable 
privileges they had  enjoyed under the Turkish regime, the 
Commissioners declared tha t "  the feeling against the Jew s was 
too genuine, too widespread, and too intense to be accounted for 
in the above superficial m anner ” . The root of the trouble, 
they maintained, was the A rab fear of a steady increase of Jewish 
immigration, which would ultim ately tend to their political and 
economic subjection. The A rabs were aware tha t this prospect 
was definitely envisaged not only by Zionists of the “  extre­
mist ” kind, like Mr. Jabotinsky, bu t by  more responsible 
presentatives of Zionism, such as D r. Eder, the acting chairm an 
of the Zionist Commission : and in pursuit of it the Zionists, 
rough their Commission and otherwise, exerted, so the Arabs 
elieved, an undue influence over the Administration. Jew ish 
igration, m oreover, was regarded b y  the A rabs as 
cause of A rab unem ploym ent. “  The object of the 
odem Jewish pioneer in Palestine ” , it was said in a 
olume issued b y  the prom oters of the Jew ish Foundation 
™d, “ is to prepare room and work for the thousands and 
liions that wait outside ” , Finally, the A rabs had observed 
th dislike and disquiet the attitude and behaviour of m any 
ong the younger im migrants. I t  was natural enough tha t 
oung Jews, escaped from the miseries and dangers of Eastern
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Europe, tasting freedom  for the first time, feeling “  at home ” 
a t last in a land  they claim ed as theirs by  right, should give rein 
to their high spirits, and  freely reflect in dress and behaviour 
the unconventional standards of the younger post-war genera­
tion in other parts of the w orld; b u t it was no less natural that 
such conduct should be regarded with distaste, if not oppro­
brium , by A rabs trained in the stricter school of Islam . They 
detected, too, in some of those young newcomers an arrogance 
which seemed to suggest th a t they felt themselves to be members 
of a superior race, destined before long to be masters of the 
country.
19. Certain other features of the troubles of 1921 should I 
be noted. In  the first place, the Moslem and Christian Arabs, 
whose relations had  always been uneasy and a t times unfriendly, 
were united in their hostility to the Jew s. Secondly, in the 
areas of disturbance, tha t hostility h ad  not been lim ite d  to 
a  particular class : it had  been shared by the A rab com m unity  
as a whole. Thirdly, the m anner in which the wildest anti-1 
Jew ish rum ours had  spread and the intense excitement they 
had  aroused showed how inflammable was the tem per of the 
A rab countryside, how easily a  feeling of discontent or dislike 
could be raised to the pitch of unreasoning fear and  m urderous 
hate. I t  was clear, lastly, th a t the gulf so suddenly and 
sharply  revealed between the two races was no accidental 
or tem porary phenom enon. "  I t  is all very well to say ” , the 
H aycraft Commission reported, " t h a t  there has been peace I 
for a  generation between A rab and  Jew s. I t  was the sort of I 
peace th a t exists between two bodies of men who have little [ 
o r nothing to do with one another ” .
20. I t  was m anifest th a t the continuance, still more thel 
aggravation, of A rab antagonism  to the N ational Home would f 
underm ine the m oral basis of the whole policy embodied in the I 
B alfour D eclaration and the M andate, and Sir H erbert Samuel I 
addressed himself energetically to the task  of conciliation. I 
One of his first steps was to accord to the Moslem community I 
the same sort of official recognition as tha t accorded to thel 
Jew s. In  M arch, 1921, he issued an O rder establishing an I 
elected committee to supervise the adm inistration of the Awqaf, | 
or Moslem religious endowments, and  the appointment of ' 
judges of the Shari’a, o r Moslem religious, Courts. The terms I 
of this O rder were severely criticized by the leading Arabs, I 
and in D ecem ber, 1921, a  new O rder was issued creating I 
a  Supreme Moslem Council in whose constitution the Govern- r 
m ent was to have no voice and  over whose administration I 
of the A w qaf the Governm ent would have no control. It must I 
have been evident from the outset th a t the position of thel 
President of this Council, if he were supported by a majority I 
of his colleagues, would be one of considerable power and|
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;tige. H e would have the A w qaf funds a t his com m and,
these were to  grow till in 1936 they am ounted to no less 
3 £67,000 a year. And he would enjoy the right of appoint­
ant! dismissing the judges and other officers of the Shari’a 
irts, whose annual emoluments am ount to a to tal of over 
,000. In  1921 H aj Amin Eff. el Husseini, a w hole-hearted 
b nationalist, who had  been appointed Mufti of Jerusalem , 
also elected President of the Supreme Moslem Council, 
has continued to hold both offices ever since.*
1. There were other proofs of the G overnm ent's desire 
conciliate A rab opinion. The ill-fated proposal made in 
2 to establish a Legislative Council was m eant prim arily 
please the A rab politicians. F o r the A rab agricul- 
sts substantial relief was accorded by the reduction of 
tithe, which was the tax  they chiefly felt, from 12J per 
t. to 10 per cent. : and one case of disputed land-ownership, 
Beisan case, in which A rab public opinion was deeply 
:rested, was settled on term s very favourable to the A rab 
dvators.f The rap id  development of social services 
reover, though dictated by the general duty of the Govern- 
at towards the whole population of the country and not 
cifically by  the need of conciliating the A rabs, was bound, 
ras felt, to have a conciliatory effect. New roads, new 
ipitals and health-services, new schools, a new regime of 
lal law and justice—these were the fruits of British admini- 
ition; and although the Jewish im m igrants only paid as 
a fraction of the taxes which financed it, this fraction was 
;ady out of proportion to their num bers. And, finally, 
se influences for peace and harm ony in Palestine had  been 
aigthened by  the attitude adopted by the Government in 
gland. I t  w as hoped that the “  Statem ent of Policy "  of 
!2, while firmly re-asserting the G overnm ent's adherence to 
: Balfour D eclaration, had  robbed it of much of its sting 
the moderate definition it contained of the N ational Home.
22. In the light of all these favouring factors, Sir H erbert 
muel, at the completion of his five years of office, reported 
narked  im provem ent in the A rab attitude. The extravagant 
irs of 1921 had  not been realized. T rust in the honest intentions 
the British Government had  been strengthened. The attitude 
the Arab Executive, it is true, was still uncompromising, 
t its influence was apparently  declining. A new and more 
derate party , the N ational P arty , had been form ed by the 
ishashibi faction. An increasing num ber of thoughtful A rabs, 
rticu larly  those whose economic interests were not in conflict 
th th e  economic interests of the Jews, were beginning, he
♦ .  See pages 177-180 below, 
t  See Section 4(c) o f Chapter IX .
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believed, to  th ink  th a t Jewish im m igration m ight after a l l l  
prom ote the welfare of A rab as well as Jew . I
2 3 . Deeds are m ore significant than  words, and  th e  b e s t !  
evidence of the hopes entertained twelve years ago w as t h e l 1 
m arked reduction in the forces available for the m ain ten a n ce *  
of law and order. The garrison, in  Palestine and  Trans-J o r d a n ,®  
which in 1 9 2 1  had  consisted of three infantry  b a t ta l io n s ,  a n * :  
three cavalry regiments with artillery and  attached t r o o p s !  
had  been reduced by the end of 1 9 2 6  to a single sq u a d ro n  o | c 
the Royal A ir Force and two com panies of armoured c a r s ! "  
the British gendarm erie had  been disbanded and th e  B r i t i s £ |ri 
as  well as the Palestinian element in the police d im in is h e d ! ,1 
and ten of the twenty-nine British district officers serving i !  
1 9 2 0  had  been replaced by Palestinians, A rab and  Jew. ! ?
optim ism  prevalent in 1925. B u t i t  is quite clear to m 
now, with our knowledge of w hat has happened since, that 
w hatever tem porary im provem ents in  the situation mai 
have been effected, the root of the problem remained ud 
touched. The dom inant force in  the m ind of educated Arab] 
was the spirit of A rab nationalism. I t  had been intensified, a| 
has been seen, by  the events of the W ar, and  it had not in and 
degree been w eakened by  anything th a t had  happened after itl 
The clearest dem onstration of this was the definite, logical anl 
unw avering attitude of the A rab Executive to the proposal t | 
establish a Legislative Council. The first com m unication 
addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mrl 
Churchill) by  the delegation which the Executive sent to Londoj 
a t the beginning of 1922 opened with the following sta tem en t:-!
“ W h ilst th e  position  in  P alestine is , as it  stands to-day, with til 
B ritish  G overnm ent holding authority b y  an occupying force, a il 
using th a t authority  to  im pose upon th e  people against their wish* 
a great im m igration o f a lien  Jew s, m any of them  of a  Bolshevik revel 
lu tionary typ e, no constitu tion  w hich w ould fall short of giving tie 
P eople o f P alestine fu ll control of their ow n affairs could be acceptable
" I f  th e B ritish  G overnm ent w ould revise their present policy i l  
P alestin e, end th e  Z ionist con-dom inium , p u t a  stop to  all alien imml 
gration and grant th e  People o f P alestine— w ho by Right a *  
Experience are th e  b est judges o f w hat is good and bad for thee 
country— E xecu tive and L egislative powers, th e  term s of a const™  
tion  could be discussed in  a different atm osphere. If to-day tie  
P eople o f P alestin e assented to  any constitu tion  w hich fell short ■  
giving them  fu ll control of their own affairs th ey  w ould be in t *  
position of agreeing to  an instrum ent of G overnm ent w hich might, a *  
probably w ould, be used to  sm other th eir  national life under a HwB 
o f alien im m igration .” -, I
2. The Situation in 1925.
24. I t  is easy to be wise after the event, and we do not mea 
to  suggest th a t there was no foundation for the cautioi
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In the course of the subsequent discussions it appeared tha t 
this w as in fact a  claim for immediate and complete national 
self-government, and th a t it was based on two m ain legal or 
quasi-legal contentions. F irst, it was asserted th a t Palestine 
was included in the body of A rab States which had  been 
proinised independence by  the McMahon Agreement.* 
Secondly, it was m aintained th a t Palestine was one of the
1 communities form erly belonging to the Turkish Em pire "  
mentioned in Article 2 2  of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
whose “ existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of adm inistrative advice 
and assistance by a M andatory until such time as they are able 
to stand alone ” —a status obviously quite different from  tha t 
which Palestine then possessed. Mr. Churchill's reply to the 
first of these contentions was that in the view of H is M ajesty's 
Government “  Palestine west of the Jo rdan  was excluded from 
Sir H. McMahon's pledge " .  As to the second contention, 
“There is no question ” , he said, "  of treating the people 
of P alestine as less a d v a n c e d  than their neighbours in  'I ra q  a n d  
Syria . . . [but] it is quite clear tha t the creation a t this stage 
of a national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the 
ledge made by  the British Government to the Jew ish people ' ' .  
view of the open opposition of the A rab leaders to Jew ish 
igration, nobody could question the tru th  of this last state- 
ent, nor could anyone fail to draw  from it the obvious inference, 
e A rab  delegates prom ptly grasped it and  underlined it. 
‘The above statem ent ” , they wrote “ constitutes the strongest 
roof th a t  the Jew ish N ational Home is the cause of depriving 
of our natural right of establishing an independent govem - 
ent the same as M esopotamia and the H edjaz ” . And again,
1 We can find no reason for this delay [in conceding national 
dependence] bu t in the eagerness of the Government to allow 
"eto elapse during which Jew s will have increased in num bers 
d the powers of Zionism become more established in the 
-d.”
25. W e believe th a t the  British Governm ent and Parliam ent 
ave a lw ay s m aintained the m oral assumption on which, as 
lained above, the M andate was based, nam ely, th a t in course 
ftime A ra b s  and Jew s could and would sink their differences in 
common Palestinian citizenship. I t  was for the achievem ent 
f that concord, not merely for the further growth in size and  
ength of the N ational Home, th a t they insisted on delay, 
other words a national self-government could not be estab- 
ed in Palestine as long as it would be used to frustrate the 
“ ose of the Balfour D eclaration. Even so, the crux was plain 
oiigh to Arab eyes. I t  was the Balfour D eclaration and its
* See pages 19 to  20 above.
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em bodim ent in  the d raft M andate and nothing else which 
seemingly prevented their attain ing a similar m e a su re  of 
independence to th a t which other A rab communities already 
enjoyed. A nd their reaction to this crux was logical. They 
repudiated the Balfour D eclaration. They protested against 
its im plem entation in the d raft M andate. “  The p eop le  of 
Palestine " ,  they said, “  cannot accept the creation of a 
N ational Hom e for the Jew ish people in Palestine” . And 
they refused to co o p era te  in any form of government other 
than  a  national governm ent responsible to the Palestin ian  | 
people.
26. The British Governm ent were not deterred by the intransi­
gence of the A rab Executive from pursuing the policy they had 
fram ed. The m ain positive proposal of Mr. Churchill's State­
m ent of Policy was the establishm ent of a Legislative Council 
to consist of Moslem A rabs, Christian A rabs, and J e w s  and] 
officials, with the H igh Commissioner presiding; and elections 
for it were held in due course in 1923. B ut the great m ajority I 
of the Arabs refused to vote, whereupon the proceedings were 
nullified by O rder in Council, and an attem pt was m ad e  to 
reconstitute the A dvisory Council by  nom inating unofficial 
members on the same representative basis as that of th e  pro­
posed Legislative Council. The H igh Commissioner invited 
ten m oderate-m inded A rabs to become members, eight Moslems 
and  two Christians. All the invitations were accepted, but 
under pressure from  the A rab Executive seven were withdraw n. 
The nom ination of unofficial members was accordingly aban­
doned: and the A dvisory Council rem ained, and has to th is  day J 
rem ained, a council of officials only.
27. In  the course of 1923 the difficulty of securing A ra b  co-1 
operation was m ade still clearer. Impressed b y  the 
emphasis la id  by  the A rab delegation in the p r e v io u s  year! 
on the powers possessed by  the Zionist E x e c u t iv e  ini 
Palestine, the Duke of Devonshire, who had succeeded! 
Mr. Churchill a t the Colonial Office, proposed th a t  an I 
A rab Agency should be established, "  which will occupy I 
a position exactly analogous to th a t accorded to thel 
Jewish Agency under Article 4  of the M andate T h e  H ighl 
Commissioner was to nom inate the members of the A g e n c y  “ ini 
consultation with the local leaders ” . This proposal, it was I 
pointed out, was “  a great concession to A rab s e n t im e n t" ,I 
and it would not be pursued if it were not certain to b e  “ loyally I 
implemented by the A rabs themselves ” . The offer was expla ined ! 
by the High Commissioner to a  gathering of 26 Arab leaders.! 
Although several of them  belonged to the moderate school,! 
and although such conciliatory force as the “  Churchill State-! 
m ent of Policy ”  contained had  by now had  time to take effect! 
“  the meeting w as unanim ous in declining to accept the offer of I 
an  A rab Agency which would not satisfy the aspirations of the| 
A rab people ” .
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28. In a telegram of the 9th N ovem ber, 1923, the Duke of 
Devonshire enum erated the three proposals m ade “ with a  view 
to closer association of A rab community with adm inistration 
of Palestine " ,  the Legislative Council, the enlarged Advisory 
Council, and the A rab Agency. “  Towards all these proposals 
Arabs have adopted sam e attitude, viz., refusal to co-operate. 
His Majesty's Governm ent have been reluctantly driven to 
conclusion tha t further efforts on similar lines would be useless 
and they have accordingly decided not to repeat the attem pt.” 
As regards constitutional development the deadlock was 
complete.
29. Two years later the position was the same. The only 
hope of progress lay in the emergence of a  moderate A rab party . 
But the  history of nationalist movements in all parts of the 
world goes to show tha t in a  struggle for national independence 
it is always easier for the extrem ist than  for the m oderate to 
secure the allegiance of his people. And the reason is plain. 
The mainspring of nationalism  in revolt is the desire of a people 
not m ere ly  for freedom  b u t for that equal status w ith other 
self-governing peoples which freedom implies. And, if freedom 
can be, equality cannot be, a  m atter of degree. E very time, 
therefore, tha t a  m oderate nationalist appeals to his people to 
accept something less than  national independence, he is invari­
ably outbidden by  the extrem ist who dem ands it in full.
30. In Palestine, m oreover, the prospects of a m oderate 
nationalism, ready to acquiesce in a more or less indefinite 
postponement of independence, were prejudiced from  the outset 
by the fact that the problem of Palestine was not a problem  that 
concerned Palestine alone. We do not refer to its unique religious 
standing in the w orld, to the feeling in the hearts of count­
less men and women outside its borders for a  land th a t is 
sacred to three faiths. W e believe th a t this aspect of the problem 
has always been and still is susceptible of treatm ent by general 
consent. The religious significance of the country, it is true, 
is closely associated with both A rab and Jewish nationalism , 
and it can be perverted by reckless extremists to excite the less 
cool-headed adherents of both. B ut it need not be, and except 
on one unhappy occasion* it has not been up to the present, 
1 dominant factor in the exacerbation of the problem. W hat we
ean when we say th a t the problem  extends beyond Palestine 
that it involves no t only the Arabs and the Jew s in the country, 
nt also the A rabs and the Jew s outside it. The situation in 
alestme, therefore, has never been stable. On the one hand, 
6 Zionist movement, supported as time passed by  a growing 
dy of World Jew ry, was unceasingly and insistently pressing
* See page 67 below.
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to get more and more Jew s into the country: so tha t moderate 
Arab nationalists were not confronted merely with a certain 
num ber of Jew s in Palestine at a certain time. They were 
bound to look abroad and ahead and to contemplate, however 
reassuring the 1922 Statem ent of Policy might seem to be, at 
best a  steadily continued, a t worst a largely increased, inflow 
of Jew s, which would drastically alter the existing balance 
between the races ; and they were bound, therefore, to find it 
difficult to disagree, and to persuade their fellow A ra b s  to 
disagree, with the extremists who said tha t Jewish im m igration 
m ust be stopped and th a t it could only be stopped by  th e  attain­
m ent of independence. On the o ther side A rab nationalism was 
exposed to the pressure of events in all th e  neighbouring  
countries. N orth and east and south-east lay Syria, Trans­
jo rd a n , ‘Iraq , the W ahabi Kingdom and the Kingdom of the 
H edjaz, all A rab lands; and south-west lay Egypt, la rg e ly  Arab 
in blood, m ainly Moslem in faith. W ith all these p e o p le s  the 
Arabs of Palestine were in constant touch. Travel by a ir  had 
not become the commonplace it is to-day; bu t ’Iraq  was already 
linked with Syria by  a  motor-service across the desert. A n d  with 
Syria Palestine was intim ately connected. U ntil the post-war 
settlement they h ad  belonged for centuries to a  single territorial 
entity. Many of the leading A rabs in the two countries belonged 
to the same families. Commercial and professional intercourse 
was close and frequent. Im portan t happenings in Syria, there­
fore, instantly affected Palestine, and vice versa; and th e re  was 
a  similar, if not always quite so strong, reciprocal reac tio n  of 
events throughout the A rab world and in Egypt.
31. Nowhere, as it happened, was the spirit of nationalism! 
more acute after the W ar than in this area of the N e a r  and! 
Middle E ast. In  all of its constituent territories, except Trans-I 
Jo rdan , there were serious disturbances, and in  all o f them,! 
except Palestine, there was a m arked advance towards! 
self-government. Trouble came first in Egypt, which had! 
become a  British Protectorate at the end of 1914. Withl 
this regime post-w ar Egyptian patriots were far fro m  satis-l 
fied, and in 1919 the organization of the nationalist movementl 
under Zaghlul Pasha, aiming a t complete and  immediate indeJ 
pendence, led to w idespread rioting and bloodshed. In 1920 thel 
Milner Mission recom mended recognition of Egypt as a| 
sovereign independent State under certain conditions, and ini 
1922 this recognition was accorded b y  a unilateral declaration 
by  the British Government. The Protectorate was abolishefl 
and E gypt declared an independent sovereign State, subject t e  
the reservation of four points to the absolute discretion of the  
British Government pending agreem ent in regard thereto. These 
were the security of the com munications of the British Empire! 
the defence of E gypt against foreign aggression or interference!
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the protection of British interests and of Minorities, and the 
Sudan. The declaration was never accepted by the nationalists. 
A long series of political outrages followed, culminating 
in th e  murder of Sir Lee Stack in 1 9 2 4 .  Severe measures 
w ere taken by  the British Government: “  terrorism  ”  was 
crushed  or driven underground: but in 1 9 2 5 ,  though Zaghlul 
was no longer in office, the nationalists could still count on the 
support of the great m ajority of the Egyptian people.
32. The situation in Syria was even more disturbed. F rom  the 
first, it will be rem embered, the Syrians had  rejected the idea 
of Mandatory governm ent and  dem anded national independence; 
and it was only after some fighting th a t the French were able 
in 1920 to occupy Damascus and  compel K ing Feisal to leave 
the country. D uring the next four years the French M andatory 
administration was organized on a  basis of territorial division, 
under which four “  states ”  were ultim ately constituted—a 
large inland “  Syria ”  ; two small sea-board “  states ” , Lebanon 
(where the tradition of French friendship was oldest and strong­
est) and an Alouite "  state ”  north of Lebanon; and  a separate 
endave in the hill-country for the Druses. In  each of these units 
elected Representative Councils had  been established by 1925; 
the administration was in the hands of A rab ministers; and the 
powers of the French officials were nominally limited to super­
vision and advice. Despite this substantial measure of self- 
government a dangerous insurrection, started by the Druses, 
broke out in the sum m er of 1925. I t  was m arked at the outset 
by the defeat of a French column with 800 casualties and the 
siege of several isolated garrisons. The most startling incident 
of the protracted fighting which ensued was the French bom bard­
ment of Damascus in October. B y the end of 1925, though the 
situation had been im proved by M. de Jouvenel’s attem pts to 
revert to “  constitutional ”  methods, the trouble was not ended 
d guerilla w arfare still continued. I t  was clear not only to 
ranee but to the A rab world th a t the task of m aintaining the 
"andate in the teeth of Syrian nationalism  was difficult and 
stty.
33. T h e  sym pathy of the Palestinian Arabs with their kinsmen 
Syria had been plainly shown throughout this period. Both 
oples clung to the principle th a t Palestine was p a rt of Syria 
d sho u ld  never have been cut off from it. Feisal was pro­
aimed King by a Syrian Congress which included Palestinians, 
other Syro-Palestinian Congress was founded a t Geneva in 
921. In 1925 an effective “  general strike ”  was organized in 
alestine in sym pathy with the Arab revolt in Syria, and 
otiier in the following year to protest against M. de Jouvenel's 
fficial visit to Jerusalem . And in 1925, when Lord Balfour 
roceeded from Jerusalem  to Damascus, his arrival precipitated 
ch serious rioting th a t French troops had  to be called in and 
own life  was for a time in danger.
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34. If  the sentiment of the Palestinian Arabs was most clearly 
engaged in developments in Syria, it was ‘Iraq  that provided the 
most striking example of w hat A rab nationalism  could achieve. 
In  ‘Iraq , as in Syria, agitation against the M andate policy had 
persisted since the end of the W ar, and the confirmation o f that 
policy a t San Remo in the spring of 1920 aggravated the unrest. 
I t  culminated in the course of the summer in a rebellion so 
vigorous and w idespread tha t it necessitated something like 
the reconquest of the country by a British arm y of some 76,000 
men. Before the fighting was over the British Government had 
decided to m ake far-reaching concessions to the nationalist 
movement. In  October, in place of w hat had  hitherto been  a 
m ainly British adm inistration, more or less on the lines o f that 
of an Indian Province before the W ar, a  provisional C o u n c il of 
State was established, consisting- of A rab ministers, a n d  the 
chief adm inistrative posts in the country districts were similarly 
filled with A rabs, with British officials acting in both cases as 
advisers. This regime prepared the w ay for an A r a b  consti­
tutional m onarchy. In  1921, on the resolution of the State 
Council confirmed by  a plebiscite, Feisal was proclaimed King. 
In  1922, with the approval of the M andates Commission, the d m  
M andate was discarded and in place of it a T reaty o f  Alliance 
between the British Government and the Government o f  ‘Iraq 
was negotiated, under which the form er, while it re ta in e d  a 
m easure of advisory control over foreign, financial and military 
m atters, acknowledged the sovereign independence of ‘I r a q  and 
undertook in due course to facilitate its admission to the League 
of Nations. Thus, a t the end of 1925, ‘Iraq  was almost, if not 
yet quite, a  free and equal m em ber of international society,! 
with an A rab constitutional m onarchy and an Arab cabinet! 
responsible to an elected A rab parliam ent.
35. Less dram atic than events in ‘Iraq , bu t still significant! 
for Palestinian A rabs, was the quiet beginning of a similar I 
regime on a  sm aller scale in T rans-Jordan. I t  remained under! 
M andate—an extension of the M andate for Palestine without! 
the Articles relating to the N ational Home—but the form ofl 
governm ent was wholly different from that of Palestine. Fro
1921 onwards it was headed by an A rab sovereign, thel 
Amir A bdullah, a  brother of K ing Feisal, and in 1923 it was! 
recognized by  the British Government as “ an independent! 
governm ent ” . The British High Commissioner for Palestine! 
retained such ultim ate powers as the continuance of the Man-1 
date with its international obligations implied; bu t the function! 
of the British Resident a t Amman and his handful of British! 
subordinates was to advise, not to govern, and the department 
of the adm inistration were headed by the A m ir’s Arab ministère 
and staffed almost entirely by  the A m ir’s Arab officials. The 
contrast with Palestine was m arked. The A rab who in 192J
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looked beyond Jerusalem  across the valley of the Jo rdan  to the 
uplands beyond looked at a country which for ages before the 
War h a d  been part of Palestine, a  far poorer country in its 
present stage of development than Palestine, a country with a 
population only about one-third of that of Arab Palestine and 
socially a n d  politically more backw ard, yet a  country far more 
advanced than Palestine towards full national freedom.
36. So it was already evident in 1925, that, on its A rab as 
well as its Jew ish side, the problem of Palestine could never 
be a  self-contained, isolated problem. If at the moment 
Palestine could have been so cut off from the r e s t  of the 
world b y  some cataclysm of nature th a t all approach to it or 
communication with it from  outside became impossible, then 
perhaps the two peoples confronting each other within its 
narrow borders might have been forced to m ake the best of 
it and learn to live in harm ony together. As it was, the Jewish 
om m unity in Palestine could not be freed from  its associa­
tion with the hopes and fears and sufferings of Jew s else-
here, nor could the national aspirations of the Palestinian 
abs be secluded from  those of the A rab world all round it.
37. Thus external as well as internal factors were already 
perating in those early days to keep the two races in Palestine 
oof a n d  hostile. A nd it is easier to see now than it was 
en th a t a conflict had  been created between two national 
deals, a n d  tha t under the system imposed by  the M andate 
t could only be resolved if one or both of those ideals were 
bandoned. I f  the Jew s had  come to Palestine willing to 
se their life and culture with A rab life and culture, to accept 
e language of the m ajority, to contemplate the possibility of 
eing some day ruled by  that m ajority, then it is conceivable that 
ey might have been as welcome and successful in Palestine as 
eir ancestors in ‘Iraq  or Egypt or Spain in the early days of the 
iaspora. B ut it would have been wholly unreasonable to
ect such an attitude on their part. I t  would have been 
e direct negation of Zionism, both on its social or political 
d on its cultural side. The Zionists came back to Palestine, 
h the one hand, to escape from an alien environm ent, to 
ake oft the shadow of the ghetto, to free themselves from  all 
e drawbacks of "  m inority life " .  On the other hand, they 
e back inspired with the faith tha t the Jewish genius, 
stored to its old home, could do things com parable with the 
gs it had done in ancient days. Necessarily, therefore, 
e Hebrew language had  to be the language of the N ational 
ome: necessarily Jew ish nationalism  was intensified by  its 
undation. Enlightened im m igrants might take a  highly 
mpathetic interest in A rab life and culture: bu t there could 
no question of a  Jewish fusion or "  assimilation ”  with it, 
1 less of a subordination. The National Home could not
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be half-national. Nor, it need hardly be said, was the idea of 
the A rabs acquiescing on their side in a  fusion of Arab with 
Jewish culture more imaginable. To quote the Arab delegates 
of 1922 again, “  N ature does not allow the creation of a spirit 
of co-operation between two peoples so different
3 8 . The situation a t the end of the first five years of the 
Civil Administration has been described a t some length because 
it is im portant to m ake it clear tha t the situation as we ourselves 
found it eleven years la ter is not a  different situation, brought ! 
about by new or tem porary factors, in Palestine or o u tsid e  it. 1 
I t  is the old situation intensified. Most of w hat has happened I 
since 1925 has been a  repetition, on a steadily increasing scale 
of gravity, of w hat happened before 1925. The p r e s e n t  diffi­
culties of the problem of Palestine were all inherent in it from 
the beginning. Time has not altered, it has only strengthened | 
them.
3.— 1926 to 1929
39. The outstanding feature of the four years after 1925 wasl 
the economic depression which afflicted Palestine and, in par­
ticular, the N ational Home. I t  was not a p art of the world-wide | 
depression which began to operate in the course of 1929, 
the causes of it are difficult to assess with certainty. One factor | 
is undisputed, the collapse of the Polish zloty  and the restric­
tions on currency in E astern  Europe generally, which seriously I 
impoverished the Jewish im m igrants who came from th a t  part] 
of the world and represented about one-half of the total immigra­
tion. W hatever the cause, the result of the depression was a I 
sharp fall in the rate of immigration. In  1925 as m any as 33,8011 
Jew s had entered Palestine and only 2,151 had  left it. In : ' 
the im m igrants num bered 13,081 and the em igrants 7,365. In|
1927 only 2,713 came in, and 5,071, nearly twice as many, 
out. And, despite this ebbing tide, the figure of Jewish unem-l 
ploym ent rose from about 400 a t the beginning of 1925 to  5,0001 
at the end of 1927. Revenue reacted sharply, especially in the| 
return from  im port duties.
T ota l R evenue
(1excluding C ustom s
grants-in-aid) Revenue
£  £
1925-26 ... ... ... ... 2,604,446 886,312
1926-2 7 ............................................2,364,887 803,665
1927 ............................................  1,709,035 569.935
(April to  December)
Efforts were m ade to relieve the prevalent distress, which 1 
accentuated by a  destructive earthquake in 1927. The Govj 
em m ent anticipated its Public W orks programm e in order tn 
provide work and wages for the unemployed. _____
* Omd. 1700. p. 28.
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40. But there were brighter features in the situation which 
s h o w e d  that the disease was by no means m ortal. There was 
a s tead y  increase in production, both agricultural and industrial. 
The index num ber for the agricultural yield of the country 
con tinued  to rise. The extent of orange plantations in 1927 was 
twice as great as it had  been in 1923. The industrial 
returns were equally encouraging. The bigger industries, 
cem ent, flour and soap, increased their trade. The young 
tobacco industry flourished. Even the smaller industries at Tel 
Aviv were increasing their output and extending their m arket in 
Palestine and abroad. Thus, while im ports were falling, exports 
were rising. The value of Palestine products exported was 
£.330,830 in 1925, £1,308,333 in 1926, and £1,889,759 in 1927; 
and o f these the agricultural exports in 1927 exceeded the agri­
cultural imports for the first time since the W ar.
41. The actual growth of the N ational Home, moreover, if 
it had been checked, had  not been stopped. Between 1925 
and 1928 the Jewish population rose from 121,000 to  151,000 
and the area of land in Jewish ownership from 944,000 dunums 
to 1,024,000 dunums.
42. In the spring of 1928 the tide began to turn. Unemploy­
ment steadily declined. The full current of Jewish im migration 
was n o t yet restored : the total of immigrants for the year was 
only 2,178. B ut the outw ard flow had been checked : there were 
ten m o re  immigrants than emigrants. Thus by the middle of
1928 th e  National Home had  survived the worst crisis 
it h ad  so far had  to face; and just at tha t time its moral 
strength was reinforced by  the enlargement of the Jew ish 
Agency. I t  has been observed in an earlier chapter tha t 
the Balfour Declaration had  not been welcomed by all the 
Jews of the Diaspora. A powerful group had been definitely 
opposed to it. B ut in  the years th a t had elapsed this opposition 
had weakened and a  growing num ber of Jews, especially in the 
United States, if still unwilling to subscribe to all the tenets 
of the Zionist creed, were now warm  supporters of the N ational 
Home and anxious to assist in its growth. Co-operation 
between them and the Zionist Organisation was obviously 
desirable. I t  was affirmed in principle by the Zionist Congresses 
of 1925 and 1927 ; and in 1928, as the result of a  full inquiry 
by a Joint Commission and of a series of conferences, a new 
onstitution was adopted giving representative non-Zionists an
ual number of seats with Zionists on all the bodies which 
ontrolled the development of the National Home. This re- 
rganization was endorsed a t the close of the Zionist Congress 
August, 1929. Thus the Jewish Agency in Palestine became 
6wish in a wider sense, and better qualified to mobilize and 
rect the sym pathy and resources of all friends of the N ational 
ome among the Jewish people, in America as well as in Europe.
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43. I t  is significant tha t these years of depression had been 
years of peace. F rom  1926 to 1928 A rab antagonism was rela­
tively quiescent. The official reports for these years record no 
organized protests against Jew ish im migration, nor demands for 
self-government. No meeting of the Palestine A rab Congress 
was held between 1925 and 1928. The Government, it was 
evident, did not believe tha t the troubles of 1920 and 1921 were 
likely to recur; for it kept the forces available for maintaining 
order a t the very low strength to which they had been reduced 
in 1926, and this despite the warning of the Perm anent Mandates 
Commission against the “  danger of not m aintaining adequate 
local forces
44. Various factors contributed, no doubt, to this interlude 
of peace. The Government was steadily pursuing its  ta sk  of 
developing the country and providing public services; a n d  due 
weight m ust be given to the prestige enjoyed by Lord Plumer, 
who was High Commissioner from  1925 to 1928, a n d  to  the 
influence he exercised among all sections of the p o p u la t io n . But 
to ascribe the apparent softening of Arab bitterness only to 
such factors as these was to ignore the root of the p ro b le m  and 
to foster a dangerous illusion of security. I t  stands to re a so n  that 
the m ain cause of A rab quiescence was the sharp decline in the 
fortunes of the N ational Home. F o r a year or two it m u s t  have 
seemed as if their fears had  been exaggerated. The low  rate 
of im m igration in 1926 m eant that, if it continued, th e  Arab 
m ajority in Palestine, already 5 to I , would become a  steadily 
greater m ajority , since the am ount of A rab natural increase 
would exceed the am ount of Jew ish increase natural a n d  immi­
grant together. The prospect seemed still brighter in 1927, when 
over 2,000 more Jew s left Palestine than entered it. I f  this 
w ent on, there was no need for the Arabs to make trouble. The 
N ational Hom e, it seemed, had  proved a failure and was in 
course of dissolution. But, when the depression began to lift, 
when the process of decline was checked, when in 1928 there  was 
a  surplus, m inute though it was, of Jewish immigrants, when 
the early m onths of 1929 witnessed no emigration a t  all, the 
A rab attitude quickly changed. The old fears were re-awakened. 
The old antagonism  revived.
45. Nor was it only the internal factors which b ro u g h t the 
peaceful interlude to a  sudden and violent end in the s u m m e r  of 
1929. The external factors played their part. On the one hand, 
the enlargement of the basis of the Jewish Agency was not 
unnoticed by  the Arabs. They knew it m eant an in c re a se  in the 
pressure of W orld Jew ry  on Palestine and  in th e  material 
resources behind it. They saw, too, tha t it had  r e v iv e d  th e  self- 
confidence, not to say aggressiveness, of the le ss-re s tra in ed  
inhabitants of the N ational Home. On the other hand, the forces
* Perm anent M andates Commission, 1926. Minutes, p. 184.
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of nationalism and self-government in neighbouring countries 
were making new advances. In  Trans-Jordan the regime of 
" independent governm ent ”  established in 1923 was confirmed 
on the 20th February , 1928, by a form al Agreement between 
His Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Amir, and an 
Organic Law came provisionally into force, establishing inter alia 
a Legislative Council consisting of elected representative of the 
people together with the A m ir’s Ministers. In  E gyp t a Treaty 
of Alliance was agreed upon by the British Foreign Secretary and 
the Egyptian Prem ier in 1927, which, though it failed to meet 
the full nationalist claims and was presently withdrawn, em­
bodied substantial concessions on the British side. E gypt was 
to enter the League of N ations without delay, and the vexed 
question of the locality of the British garrison was to 
he reconsidered in ten years’ time.* In  ‘Iraq  the advance was 
still more m arked. By successive agreements from 1926 
onwards the British Government had undertaken to bring the 
quasi-Mandatory position to an end and to promote the entry 
of ‘Iraq into the League a t as early a  date as the progress of the 
country justified. But, in view of the nationalist dem and for a  
more specific pledge, a  new Treaty was signed in  the sum m er 
of 1930, committing the British Government to recommend 
'Iraq ’s admission to the League without any proviso in 1932. 
Even in troubled Syria, always closest to A rab Palestine in senti­
ment as in physical fact, the prospects of nationalism  were 
brightening. The French Government, doubtless impressed by 
the course of events in 'I ra q , set itself wholeheartedly to come 
to terms with Syrian nationalism , and in 1928 a Constituent 
Assembly was set up to draft a constitution in accordance with 
Syrian ideas. Certain articles in the draft went too far to accord 
with French M andatory obligations, and nothing came of it for 
the moment. B ut in opening the Assembly the H igh Commis­
sioner had revealed tha t a modification or term ination of the 
Mandate was already contemplated. H e had  declared “ tha t 
when the Assembly had  completed its task, the time would have 
arrived for placing the relations between Syria and France on the 
basis of a treaty Thus, in 1929, as in 1925, among all 
that group of kindred countries it was only in Palestine that no 
advance whatever had  been m ade towards popular governm ent 
or national independence.
46. The starting-point of the series of events which culm ina­
ted in the disastrous outbreak in August, 1929, was an incident 
which occurred in Jerusalem  on the 24th September, 1928, the 
Jewish Day of Atonement. In  accordance with immemorial 
usage, a service was held on that day in front of the W ailing 
Wall, a lofty wall of massive stone blocks which is sacred to the
* Further negotiations took  place in  1929 and in 1930 agreem ent was. 
cached on all questions except th e  future of th e Sudan.
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Jew s as having once been part of the Temple exterior, and 
sacred to the Moslems as constituting the W estern face of the 
platform  of the Haram-esh-Sharif. I t  is Moslem property; but 
since the Middle Ages, if not earlier times, the Jews have enjoyed 
the right of access to the narrow  pavem ent below the W all in 
order to p ray  there. B ut the Moslem authorities had insisted, 
and  the Turkish Government had agreed, that no chairs,benches! 
screens and so forth were to be set up on the pavement. Thé 
B ritish A dm inistration, mindful of its obligations under Article 
13 of the M andate, had decided strictly to m aintain the status 
quo. W hen, therefore, it was reported on the evening of the 
23rd September th a t the Jews had introduced a screen to divide 
the men from  the women, orders were given for its removal. 
B ut the Jews did not remove it, and it was forcibly re m o v e d  by 
the police in  the course of the service on the 24th.
47. N othing more occurred, and  to the uninstructed it might 
w ell have seemed a very trivial incident. B ut in Palestine 
i t  cannot be forgotten tha t the Haram-esh-Sharif was once  the 
s ite  of the Temple. No m oderate-m inded Zionist, we a re  con­
vinced, w hatever symbolic language he m ay use, w o u ld  con­
tem plate in  these days the actual restoration of the Temple. 
B u t m any less responsible Jews thought otherwise and had 
said  or w ritten words to tha t effect; and, while moderate-minded 
A rabs m ight not be unreasonably alarm ed, there were extremist 
A rabs ready to believe the worst and to pass it on to the credu­
lous and fanatical country folk throughout the land. So far, 
fortunately, this highly incendiary element of religion h a d  had 
little to do with the growth of Arab antagonism  to the National 
Hom e. In  Palestine, as elsewhere in the Moslem world, nation­
alism had been more political than religious. B ut, if the religious 
cry  were raised, if it were widely and genuinely believed th a t  the 
coming of the Jew s to the country would m ean not merely their 
economic and  political ascendancy bu t also the full re-estab- 
lishm ent of ancient Judaism , the invasion and desecration of the 
H oly Place, and the rebuilding of the Temple on its original site, 
then there could be little doubt tha t Arab hostility would be 
more unanim ous, m ore fanatical, and more desperate than 
it had ever yet been.
48. The Jew ish authorities at once realized the danger latent 
in the incident. The Zionist O rganisation, in a d d r ess in g  a j 
protest to the League of N ations against the removal of the 
screen, took occasion to repudiate in vigorous term s t h e  sugges­
tion tha t the Jews intended "  to menace the inviolability of the 
Moslem Holy Place and in an open letter to th e  Moslems 
o f Palestine the Va ad Leum i, while asking that J e w is h  rights 
a t  the Wailing W all should b e  respected, declared "  em phatically  
an d  sincerely th a t no Jew  has ever thought of encroaching upon
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the rights of Moslems over their own Holy Places ” .* B ut the 
îarm  had been done. H aj Amin Eff. Husseini, still Mufti of 
erusalem and still President of the Supreme Moslem Council,, 
tod his fellow-leaders had  determined to make the m ost of it. 
’ro tests were m ade to the Palestine Governm ent; a  telegram 
was sent to the King, “  alleging tha t there were repeated en­
croachments by  Jew s at the W all ” ; and the Mufti, addressing 
the Officer acting for the absent H igh Commissioner, declared 
in the  name of the Supreme Moslem Council the Moslem belief 
“ th a t  the Jew s’ aim is to take possession of the Mosque 
of Al-Aqsa g ra d u a lly ." ( j)  On the is t  November a  General 
Moslem Conference m et, the Mufti of Jerusalem  presiding, and  
addressed further protests to the League of N ations and resolved
o establish a “  Society for the Protection of the Moslem H oly 
’laces Further fuel was added to the flames in the course 
of the  next few m onths by building operations and other “  inno­
vations ” carried out by the Moslems in the neighbourhood of 
he Wailing W all, which the Jew s believed to be deliberately 
intended to interfere with their devotions. An attem pt by the  
Government to settle the various questions in dispute by  m utual 
agreem ent between the two communities was baffled as m uck 
)y Jewish reluctance as by Arab.
49. Meanwhile politics h ad  begun to play their p a rt in alliance 
with religion. The A rab Executive set itself early in 1929 to 
m g  about a  revival of nationalist agitation throughout the 
country; and for th a t purpose branches of certain Moslem 
societies were established in  the larger provincial towns. The 
mmary objective of this agitation was the old objective, nat- 
onal self-government; and, when L ord Plum er left office at: 
the end of 1928, the A rab Executive lost no time in pressing 
on Sir John Chancellor, the new High Commissioner, a request 
or the re-opening of negotiations for the establishm ent of a  
Representative Assembly.
50. T h e  immediate prelude to the outbreak of disorder in 
August, 1929, was a  provocative demonstration and counter­
dem onstra tion  of Jew ish and  Arab nationalism  respectively. 
)n the 15th August the Jew s m arched in procession to th e  
Wailing Wall. On the next day th e  Arabs did likewise. A 
week later the fire which had  so long been kindling burst in to  
flame. From the 23rd to the 29th August m urderous attacks, 
were m a d e  on the Jew s in various parts of the country. T h e  
most violent were directed not against the new settlements b u t 
against th e  old-established Jew ish communities in the A rab 
lill-country at H ebron and Safad. At H ebron over 60 Jew s 
were k illed , including women and children, and more than 50.
* Shaw  Report, Cmd. 3530, p. 30. 
t  Ibid, p. 31.
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the one British police officer in  the town prevented t  outbreak I  
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were killed or wounded, and  there was similar l ti   I  
destruction in the Jew ish quarter. Less sanguinary outbreaks I  
occurred a t Jerusalem  and Jaffa. In  the rural ar  s r l I  
Jew ish colonies were attacked and six of the  irt ll  I  
destroyed. There was little retaliation by the Jew s.  t I  
cases were a t Jaffa , where an  A rab Im am  and som   t  I  
were killed, and a t Jerusalem , where a mosque of great antiquity I  
was dam aged and  desecrated. I
51. W hen peace had  been restored with the help I 
rushed up from  E gypt, it was reckoned tha t 133 Jew  I  
killed and  339 wounded. Of the Arabs, as far as coul I  
tained, 1 x 6  had  been killed and  232 wounded. As in I  
m ajority of A rab casualties were inflicted by the troop . I  
In  the subsequent judicial proceedings 27 death-sente I  
m urder were finally confirmed, one of them  on a Je I  
A rabs were hanged:, the rest of the sentences were  I  
by  the High Commissioner to term s of im prisonment. ■
52. In  the report of the Commission of Enquiry , u n d e r  Sir I  
W alter Shaw, which visited Palestine from October to I  
December, 1929, the causes of the outbreak were clearly stated. I  
“  There can, in our view, be no doubt tha t racial animosity on I  
the p art of the A rabs, consequent upon the disappointment of I  
their political and national aspirations and fea I  
economic future, was the fundam ental cause of the I  
August last.”  On the political side, the Commission  I  
out tha t the schism between the races was a  development of post-1  
w ar days and was m ainly due to the conflict betwee ter-1  
pretations placed by A rab and  Jew ish nationalists I  
on the war-time pledges given by the British Govern E  
following sentence deserves special attention. “  I  
Home for the Jew s, in the sense in which it was wi - B 
stood, was inconsistent with the dem ands of Arab ti lists H  
while the claims of A rab nationalism , if adm itted, ■  
rendered impossible the fulfilment of the pledge to  .  I  
On the economic side the Commissioners reported : I
" In pre-war days th e  Jew s in  P alestine, regarded collectively, bad I  
form ed an unobtrusive m inority; individually m any of t   ^H r  
dependent on charity for their living, w hile m any of th e re ainder- 
in  particular th e colonists— brought direct and obvious material benefits 
to  th e  inhabitants of th e  area in w hich th ey  settled . The Jewish 
im m igrant of th e  post-w ar period, on th e  other hand, is a person of 
greater energy and in itia tive than were th e  m ajority of the Jewish 
com m unity  of pre-war days. H e represents a m ovem e t create   
an  im portant international organization supported b y  f  i ,
* Shaw R eport (Cmd. 3530), p. 64.
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judged by Arab standards, seem  inexhaustible. To th e  Arabs it  
must appear im probable th a t such com petitors w ill in  years to  com e 
be content to  share th e  country w ith them . These fears have been  
intensified by th e m ore extrem e statem ents of Z ionist policy  and the  
Arabs have com e to  see in th e  Jew ish im m igrant n ot on ly  a m enace to  
their livelihood but a  possible overlord of th e  future."
53. These pohtical and economic fears, the R eport explained, 
had been intensified on the one hand by the num ber of Jewish 
immigrants who, despite the set-back of 1926-8, had already 
settled in the country, and on the other hand by the am ount 
of land they had already acquired.
“ Though Jew ish im m igration and enterprise have been of great 
advantage to  P alestine, the direct benefit to  individual Arabs, w hich  
alone is likely to  be appreciated, has been sm all, alm ost negligible, by  
comparison w ith w hat it m ight h ave been had th e  pre-war m ethods 
of settlem ent been continued. W hen trade depression and unem ploy­
ment followed the period of h eavy  im m igration the indirect benefits 
which Jewish activ ities had brought to  m any parts o f P alestine were 
forgotten and everyw here am ong the Arab people th e Zionist m ovem ent 
was regarded as the cause of th e  econom ic problem s o f th e  country. 
The sale of th e Sursock lands and other Jewish land purchases in  
districts where th e soil is m ost productive were regarded as show ing  
that the im migrants would not be content to  occupy undeveloped  
areas and that econom ic pressure upon th e  Arab population w as likely  
to increase.
“ In other words, those consequences of Jew ish enterprise w hich  
have m ost closely affected th e  Arab people have been such th a t the  
Arab leaders could use them  as th e  m eans of im pressing upon their 
followers th at a  continuance of Jew ish im m igration and land purchases 
could have no other result than th a t th e  Arabs w ould in tim e be 
deprived of their livelihood and th a t th ey , and their country, m ight 
ultimately come under th e  political dom ination of th e  Jew s. R acial 
antipathy needed no other stim ulus, b u t i t  w as further encouraged  
by a spirit of m utual intolerance w hich has unfortunately been a 
marked feature of the past decade in  Palestine. From  th e beginning  
the two races had no com m on interest. T h ey differed in  language, 
in religion, and in outlook. Only b y  m utual toleration and b y  com ­
promise could th e  v iew s of th e  leaders of the tw o peoples have been  
reconciled and a jo in t endeavour for th e  com m on good have been  
brought about. Instead, neither side had m ade any sustained a ttem p t 
to improve racial relationships. The Jew s, prom pted b y  eager desire 
to see their hopes fulfilled, have pressed on w ith a  policy  at least as 
comprehensive as the W hite Paper o f 1922 can warrant. The Arabs, 
with unrelenting opposition, have refused to  accept th a t docum ent 
and have prosecuted a political cam paign designed to  counter Jewish  
activities and to  realize their own political am bitions.”
54. Subsequent events, in our opinion, have confirmed the 
th of these observations, which again revealed the real 
avity of the problem. The hopes on which the optimism 
f 1925 had rested had  been shown to be illusory. The 
‘nse of peace and security which had  inspired the reduc- 
on of the garrison had  proved false and dangerous. So far 
om drawing together during the last four years, the races 
ad drifted further apart. And the breach had been widened 
ar beyond its breadth in 1025 bv  the events of 1928-9, first
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the emergence of the religious factor, and then the actual out­
break of m urder and  destruction and its forcible repression. 
F or some time to come, a t any rate, all possibility of co-opera­
tion, even in the economic field where its chances seemed most 
favourable, was eliminated. Reciprocal "  boycotts ” of Arab 
and Jew ish trade were organized. Jewish merchants at 
Jerusalem  abandoned their establishments in the Old City and 
started afresh in the new commercial quarter outside the walls. 
Jewish shopkeepers moved from Jaffa to Tel Aviv. In every 
respect the schism between the two peoples was now open 
and undisguised.
4. The Controversy of 1930.
55. By the opening months of 1930, though race-feeling was 
still b itter and its expression in the newspapers still virulent, the 
tension had  somewhat relaxed. The A rab trade-boycott, which 
had  been stricter and had lasted longer than the Je w is h  one, 
gradually died out; and the influence of common economic 
interests was again perceptible. I t  was as if something like an 
armistice had  been declared pending the publication of th e  Shaw 
R eport and the Governm ent’s decision on it. B ut it w a s  only a 
truce, not peace. There was no question of co m p ro m ise  or 
co-operation. W hen an International Commission a rriv ed  in 
Palestine in Ju n e  to deal with the question of the Wailing Wall, 
the Government’s attem pt to persuade the A rab and Jewish I 
leaders to come together and fram e a voluntary agreement on the I 
m atter instead of having a decision imposed on them fro m  above I 
was a  complete failure. At the end of the year the Commission I 
reported, and its recommendations were adopted. T h o u g h  Arab I 
fears of far-reaching Jewish designs on the Haram-esh-Sharif I 
have never been dissipated and were indeed expressed in Arab I 
evidence before us, on this particular question of the Wailing I 
Wall there has been no serious controversy since. j
56. The Shaw R eport appeared in March. I t  attributed , as I 
has been seen, the m ain cause of the outbreak to  Arab I  
antagonism to the N ational Home, as being on the one hand an I  
obstacle to the attainm ent of their national independence and as I  
tending, on the other hand, through the increase of immigra-1 
tion and land-purchase, to lead to their economic and political ■  
subjection. In  fact the findings of the Shaw Commission, 1  
though they were the fruit of a longer and fuller in vestigation ,! 
w e r e  virtually identical with those of the H aycraft Commission. 1  
In  1921 and 1929 the same causes had  the same results. A sl 
will presently be seen, the same causes were to have the sam el 
results in 1933 and 1936. I
57. The main recommendations of the R eport were
issue of a  clear statem ent of the policy which His M ajesty $ ■
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Government intend to be pursued in Palestine . . . with the 
least possible delay including a definition of the m eaning of 
the passages in the M andate which purported to safeguard the 
interests of the “  non-Jewish communities (2) a revision of 
the methods of regulating immigration to prevent “  a  repetition 
of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926 ”  and to provide 
for consultation with non-Je  wish representatives with regard to 
it: (3) the initiation of a scientific expert inquiry into "  the pros­
pects of introducing im proved methods of cultivation in Pales­
tine ” , and the regulation of land-policy in accordance with the 
results : (4) a re-affirmation of the statem ent made in 1922 that 
" the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation by 
the Mandate does not entitle it to share in any degree in the 
government of Palestine
58. As far as it went, the Shaw Report was not unsatisfactory 
to the Arabs. In  particular it had  raised their hopes by express­
ing the opinion that Jew ish im migration had been “  exces­
sive ” in the past; and they were still further encouraged when 
the issue of immigration certificates was suspended until Sir 
John Hope Simpson, who arrived in Palestine in May to 
conduct the inquiry recommended by  the Shaw Commission, 
had completed his work. His Report was published in October, 
and once more, it seemed, it was the A rab rather than the 
Jewish point of view that had  prevailed. F o r th a t Report was 
based on a calculation which, if it were accurate, cut at the 
very root of the N ational Home. I t  had  hitherto been taken for 
granted that a  substantial am ount of cultivable land was still 
available for the further expansion of Jew ish colonization 
without injury to A rab interests. The am ount available had  
been put by some Zionists as high as 16,000,000 dunums or 
more; the Commissioner of Lands had  estimated it at 
10,592,000;* bu t Sir John  Hope Simpson’s figure was only 
6,544,000* dunums. From  that basic calculation he drew two 
startling conclusions.
(1) If all the cultivable land in Palestine were divided 
up among the A rab agricultural population, there would 
not be enough to provide every family with a  decent liveli­
hood.
(2) Until further development of Jewish lands and of 
irrigation had  taken place and the A rabs had  adopted 
better methods of cultivation, “  there is no room for a 
single additional settler if the standard of life of the 
fellaheen is to rem ain a t its present level.”  On State lands, 
similarly, there was no room, pending development, for 
Jewish settlers.
* These estim ates excluded th e  Beersheba Sub-D istrict.
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B ut Sir John  Hope Simpson went on to record his “ personal 
belief . . . tha t with thorough development of the country there 
will be room, not only for all the present agricultural popula­
tion on a  higher standard of life than it as present enjoys, but 
for not less than 20,000 families of settlers from outside In 
order, therefore, to c a n y  out the obligations of the Mandate 
tow ards both A rabs and  Jew s he recommended "  an active 
policy of agricultural development, having as its object close 
settlement on the land and intensive cultivation by b o th  Arabs 
and Jews
59. I t  would take time for the fruits of this development policy 
to m ature, and meanwhile Sir John  Hope Simpson w a s  clearly 
opposed to the admission of any more Jewish immigrants as 
settlers on the land. N or, a t first sight, was he much more 
encouraging with regard to industrial immigration. At that 
tim e there was no statistical m aterial available—it is still 
insufficient—to form  a scientific opinion on the amount o f  Arab 
unem ploym ent in  the country. W hile refusing, therefore, to 
dogmatize on the subject, Sir John  Hope Simpson was convinced 
that A rab unem ploym ent was “  serious and widespread and 
“  it is w rong,”  he argued, “  that a Jew  from  Poland, Lithuania, 
or the Yemen, should be adm itted to fill an existing vacancy, 
while in Palestine there are already workm en capable o f  filling 
tha t vacancy who are unable to find em ploym ent.”  “ This 
policy,”  he added, “  will be unacceptable to the Jewish autho­
rities.”  H e w as right: b u t in point of fact he had  added a  rider 
to his judgm ent which w ent far to meet the Jewish case.
" I t  has been pointed  ou t th a t Jew ish capital w ill not b e  brought 
in to  P alestine in  order to  em ploy Arab labour. I t  w ill c o m e  in  with 
th e  definite ob ject o f th e  em ploym ent of Jew ish labour and not 
otherw ise. T he principle o f ‘ derived dem and ’ would justify the 
im m igration o f Jew ish labour even w hen there are Arab unem ployed 
in  the country if th e  new ly-im ported Jew ish labour is assured of work 
of a perm anent nature, through the introduction of Jewish capital 
to  provide th e  work on w hich th a t labour is to  be employed. I t  is 
clearly o f no advantage to  the unem ployed Arab th a t Jewish capita! 
should be prevented from entering th e country, and he is in n o  worse 
position b y  th e  im portation of Jewish labour to  do work in Palestine 
for w hich th e  funds are available b y  th e  sim ultaneous importation of 
Jew ish capital. In  fact, he is better off, as th e  expenditure of that 
capital on w ages to  Jew ish workm en w ill cause, u ltim ately, a demand 
for th e  services o f a portion of th e  Arab unem ployed .”*
60. The inquiries arising from  the outbreak of 1929 w er e  now 
complete, and His M ajesty’s Government lost no time in  acting 
on them. In  October, 1930, concurrently with the Hope Simpson 
Report, appeared a “  Statem ent of Policy by His M ajesty’si 
Government in the U nited K ingdom ,”  soon to be k n o w n  as the I 
"  W hite P ap er.” |  The first p a rt of it contained the defin ition  of I
* H ope Sim pson R eport (Cmd. 3686), pp. 131-6. 
f  Cmd. 3692.
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policy and the expression of a determ ination to pursue it which 
had headed the list of the Shaw Commission's recommendations. 
It quoted the words used by the Prim e Minister (Mr. Ram say 
MacDonald) in the House of Commons a few m onths earlier :
" a double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on 
the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on 
the other ” ; it pointed out tha t much of the recent agitation had  
arisen from a failure, both by Arabs and by  Jew s, to realize the 
limits imposed on policy by this double undertaking; and it 
declared that “  His M ajesty's Government . . . .  will not be 
moved, by any pressure or threats, from the path  laid down in the 
M andate.”  As regards the character of the N ational Home and 
the functions of the Jew ish Agency it repeated w hat had  been 
said in  the Churchill M emorandum of 1922 ; and it re-affirmed 
the principle th a t "  economic absorptive capacity ”  was to be 
the limiting factor in  im migration. So much for principles. 
“ The practical problem s to be faced ”  were then dealt with 
under three heads, (1) Security, (2) Constitutional Development,
(3) Economic and Social Development. On the first head it was 
stated that two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of aircraft 
and fo u r  sections of arm oured cars would b e  retained for the 
time b e in g  in Palestine and T rans-Jordan. On the second head 
it d ec lared  tha t the time had  come to establish a Legislative 
Council on the lines indicated in the Churchill Statem ent of 
Policy. On the th ird  head, em bracing the most difficult and 
controversial issues—the possibilities of lând-settlem ent, the 
problem of unem ployment, and the effect thereof on the rate of 
im m igration—it adopted, almost w ord for word, most of Sir 
John Hope Simpson’s estimates, opinions and recom m endations. 
But th e re  were two notable omissions. The “  W hite Paper ”  
did no t commit the Government to the view that, if a com pre­
hensive policy of development were carried out, there would 
ultimately b e  room for a substantial num ber of Jew ish settlers 
on land n o t  yet acquired by them. Secondly, while it repeated 
Sir Jo h n  Hope Sim pson’s argum ent as to the connexion between 
Arab unemployment and the rate of im m igration, it m ade no 
reference to his saving paragraph on the employment of Jewish 
capital which would not otherwise have been available. The 
language of the “  W hite P ap er,”  moreover, betrayed a m arked 
insensitiveness to Jewish feelings. Thus, while the Government 
had no t in  fact gone beyond the decisions and proposals of the 
Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports, the tone of the docum ent 
suggested a rather more definite inclination towards the A rab 
side of th e  controversy than had  either of the two Reports.
61. The sequel was unfortunate. The publication of the 
“ White Paper ”  was the last of a series of set-backs to the 
Zionist cause. The outbreak of 1929 and in particular the 
butchery at H ebron and Safad had  revealed the insecurity of
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the N ational Home. The Shaw R eport had  w arned the Govern­
m ent against "  excessive ”  immigration. The Hope Simpson 
R eport had  foreshadowed a drastic restriction of it, if not a 
tem porary cessation, for the purposes of settlement on the land. 
The “  W hite Paper ”  had given the impression that fo r the 
purposes of labour likewise no Jew ish workm an w ou ld  be 
adm itted as long as any A rab workm an was unemployed. And 
these successive blows had  fallen at the moment when the 
N ational Home had just recovered from the "  slump ” and I 
Jewish hopes for the future were running high. N ot unnaturally  
there was an outcry am ong Zionists and their s u p p o r te rs  in 
Europe and  America. Dr. W eizmann protested th a t  the 
“ W hite P a p e r ”  was “  inconsistent with the terms of the 
M andate and in vital particulars m arks the reversal of the 
policy hitherto followed by His M ajesty’s Government in  regard 
to  the Jewish N ational Hom e ” , and informed the Secretaiy 
of State for the Colonies (Lord Passfield) th a t he had resigned 
his joint office of President of the Zionist Organisation and 
the Jew ish Agency. O ther em inent Zionists also resigned their 
posts in the Zionist adm inistration. Their attitude was openly I 
supported by leading politicians. Letters appeared in The\ 
Times supporting D r. W eizm ann’s claim that the course of | 
B ritish policy had  been changed and accepting his interpreta­
tion of the M andate; and for the moment there seemed to bel 
a serious danger th a t the governm ent of Palestine would 
become an issue in British party-politics, with one party on the I 
A rab side and the others on the Jewish. Such a deplorable 
dénouement was happily averted; b u t the public ventilation 
of the controversy was an  impressive demonstration of the J 
political power the Zionists could mobilize in England, pro­
vided always th a t they could m ake a  reasonable case. And 
this they had been able to do. They had  been able to show 
tha t the basis of Sir John Hope Simpson’s Report, his estimate I 
of the to tal cultivable land, was not—it seems doubtful, indeed, I 
if it had  been intended to be—a  sufficiently scientific and final 
calculation to justify  a reversal of immigration-policy. They 
had  been able to argue with some force tha t the reservation I 
of all such State land as m ight become available for landless 
Arabs, whether dispossessed by  Jew s or not, could n o t easily 
be reconciled w ith the requirem ents of Article 6 of the Mandate. 
And they had been able to exploit the particular omissions 
and the general tem per of the "  W hite Paper ” o f which | 
m ention has been m ade above.
62. I t  was announced in Novem ber that the Jewish Agency 
had  been invited to confer with Government on the " White | 
P ap e r.”  In  the following F ebruary  the result was published, 
not in an  am ended ' ‘ Statem ent of Policy ’ ’ but in the form 01 
a letter from  the Prim e Minister to D r. W eizmann. This letter |
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did not repudiate the policy laid down in the “ W hite P aper ”  ; 
it set out to explain or interpret it; bu t on such im portant points 
as the prospective availability of State land for Jew ish settlers 
or the admission of Jew ish labour m aintained by Jewish capital 
the interpretation was more favourable to Jewish claims than the 
uninterpreted “ W hite P aper "  had seemed to be. B ut a close 
com parison  of the two documents shows tha t the difference 
between them was not in fact so m arked as has commonly been 
supposed. The really striking difference was not in statements 
of o p in io n  or of policy bu t in the tone.
63. The effect, however, of these proceedings as a  whole on 
Arab opinion was inevitably mischievous. The swing-back to a 
more sympathetic attitude towards the N ational Hom e or, as 
the Zionists pu t it, an  attitude more in consonance with the 
M andate, was necessarily regarded b y  the A rabs as an  unjust 
Jewish victory over A rab rights. And it is still commonly 
stated, and no t only by A rabs, tha t a series of Commissions 
have b e e n  sent to Palestine, tha t in each case they have reported 
in fa v o u r of the A rabs, and that in each case their recom menda­
tions have been rejected b y  the British Government. This is 
far fro m  the truth. As a m atter of fact, the m ain recom­
mendations of the Shaw Commission and of Sir John  Hope 
Simpson were prom ptly adopted and put into effect. A state­
ment of policy was issued : the m achinery for regulating im m igra­
tion w as improved : the fact th a t the Jewish Agency, though 
entitled under the M andate to advise and co-operate with 
the G o v e rn m e n t  of Palestine, was not in any sense a p art 
of th a t Government, was re-asserted: a Developm ent D epart­
ment w as established and began to carry  out the recommended 
program m e. The only im portant question on which the 
G overnm ent’s  subsequent action did not accord with the 
Shaw and Hope Simpson R e p o r t s  was the question of 
Jewish land-settlement : and on tha t point the Jew ish repre­
sentatives had forcibly m aintained—and the event, in our 
opinion, has confirmed it—that a  certain am ount of further 
settlement was possible, particularly on land hitherto regarded 
as uncultivable, w ithout in jury  to the A rab population.
64. The truth, however, as to w hat was done h ad  been sadly 
obscured by the method of doing it. In  Arab eyes the substitu­
tion of the “ Black Letter ” , as they called it, for the “  W hite 
Paper ” was plain proof of the power which W orld Jew ry could 
exert in London, and such confidence as they m ight previously 
have h a d  in British determ ination to do a t least w hat justice 
could be  done under w hat they have always regarded as an 
unjust Mandate was seriously shaken. B ut here again the effect 
on Arab opinion has been exaggerated. I t  is widely believed 
that the so-called volte-face of 1 9 3 1  was a prim ary cause of the 
subsequent "  disturbances ”  ; and it is not to be denied that the
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memory of it has been an aggravating factor in the Arab attitude 
ever since. B ut we have tried to m ake it clear on previous pages 
of this R eport th a t in our view the root of the trouble lay deeper. 
The overriding desire of the A rab leaders in 1931 was precisely 
w hat it had  been in 1920—national independence : and the over­
riding cause of their antagonism  to the N ational Home in 1931, 
as in 1920, was the conviction that it barred the way to  the 
realization of tha t desire. I t  is sometimes forgotten that an 
A rab delegation, headed by the President of the A rab E xecutive , 
came to London in 'M arch, 1930, the month in which th e  Shaw 
R eport was published. According to the official summary of the 
ensuing conversations between the delegates and members of the 
Government, the A rabs stated their case not only on land- 
purchase and immigration bu t also on self-government; and  it 
was to the last point tha t the Government’s reply was mainly 
directed.
“  I t  w as pointed  ou t to  th e  D elegation th a t the sweeping con­
stitu tional changes dem anded b y them  were w holly unacceptable 
since th ey  w ould have rendered i t  im possible for H is Majesty’s 
G overnm ent to  carry ou t their obligations under th e  Mandate. It was 
m ade clear th a t no proposals could be considered which were incom­
patib le w ith  th e  requirem ents of th e  M andate.
“  Since th e  effect of m eeting th e  w ishes of th e  Arab Delegation as 
regards dem ocratic governm ent would have been to  render it impos­
sible for H is M ajesty's G overnm ent to  carry ou t their full 
responsibilities as M andatory for P alestine and since despite the 
explanations and assurances given  b y  H is M ajesty's Ministers the 
D elegation could n o t see their w ay to  m odify  their attitude, it 
becam e evident th a t th is m atter could n ot usefully be pursued 
further.”
65. Nor could the A rabs derive more satisfaction on this basic 
issue from  the Shaw Report. W hile the Commissioners admitted 
tha t the A rab animosity towards the Jews, which was the funda­
m ental cause of the outbreak of 1929, had  arisen from “ the 
disappointm ent of their political and national aspirations ” as 
well as from  “  fear for their economic future ” , they expressly 
refrained from  m aking any recommendation on “ constitutional 
development ” . Even the “  W hite P aper ” , seemingly not in- 
appreciative of the A rab point of view on other questions, only 
offered them  again the Legislative Council they had already 
rejected. The concession of anything more than  tha t was firmly 
ruled out. “ I t  is useless for A rab leaders to maintain their 
dem ands for a form of Constitution which would render it impos­
sible for His M ajesty’s Government to carry out, in the fullest 
sense, the double undertaking . . .  to the Jewish people on the 
one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the 
other ” . In  tha t stark contradiction between A rab aspirations 
and British obligations lay  and had  always lain the o n e  insur­
m ountable crux. The rate of Jew ish im migration might rise or 
fall, Jewish land-purchase m ight be extended or restricted,
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“ B lack  Letters ” m ight follow on “  W hite Papers " ,  bu t all 
these factors, though they were certainly im portant, were only 
subsid iary  factors. They might add fuel to the flames or dam p 
them d o w n . B ut the Mandate itself, of which these other factors 
were o n ly  applications or interpretations, had lighted the fire; 
and th e  M andate itself, however applied o r  interpreted, was 
bound to keep it burning—except on the old original assumption 
that th e  two races could and would learn to live and work 
together.
66. It is not suggested tha t His M ajesty's Government had  
failed at any time to realize how fundam ental this assumption 
was. On the contrary, a t every crisis, in every discussion, in 
every official statem ent, it had  been firmly and sometimes 
eloquently reaffirmed. The following quotations speak for 
themselves.
Churchill S ta tem en t of P o licy , 1922.
" The Secretary of State believes . . . th a t upon th is basis m ay
be built up th a t spirit of co-operation upon w hich th e  future progress 
and prosperity of th e  H oly  Land m ust largely depend.”
Duke of D evonshire to  H igh Commissioner, 1923.
“ For th is reason H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent have m ade it  their  
primary concern to  devise measures w hich w ill p u t an end to  the 
present agitation and inaugurate a regim e in  w hich all sections of the  
community w ill co-operate w ith  th e  B ritish  A dm inistration.”
White Paper, 1930.
“ It is necessary, however, to  em phasise one im portant p oint, v iz ., 
that in the peculiar circum stances of P alestine no policy, however 
enlightened or how ever vigorously prosecuted, can hope for success, 
unless it  is supported, n ot m erely b y  the acceptance, b u t by the  
willing co-operation of th e  com m unities for w hose benefit it  is 
designed."
Prime M inister’s  L e tte r ,  1931.
" Differing interests and view points . . . can on ly  be reconciled
if there is a proper realisation th a t th e  full solution of th e  problem  
depends on an understanding betw een th e  Jew s and th e  A rabs.”
67. The various Commissions of inquiry had  preached from 
the same text.
Hay craft Commission, 1921.
“ Much, w e feel, m ight be done to  allay th e ex isting  h ostility  
between the races if  responsible persons on both  sides could agree 
to discuss the questions arising betw een them  in  a reasonable spirit, 
on the basis th a t th e  Arabs should accept im plicitly  th e  declared  
policy of the G overnm ent on th e  subject of th e Jewish N ational H om e, 
and that the Z ionist leaders should abandon and repudiate all pre­
tensions that go beyond i t .”
Shaw Commission, 1930.
“ In an atm osphere in  w hich racial antagonism  and m utual suspicion  
are general . . .  i t  m ay seem  idle a t th is m om ent to  point out 
that there is little  prospect either of th e  success of Jew ish colonization  
in Palestine or of th e  peaceful and progressive developm ent of the
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Arab people unless co-operation betw een th e  tw o races, th e  composure 
of their differences and th e  rem oval of causes of suspicion are by some 
m eans brought about . . . .  W ithout co-operation in a spirit of 
m utual tolerance, there is little  hope th a t th e  aspirations of either 
people can be realized .”
L ord  Snell’s N o te  of R eservations, 1930.
"  Peaceful econom ic and political developm ent in Palestine will 
be dependent upon a  corresponding grow th of good w ill between the 
tw o  peop les.”
H ope Sim pson R eport, 1930.
“  U nless such a schem e is accepted b y  both  Jew  and A rab it  may 
very  w ell fail. Of b oth  it  w ill require th e  support, if  it  is to have 
th e  desired result, nam ely, th e  advancem ent of a  neglected but 
historic country in  th e  p ath  of modern efficiency, b y  the joint 
endeavour of th e  tw o  great sections of its population, with 
assistance of th e  M andatory P ow er.”
68. The Zionists, for their part, had  endorsed these déclara-1 
tions.
Resolu tion  of Zionist Congress, 1921.
“ T he determ ination of th e  Jew ish people to  live w ith the Arab | 
people on term s of concord and m utual respect, and together wi 
th em  to  m ake th e  com m on hom e into a flourishing community.” 
L e tte r  from  Z ionist O rganization to  Colonial Office, 1922.
‘‘ T he Z ionist Organization w ill continue on its side to spare no I 
efforts to  foster th e spirit o f goodw ill to  w hich H is M ajesty’s Govern­
m en t h ave pointed as th e on ly  sure foundation for th e future prosperity | 
o f P a lestin e .”
Jew ish  A gency M em orandum  on W h ite  P aper, 1930.
T he Congress R esolution of 1921 " rem ains true, as it has always | 
been tru e .”
69. Thus British Ministers, Commissioners of Inquiry, : 
the spokesmen of Zionism had  unanim ously re-affirmed 
assumption on which the successful operation of the Mandate! 
had  rested from the outset, nam ely, th a t somehow and at some I 
time Jew s and A rabs would co-operate in promoting the peace I 
and welfare of Palestine. Only one voice was missing from the I 
chorus—the A rab voice. Not once since 1919 had any Arab I 
leader said tha t co-operation with the Jew s was even possible.! 
The response of A rab nationalism  to the assumption to which I 
all the other parties in the case so stubbornly adhered was an | 
equally stubborn denial. Obstat natura.
5. 1931 to 1936.
70. The outbreak of 1929 and the subsequent inquiries and I 
discussions had  clearly revealed the difficulties inherent in the I 
execution of the M andate. The balance which the Mandatory |  
h ad  striven to m aintain between its two obligations had b 
disturbed. F o r a m om ent, under A rab pressure, it had swung I 
a  little to the A rab side. Im m ediately, under Jewish pressure, r
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it had swung back to its old position. Loyalty to the M andate, 
it appeared, required tha t Jew ish immigration should continue 
as long a s  it could be shown that it did not injure A rab economic 
interests. The political problem was left, as before, for time 
to solve. T hat it was the m ajor problem, that it was acute, 
that it barred the road to peace—those basic facts m ay have 
been blurred by  the belief tha t the possibility of the Jew s 
becoming a m ajority in Palestine seemed remote. If  tha t 
was, indeed, the line of reasoning, it missed the point. Jewish 
immigration had  not created, it had only stiffened, the Arab 
demand for national independence. A nd even if tha t dom inant 
fact a n d  all that flows from it had been fully understood, it 
is doubtful w hether a t th a t time His M ajesty’s Government 
would have been prepared to reconsider the whole position and 
to ask whether the M andate itself, in the light of ten years'
civil government of Palestine, ought not perhaps to be revised.
So the old process continued on much the same course after
1929 as before it :  and it led, as will soon be seen, to the same 
result.
71. Since the turn of the tide in 1928 the fortunes of the 
National Home had been steadily, if slowly, rising. In  1929 
" e number of Jew ish immigrants was 5,249, in 1930 4,994,
d in 1931 4,075. B ut against this slight decline in immigra- 
on stood a m arked decline in emigration. The num ber of 
ewish emigrants in those same years was 1,746, 1,679 and 666. 
d then in 1932 the im migration figure rose to 9,553, the
t of the four consecutive leaps which were to transform
e situation by the beginning of 1936. No emigration figure 
or Jews as distinct from  other races was compiled in the years 
932 to 1934, but in 1935 Jewish emigration had  sunk to the 
egligible total of 396. N or was th a t the whole picture. F or 
orne years past a growing num ber of Jews had been entering 
alestine and rem aining there in violation of the law, either 
y obtaining travellers’ passports and outstaying the time of 
esidence perm itted or by  smuggling themselves in by land and 
a. In 1931 the Government decided to accept the fait 
compli and allowed some 6,000 Jews, who adm itted their 
egal presence in the country, to be registered as im migrants, 
ut the irregular inflow continued. W hen the im proved system 
f control came into force, it was discovered th a t the num ber 
f “ travellers ”  entering and illegally remaining in the country 
1933 ran into thousands, and to tha t was to be added a num ber 
f “ self-smugglers.”
72. With the growth of im migration went a corresponding 
owth in the am ount of capital invested in the N ational Home 
nd in its agricultural and industrial production. I t  has been 
ggested, indeed, tha t the high volume of illegal im migration
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w as partly  due to the inform ation spreading over Eastern 
E urope, now in the trough of the world-depression, that work 
was to be had  and wages earned in Palestine.
73. Meantime the economic position of the Arabs as a  whole 
continued to improve. W ages rose, m arkets for country- 
produce expanded, more roads and  bridges and schools were 
built. And in due course the new measures determined on in
1930 for safeguarding and advancing A rab interests came into 
operation. In  the sum m er of 1931 Mr. Lewis French, th e  new 
Director of Development, arrived in Palestine and in Decem ber, 
1931, and April, 1932, he subm itted two reports. H e  w as to 
have been assisted by two colleagues, an A rab and a J e w ;  but, 
significantly enough, neither the A rabs nor the Jews would 
agree to take p art in the work. In  1931, Arabs c la im in g  that 
they had  been displaced from  lands owing to Jewish purchase 
thereof were invited to subm it their claims for registration with 
a view to re-settlem ent a t Government cost. To g u a r d  against 
further “  landlessness ”  a Protection of Cultivators Ordinance 
had  been enacted in 1929, securing tenants from arbitrary 
rem oval from  land in the event of its sale. After several amend­
ments this was replaced by  a new Ordinance in 1933. In 
1931, and again in 1933, Mr. C. F . Strickland visited 
the country to prom ote, by  inquiry and report and by 
personal propaganda throughout the country, the growth 
of co-operative societies—a m easure of assistance, again, which, 
though helpful to both races, was needed less by the Je w s , who 
had long established an extensive and varied system o f co-opera­
tion, than by the Arabs, who knew virtually nothing ab o u t it. 
In  the political field, likewise, an  advance was m a d e  which 
m ight have been regarded as designed to meet A rab n eed s and 
claims more than  Jew ish. In  1932 a draft Municipal Corpora­
tions Ordinance was communicated to the A rab E x e c u tiv e , the I 
Jew ish Agency, and various local authorities for c o m m e n t and I 
criticism; and the Government declared its intention of taking! 
steps towards the form ation of a Legislative Council as soon as I 
the Ordinance in its final form  h ad  come into operation.
7 4 . The relative tranquillity which prevailed in Palestine I 
between 1930 and  1933 might have encouraged a belief that,! 
taken a l l  together, these measures for prom oting A r a b  welfare I 
were having a conciliatory effect. B u t events occurred from I 
time to time which revealed th a t under the quiet surface Arab I 
antagonism  was still fiercely smouldering. Several Je w s  were I 
m urdered b y  unknow n assassins. Jew ish orange-trees were I 
destroyed, Jewish cattle maimed, Jewish land-purchasesl 
obstructed by  organized trespass. In  1931 the rifles w hich had! 
been stored for ten years past in sealed armouries in  isolated! 
Jew ish colonies were replaced by  shot-guns, effective for defence! 
but useless for long-range fighting. In  view of the murderous!
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attacks of 1929, this change could scarcely be regarded as provo­
cative, at any rate by A rabs; bu t it was made the excuse for an 
inflammatory agitation in the A rab Press against the “  arm ing of 
the Jews ” ; and the consequent demonstration at Nablus was only 
repressed by vigorous action on the part of the police. There were 
cases, it is true, of interracial co-operation. A few A rabs and Jews 
were sitting together on Government Committees and on' the 
old Municipal Corporations. B ut an invitation to representative 
Arabs to serve on a Government Education Committee in 1932 
was refused, and two A rab members of the Road B oard resigned 
soon after their appointm ent. N or was there any change in the 
attitude of the A rab leaders towards economic co-operation. 
When the Jews opened a Palestine trade exhibition, the “  Levant 
Fair,” at Tel Aviv, the A rab Executive not only declared a boy­
cott of the Fair, b u t announced that Jew s would not be invited to 
participate in the A rab F air to be held in the following year. 
Two other events of the period are worth recording. At the end 
of 1931 a Moslem Congress, attended by 145 delegates from all 
parts of the Moslem world, assembled a t Jerusalem . Its  public 
proceedings were not political, and did not lead, as had  been 
feared, to disorders. B ut on the one hand it strengthened the 
position and prestige of the Mufti of Jerusalem , who presided; 
and on the other hand it was a demonstration of the solidarity 
f Islam, significantly staged on Palestinian soil. The second 
oteworthy event was the creation in 1932 of a new A rab party , 
elstiqlal (Independence) P arty , which, if it could no t compete 
'th the two dom inant factions, the Husseini and the 
ashashibi, was calculated to appeal to the younger generation 
f Arab nationalists by  its uncompromising concentration on 
‘ e demand for national freedom.
75. Such was the internal position—as bad beneath the surface 
it had ever been—when one of the two external factors, which 
om the outset had  continuously played upon the delicate 
'ance of affairs in Palestine, suddenly began to operate with 
ensely aggravated force. On the 30th January , 1933, the 
ational-Socialist regime was established in Germany. Almost 
mediately, and in steadily increasing volume, a stream  of 
ewish fugitives began to pour out of Germany. M any of them  
und a temporary refuge in  neighbouring countries; bu t the 
ors which had been closed after the W ar against large-scale 
"gration overseas were not reopened. Meantime the situa- 
on of the Jews in Poland and Roum ania was growing steadily 
oise. It was the blackest crisis the Jew ish people has had  to 
ce in modem times—blacker because more widespread and 
some respects more painful than the crisis of the Russian 
groms before the W ar. A nd naturally it was to Palestine 
t the eyes of Jew ry turned—to the only country they could 
to “ as of right and not on sufferance ” . In  tha t year,
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1933, the record of Jew ish im migration jum ped from 9,553 to I 
30,327—more than  a  threefold increase. Of those, the 
m ajority  (13,125) came as in previous years from Poland; 
bu t the second place in the list was now occupied by Jews 
from  Germ any, who in  1932 had  num bered only 353 b u t in 
1933 num bered 5,392. A nd in one respect this n e w  wave 
of im migration was of an  unprecedented character. The 
im m igrants from  G erm any included a  body of unusually 
gifted men—some of them  men of world-wide re p u ta t io n  in 
science and the professions. And with scientists and doctors and I 
lawyers came m en of experience and ability in finance a n d  busi­
n e s s  organization. M aterially, too, the strength of the National I 
H om e was greatly fortified. The am ount of Jewish capital 
invested in land-purchase, in the development of citriculture, and 
in industry and transport was £2,833,000 in 1932 and £5,630,0001 
in 1933.* The im ports of capital goods for the e q u ip m e n t of | 
agriculture, industry and transport or as raw  materials 
worth £2,422,000 in 1932 and  £4,060,000 in 1933.* The finan-| 
cial element which the N ational Home had  always n e e d e d  for its I 
success—the investm ent of money in it not as a missionary enter-1 
prise but as a "  going concern " —had already begun  
materialize before 1933 ; bu t now its continuance and expansion j 
seemed assured.
76. The A rab reaction to this sudden and striking develop-^1 
m ent was quite natural. All th a t the A rab leaders had felt I 
in 1929 they now felt more bitterly. Then the National Home I 
was emerging from a  “  slump ” . Now it was entering on aj 
“ boom All these Jew ish m en and women, all this Jewish I 
m oney, pouring into Palestine m ight m ean more prosperity fori 
A rabs as well as Jew s, though even th a t measure of consolation I 
they refused to adm it: b u t the greater the Jewish inflow, the I 
greater the obstacle to their attainm ent of national independ-| 
ence. A nd now, for the first tim e, a  worse fate seemed 
threaten them  than the w ithholding of their freedom and the| 
continuance of M andatory rule. H itherto, w ith the high rate 
of natural increase am ong the A rabs, it had seemed impossible 
th a t the Jew s could become a  m ajority  in Palestine withinl 
m easurable tim e. B ut w hat if the new flood of immigratioil 
were to rise still higher? T hat question gave a  very different! 
colour to the idea of self-governm ent in Palestine as Arabl 
nationalists h ad  hitherto conceived it. I t  opened up the| 
intolerable prospect of a  Jew ish State—of Palestinian Arab! 
being ruled by  Jew s. I t  is no t surprising, therefore, to fini 
as ship after ship of Jew ish im m igrants arrives, hailed wilt 
unrestrained enthusiasm  by  the Hebrew Press, the old antagon­
ism growing hotter and hotter, till it bursts again into flames.j
* Figures supplied b y  the Jew ish A gency.
83 Chapter I I I .
77. The first open manifestation of this rising tem per was 
the publication by the A rab Executive Committee in March, 
Ï933, of a manifesto to the A rab N ation. I t  declared tha t 
" the general tendency of Jews to take possession of the lands 
of this holy country and their stream ing into it by  hundreds 
and thousands through legal and  illegal means has terrified 
the country.”  The country, it went on, was fully aware tha t 
the object of the G overnm ent’s policy was "  to pave the road 
for driving thé nation away from its homeland for foreigners 
to supersede it they “  will not expect any good from this 
Government and its oppression and “  it will be looked upon 
as the true enemy whom they m ust get rid of through every 
legal means The manifesto concluded with an announce­
ment of a meeting to be held a t Jaffa and appealed to the 
nation “ to get ready for the serious acts which will be imposed 
by the resolutions of this assembly ” . "  The country calls its 
sons for action and sacrifice in these hard  times ” . The meeting 
was held on the 26th March and attended by  some five or six 
hundred Arabs of all classes, townsmen and villagers alike, and 
of all parties, by  the m em bers of the Arab Executive, including 
the Mufti of Jerusalem , and by the mayors of most of the Arab 
towns. Resolutions were passed adopting "  the principle of 
Inon-co-operation ” , and  ordering “  the immediate execution of 
[its first steps forthw ith, such as boycotting receptions and 
[exchange of courtesies with Government, Government Boards, 
iBritish goods and Zionist goods, products and commercial 
[premises ” , and the form ation of a  Committee to study ways 
land means for a w ider application of the "  non-co-operation 
principle ” .
I 78. From that time onwards, the A rab Press, already 
Ivimlent enough, became steadily more inflamm atory. A new 
■Press Ordinance was enacted under which newspapers publish­
ing m a tte r  “  likely to endanger the public peace ”  could be 
jKuspended with or without w arning; b u t a num ber of warnings 
e* d d r e s s e d  to certain newspapers had little, if any, effect, and 
^u)ne w as actually suspended in 1933. B y the early autum n such 
rade charges against the Palestine Government were being 
minted a s  that it was deliberately "  flooding the country with 
ltH e w s  w ith  the object of displacing Arabs from the land and 
jjB jepriv ing  them of their employment ” or that “  a mass immigra- 
);H io n  of J e w s  was being allowed and  encouraged by Government 
that when the Legislative Council was introduced the Jew s 
» ' ould be in a m ajority In  August the flames were fanned 
thHy the proceedings of the Zionist Congress a t Prague—which 
n.B e m a n d e d , with special reference to events in G erm any, that 
s . * 16 Jew ish  National Hom e should be “  built as speedily as
* A nnual R eport for 1933, p. 5.
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possible and on the largest scale ' ’—and b y  reports th a t as I 
m any as 10,000 “  illegal im m igrants ”  had  recently secured I 
a footing in the country. A t a Moslem festival early  in I 
September the President of the Arab Executive, Musa Kazem I 
Pasha el Husseini, made a violent speech against Jewish I 
immigration and  telegraphed to the High Commissioner I 
dem anding its immediate stoppage. F urther serious agitation I 
followed, and public meetings were organized not only b y  the I 
Istiqlal P arty  and the Moslem Young M en's Association, but I  
also by  the Moslem-Christian Association: for M o slem  and I 
Christian A rabs were once more sinking their d iffe ren ces in I 
the common cause. I
79. Finally, early in October, the A rab Executive, whose I 
members had  been bitterly criticized in the Arab newspapers I  
for their apathy and inertia, announced th a t a “  general strike ” I  
would be declared on the 13th October and a dem onstration I  
made a t the Government Offices a t Jerusalem . D esp ite  the I  
Government’s prohibition, the dem onstration was a tte m p te d  on I  
the appointed date, and the angry m ob was only dispersed ■  
after repeated baton charges by the police. In  the course of I  
the next few weeks the trouble spread to other p a rts  of I  
Palestine. On the 27th October there was a serious outbreak ■  
a t Jaffa. So excited and so dangerous was the temper of thefl 
A rab rioters th a t the police were forced to use their firearms I  
before order could be restored. The news of these events B  
quickly reached Nablus where public buildings were attacked 1  
and the police stoned, and travelled on to  H aifa w h ere  t h a t l  
evening and next day there were similar disturbances. On the I 
28th and 29th rioting broke out again at Jerusalem . A t e a c l l  
of these towns the attacks on the police, though nowhere s o l  
grave as a t Jaffa, were formidable enough to compel them t o i  
fire in self-defence. The to tal casualties were one policeman■  
killed and 56 injured, and 26 rioters or bystanders killed and I  
187 injured. I
80. So one more page of the history of Palestine under the I  
Mandate had  been written in blood. Arid there was one featurel 
of this last outbreak of A rab violence which was as unpre-l 
cedented as it was significant. In  1920,1921 and 1929 the Arabs I 
had attacked the Jew s. In  1933 they attacked the G o v e rn m e n t.■
The idea tha t the British authorities in London or Jerusalem were!
trying to hold the balance even between A rab and Jew was now* 
openly scouted. They were the allies of the Jews, it was said,! 
and the enemies of the A rabs. The Mandate was merely a H  
cynical device for prom oting British “  imperialism "  under a *  
m ask of hum ane consideration for the Jew s. One other point® 
could not be missed—the rapidity with which the trouble had* 
spread. Palestine is a small country, and the Arab leaders, ! ■ [  
was clear, already possessed a dangerous measure of control*
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over p u b lic  opinion a t large. I t  has been asserted, indeed, that, 
if p rom pt action had not been taken a t the outset, if the police 
had abstained from firing,*a situation not much less serious than 
that o f 1 9 3 6  might quickly have developed. As it was, the 
prompt repression of the disorders m ay have tem pted the autho­
rities to go on hoping that somehow or other the M andate might 
be m ade to work without bloodshed, that somehow or other the 
quarrel between A rab and Jewish nationalism could be 
com posed.
81. The Arabs, in this period of tension, were not the only 
disturbers of the peace. From  the beginning of the M andatory 
regime there had  always been a minority-group among the Jew s 
almost a s  bitterly opposed to the Mandate as the A rab 
nationalists. They were called “  Revisionists ” , because they 
desired the Mandate to be revised so as to include T rans-Jordan 
within its scope. They repudiated the idea of a National Home 
in the a re a  between the Jordan  and the sea. They claimed tha t 
all Palestine, on both sides of the river, should be the National 
Home. And if the British Government were not prepared to 
people it as soon as possible with several millions of Jew s, then 
they demanded the transfer of the M andate to some other Power 
that would be so prepared. P arty  feeling among the Jew s had 
always been vigorous and, despite the progress of the N ational 
Home and the great increase in immigration, it was running high 
in 1933. I t  was widely suspected tha t the brutal m urder of 
Dr. A rlosoroff, a leading member of the Jewish Agency, in June 
was an act of political terrorism . In  the Arab outbreaks in the 
autumn, which were directed, as has been seen, against the 
Government, the Jew s were happily not involved. B ut in 
December, soon after their repression, there was a clash a t Tel 
Aviv between a Revisionist gathering and the police, who were 
compelled to charge the mob through a shower of stones. 
Nobody was killed, bu t 11 police and 8 civilians were injured.
82. In this uneasy atmosphere the growth of the N ational 
Home continued to accelerate. In  1934 there were 42,359 
authorized im migrants, in 1935, 61,854. Two new points stood 
out. F i r s t ,  far more future immigrants were going to be 
" absorbed ”  into industry and urban  life than by  agriculture 
and land-settlement. Secondly, so far from  reducing 
“ economic absorptive capacity ” , immigration increased it.
he more immigrants came in, the more work they created for 
ocal industries to meet their needs, especially in building : and 
ore work meant more room for immigrants under the “  labour 
edule ” , Unless, therefore, the Government adopted a  more 
estrictive policy, or unless there were some economic or finan- 
>1 set-back, there seemed no reason why the rate of immigra- 
on should not go on climbing up and up.
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83. As in 1933, so or more so in 1934 and 1935, the indices 
of commercial and industrial activity rose with the rising figures 
of immigration. Some of these are given in the following 
tab le :—
1 9 3 3 1934 1 9 3 5
3 0 . 3 2 7 4 2 , 3 5 9 6 1 , 8 5 4
I I  • I i 5 - i I 7‘7 j
2 - 6 3 - 2 4 ' 2
86 1 0 3
133
3 - 1 4 - 1 5 ' 4
2 2 - 2 3 7 - 5 5 6 8
3 - 6 4 - 7 6 6 1
3 - 9 5 * 4 5-7 1
1 . 8 2 - 6 2 - 7  1
2 - 7 3 - 2 4 ' 2  I
Im m igration
Im ports for consum ption (in £  millions)
E xports (in £  millions)
R ailw ay G oods Traffic (in m illion ton  
kilom etres).
Overseas Shipping tonnage cleared (in 
m illion ton s, steam ships only).
C onsum ption of E lectric Pow er (in m illion  
K .W .H .).
N ote and Coin Circulation a t end o f year  
(in £  m illions).
R evenue (in £  m illions)
Custom s (in £  m illions)
E xpenditure (in £  m illions)
The N ational Home, in fact, was growing a t a  pace which ini 
earlier days its most ardent supporters can scarcely have ex-1 
pected; and  its prosperity was reflected in the mounting revenue) 
of the Palestine Government. On the m aterial side, indeed,! 
most other countries a t that time m ight well have envied | 
Palestine. B ut there were two sides to the picture; and 
brighter grew the one, the darker grew the other. With almost I 
m athem atical precision the betterm ent of the economic situation | 
in Palestine m eant the deterioration of the political situation.
84. As the N ational Home expanded from 1933 onwards,! 
so the A rab hate and fear of it increased. I t  m ade no difference I 
tha t in the spring of 1934 the Government cut down th e  Jewish |  
Agency's half-yearly estimate of "  absorptive capacity ” 
the Labour Schedule from  20,100 to 5,600, with the resu lt that 
a strike was declared at Tel Aviv and Jewish rioters were dis-| 
persed by  the police. N or was A rab feeling tempered by ’ 
fact t h a t  the measures taken by the Government to prevent! 
illegal immigration were now proving fairly efficacious. 0n| 
the contrary, the attitude of the A rab leaders b e c a m e  more 
hostile to the Government, and the tone of the Arab P re ss  more 
bitter. In  the autum n of 1934 the A rab Executive submitted 
to  the High Commissioner a  form al expression of th e ir view| 
tha t the safeguards for A rab interests embodied in the M andate 
had  broken down. A cam paign, in which the Supreme Moslem 
Council took an active part, was set on foot to prevent moit| 
A rab land passing into Jew ish hands. Small landowners wer 
persuaded to register their lands as family awqaf to precludi 
alienation. One particular contract for the sale of 5,000 d u im "  
to Jew s was cancelled a t the direct instance of the Suprem  
Moslem Council. A rabs accused of facilitating the sale of lam
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to Jew s were denounced in the mosques, at public meetings and 
in the Press as traitors to the nation. An A rab bank was started 
with a  capital of £ 60,000 for the development of A rab land 
or its exclusion from alien purchase. Attempts were made, 
m oreover, by organized trespass and fictitious litigation, to pre­
vent th e  settlement of Jew s on land they had  already bought.
85. I n  politics the symptoms of deepening hostility were 
equally m arked. In  1934 the activities of the six A rab organiza­
tions were largely concerned with m utual jealousies and re­
criminations; bu t in the course of 1935 they not only tended 
to crystallize into more efficient "  parties " ,  bu t, yielding to  
vehement appeals in the newspapers for the subordination of 
their quarrels to the national cause, they united, with the excep­
tion of the Istiqlal P arty , in preparing a joint statem ent of their 
case fo r submission to the Government.
Meantime the nationalist movement as a whole was improving 
its organization and widening its scope. The “  Y outh Move­
ment ” , in particular, was encouraged. Young m en’s societies, 
under various nam es, became more consciously and ardently 
nationalist. Boy-scout bands and sports-clubs were constituted. 
“ T ow ards the end of 1935 ”  (to quote the Government R e­
port*) “ the younger elements had evidently gained ground, 
and w ere becoming a factor which might challenge the influence 
of the older A r a b  leaders " .
86. I t  was thus becoming clear that the crux of the situation 
in Palestine was not growing less formidable with the passing of 
me. O n  the contrary, the longer the Mandate operated, the 
tronger and more bitter A rab antagonism to it became. And 
e task of reconciliation to which Sir A rthur W auchope, who 
ucceeded to the High Commissionership in 1 9 3 1 , wholeheartedly 
ddressed himself had  never been more difficult. In  his personal 
estimony at the twenty-second session of the Perm anent Man- 
ates Commission in 1 9 3 2  he gave reasons for taking a 
oderately hopeful view. For the immediate future he based his 
opes of peace on the development of “ self-governing institu­
ons ” , under Article 2  of the M andate. He expected, he said, 
0 enact a new Local Government Ordinance in 193 3  and to 
ollow it up with new proposals for the establishment of a  Legis- 
tive Council. Asked whether these measures would "  satisfy 
e aspirations of the A rabs for self-government ” , he replied 
at “ though the extremists might not be influenced, he hoped 
at the moderate A rabs would be satisfied ’ ’. On the long view, 
e expressed his faith in the community of economic interests. 
He w as convinced tha t with the passage of time, the A rabs and
* Report on the A dm inistration of Palestine for 1935, p. 17.
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Jew s would see th a t it was to their m utual advantage to  work 
together H e concluded his formal statem ent as fo llo w s:—
“  W e w ould glad ly  govern P alestine in accordance w ith  the  wishes 
o f th e  tw o races; and w hen these w ishes conflict, I  use every means 
to  reconcile them . I f  th ese efforts prove o f no avail, then  Government 
m ust, regardless o f criticism , carry ou t w hatever policy it considers 
b est in the interests o f th e  people as a w hole and in  accordance with 
th e  M andate
87. The last words are im portant; for it was the obligations 
of the M andate, then as always, tha t made the task of reconcili­
ation not only supremely difficult bu t, as we now think, 
impossible. W hen the Arab Executive, as has been se e n , sub­
m itted a  protest against Jewish immigration and land -pu rchase  
in  the autum n of 1934, the H igh Commissioner could o n ly  reply 
th a t the num ber of immigrants had not exceeded the absorptive 
capacity of the country and tha t he was doing w hat he could to 
protect A rab cultivators and increase the productivity of the 
land. N or was any deep impression m ade by his announcem ent 
th a t on obtaining the concession for the drainage of th e  Huleh 
basin the Jew ish group concerned had  agreed to in c re ase  by 
about one-half the area reserved for A rab settlement. In Ju n e  of 
the following year (1935) the sincerity of the High Commissioner's 
desire for reconciliation was manifested by a signal act of 
clemency. On the occasion of the K ing’s birthday he announced 
tha t fourteen prisoners, who had been convicted for partici­
pation in the disorders of 1929, would be a t once released, and 
that twenty-two whose death-sentences for m urder had b een  pre­
viously commuted to imprisonment for life would be released 
in 1936.
88. In  the autum n the situation rapidly d e te r io ra te d . In 
October the discovery of arm s and am munition concealed  in 
a consignment of cement im ported from  Belgium was hailed as 
a  proof tha t the Jew s were secretly arm ing on a  la rg e  scale. 
The A rab Press excelled itself in denunciation of the Govern-1 
ment and the Jews. B y w ay of protest a “ strike ”  was declared I 
for the 26th October and widely observed. At Jaffa it  excited I 
strong feeling, and  a  clash with Tel Aviv was narrowly averted. I
89. E arly  in November it became known tha t a “ terrorist j 
band  had  established itself in the hills of Galilee, u n d er thel 
leadership of Sheikh Izzed Din al Qassam, a political refugee I 
from  Syria with a  widespread reputation as a religious leader.! 
The band was caught by the police near Jenin, and fo u r  of tel 
members killed, including Sheikh Izzed Din. A great crowd ofl 
A rabs attended his funeral a t H aifa, and there was s o m e  demon-1 
stration and stone-throwing. The Arab newspapers hailed him asl 
a  m artyr to his nation and his faith. ' 1 D ear friend and m artyr 1
* M inutes of th e  22nd Session of th e Perm anent M andates Com m ission,! 
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said one of them , ‘ ‘ I have heard you preach from a platform  
resting on a  sword. To-day . . . you are, by God, a  greater 
p r e a c h e r  than alive you ever were ” .
go. O n  the 25th November the five Arab Parties formally pre­
sented the High Commissioner with three m ain dem ands— (1) 
the establishment of democratic governm ent, (2) the prohibition 
of the transfer of Arab lands to Jew s, (3 )  the immediate cessa­
tion of Jewish im migration and the formation of a committee to 
determine the "  absorptive capacity ”  of the country.
91. I t  was obvious, once again, that the concession of the 
second and third dem ands was inhibited by the M andate unless 
it could be shown that Jew ish im migration and land-purchase 
were definitely injuring the rights and position of the Arabs. 
And the Jews were prepared to m aintain with a  wealth of 
argument that, so far from injuring the Arabs, the N ational 
Home had greatly benefited them. Ju st a t this time, moreover, 
the “ external factors " ,  as we have term ed them , were operat­
ing on the Jewish as well (as will be seen) as on the Arab 
side with maximum force. Jewish prospects in Europe were no 
better; in  Poland, indeed, they were worse; and the “  boom ” 
in the National Home had  raised to the highest pitch the hope 
that re lief on an increasing scale would be found in Palestine. 
The attitude of the Zionist Congress, which had been held at 
Lucerne in Ju ly  and August, had shown that in Jewish eyes 
it was a  question not of restricting but of augmenting the volume 
of immigration in the future.
" In brief, th e  resolutions o f th e  P olitical Commission, w hich were 
carried unanim ously, reviewed the adverse conditions of Jew ish life 
in the Diaspora, considered th a t Jew ish achievem ents in  P alestine, 
the only country a t present open to  Jew ish im m igration on a large 
scale, had proved th a t im m igration and settlem ent could proceed far 
more rapidly th an  h itherto, and proclaim ed th e  firm resolve of th e  
Zionist Organisation to  focus the energies of th e Jew ish people on the  
extension and acceleration o f its  re-settlem ent in P alestine. The Con­
gress, while appreciating th e  part p layed b y  th e M andatory Power  
and re-affirming the readiness of th e  Zionist Organisation to  co-operate 
appealed to  th e G overnm ent to  fulfil its  obligations b y  an active and  
systematic policy  o f furthering th e  Jew ish N ational H om e on a scale 
and a t a pace dem anded b y  the position o f Jew s in  th e world and  
possible w ith active G overnm ent assistance.” *
The B ritish  Government m ay not have been prepared to endorse 
so sanguine a  view of future possibilities, b u t a t any rate they 
saw no reason for departing from the policy of i g 3 i .  The second 
and th ird  of the A rab demands were, therefore, rejected. B ut 
an effort was made to show tha t the Arab case was by no means 
overlooked. The High Commissioner was authorized in 
February, 1 9 3 6 , to inform  the leaders of the five parties that 
(1) an Ordinance was to be enacted prohibiting the sale of land
* Report on th e  A dm inistration of Palestine for 1935, p. 19.
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unless the owner should retain a  sufficient am ount of it to provide 
subsistence for himself and his fam ily, and (2) the carefu 
estimates already made of “  absorptive capacity "  were to be 
further checked by  a new Statistical Bureau.
g2. To the first of the A rab demands the Government’s reply 
had  been given without delay. I t  has been seen that Sir 
A rthur W auchope’s chief hope of peace lay in the d e v e lo p m e n  
of self-governing institutions. The new Municipal C o rp o ra tio n s  
Ordinance had  come into force in Jan u ary  IQ34. In  the follow­
ing December he had inform ed the A rab leaders that, w ith  the 
full agreem ent of the Secretary of State, he proposed, a fte r  a 
reasonable interval for observing the operation of the new 
Municipal Councils, to discuss with the various parties the estab­
lishment of a  Legislative Council. On the 21st and 22nt 
December, ig35, he subm itted to the A rab and Jewish leaders 
successively a  definite scheme for the constitution of the Council. 
I t  was to consist of twenty-eight members, only five o f  whom 
would be officials. There would be eleven nom inated unofficial 
members, and  twelve elected members. Of these twenty-three, 
eleven would be Moslems, seven Jew s, three Christians, and 
two representatives of commercial interests. The P resident 
would be "  some im partial person unconnected with P a le s t in e  
There would thus be no official m ajority; bu t there w e re  to be 
three m ain "  safeguards (1) The validity of the M andate 
was not to be questioned. (2) The High Commissioner would 
• be empowered, in  certain circumstances, to legislate by “ certifi­
cation ”  or by ordinance. (3) H e would continue to determ ine 
the Labour Schedules, though discussion of them in the Council 
would be allowed.
g3- These proposals could scarcely be regarded by the Arab 
leaders as conceding the “  democratic government ”  they had 
dem anded, still less the national independence which fro m  the 
outset had  figured in the forefront of A rab claims and w as still 
vigorously cham pioned by the Istiqlal P arty  and by a growing 
num ber of the younger educated A rabs. Almost all the Arab 
newspapers denounced the scheme as maintaining to o  much 
power in the hands of the High Commissioner and g iv in g  too 
little weight to the A rab electorate. Above all, it a f fo rd e d  little 
prospect of A rab opinion being more effective in the future than 
it had  been in the p as t in checking the flow of Jewish immigra­
tion. The scheme, however, was a  longer step towards real 
self-government than  the scheme of 1922, and the united party- 
leaders did not reject it outright. I
Ç4. We have little doubt that one of the main reasons why the I  
A rabs acquiesced to this extent in the proposals was th e  vehe-l 
mence with which the Jew s opposed them. Such m e r it  as the ■  
scheme possessed in A rab eyes condemned it in theirs . An I
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advance towards real self-government m eant an advance to- 
words the subjection of the National Home to an A rab m ajority. 
Already at Lucerne the Zionist Congress had  m ade its uncom­
prom ising attitude quite clear. To continue the sum m ary quoted 
above:
“ Expressing its grave concern a t th e intention of th e  M andatory 
Government to  establish a  L egislative Council, a  step w hich it  regarded 
as contrary to  the spirit o f th e  M andate, the Congress re-affirmed its 
opposition to  the establishm ent of a Legislative Council in th e  present 
stage of the developm ent of Palestine, and reluctantly expressed its 
categorical rejection o f th e  schem e.” *
Dr. Weizmann and his colleagues accordingly informed the 
High Commissioner tha t they rejected the scheme and had  
resolved to take no p a rt in its operation.
95. Its fate was soon determined outside Palestine. On 
26th February, 1936, it was debated in the House of Lords and 
on the 24th March in the House of Commons. On the former 
occasion Lords Snell, Lytton, Lothian, Jessel, E libank, 
Mansfield, Melchett, M arley and Cecil, representing all Parties 
in the House, were agreed in urging that the scheme should either 
be abandoned for the present or suspended while a  Royal 
Commission inquired into the question on the spot. The 
Government spokesman, Lord Plym outh, was its only supporter. 
In the House of Commons the result was much the same. 
Twelve members asked for the suspension or drastic modification 
of the scheme; and the Secretary of State (Mr. J .  H . Thomas), 
whose speech was constantly interrupted, had  only two 
supporters.
96. In view of the Arab reaction to these debates, we think 
it right to point out th a t only two of the speakers in 
each House were Jews. Re-reading the debates, moreover, 
in the fight of our experience in Palestine, we have been im ­
pressed by the fairness of most of the speeches. If  the case 
stated against the scheme was partly  based on the likelihood that 
it would operate to the disadvantage of the Jewish National 
Home, it was also based on such general considerations as the 
desirability of allowing more time to elapse for training in local 
government or the unwisdom of committing Palestine to a form 
of constitution which would naturally lead, and had  elsewhere 
led, to Responsible Government. And on this last point it 
should be remembered that for several years past Parliam ent had 
been discussing the difficulty of introducing Responsible Govern­
ment in a country so deeply divided by communal differences as 
India.
, 97- But, if Parliam ent judged the scheme on its merits, it 
s none the less unfortunate tha t the Jewish side of the case was 
0 much more fully stated than the Arab. The debate, indeed,
* Report on  th e A dm inistration of Palestine for 1935, p. 19.
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was a  striking illustration of the disadvantage which the Arabs 
suffer whenever the field of controversy shifts from Palestine to 
the U nited Kingdom. The Jew s are perfectly entitled to make 
use of all the opportunities a t their com mand for ensuring that 
their claims are fully understood; bu t we believe that their own 
ultim ate interests would have been better served if B r it is h  
public opinion could have been confronted from the outset w ith  
a no less clear and cogent statem ent of the Arab case.
98. I t  was, we assume, with a  view to adjusting in  some 
degree the one-sidedness of the position that after the d e b a te s  an 
invitation w as addressed to the Arab leaders to send a delegation 
to discuss the question of a Legislative Council a t the Colonial 
Office. The “  disturbances ”  broke out before this proposal 
could take effect : bu t it is difficult to suppose that it could in  any 
case have done much to erase the impression made o n  Arab 
minds by the debates. Nobody in Palestine doubted that 
Parliam ent had  killed the scheme. The Jewish P r e s s  was 
jubilant. I t  went so far as to hail the result as “ a  great Jewish 
victory ” . And that, of course, was how the Arabs lo o k e d  at 
it. They were bound to think it an  even more conclusive 
dem onstration of Jewish power in London than the " Black 
Letter ” . The scheme, which in their eyes went only a  little 1 
way to concede the rights they claimed, had  been a d o p te d  by 
the High Commissioner and endorsed by  the British Govern­
m ent, only to be rejected by  Jew ish influence in P arliam en t. 
T hat there m ight have been some other reason for the rejection 
seems never to have entered their minds. Inevitably th e ir  old 
hostility to the M andate and all it stood for was reinforced. I 
More than tha t, their old fear tha t the M andate might ultimately I 
lead to their subjection to the Jew s became more c o n c re te  and I 
more urgent. They were really to be “  swamped ” , i t  seemed,I 
and that in no long time. I
99. While we think it im portant thus to emphasize the I 
serious effect on A rab feeling of the rejection of the L e g is la t iv e  I 
Council scheme, we m ust once more enter a caveat a g ain st I 
exaggeration. The rejection was not the cause of the trouble I 
tha t ensued. I t  aggravated the cause of it. I t  helped t o  bring I 
it to a head. B ut, in our considered judgm ent, if Parliament had I 
accepted the Legislative Council scheme, it would n o t  have I  
satisfied the Arab nationalists for any length of time. T o  sup-1 
pose tha t it would have done so is to ignore the “ extern a l I  
factors ” . For, just as the pressure of European Jewry on! 
Palestine was now a t its strongest, so also was the in flu en ce  I  
of events in neighbouring lands. This very winter of i935'3“ l  
witnessed a recrudescence of nationalist agitation i n  Egypt ■  
and  in Syria so vigorous and effective tha t in both c o u n t r i e s , !  
within a  few months it attained its final objective, the c o n c e s s i o n !  
of national independence. I
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100. In the autum n of 1935 developments arising out of the 
Abyssinian w ar led to the formation in Egypt of a “ United 
Front ” of political parties. This body dem anded the conclusion 
of a treaty between Great B ritain and  Egypt. The five weeks 
which elapsed before the British reply was published were 
m arked by constant unrest and serious rioting, mainly by 
the s tu d e n ts  in Cairo. B ut, when it was known that the 
British Government were prepared to negotiate, the tension 
was e a se d . On the 2nd M arch, 1936, the negotiations be­
gan. On the 26th August the Anglo-Egyptian T reaty of 
Alliance was signed. In  it the British Government, having 
already recognized E gypt as “  a  sovereign independent State " ,  
undertook to support its application for admission to the League 
of N a tio n s . Other articles established “  an alliance between the 
High Contracting Parties " ,  provided for consultation in times of 
crisis a n d  co-operation in the event of war, declared the British 
military occupation of Egypt to be term inated, and provided for 
the removal of the British air and land forces to the neighbour­
hood of the Suez Canal.
101. The Egyptian example had a considerable influence on 
opinion in Syria, and the course of events there was much the 
same as that in Egypt. In  January  1936 the growing power of 
the “ Nationalist bloc ” culminated in an outbreak of serious 
disorder. A “  strike ”  was declared and lasted for fifty days. 
On the 1st March the French Government announced its decision 
to nego tia te  a treaty. On the 9th September the Franco-Syrian 
Treaty of Alliance was signed. Modelled on the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1930, it provided that, within three years a t most, 
the F re n c h  Government should resign the Mandate and support 
the application of Syria for admission to the League of Nations. 
Provision was made for an alliance between France and Syria, 
for consultation on foreign policy, and for m utual assistance 
against aggression. France was to have the use of two military 
air-bases on Syrian soil. The rights of minorities were carefully 
safeguarded. The essence of the Syrian Treaty, like tha t of the 
Egyptian, was the acquisition of fuU national status. I t  m eant 
'at a treaty-relationship between two sovereign States was 
hortly to  be substituted for the existing relationship between a 
an d ato iy  Power and a M andated Territory. Thus quickly and 
ecisively Syrian nationalism  had reached its goal.
102. O n  the 13th November an  almost identical treaty  was 
igned b e tw e e n  France and the Lebanon, under which that little 
ea-board country, with a population of about 860,000 and a 
erritory about the size of Norfolk and Suffolk combined, will 
oon b e co m e, like Syria and ‘Iraq , a sovereign independent 
tate.
,I03- These developments in Egypt and Syria were bound to 
timulate nationalist agitation in Palestine. The Arab newspapers
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m ade the most of such congenial m atter. A t the time of the riots 
in Cairo, one of them called on its readers to follow the E gyptian  
example. “  Rise to rid  yourselves from Jewish and British 
slavery . . . The leaders in Egypt have awakened. Where are 
our leaders hiding? ”  Again, a little later, the students of 
Palestine were urged to awake like their brothers. “ The tim e is 
near and the situation grave. Unify yourselves. Demand your 
violated rights and stolen freedom. Advance. God is with 
you " .  The opening of the Franco-Syrian nego tia tions, 
similarly, evoked the strongest expressions of sympathy with 
“  our heroic brothers in  the northern part of this oppressed 
A rab country ” , “  Syria is to be congratulated. Palestine
wishes it success in its national aspirations and in its challenge 
to the colonizers ” . I t  was only to be expected that P alestin ian  
Arabs should thus envy and seek to emulate their successful 
fellow-nationalists in those countries just across their northern 
and southern borders. F o r now of all the Arab peoples 
in  the Middle E ast they were the only people, except the people 
of Trans-Jordan, who had not attained or were not soon to 
attain full national freedom : and, as has been mentioned before, 
the Government of T rans-Jordan had  long been re c o g n iz e d  as 
an  “ independent governm ent
104. There was one further external factor operating o n  the 
situation. The conflict between Ita ly  and the League of Nations 
on the question of Abyssinia from September 1935 onwards 
was closely watched throughout the Levant, and its u p s h o t ,  we 
have been informed, was everywhere taken to show that British 
sea-power in the Eastern M editerranean was no lo n g e r  so 
unquestioned as it once had  been. Italian propaganda a t  that 
time was not unnaturally concerned to weaken British prestige 
w herever possible. The wireless-station a t Bari broadcast I 
criticisms of British “  imperialism ” in Arabic. The attention I 
of Arab “  listeners ”  in Palestine was directed, for exam ple, I 
to the inadequate provision made by the Government fo r  Arab I 
education. But it would be easy, we think, to overestim ate  I 
the influence of the Abyssinian imbroglio over e v e n ts  in I 
Palestine. Unquestionably it suggested to zealous nationalists , I 
in Palestine as in  Syria and  Egypt, tha t an  opportunity h a d  been I 
given them  for pressing their claims which might n o t  easily I 
recur; and it seems probable th a t the coincidence in  tino 
between the Anglo-Italian tension and the “ disturbances ’ in I 
Egypt, Syria, and Palestine was no accident. B ut t h a t  is all. I 
To suppose that the quarrel over Abyssinia greatly in c re a s e d  the I 
trouble in Palestine, still more to imagine that Italian propa-l 
ganda engendered it, is to m ake the old mistake. As w e have I  
tried to show, the situation was quite grave enough before ■  
September 1935. 1
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105. Thus the history of the fifteen years which had p assed 
since th e  execution of the M andate was first entrusted to a Civil 
Administration had led up to a situation in which almost every 
factor, both internal and external, prejudicial to a peaceful 
outcome was stronger than it had been a t the outset. I t  is not 
surprising in the circumstances tha t in April 1936 the “  distur­
bances ” broke out which occasioned the appointm ent of the 
Royal Commission.
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C H A PTER  IV.
THE DISTURBANCES OF 1936.
(( I . W e do not regard it as part of our duty  to d e sc rib e  the 
“  disturbances ”  of last year in detail or to discuss th e  manner 
in which they were dealt with by the Palestine G o v ern m en t 
We propose, therefore, to confine ourselves in this c h a p te r  to 
summarizing very briefly the course and character of th e  dis­
turbances and to stating our opinion as to the “  underlying I 
causes ”  of them  in pursuance of the first of our te rm s of I 
reference. 1
1. The Course of the Disturbances. I
2. The trouble began with the m urder of two Jews b y  Arab I 
bandits on the night of the 15th April on the T u lkarm -N ab lus I 
road. The following night two Arabs were murdered no t far I 
from  Petah Tiqva as an act, so the A rabs believed, o f  Jewish I 
reprisal. The funeral of one of the m urdered Jews at T e l Aviv I 
on the 17th April led to angry Jew ish demonstrations. A  series I  
of assaults on A rabs in Tel Aviv began, and on the 1 9 th  April, I  
excited by  false rum ours tha t A rabs had been killed, A ra b  mobs I  
in Jaffa began attacking Jew s and m urdered three o f them. I  
Police, reinforced by troops, dispersed the rioters. C u rfe w  was I  
imposed on Jaffa and Tel Aviv, and the Palestine (Defence) I  
Order in Council and the Em ergency Regulations thereunder I  
were brought into force for all Palestine by proclamation. I
3 . On the 20th April an A rab N ational Committee was formed I  
a t N ablus and resolved th a t a general strike should be declared ■  
throughout the country and m aintained until the Arab dem ands! 
as p u t forward in the previous November had  been conceded. ■  
B y the end of the m onth N ational Committees had also been! 
constituted in all the towns and in some of the larger villages 1  
in Palestine. On the 21st April the leaders of the five  united ■  
parties accepted the decision taken a t Nablus and called a l  
general strike of all A rabs engaged in labour, transport, a i l  
shopkeeping on the next day. On the 25th April at a  meeting■  
of all A rab parties a Supreme A rab Committee, subsequently■  
known as the A rab H igher Committee, was e s tab lish e d . I f l  
consisted of H aj Amin Eff. E l Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem 1  
(P resident), Awni Bey Abdelhadi (Secretary), A h m a d  H ilm J  
Pasha (T reasurer), Ragheb Bey N ashashibi, J a m a a l  Bey El■  
Husseini, Abdul Latif Bey Salah, D r. Hussein Eff. E l  Khalidil 
(Mayor of Jerusalem ), Y aqub Eff. Ghussein, Y aqub E ff. FarrajB 
and Alfred Eff. Rock. I t  should be noted that the Is tiq la l Party ■  
was now prom inently associated with the rest, since Awni Beyl 
Abdelhadi is its General Secretary and Ahmad H ilm i Paste*  
(M anager of the A rab Bank) is associated with it, and that*
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Yaqub Eff. Farraj and Alfred Eff. Rock represented the Christian 
Arabs, being members of the Greek Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic communities respectively.
4 . The new Committee adopted a resolution “  to continue the 
general strike until the British Government changes its present 
policy in a fundam ental m anner, the beginning of which is the 
stoppage of Jewish im m igration.'’ They also re-stated the A rab 
national demands as follows: (1) the prohibition of Jewish 
immigration; (2) the prohibition of the transfer of A rab land 
to J e w s ;  (3) the establishment of a N ational Government 
responsible to a representative council. I t  will be observed 
that th e  third item is a clearer definition of the full A rab claim 
than “ the establishment of democratic government ”  dem anded 
in the  previous November.
5. On the 5th May the High Commissioner unsuccessfully 
appea led  to the A rab Higher Committee to assist the Govern­
ment in maintaining law and order. On the 8th May a conference 
of the National Committees was held a t Jerusalem  and resolved 
not o n ly  that the strike should be continued but tha t Arabs 
should refuse to pay  taxes. A manifesto issued b y  the Arab 
Car-owners' and D rivers’ Committee* also urged the non-pay­
m ent of taxes and further called on the A rab Higher Committee 
to enforce a strike of all Arab Government officials.
The Committee intim ated tha t, while they were not respon­
sible for it, the agitation in favour of “  civil disobedience ” 
must be regarded as a spontaneous expression of national feel­
ing, and they added tha t they could not use their influence to 
check illegal action o r to call off the strike unless Jewish 
immigration were suspended. To such a  “  fundam ental ” 
change of policy the High Commissioner could not agree. On 
the 18th May a  Labour Schedule of 4,500 im m igrants for the 
next six months was approved.
6. Meantime the strike had  been effectively imposed. A lready, 
in M ay, Arab work and trade were virtually a t a standstill. 
Jaffa port was out of action. Arab shops in Jerusalem  and 
elsewhere were closed. Only a t H aifa P ort and to some extent 
on the railways was A rab labour still available. The strike 
was accompanied by interm ittent local demonstrations. Jew s 
were assaulted and stoned in various parts of the country. 
Much destruction, however, was done to Jewish trees and crops 
in the Northern District.
7- On the 18th May the Secretary of State informed the 
House of Commons that it had been “  decided, after order is 
restored, to advise His M ajesty to appoint a Royal Commission
* The President and Vice-President of this Committee were convicted of, 
inciting to disorder and fined £ 2 5  each.
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which, w ithout bringing into question the terms of the Mandate, 
will investigate causes of unrest and alleged grievances either of 
A rabs or of Jew s."  In  a  debate on the 19th June Mr. Ormsby 
Gore, who had  succeeded Mr. Thomas as Secretary7 of State, 
declared, with reference to the Royal Commission, that “ thé 
sole aim of His M ajesty’s Government is to obtain an objective 
and non-partisan report, to enable them  to do justice to aU 
sections of the Palestine population.”  If the policy recom­
m ended by the Commission commended itself to the Govern­
m ent, it would be carried into effect w ithout fear or favour; 
bu t, in view especially of its obligations to the L e a g u e  of 
N ations, the Government m ust retain the ultim ate responsibility. 
H e added th a t until the report had been received and con­
sidered, “ no change of policy whatsoever could be contera- |  
p la ted .”  On the 29th Ju ly  the personnel of the C om m ission 
and  its term s of reference were announced.
8. The position in Palestine, meanwhile, had been steadily 
worsening. D uring May and June the strike hardened through­
ou t the country. Those few A rabs who kept their shops 
open or otherwise abstained from striking were soon won over 
o r intim idated by  representatives of the National C om m ittees, 
which, staffed largely by younger Arabs, kept a highly 
efficient watch on the conduct of the strike. Violence and 
sabotage increased. There was persistent sniping at Jewish 
colonies. Five Jew s, two A rabs, and one British policeman 
were m urdered. Sporadic attacks were made on the railway 
lines, two trains were derailed, and one bridge blown up. 
Roads were barricaded, and telephone wires cut. B u t  the 
most serious development was the appearance of b a n d s  of 
arm ed A rabs in the hills, including volunteers from S y r ia  and 
‘Iraq . H itherto the m ilitary and police had  only been exposed 
to indiscriminate sniping. Now organized attacks were m ad e  on 
them.
9. From  the second week in May onwards m ilitary r e in f o r c e ­
ments were arriving from  Egypt and Malta. They were m a in ly  
used for the defence of key-points, patrolling the roads, esco rt­
ing convoys and protecting the railway lines. No la r g e - s c a le  
attack was made on the bands in the hills. On the 23rd May 
sixty-one A rab agitators in various parts of the country were 
arrested, and in most cases compelled to reside under police 
supervision in other than their home towns. In  June s o m e  of I 
the more prom inent leaders, including Awni Bey A b d e lh a d i ,  
were interned in a “  concentration cam p ”  at Sarafand. In 
the same month the Em ergency Regulations were e x t e n d e d  so 
as to increase the penalties for firing on troops and police, 
bomb-throwing, and the illegal possession of arms. Those 
m easures had little effect, and a t the end of June a w e a k e n in g
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became apparent in the ranks of the adm inistration itself. A 
memorandum was submitted to the High Commissioner, 
signed by 137 A rab senior officials and judges.
10. The salient points of this memorandum (which is printed 
in full as Appendix 2 to this Report) were as follows:—
(i) The disturbances were due to a feeling of despair 
among the Arabs which had  been largely caused by “ loss 
of faith in the value of official pledges and assurances for 
the future.”  “  The Arab complaint on this head is sub­
stantially justified.”
(ii) The Government has apparently failed to realize 
that the trouble cannot be stopped by force, bu t only by 
removing the causes of it.
(lii) “ We have no hesitation in recommending the stop­
page of immigration as the only fair, hum ane, and 
honourable solution of the deadlock.”
(iv) "W e m ust conscientiously raise a protest against 
the present policy of repression.”
In putting forward these opinions and recommendations 
the signatories claimed to be "  naturally in closer contact 
with the intim ate thoughts of the Arab population than  
even Your Excellency’s closest advisers.”
11. This memorandum , which, though phrased in deferential 
language,, definitely asserted tha t distrust of the Governm ent’s 
good faith was justified and definitely condemned its policy, 
was signed or afterwards endorsed by all the senior Arab 
officials, including highly-placed officers in the political as well 
as the technical departm ents of the A dm inistration, * and— 
still more rem arkable—by all the Arab judges. I t  seems to us 
to throw a sharp light on the state of affairs in Palestine tha t 
a British Government should ever have been confronted with 
such a situation. The m em orandum  was accepted. A similar 
memorandum was subm itted some weeks later by  1,200 A rab 
officials in the Second Division of the Public Service.
12. In the middle of Ju ly  the Qadis of the Moslem Shari'a  
Courts presented yet another m em orandum . These judges, 
t will be remembered, are not Government officers, bu t they 
re appointed by  and  responsible to the President of the 
upreme Moslem Council, who receives a salary from  Govern- 
ent. The tone of this document was more mutinous than  th a t 
f the others. I t  described the Government’s policy as 
' detestable” ; it charged the police and m ilitary with “ uni-
aginable acts ”  ; and it w arned “  the British authorities of the 
evenge of God the Almighty ” . I t  demanded, in conclusion,
the grant of all the dem ands of the A rabs and the enforcement 
f the pledges given to them .”
* Officials in  th e  P olice w ere the on ly  exception.
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13. The announcem ent of the terms and reference and 
personnel of the Royal Commission a t the end of July 
had no effect on Arab opinion. I t  was argued, first, 
tha t the result of previous enquiries had shown th a t  no 
recommendations favourable to the Arab cause w o u ld  be 
implemented and, secondly, that the terms of reference pre­
cluded the Arabs from attacking the Mandate itself on  the 
ground that it had broken an antecedent pledge. T h roughou t 
August and September, therefore, the “ disturbances " con­
tinued. There were two short periods of relative quiescence 
while attem pts were made to settle the dispute. His Highness 
the Amir of T rans-Jordan had invited the Arab Higher Com­
mittee to Amman on the 6th June, and had been informed by 
them  that they were powerless to stop the strike unless Jewish 
im migration were suspended. Now, on the 7th A u g u s t the 
Amir repeated his invitation, but the result was no more satis­
factory. The next move came from ‘Iraq . Nuri P a s h a ,  the 
‘Iraqi Foreign Minister, arrived in Palestine on the 20th August, 
having offered his services as an unofficial mediator b e tw e e n  the 
Government and the Arab leaders. The latter w e lc o m e d  his 
intervention ; but, since he could make no promises on  the 
G overnm ent’s behalf, the negotiations broke down. O n  the 
30th August the Arab Higher Committee published a manifesto, 
declaring their willingness to trust to “ the mediation of the 
Government of ‘Iraq  and of Their Majesties and Highnesses 
the Arab Kings and Princes ” , and that in the meantim e 
“  the Nation will continue its general strike with th e  same 
steadfastness and conviction which it has shown.
14. Throughout these months the forces of disorder became 
more powerful and active. The strength of the bands in the 
hills was increased both in num bers and in arm s and <■ nmu­
nition; and towards the end of August they were jo in ed  by 
trained guerilla leaders from outside Palestine. One of these 
Fawzi ed Din el K auwakji, a Syrian, had served w ith  distinc­
tion in the Turkish Army in the W ar and after th e  French 
occupation of Syria had  obtained the légion d ’honneur tor his 
work as an  intelligence officer. On the outbreak of th e  ^ruse 
revolt in 1925 he had joined the rebels and been sen ten ced  0 
death; but he had  escaped to the H edjaz, where he became 
M ilitary Adviser to King Ib n  Saud. Finally he had obtained 
a commission in the ‘Iraq  Army, which he resigned in  193 ■ 
Arrived in Palestine, he appointed himself “  generalissimo 0 1  
the rebel forces and issued “ communiqués ”  and P ro c la " 
mations U nder his leadership the bands were drilled ana 
instructed in trench-warfare, and they had several sharp 
encounters with the British troops. Meanwhile th e  lawless 
activities of individual Arabs or “ terrorist ”  gangs b e c a m e  mor 
violent and frequent. Several Jew s were m urdered. Sabotage
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of e v e r y  kind increased. The oil pipe-line running through the 
P la in  o f  Esdraelon was repeatedly punctured. Roads were 
systematically mined. Railways were frequently dam aged 
and t h e r e  was one serious derailment involving loss of life.
1 5 . On the 7th September the Colonial Office issued a 
S t a t e m e n t  of Policy. It outlined the course of the distur­
b a n c e s  and described “  the situation which had been created ” 
as a  “ direct challenge to the authority of the British Govern­
m en t i n  Palestine ” . I t referred to the appointm ent of the Royal 
Commission and to the attem pts at conciliation from outside, 
and  pointed out that, owing to the Arab leaders' determination 
not to  end the strike until “  fundam ental changes "  had been 
made i n  British policy, “  all efforts to introduce a reasonable 
sp irit o f  accommodation have hitherto failed.”  Finally it 
d e c la re d  that the state of disorder must be brought to an end 
w ith o u t  delay, and announced that an additional division of 
t ro o p s  was being sent to Palestine and that Lieutenant-General 
J. G . Dill would assume the supreme military command.
16. T he  reinforcements began to arrive in Palestine on the 
22nd S e p te m b e r  and extensive operations were prom ptly set on 
foot with a view to rounding up the Arab bands. By the end 
of the month the num ber of British troops in the country had 
risen to about 20,000. Moreover, an O rder in Council had 
been m ad e  authorizing the application of “  m artial law ” by 
the High Commissioner or by the G.O.C. Palestine Forces as 
his delegate .
17. T he outbreak was now clearly nearing its end. On the 
one hand , it was evident that the bands could not long resist 
so large a  military force; on the other hand, many of the less 
politically-minded Arabs were wearying of the long conflict and 
the personal insecurity and pecuniary sacrifice it entailed. The 
prospect of not participating in the orange-season, which opens 
in N ovem ber, was particularly unpleasant. In  this situation, 
the Arab Higher Committee, who had kept in touch with the 
Arab K ings and Princes throughout the disorders, welcomed the
[rival o f  appeals for peace, couched in identical terms, from 
" g  Ibn  Saud, King Ghazi of ‘Iraq , and the Amir Abdullah 
fTrans-Jordan. The text was as follows: —
" Through th e  President o f the Arab H igher Com m ittee to  our sons 
the Arabs of Palestine : —
We have been deeply pained b y  the present state of affairs 
in Palestine. For th is reason we have agreed w ith  our Brothers 
the Kings and th e E m ir to  call upon you to  resolve for peace in 
order to save further shedding of blood. In doing th is, we rely  
on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has de­
clared that she will do justice. You m ust be confident that we 
will continue our efforts to  assist y o u .”
18. On the n t h  October the Arab H igher Committee pub- 
shed this document, and announced that with the unanimous 
greement of the National Committees they had decided “  to
respond to the appeal of Their Majesties and Highnesses
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Arab Kings and Amirs, and to call upon the noble Arab nation 
in Palestine to resort to quietness and to put an end to the strike 
and disorders ” .
19. These orders were obeyed. W ork was generally resumed 
on the 12th October. The bands, on which the British troops 
were now beginning to close in, were perm itted to disperse. 
Cases of sniping and law-breaking still occurred, b u t  the 
“  disturbances ”  as an organized national movement had
ceased. They had  lasted six months.
20. At the beginning of November the situation w as con­
sidered sufficiently peaceful for the Royal Commission to go 
out to Palestine. We left England on the 5th N o ve m b e r and 
arrived at Jerusalem  on the n t h  November. But, though  the 
strike had  been ended, we found that the Arab leaders were not 
prepared to assist us in our inquiry. On the 5th N ove m b e r the 
Secretary of State had  announced in the House of Commons 
the Governm ent’s decision that a  suspension of im m igration 
during the course of the Royal Commission’s investigation 
"  would not be justifiable on economic or on other grounds ”,
" I t  is th e  v iew  o f H is M ajesty's G overnm ent th a t, if a n y  drastic
departure from th e  im m igration policy h itherto pursued w ere  now 
to  be introduced in  advance o f th e  findings of th e  R oyal Commission, 
th is would involve an alteration in  the existing situation a n d  might 
be held to  prejudice th e  inquiries of th e  R oyal Commission, which 
w ill be directed, am ong other m atters, to  th e  very  im portant quest™ 
of im m igration generally .”
21. In  view of this announcement, the Arab Higher Com­
mittee resolved on the 6th November to boycott the 
Commission; and  next day, after an interview with the High I 
Commissioner, who did his utm ost to persuade them to change I 
their minds, the decision was published in the following I 
term s:— 1
“ T he Arab H igher C om m ittee has m et and studied the statement I 
m ade b y  th e  Colonial Secretary in  th e  H ouse of Commons on 5th I 
N ovem ber, 1936, in  relation to  th e  decision of th e  B ritish Government I 
n ot to  stop Jfewish im m igration and consenting to  issue fresh  labour I 
im m igration certificates and to  allow  all other forms of immigration I 
T his is contrary to  w hat th e  Arabs had been expecting, i.e ., a com-1 
plete stoppage of a ll form s o f im m igration. T he Committee finds the I 
reasons g iven  b y  th e  Colonial Secretary obviously inadequate. I
“ W hereas th e  strike w hich w as declared b y  the Arabs and which I 
continued for six  m onths w as nothing b ut a protest against the policy |  
of th e  B ritish  Governm ent, w hich deprives th e  Arabs of their political I  
rights, and a dem and for a fundam ental change o f policy  which wow I  
h ave as its first aspect a suspension of im m igration (Jewish), and| 
whereas th e  statem ent o f th e Colonial Secretary is a strong insult I  
to  the Arabs and hostile to  their interests and is an indication of ® |
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absence of good faith , in bringing about a ju st solution of the Arab 
case based on the realisation of th e Arab dem ands and th e safe­
guarding of their national existence :
Therefore th e C om m ittee denounces w ith  vigour th is stand and  
decides not to  co-operate w ith  the R oyal Commission and asks the  
honourable nation, w hich has proved to  th e  world a t large its  political 
maturity and strong national faith , to  abide by th is decision; and m ay  
God arrange m atters.
The Arab Higher C om m ittee."
22. The boycott was m aintained until we had heard most 
of the Jewish and  British evidence and had  announced the 
date at which we intended to leave Palestine. B ut on the 
6th January it was abandoned in similar circumstances to 
those in which the strike had been called off. On the 
previous evening a delegation which the Arab H igher Com­
mittee had sent to ‘Iraq  and Saudi-Arabia returned to Jeru ­
salem, bringing letters from King Ghazi and King Ibn Saud. 
They recommended the A rab Higher Committee, in identical 
erms, to state their case to the Royal Commission.
“ On account of the confidence we have in th e  good intentions of 
the British Governm ent to  give justice to  th e  Arabs, we have seen that 
it is in the interest of th e Arab case to get into touch w ith  th e R oyal 
Commission and to lay  before it  your just claim s because th a t is a 
surer method to  safeguard your rights and a more helpful w ay for 
securing the aid o f your friends in defending you  properly. W e have  
explained to the noble delegation all our thoughts on th is m atter and  
wish to assure you th a t we shall not refrain from helping you  in 
bettering the situation as far as lies in  our power and w e tru st th at 
God will help you  all to  w hat is best for Islam  and th e A rabs.”
Next day the Arab Higher Committee issued the following
anifesto : —
" The Arab H igher C om m ittee has held a session in th e  presence of 
the delegation w hich has returned from Baghdad and R yadh and after  
hearing the statem ent of th e  delegation and reading th e  letters of 
the King of ’Iraq and K ing of Saudi Arabia w hich were brought by  
the delegation, has found it  necessary to  accept the exalted  request 
of the said kings and to  present th e Arab case before the R oyal Com­
mission.
" The Arab H igher C om m ittee w ill get into touch w ith th e  R oyal 
Commission on behalf of th e Arabs and hopes th a t everyone w ho has 
information or statem ents helpful to  the case w ill send them  to  the 
Committee in w riting and th a t no individual w ill go to  give evidence
without prior consent o f the Arab H igher C om m ittee as th is rule will
both lead to a proper and system atic presentation of th e case and will
avoid repetition and confusion."
The Character of the Disturbances and the Loss occasioned 
by them.
23. It remains to draw  attention to the more significant 
attires of the disturbances and roughly to estimate their cost. 
In some respects the outbreak of 1936 followed the same 
es as those described in the preceding chapter. There was 
e same use of the economic weapon—the strike. There was
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the same consolidation of the Arab nationalist fo rces, all 
parties uniting and Christian m aking common cause with 
Moslem. There were similar assaults on the p e rso n s  and 
property of the Jew s, conducted with the same reckless fero­
city. Women and children were not spared. Of many tragic 
cases we m ay mention that of Mr. Lewis Billig, Lecturer in Arabic 
Literature in the Hebrew University, who had  devoted his life 
to Arabic studies and was m urdered in his house in th e  suburbs 
of Jerusalem . B ut in all these respects, except, p e rh a p s , the 
last, the outbreak of 1936 overshadowed all its predecessors. 
I t  lasted far longer; it extended more completely throughout 
the whole country; and it was much more efficiently 
organized.
24. One other feature of the “  disturbances ”  of la s t  year 
had likewise appeared before. I t  has been pointed out th a t the 
outbreak of 1933 was not only, or even mainly, an a ttack  on 
the Jew s, but an attack on the Palestine Government. In 
1936 this was still clearer. Jewish lives were taken and Jewish 
property destroyed; bu t the outbreak was chiefly and directly 
aimed at the Government. The word “ disturbances ” gives a 
misleading impression of w hat happened. I t  was a n  open 
rebellion of the Palestinian A rabs, assisted by fellow-A ra b s  from 
other countries, against British M andatory rule. Throughout 
the strike the A rab press indulged in unrestrained invective 
against the Government. “  The Government imprisons and 
demolishes and imposes extortionate fines in the interests of 
imperialism " .  "  G reat B ritain has m ade the L eague of
Nations into a  tool for the realization of its wickedest objects 
and the legalization of its worst political and social aim s, and 
relies on it as an  agent for the annihilation of Palestine . ’’ And 
as to the m ilitary operations and the conduct of the troops, the 
dropping of poisoned sweets from  aeroplanes was one of the 
least outrageous charges made.
25. So far the outbreak of 1936 was a  repetition, to a  greatly 
intensified degree, of the past: bu t there were two features of 
it which were quite unprecedented. The first was th e  attitude 
of the A rab officials. W e  have already referred to th e ir  memo­
randum , and we shall refer later on to the difficulty the 
Government experienced, as the disorders dragged o n , in rely; 
ing on its A rab district officers and police. T h e  secon 
novelty was the intrusion of the "  external factor.” Previo" 
outbreaks in Palestine had  excited the interest and sym path 
of the neighbouring A rab peoples : bu t this time, n o t  only w 
considerable popular feeling displayed against th e  Bri 
Government as well as the Jew s, bu t a substantial number 
volunteers, including the ultimate leader of the rebellion , c
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from Syria or ‘Iraq , and the Arabs of T rans-Jordan were with 
difficulty prevented from joining in the conflict. Still more 
im p o rta n t, the A rab Governments concerned themselves for 
the first time in the dispute. Throughout its course the Arab 
leaders in Palestine kept in touch with the Kings of Saudi 
A rabia and ‘Iraq  and  the Amir of T rans-Jordan. A direct 
attem pt to mediate was made by  the ‘Iraq i Foreign Minister. 
And th e  rebellion was brought to an end on the direct advice 
of the Rulers of Saudi A rabia, ‘Iraq , Yemen and Trans­
jo rd a n . The boycott of the Royal Commission, similarly, was 
abandoned  at the instance of K ing Ibn  Saud and King Ghazi. 
N atu ra lly , too, the language used both by the Rulers in their 
letters a n d  by the Arab H igher Committee in announcing the 
acceptance of their advice reflects the solidarity of Arab 
interests. The Rulers address the Palestine A rabs as “  our 
sons " and promise to give them all the help they can. The 
Arab Higher Committee acknowledges “  the great benefit to 
accrue from their intervention and support.”  The Arab Rulers 
are well aware that Y our M ajesty’s Government is accountable 
to no o th e r  body than the League of Nations for its execution 
of the Mandate; and we understand that their relations with 
Your Majesty’s Government are altogether friendly and 
correct : but the difficulty in which they are placed by an 
Arab rebellion in Palestine and by the excitement it arouses 
among their subjects is evident. If, indeed, we were to pick 
out th e  feature of the late "  disturbances ”  which on 
a general view seems to us the most striking and far-reach- 
ing, it would be the m anner in which they roused the feeling 
of the Arab world a t large against Zionism and its defenders.
26. Only the roughest reckoning can be m ade of the loss 
occasioned by the “  disturbances ”  to the A rab population. 
The official list of "  casualties ”  gives 195 A rabs killed or 
died of wounds and 804 wounded. B ut these figures are 
based o n ly  on verified deaths and treatm ent in hospitals; and 
the full extent of the A rab losses cannot be gauged. I t  has 
been c re d ib ly  estimated a t 1,000 killed—mostly in fighting, 
since v e ry  few Arabs were murdered.
27. O n the Jewish side, the official list gives 80 Jew s killed 
or died of wounds and 308 wounded. The figures supplied 
by the Jewish Agency are “ 82 Jews m urdered, apart from 
nine further deaths arising out of and connected with the 
disturbances between April and October, 1936,”  and 369 Jews 
wounded in  the same period. As to m aterial loss, the Jewish 
Agency reports the destruction of 80,000 citrus trees, 62,000 
other f ru i t  trees, 64,000 forest trees, and 16,500 dunums of
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crops. I t  reckons the total cost of the injury to Jewish 
property at about £250,000, of which £100,000 is in respect 
of the destruction o r dam age of commercial or industrial 
premises in Jaffa by  fire or otherwise.
28. Of the Palestine Police Force and the Trans-Jordan 
Frontier Force one officer and fifteen other ranks were k illed  or 
died of wounds, and fifteen officers and eighty-seven other ranks 
were wounded.
29. Of the British forces, naval, m ilitary and air, two officers 
and nineteen other ranks were killed or died of wounds, and 
seventeen officers and eighty-seven other ranks were wounded.
30. The direct cost of the "  disturbances ”  to the Palestine 
T reasury in the financial year 1936-37 is estimated a t more than 
£1,500,000 (including £1,186,000 for additional troops, £144,000 
for extra expenditure on Police and Prisons, and about £35,000 
for repairing dam age to roads and railw ay bridges, rolling stock 
and the like). The corresponding total for 1937-38 is £433,000 
(principally increased expenditure on security forces). The 
effect on receipts is more difficult to assess, bu t the loss of 
revenue probably am ounted to £900,000 in 1936-37, and it is 
estimated that it will be as much as £750,000 in the current 
year. Thus the total direct cost to the taxpayers of Palestine 
will have been approxim ately £3^ million. To this m u st 
added the losses incurred by  the A rab and  Jewish com m unities 
—both directly from  the interruption of business and employ­
m ent, the suspension of the tourist trade, dam age to property 
and in other ways, and indirectly from the resultant check  on 
the im portation of capital. Only conjecture is possible as to 
the am ount of these losses; bu t it m ust have run  into millions 
of pounds.
3. The Underlying Causes.
31. This seems to us to be an appropriate point to deal with 
the first of our terms of reference, which requires us 
ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances ” .
32. The evidence given b y  the A rabs on this question is the 
more im portant, because it was they who made the "  distur­
bances ” , and the A rab H igher Committee told us p la in ly  why 
they did it. There has never, indeed, been very much doubt 
about it. The A rab leaders have often set out their case before 
in public statements, and  for some time they were in  doubt 
w hether they could add to its weight by  repeating it before the | 
Royal Commission.
3 3 . The gist of their evidence on the m atter m ay b e  summa­
rized as follows :—
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They frankly stated tha t, though they considered that 
they have complaints as to the way in which the M andate has 
been carried out, they do not rest their case upon these griev­
ances but that their quarrel is with the existence of the Mandate 
itself. They do not accept the interpretation of the McMahon 
letter set out in the G overnm ent’s statem ent of British policy 
in Palestine in June, 1922.* They deny the validity of the 
Balfour Declaration. They have never adm itted the right of 
the Powers to entrust a M andate to Great Britain. They hold 
that the authority exercised by the M andatory is inconsistent 
with the Covenant of the League of Nations and with the 
principle of self-determination embodied in tha t Covenant. 
We have examined these controversial issues in an earlier 
chapter; and the point which concerns us here is not whether 
these Arab claims are justified or not, bu t simply tha t they 
are their claims, and tha t the overriding or setting-aside of them 
was the main cause of the disturbances.
34. In support of these claims, the Arab H igher Committee 
re-affirmed the conviction, m aintained by  A rab leaders ever 
since the W ar, that Palestine west of the Jordan  was not m eant 
to be excluded from the McMahon Pledge. They asserted 
that they were not an oppressed people under Turkish rule but 
that they had as full a share as any other Turkish citizens in 
the government of the country. I t  was not to escape oppression 
but to secure independence that they assisted the British forces 
and threw in their lot with the Allies. K ing Hussein called 
upon all the A rab territories to take their share, and volun­
teers from Palestine were am ong the first to join in a revolt 
which had a single end in view—the independence of the A rab 
lands, including Palestine. The A rabs of Palestine put their 
trust in the Proclam ation which Lord Allenby issued in 1918 
in the name of the Governments of Great Britain and France 
that it was the solemn purpose of the Allies to further the cause 
of A rab self-determination and to establish A rab national 
governments. They understood this Proclam ation to be the 
renewed assertion of the promise made to King Hussein in the 
McMahon letter.
35- The Arab H igher Committee further claimed that the 
League of Nations recognized in principle the independence of 
11 the Arab countries which were separated from the Turkish 
mpire. They were classed together in a group, to which w hat 
ere called " A "  M andates were to be applied: i.e., they 
ere to be subject to the tem porary advice and supervision 
f a Mandatory Government, and in the selection of the Man- 
atory th e  public opinion of the state concerned was to have 
determining voice. The Arabs were therefore indignant when
* See page 20 above.
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Palestine, without any consultation of its inhabitants by  the 
Allied Powers, was severed from Syria and placed under a 
British Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was 
enshrined. Again, though the M andate was ostensibly based  on 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, its 
positive injunctions were not directed to the “  well-being and 
development ” of the existing A rab population but to the 
promotion of Jewish interests. Complete power over legisla- 
tation as well as administration was delegated to the Manda­
tory, who undertook to place the country under such political, 
adm inistrative and  economic conditions as would secu re  thé 
establishment of the Jewish National Home.
36. In  actual fact, the A rab witnesses m aintained, th e  rights 
and position of A rabs have been prejudiced by the fall in their 
numerical proportions in Palestine from about 90 per cent, in 
1922 to 70 per cent, to-day. As their aspirations to self-rule have 
been disappointed they have been unable to administer their 
own country and their national existence is threatened with 
annihilation through the entering into the country of another 
race.
37. One m em ber of the Arab H igher Committee dealt more 
closely with the legal argum ent. He rem arked that the terms 
of the M andate are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 
22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Paragraph 4:of 
that Article recognizes the existence of two juristic persons—one 
the community which should govern independently an d  the 
other the foreigner who is to assist and advise until the former is 
able to stand alone. B ut in Palestine there is one person who 
governs and who assists himself. Y our M ajesty is the Manda­
tory and Your M ajesty’s Government and their nominees are 
the Government of Palestine and, while the Preamble speaks I 
of a  Mandate, Article 1 denies the existence of a M andate ini 
the proper sense by  conferring upon w hat is called “ th e  Man-1 
datory ”  full powers of legislation and administration. T h e  com-1 
m unity which is to be provisionally recognized as independent! 
has no existence. This, it was argued, does not meet the pro I 
visions of Paragraph 4  and is contrary in principle to the treat-1 
ment of other territories which were, like Palestine, released  from I 
the Government of Turkey. The Arabs m aintain that a ll "  A I 
Mandates were or are being governed by this section with the I 
exception of the M andate for Palestine; and they c la im  that I 
the Arabs of Palestine are as fit for self-government as the I 
A rabs of ‘Iraq  or Syria. They think that Article 22, and I 
particularly Paragraph 4  of tha t Article, is really their charter I 
and the M andate represents—or should represent—its by-laws. I  
They subm it tha t the by-laws are inconsistent with the charter. I 
They complain that the term s of the M andate are drafted in such I 
a m anner tha t the student might understand tha t there existed I
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in P a le s tin e  a Jewish m ajority and a non-Jewish m inority, the 
other sections of the population. On the contrary the Arab 
inhabitants of Palestine form  the overwhelming m ajority and 
are th e owners of the territory for the welfare of which the 
Mandate system was created; yet throughout the Mandate 
they a re  referred to as the “  non-Jewish ”  population—a mis­
leading and humiliating term. The Jews, in fact, are to live in 
Palestine, to quote the words of the Churchill Statement of 
Policy, " a s  of right and not on sufferance ” ; while the A rabs, 
on the other hand, are to live in Palestine as on sufferance and 
not of r ig h t . Again, in Article 2  the countiy is to be placed under 
such administrative, economic and political conditions as will 
secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home, while 
the Arab owners and inhabitants of the land are merely to 
have th e ir  religious and civil rights safeguarded. U nder Article 
4 a J e w is h  Agency is to be established to assist the M andatory 
in all Jewish affairs. This provision has not only created a 
state w ith in  a state, but has formed a M andate over a M andatory 
in that country.
38. The Arab H igher Committee further m aintained tha t faith 
of the Arabs in the British Government was shaken by this out­
come of their efforts in the W ar, and  th a t subsequent actions of
e Government had deepened their distrust. In  particular the 
ubstitution of Mr. M acDonald’s letter for the “  W hite Paper ”  
f 1930 and the recent rejection by  Parliam ent of the proposals 
or a Legislative Council had  convinced them  tha t Jewish in- 
uence was too powerful to perm it justice to be done.
39. T he  desire for the removal of the M andate and the estab- 
hinent of national independence was thus pu t forward by  the 
"ah Higher Committee as the prim ary cause of the disturb- 
ces. With it was associated both by Arab and non-Arab wit- 
esses th e  fear of Jewish domination, political and economic.
e A rab s are afraid of the Jew s: they are impressed and 
armed by their pertinacity, their w ealth, their ability and 
owing numbers. They cannot attem pt to emulate the £ 7 0  
on o r more of capital which the Jew s in the last 2 0  years 
ave brought into the country. They view with m istrust the 
xtent of land which has passed into Jewish hands : they fear 
at as th e  result of high prices and the weakness of some of 
eir fellow-countrymen more land will pass into the hands of 
e Jews. They note that land once acquired by  the Jewish 
ational Fund can never, b y  the terms of the trust, be re-sold to 
e A rab. They point to the destruction of villages and  the 
ecaY of the social structure of village life. If  they have fears 
or them se lves, these fears are multiplied a  thousandfold for 
eir c h ild re n , whose whole future seeems to be threatened by 
e a d v an c in g  tide of Jew ish im migrants. No doubt, too,
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am ong the less-educated A rabs a t any rate, the fear is wide­
spread that Jew ish domination might affect the Holy Places and 
influence the freedom of religious observance.
40. The Jew ish witnesses agreed with the A rab in regarding 
the "  underlying causes ”  of the disturbances as political. They 
questioned w hether Arab nationalism  was so s t ro n g  or so 
coherent as it m ight seem to be on the surface in P a les tin e  or 
outside it: bu t they adm itted tha t the opposition of Arab 
nationalism to the Balfour Declaration and the M a n d a te  was 
the m ainspring of all the trouble. "  The underlying cause ”, 
said a Jewish witness, '* is that we exist
41. B ut this opposition, it was argued, would have been re­
strained and its expression in violence and  rebellion discouraged 
if the M andatory Government had  shown a more positive 
sym pathy with the policy of the Jewish National H o m e  and a 
greater resolution in carrying it into effect. As it w as, the 
official tendency in Palestine to take up a  defeatist, almost 1 
an  apologetic, attitude on this cardinal issue had  helped to 
foster a belief in the A rab m ind that the N ational H o m e  was 
not an im m utable point of policy and that, if A rab resistance to 
it were sufficiently obstinate and forcible, the Mandatory Power 
might presently be worried or even frightened into giving it up. 
In  this connexion Jew ish witnesses laid stress on the Govern­
m ent's failure to m aintain law and order, on its hesita tion  to 
make use of Jewish loyalty, particularly in police-service, on I 
its toleration of inflamm atory attacks on the National Home ini 
the Arab Press, and on its perm itting Palestine to become a I 
centre of Pan-A rab and Pan-Islam ic propaganda.
42. On the negative side the Jew s asserted that th e  trouble I 
had not been caused either by the economic effects on the Arabs I 
of Jewish im m igration or by its increase. The g ro w th  of the I 
National Home had benefited the Arabs as a  whole; and, though I 
the high figure for im migration in 1935 might have helped to I 
precipitate the outbreak in the following year, the outbreaks oil 
1920 and 1921 had  occurred when immigrants were relativelyl 
few, and that of 1929 had followed on two years o f greatlyl 
reduced im migration. I
43. After exam ining this and other evidence and studying the! 
course of events in Palestine since the W ar, we have no doubt! 
as to w hat were “  the underlying causes of the disturbances I  
of last year. They w ere:—  J
(i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence. I
(ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of thel 
Jew ish N ational Home. I
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44. We make the following comments on these two causes : —
(i) They were the same underlying causes as those which 
brought about the “  disturbances ”  of 1 9 2 0 , IQ2 I ,  19 2 9  
and 1933 .
(ii) They were, and always have been, inextricably 
linked together. The Balfour Declaration and the Man­
date under which it was to be implemented involved the 
denial of national independence at the outset. The subse­
quent growth of the National Home created a practical 
obstacle, and the only serious one, to the concession later of 
national independence. I t  was believed that its further 
growth might mean the political as well as economic subjec­
tion of the Arabs to the Jew s, so that, if ultim ately the 
Mandate should term inate and Palestine become indepen­
dent, it would not be national independence in the Arab 
sense but self-government by a Jewish m ajority.
(iii) They were the only “  underlying ”  causes. All the 
other factors were complementary or subsidiary, aggra­
vating the two causes or helping to determine the time 
at which the disturbances broke out.
45. The other factors m ay be summarized as follows: —
(i) The effect on Arab opinion in Palestine of the attain ­
ment of national independence first by  ‘Iraq , to a less com­
plete extent by T rans-Jordan, then by Egypt and lastly, 
subject to a short delay, by  Syria and the Lebanon. The 
weight of this factor has been augm ented by close contact 
between Arabs in Palestine and Arabs in Syria, ‘Iraq  and 
Saudi Arabia and by the willingness shown by the Arab 
Rulers to do w hat they properly could to assist them.
(ii) The pressure on Palestine exerted by W orld Jew ry 
in view of the sufferings and anxieties of the Jews in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The increase in this pressure from 
the beginning of 1 9 3 3  onwards and the consequent high 
figures of Jewish im migration gravely accentuated Arab 
fears of Jewish domination over Palestine.
(iii) The inequality of opportunity enjoyed by  A rabs and 
Jews respectively in putting their case before Y our 
Majesty's Government, Parliam ent, and public opinion in 
this country; and the A rab belief that the Jew s can always 
get their way by means denied to the Arabs. Based in 
general on the status of the Jewish Agency both in Jerusa ­
lem and in London, this belief was greatly strengthened 
by the publication of Mr. M acDonald’s letter to Dr. Weiz- 
mann in 1931 and by  the debates in Parliam ent on the 
proposals for a Legislative Council early last year.
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(iv) Associated with this last factor, the growth of Arab 
distrust, dating back to the time of the McMahon P led g e  and 
the Balfour D eclaration, in the ability, if not the will, of 
Y our M ajesty’s Government to carry  out their promises.
(v) A rab alarm  a t the continued purchase of Arab land 
by Jews.
(vi) The intensive character of Jewish nationalism in 
Palestine; the “  modernism ”  of m any of the younger 
im m igrants; the provocative language used by irresponsible 
Jew s; and the intem perate tone of much of the Jewish 
as well as the Arab Press.
(vii) The general uncertainty, accentuated by th e  am­
biguity of certain phrases in the M andate, as to the ultimate 
intentions of the M andatory Power. This uncertainty 
has aggravated all the difficulties of the situation, and in 
particular has (a) stim ulated the Jewish desire to expand 
and consolidate their position in Palestine as q u ic k ly  as 
m ay be, and (6) made it possible for the Arabs to interpret 
the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government and the 
sym pathetic attitude of some of its officials as showing that 
the British determination to implement the Balfour Declara­
tion is not whole-hearted.
i i 3
CH A PTER V.
THE PRESENT SITUATION.
1. W e arrived in Palestine on Armistice D ay arid attended the 
eremony a t the British W ar cemetery on Mount Scopus over- 
ooking Jerusalem. No one in the circumstances could help 
effecting that the Peace which followed the Armistice of 1918 
ad been an even less real peace in Palestine than in Europe, 
m ething like another war, however minute in scale, had
ecently been waged, and something like another armistice had 
een concluded. The more we saw and the more we heard in 
e days that followed, the clearer it became that this armistice 
as only a suspension of hostilities, not a  prelim inary to peace, 
e A rab  leaders had refused to co-operate with us in  our search 
or a means of settling the dispute. I t  was believed in m any 
uarters that another outbreak might occur at any moment, 
everal isolated m urders or assaults occurred during our stay, 
d a t one time acts of brigandage were reported almost every 
ay. I t  was impossible not to feel the sense of tension a t 
erasalem, and of pessimism. In neutral circles the task we had 
dertaken was regarded as well-nigh impossible. But, while 
deed it seemed manifest tha t the situation was far more serious 
-d a settlement far more difficult than we had  imagined before 
aving England, we realized the danger of allowing ourselves 
0 be too much affected by the atmosphere around us. W e tried 
prevent our judgm ent being unduly darkened by the circum- 
tances of the moment. W e sought to discount all such factors 
the problem as might fairly be regarded as the transient out- 
orae of the recent disorders. And, if in the result our grave 
"ew of the situation was not only confirmed bu t enhanced, it was 
otdue, so far as we are aware, to any neglect on our part to give 
ue weight to any reassuring facts or opinions o r to follow up any 
e which might conceivably lead to a happier conclusion. We 
esure, therefore, that the following description of the position 
Palestine as we found it and left it, discouraging though it 
y be, is not an  overstatem ent of the facts.
1. The Jewish National Home.
2. At first sight and viewed in isolation from the sombre 
ckground, one feature in the picture m ight seem bright
D ough. Twelve years ago the N ational Home was an experi- 
ent: to-day it is a “  going concern ” . The num ber of its 
a b i t a n t s  has increased fourfold. In  1925 it was 121,000. 
st y e a r  the official estimate was 370,000; bu t it was generally 
d m it te d  that the actual figure was a t least 400,000 and 
r o b a b ly  higher. The process of agricultural colonization has 
e a d ily  continued. The am ount of land in Jewish ownership
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has risen from 844,000 dunums in 1925 to 1,332,000 dunums I  
in 1936. There are now 203 agricultural settlements containing I  
some 97,000 people.* Some of the new colonies are a g a in  in the I  
uplands of Galilee, northw ards of Mount Tabor; b u t  most I  
of them , as before, are in the plains. Three-parts of th e  Plain I  
of Esdraelon, all the Valley of Jezreel, a great part of the I  
Maritime Plain between Jaffa and Mount Carmel, and another I  
large area south of Jaffa—these wide stretches of plain-land, I  
drained and irrigated and green with citrus trees o r  brown I  
from the plough, are now the agrarian basis of the National I  
Home. The country-towns have likewise grown and prospered. I  
To take the two examples given for 1925, the area of Petah I  
Tiqva (including village lands outside the municipal area) is I  
now 5,900 acres and its population 15,000. T h e  popu-B 
lation of Rehovot has increased from about 1,400 to  nearly I
7.000, and its Local Council, which in 1925 had raised a n d *  
spent some ,£1,400 on local services, had a budget in 1936 of H  
nearly £20,000. I
3. Yet more impressive has been the urban development. I  
Tel Aviv, still a  wholly Jewish town, has leaped to the  first ■  
place among the towns of Palestine. Its population n o w l 
probably exceeds 150,000. I t  spreads over 1,600 acres a n d H  
contains between 6,000 and 7,000 houses. Its Municipal H  
Council obtains a revenue of over £400,000 (exclusive of the * '  
Government grant-in-aid). I t has grown too fast for o rd é r ly H 1 
town-planning : its frontage on the sea has so fa r  beenH* 
neglected; and it has not yet acquired public buildings worthy ■  : 
of it; but its m ain boulevard and some of its residential quarters, * ,  
its shops and cafés and  cinemas, above all the busy, active 
people in the streets already reproduce the atmosphere of the H ,  
older M editerranean sea-side towns of Europe. But it is essen-H  
tially European. From  its beginnings the contrast betw eenH 
Tel Aviv, an artificial creation, rising so quickly from a barrenH  
strip of sand, and ancient Jaffa, still more the contrast with a H  
purely A rab town among the hills like Nablus, w a s  clearly 
m arked, and it is now quite startling. ■
There is the same effect at Jerusalem . On the slope rising* 
westwards from  the Old City, still a tangle of narrow streets*j 
and  dark arcades, still indom itably Asiatic, has spread, andH 
is still fast spreading, a  suburb of m odem  Jewish stone-built* 
villas and flats and shops, centred round the massive fortress-* 
like headquarters of the Jew ish Agency. The population o fK  
Jerusalem  has grown to 125,000: and of that some 76,000 a re *
The growth of H aifa, too, which has now a population o f *
100.000, is only less rem arkable than that of Tel Aviv. B ut*
H aifa is not, like Tel Aviv, a wholly Jewish concern. It has
* Jew ish A gency’s enum eration, Septem ber, 1936.
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grown, i t  is true, with the growth of the National Hom e, about 
o n e - h a lf  of its inhabitants are now Jew s, and much of the 
business o f  its port is Jew ish business, but m uch of it is also 
in ternational. The E uropean shipping in the new and spacious 
harbour is serving A rab as well as Jew ish Palestine. We 
observed that m any cases of goods in the sheds at the quay-side 
were marked for transit to Baghdad.
4. B u t, broadly speaking, the rem arkable urban develop­
ment in  Palestine has been Jewish. Nor is it in Jewish 
eyes b y  any means complete. If all goes well with the 
National Home, if the ' boom "  persists, if expanding 
industries can find expanding m arkets, if the im migra­
tion of men and money continues to supply the demands 
of production and consumption alike, new towns, it is fore­
told, w ill spring up along the sandy coast, where no one can 
assert, whatever m ay be said inland, tha t a Jew  coming in 
means a n  Arab going out. A lready, indeed, on a barren 
waste just south of Jaffa a whole township has been planned, 
many of the streets laid out and paved, and building begun; 
and sch em es, no doubt, are being considered for the develop­
ment of other seaside towns. To some Zionists this rapid growth 
of in d u stry  and urban life m ay seem to threaten one of the 
basic principles of their original creed—th a t the return to 
Palestine was a return  to work on its soil. But so far, a t a n y  
rate, it c a n  be said tha t the industrial structure has not entirely 
outgrown its agrarian base. The relation between rural and 
urban areas, between industrialists and agriculturists, has 
remained fairly constant from  the start. In  1927 the propor­
tion of workers on the land (earners) to the Jewish population 
was 7-3 per cent. : to-day it is 6-4 per cent. In  the United 
Kingdom the proportion is 6-4 per cen t.; in Belgium 7 per 
cent.*
5. The economic structure of the National Home will be 
examined in a later Chapter, f  I t  is sufficient here to illustrate
e growth of citrus production on the one hand and industrial 
nterprise on the other by  figures supplied by the Jewish 
gency. In the 1929-30 season the value of the fruit exported 
om Jewish orange, grapefruit and lemon plantations was about 
300,000: in the 1936-37 season it is estimated to have been 
2,000,000. D uring the same period the production of 
ewish industrial enterprise rose from £p,\ millions to 
millions, and the am ount of capital invested from 
’lions to  over £8  millions. From  1918 to the present day 
ver £14 millions has been invested in Palestine through the 
' national funds ’ ’ and roughly £63 millions by  private fil­
estore, nearly half the latter sum in the course of the last four 
ears. T he  total investm ent, therefore, am ounts to £77 millions,
* Figures supplied b y  Jew ish to  A gency, 
t  See Chapter V III.
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and of this a t least one-fifth has been contributed by the Jew s in 
the United States. Lastly, the am ount of Jewish d epo sits  in 
Palestine banks am ounted last year to millions. T h ese  are 
all startling figures. They bear witness to a  quite ex trao rd in a ry  
measure of economic expansion.
6. The political and social structure rem ains as we described 
it in 1925. W ith the passing of ten years and the fourfold 
increase in the population the Jew ish Agency and the Va ai 
Leum i have consolidated their position as the allied organs of 
W orld Jew ry and the Jews in Palestine. The General Assembly, 
the membership of which was reduced in 1930 to 71 (the number 
of the old Sanhédrin), still consists of nearly 20 parties or I 
groups, but these, as before, have roughly cohered into a I 
dom inant Labour “  bloc ” , a m ainly Revisionist opposition, 
and a weak and unorganized Centre. Local government is now 
firmly established. The Municipal Council of Tel Aviv is crying 
out for more freedom from official control than the Government 
has so far thought it wise to concede. W hile we were drafting 
this R eport, Petah Tiqva attained municipal status, a n d  thus 
became the second wholly Jew ish town in the world. Eveiy 
Jew ish “  colony ”  or village still manages its domestic affairc 
through elected committees.
7. W ith every year that passes, the contrast between this in-1 
tensely democratic and highly organized modern community I 
and the old-fashioned A rab world around it grows sharper, anal 
in nothing, perhaps, more m arkedly than on its cultural side.! 
The literary output of the N ational Home is out of all proportion! 
to its size. Hebrew translations have been published of the I 
works of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz, Fichte, K ant, Bergson! 
Einstein and other philosophers, and of Shakespeare, Goethe! 
Heine, B yron, Dickens, the great Russian novelists, and many I 
m odem  writers. In  creative literature the work of Bialik, whol 
died in 1935, has been the outstanding achievement in Hebrewl 
poetry, and  that of N ahum  Sokolov, who died in 1936, ini 
Hebrew prose. A num ber of Hebrew novels have been writtenr 
reflecting the influence on the Jew ish m ind of life in the National! 
Home. The Hebrew Press has expanded to four daily and tenl 
weekly papers. Of the form er the H a‘aretz and the 
with circulations of about 17,000 and 25,000 respectively, ar 
the most influential and m aintain a high literaiy  standard. Tw 
periodicals are exclusively concerned with literature and <r 
with dram atic art. B ut perhaps the most striking aspect of I 
culture of the N ational Home is its love of music. It was wh 
we were in Palestine, as it happened, that Signor Toscanini 1 
ducted the Palestine Sym phony O rchestra, composed of son) 
70 Palestinian Jew s, in six concerts m ainly devoted to 1 
works of Brahm s and Beethoven. On each occasion every f
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was occupied, and it is noteworthy that one concert was reserved 
for some 3,000 workpeople a t very low rates and that another
3,000 attended the O rchestra's final rehearsal. All in all, the 
cultural achievement of this little community of 400,000 people 
is one of the most rem arkable features of the N ational Home.
8. T h ere  is Arab literature, of course, and Arab music, but 
the cu ltu re  of Arab Palestine is the monopoly of the intelli- 
fienzia; and, bom  as it is of Asia, it has little kinship with that 
of the National Home, which, though it is linked with ancient 
Jewish tradition, is predom inantly a culture of the West. 
Nowhere, indeed, is the gulf between the races more obvious. 
Anyone who attended the Toscanini Concerts a t Jerusalem  
might have imagined, if he closed his eyes, that he was in Paris, 
London, or New York. Yet, almost within earshot was the 
Old C ity , the Haram-esh-Sharif, and the headquarters of the 
Arab Higher Committee. I t  is the same with science. The Daniel 
Siefi Research Institute a t Rehovot is equipped with the most 
delicate modem instrum ents; the experiments conducted 
there a re  watched by  chemists all over the world : yet from  its 
windows can be seen the hills inhabited by a  backw ard 
peasantry who regard it only as the dem onstration of a power 
they ha te  and fear and who would like, no doubt, when their 
blood is u p ,  to destroy it.
9. Our stay in Palestine was necessarily too short for us to 
robe deeply into the psychology of the National Hom e, but 
e received some m arked impressions. The Jews in Palestine, 
0 begin with, are happy. They are not as happy as they 
ere before the outbreak of last year. If there is gaiety a t 
el Aviv, there is tension there, too, as a t Jerusalem ; and
oughout the “  colonies ”  there is an uneasy feeling that the 
ational Home is confronted with a crisis in its fate. Some 
embers of the com m unity, moreover, notably some of the 
ecent immigrants from  Germany, are not enthusiastic Zionists 
or deeply steeped in Hebrew tradition, and m ay therefore 
d the National Home not very homelike. But, speaking 
enerally, whether it be the Jew  who has been driven from 
comfortable life in a  cultured milieu and is now digging all 
y in the fields and sleeping in a bare cottage, or whether i t  
the Jew who has emerged from a Polish ghetto and is now 
orking in a  factory at Tel Aviv, the dom inant feeling of both 
an overwhelming sense of escape. The champions of Zionism 
, ye a lw ays held—and on the whole they are now proved 
ght—th a t a Jew  released from  an  anti-Jewish environm ent 
d “ restored ”  to Palestine would not only feel free as he 
ad never felt before bu t would also acquire a new self- 
nfidence, a new zest in living from his consciousness that 
was engaged in a great constructive task.
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10. This sense of a "  mission ”  was strong, as h as 
seen, from the first; and  it is a t least as strong now as it has 
ever been. B ut the change in its character already to be 
observed in 1925 is now more m arked. In  the older 
“  colonies ” , which are largely of Russian origin, the religious 
attitude to the National Home still prevails; but in some of 
the newer “  colonies ”  and in the towns the most zealous, 
the m ost missionary-minded Jews are often Jews in race  alone 
and not in faith. To adopt the term s of a significant question 
and answer at one of our sessions, there are fewer Jew s now 1 
whose m andate is the Bible and more whose bible is the | 
Mandate.
11. The non-Zionist orthodox Jewish community, Agudaik 
Israel, is known to have deplored this increasing ten d en cy  to­
wards secularism, and it has long carried on a stubborn dispute 
with the Jew ish Agency with special reference to the  allot­
m ent of immigration-certificates. ' Nevertheless, as with Moslem 
and Christian Arabs, so with orthodox and unorthodox Jews, 
the national crisis has established a common front. T he dis­
orders of 1933 were quickly followed by  a rapprochement be­
tween Agudath Israel and official Zionism. The m o re  serious I 
outbreak of 1936 cemented the alliance. In  giving evidence 
before us the representatives of Agudath Israel su p p o rte d  on | 
all m ajor points the case presented by the Jewish Agency. 
Zionism, in fact, is Jew ish nationalism , and Hke nationalism I 
elsewhere—in post-war Turkey, for example—its driving force | 
is political rather than  religious.
12. Thus a tendency already apparent in 1925 h a s  
intensified; and under existing conditions the process is bound,I 
in our view, to continue. To take one vital point, th e  Jewish I 
system of education is doing w hat it was m eant to do. Practic-1 
ally every Jewish boy and girl attends a prim ary school. AI 
substantial proportion of them go on to a secondary school. I 
In  more than two cases out of three, the school, whether I 
prim ary or secondary, is a Jewish school, the instruction  is I 
in Hebrew, the course of work is planned to impregnate the I 
pupil with the Hebrew tradition. A glance at the curriculum I 
of a leading Jewish secondary school will illustrate th is point |  
Twelve hours a  week are devoted to the Hebrew language, the| 
Bible, the Talm ud, and Hebrew literature and history 
general, as against four hours to English and three hours to j 
Arabic—which last is a highly commendable provision as far I 
as it goes. Considering, further, tha t Jewish schoolmasters and! 
schoolmistresses are bound for the most part to be enthusiastic 
believers in the Zionist “  mission ” , it is not surprising if fr<® 
this educational “  melting-pot ”  emerges a n a tio n a l sett 
consciousness of unusual intensity. W e do not underrate : 
achievement. I t  is impossible, indeed, not to be impressf
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by the energy and  self-sacrifice which have gone to build up 
this system  of education. We are only concerned to point out 
that the process is intensive, and th a t the product of it loses in 
breadth what it has gained in depth. The civic sense of 
Jewish youth in Palestine is not Palestinian except in so fa r 
as in theory or in prospect Palestine is identified with the 
National Home.
13. I t  should be frankly recognized, then, that the ideal of 
the N atio n al Home is a purely Jewish ideal. The A rabs hardly 
come in to  the picture except when they force an entry with 
violence a n d  bloodshed. T hat does not m ean, it need hardly 
be said, that the Jews wish to oppress the Arabs or to keep 
them p o o r and backw ard. On the contrary they m aintain 
as they h a v e  always m aintained—and we do not question their 
sincerity—that the establishment of the N ational Home has 
been an d  will continue to be a positive economic a d v a n t a g e  to 
the A rabs. But for the average Jew  that comfortable assur­
ance is enough. He goes on with his work and tries to forget 
about the Arabs. In  some of the older “  colonies "  there used 
to be som e sense of kinship with the Arabs or a t least that 
fellow-feeling which comes from  working side by side. But 
there is little  of that left now, and there has never been m uch 
of it am o n g  the more m odern, western-minded, urban  Jews. 
Welfare work has been done for Arab as well as for Jew  by 
Jewish institutions, notably the H adassah. Jewish professional 
men have given their services to both races. Since we left P a le s ­
tine a tra g ic  case has been reported in the press of a Jewish 
doctor w ho went back alone to work among the A rab villagers
rem ote Beisan and was m urdered. But, broadly speaking, 
e got th e  impression tha t the social conscience of the National 
ome te n d s  to concentrate on Jewish needs and to  leave the 
bs to  t h e  care of Government.
14. Jewish nationalism , indeed, seems sometimes to reject 
ousciously or unconsciously, the very idea of a real Pales-
an community. I t  claims, for exam ple, that, though Pales- 
ne is n o t  an Arab word and might therefore fairly serve for 
ews as w e ll as A rabs, Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) should be 
Iso a c c e p te d  as the official translation of “  Palestine ” , and pro­
fs th a t  the printing of the Hebrew initials “  E .I .”  after 
‘ Palestine ”  on every stam p and coin is not enough. I t  de­
ads, to o , that Government grants for public services should 
shared  between Arabs and Jew s in strict proportion to their 
umbers, a n d ,  since Jew s provide proportionally more revenue, 
e claim  s e e m s  logical ; bu t in fact it runs counter to one of 
0 p rin c ip le s . E ither it repudiates the basic idea of public 
ance in  the democratic world—th a t the rich should be taxed 
meet th e  needs of the poor—or it denies or ignores the theory 
at A rabs and Jew s are members of one Palestinian society.
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I t  has long been obvious tha t the notion of a cultural 
“  assim ilation”  between Arab and Jew  is a phantasy, ft 
is time, surely, th a t Palestinian “  citizenship ”  also should be 
recognized as w hat it is, as nothing bu t a legal formula devoid 
of moral meaning.
15. I t  rem ains to consider the relations of the Jews with the I 
M andatory Government. I t  can be said a t once, though it 
is little enough to say, tha t they are better than the relations 
of the Arabs with the Government. The policy of th e  great 
m ajority of the Jew s is the policy of the Jewish A g en cy ; and 
the Jewish Agency, which is entitled under the M andate to 
co-operate with the Government, m ay have differed from it 
often enough, criticized it, resented its decisions, but it h a s  never I 
carried controversy to the point of challenging the Govern-f 
m ent’s authority. I t  has steered a course for the majority I 
between the opinions of two minority groups. One of these is I 
a  group of intellectuals, centred a t the Hebrew U n iv e rs ity , who I 
hold that the only solution of the problem of P a le s tin e  is fori 
the Jews to show themselves not “  like other nations ” in the I 
quality and tem per of their nationalism , to subordinate political I 
ambitions to cultural and spiritual ends, to acquiesce in  such I 
a  limitation of their num bers as would make them a permanent I 
m inority in Palestine, even in the last resort to s u b m it  to Arab I 
rule. The m oral courage of that school of thought m u st com-1 
m and respect; bu t it enlists no effective support in the National I 
Home. The other m inority consists of the Revisionists,! 
who still dem and the expansion of the National H o m e , pre-l 
sum ably by  force, over all Palestine and Trans-Jordan. They I 
are a determined and troublesome group. Since we left Pales-1 
tine they have attacked the Jew ish Agency’s h e a d q u a rte rs  at] 
Jerusalem  and its branch-office a t W arsaw. But their followers I 
only am ount to about one-twentieth of the Jews in  Palestine;! 
and we have little doubt that the Jewish Agency, backed asl 
it is by  an  organised m ajority in the National A ssem bly  andl 
the V a'ad Leum i, will m aintain its control of the situation. Fori 
in the National Home “  extremist ”  nationalism is deprived of| 
the advantage which, as has been explained above, i t  enjoy: 
elsewhere. I t  cannot, like A rab extremism, “ go a ll  ou t " fa 
freedom, since a free Palestine in present circumstances mea 
an Arab State. N or can it refuse allegiance to th e  Briti 
Government, which alone protects it from the e n m ity  o f 1 
A rab world. B ut, if the Agency and  the Va’ad Leumi 
not in that sense extrem ist, their policy is not altogetl 
m oderate. They claim the maxim um  of “  rights " whict 
the M andate, as they interpret it, can yield. They insist 
the rate of im migration should be kept up to the fu ll extent c 
the “  economic absorptive capacity ”  of the country, and the; 
estimate of tha t capacity has always exceeded a n d  often
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e x c e e d e d  the G overnm ent's estimate. They attack the Govern­
ment’s proposals for regulating the sale of land in the interests 
or Arab agriculturists. They complain that the share of revenue 
allotted to Jewish public services is not in fair proportion to 
their n u m b e rs  or their contribution to taxation. And, when 
in these and other m atters they do not get their w ay, they 
are tem p ted  to forget that the M andatory obligation is two­
fold a n d  to complain that the adm inistration is culpably 
"pro-Arab.”
16. We shall consider in later chapters of this R eport how 
far this sense of grievance is justified. Our concern a t the 
moment is to point out tha t the relationship between the National 
Home and the Government is not as happy as it ought to be. 
It is true, of course, that in times of disturbance the Jews, as 
compared with the Arabs, are the law-abiding section of the 
population : and, indeed, throughout the whole series of out­
breaks, and under very great provocation, they have shown a 
notable capacity for discipline and self-restraint. B ut in less 
grave matters than rioting and bloodshed we could not help 
observing a certain restiveness, a certain impatience of authority. 
An illustration is the attitude assumed by the inhabitants 
of Tel Aviv. The law requires that the Municipal Council should 
expend no money without the prior approval of the Government, 
represented by the District Commissioner. In  fact, that prior 
approval is often dispensed with, on the ground that some expan 
sion of social services is needed without delay. The Government 
for its part usually acquiesces in such infringement of the law, on 
the ground that an  attem pt to enforce it would be met by at 
least the passive resistance of the whole community. In  our 
view such an attitude to Government, however unfortunate, is 
ot altogether surprising. The British Government, it should
remembered, is an alien Government to all bu t a tiny handful 
f the Jews in Palestine. Jew s from Poland or Germany or 
oumania may appreciate the difference between the British 
ttitude to Jew ry and that which they have experienced in the 
untries of their birth. All Jews, we were assured, are grateful 
Britain. But, when Jew s in Palestine are told tha t the 
overnment's interest in the N ational Home is a t the most half- 
earted, their resentment is not softened by any sense of kinship 
th its British officers or any native loyalty to the British 
rown.
17. The root of the restiveness, however, lies deeper than that, 
he National Home is a  highly educated, highly democratic, 
erY politically-minded, and unusually young community. I t
conceivable, though we think im probable, that it would 
cquiesce in a dictatorship if the dictator were a Jew  of its own 
oice: but it can never be at ease under an alien bureaucracy, 
rown Colony government is not a suitable form of governm ent
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for a num erous, self-reliant, progressive people, European for 
the m ost p art in outlook and equipment, if not in race. The 
European communities in the British Em pire overseas have long 
outgrown it. The evolution of self-government in In d ia  left 
th a t stage behind in 1909. Crown Colony government is 
nowadays m ainly m aintained for the wardship of politically 
backw ard races in the tropical or sub-tropical world. I ts  reten­
tion in other Colonies, such as most of the W est In d ies or 
M auritius or M alta, is due to the existence of a  mixed population 
or to other special circumstances. And, of course, it is on ly  the 
peculiar circumstances of Palestine which justify the mainten­
ance of Crown Colony governm ent there. If, apart from those 
circumstances, it would be difficult to contest the Arab claim that 
they are “  able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the m odern w orld,”  it would be absurd to  contest 
such a claim on the part of the Jews.
18. The form of government, then, which circumstances have 
imposed on the whole of Palestine, is not a suitable or natural 
form for the Jewish section of its population. I t  tends, more­
over, in our opinion, to im pair the political health of the 
N ational H om e: for it breeds one of the worst of political 
ailments—irresponsibility. On a wide range of important 
m atters, it is true, the Jews enjoy a large measure of local 
self-government; but even in tha t field it is the Government of 
Palestine which possesses, if it does not always exercise, the 
ultim ate control. A nd in more vital m atters, the ra te  of 
im migration, the regulation of land-sales, the protection of in­
dustry  and prom otion of trade, the maintenance of law  and 
order, the provision of a garrison, in the m atters, in fact, which 
really determine the fate of the N ational Home, its inhabitants 
have no constitutional power a t all and no responsibility. The | 
general dem and they m ake on the Government may b e  sum­
m arized as a dem and for a  forcing of the pace. T h e y  want! 
more im migrants, more land, more ru ra l and urban develop­
m ent, and they w ant it all in a hurry . They realize, n o  doubt, 
th a t so rapid a  growth has its risks, and, no doubt, th ey  are 
prepared to face them  in the sanguine spirit of their race and 
mission; but, when they abuse the Government for not con­
ceding all they ask, they seem to forget that, if th ings go 
wrong, the Government m ust bear the blame and the burden! 
of putting them  right. We have referred elsewhere to the! 
difficulty of foretelling the future economic development of J 
the N ational Hom e; but it stands to reason that for o ne  cause 
or another, as the result, perhaps, of some world-wide 
catastrophe, a set-back to its fortunes is a t least c o n ce iv ab le . 
In  th a t case the National Home would doubtless suffer most, 
bu t all Palestine would suffer with it: and the cost o f repara-1 
tion and recovery would fall on Arab as well as Jew ish  tax-1 
payers and  perhaps in the end on British taxpayers as well, f
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To make demands without having to deal w ith all the difficulties 
they m ay  involve, to clam our for a policy without being answer- 
able for its execution, to insist on risks being taken without 
incurring the full responsibility for the consequences, these 
are familiar features of agitation among politically-minded 
people who are not responsible for governing themselves. The 
unusual feature in this particular case is th a t the agitators do 
not want self-government, because it means governm ent by an 
Arab majority. So the disease continues unchecked by its 
natural remedy; and we cannot help regarding it as a 
regrettable weakness in the life of the National Home that its 
young community should be growing up in an atm osphere of 
^responsibility with regard to the gravest issues that confront it.
19. We have just referred to the forcing of the pace: and 
the sense of haste is the last, but by  no means the least m arked, 
of the impressions we wish to record of the National Home. 
It is obvious, indeed, tha t the rapidity with which its whole 
structure has been built up , especially in the last few years, 
has in ten sified  the difficulties inherent in the situation. If 
Jewish immigrants had only trickled in, if Jewish colonization 
had been predom inantly agrarian and only gradually extended, 
if there had been no great urban and industrial development, 
the p ro b lem  of adjusting the relations between the N ational 
Home and Arab nationalism  would have had  to be faced in 
due course  : but conceivably it could have been dealt with in 
a calm er atmosphere and with better chances of agreement. 
As it is, the pace a t which the Home has grown has exacerbated 
the q u a rre l and helped to bring it to a  head. Y et the reason 
for haste is easy to understand. Im m igration means escape. 
Im m igrants squeeze into Palestine, prepared to endure any 
hardships which m ay result from  overcrowding, because life 
in Palestine  at its worst is better than the life they have led 
elsewhere.
20. B u t there is another reason for haste which has recently, 
we think, been working on Jewish minds. Arab antagonism to 
the National Home was never ignored by thoughtful Zionists; 
but, w h ereas they used to regard it as no more than an obstacle, 
however serious, to be somehow overcome, they now see it, we 
believe, though they do not always say so, as the danger that it 
is or m ight become. Nobody in Palestine can fail to realize how 
much m o re  bitter, how much more widely spread am ong the 
people, Arab hatred of the National Home is now than it was 
five or ten  years ago. A nd the feeling is not confined to Palestine. 
The Arab leaders have long seen to it tha t their grievances were 
known a n d  discussed in Cairo, D am ascus and B aghdad; and 
the story of fighting and bloodshed in Palestine last year, often 
grossly magnified and distorted, was soon current ta lk  througho­
ut the Arab world. In  earlier times there had been little, if
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any, anti-Jewish sentiment observable in E gypt or ‘Iraq or the 
heart of Arabia. B ut last summer there were repeated demon­
strations in Cairo and Baghdad. We have reason to believe 
th a t this anti-Jewish agitation has not yet become formidable; 
for the mom ent it is quiescent: bu t there can be little doubt 
tha t a renewal of the conflict in Palestine would revive and 
inflame it. The same is true of Trans-Jordan. The militant 
Bedouin were only restrained with difficulty from jo ining in 
the fight across the river; and we were told on unimpeachable 
authority tha t, w hatever m ay have been the attitude of the 
Arabs in T rans-Jordan to the question of Jewish immigration 
in the past, a  Jew ish settler could only enter the country now 
a t the risk of his life.
21. I t  is, indeed, one of the most unhappy aspects of the 
present situation—this opening of a  breach between Jewry and 
the A rab world. We believe that not in Palestine only but in' 
all the Middle E ast the A rabs might profit from  the capital and 
enterprise which the Jew s are ready enough to provide; and we 
believe that in ordinary circumstances the various Arab Govern­
ments would be ready enough on their side to perm it a measure 
of Jewish im migration under their own conditions and control. 
B ut the creation of the N ational Home has been neither con­
ditioned nor controlled by the A rabs of Palestine. I t has been 
established directly against their will. And tha t hard fact has 
had  its natural reaction on A rab minds elsewhere. The Jews 
were fully entitled to enter the door forced open for them into 
Palestine. They did it with the sanction and encouragement of 
the League of Nations and the United States of America. But | 
by  doing it they have closed the other doors of the Arab world 
against them. And in certain circumstances this antagonism 
m ight become dangerously aggressive. Like everyone else, the 
Jew s m ust realize that another world-war is unhappily not 
impossible : and in the changes and chances of war it is easy to 
imagine circumstances under which the Jew s might have to rely 
m ainly on their own resources for the defence of the National 
Home. There, then, is a second and a very potent reason for 
haste. The more im m igrants, the more potential soldiers. 
“ There is safety in num bers,”  said a Jewish witness. And 
again: “  If we are kept in a  state of perm anent minority, then 
it is not a National Home, it m ay become a death-trap.”
22. I t is impossible, we believe, for any unprejudiced observer 
to see the National Home and not to wish it well. I t has meant 
so much for the relief of unm erited suffering. I t  displays so I 
much energy and enterprise and devotion to a common cause. I 
In  so far as Britain has helped tow ards its creation, we would 
claim, with Lord Balfour, tha t to that extent, at any rate, I 
Christendom has shown itself “  not oblivious of all the wrong it I 
has done.”  B ut we would ask all sym pathisers with the N a t io n a l  j
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H o m e , in Europe or overseas, not to under-estimate the diffi­
c u lt ie s  which confront it. I t  does it no service to brush them  
a s id e , t o  say tha t all will be well if we w ait a  little longer, still 
less t o  assert tha t there would be no real difficulty at all if the 
M a n d a t o r y  Power would do its duty by  the Mandate. At each 
s u c c e s s iv e  crisis in Palestine those idle hopes have been raised, 
a n d  those hasty charges m ade. The best service which well- 
w is h e rs  of the N ational Home can render it is to recognize 
f r a n k ly  that the situation in Palestine has reached a deadlock 
a n d  t o  bend their minds to finding a way out.
2. Arab Progress.
23. I n  Arab as in Jewish Palestine the most striking fact is 
the g ro w th  of population. I t  has risen since 1920 from about
600,000 to about 950,000; and in this case, unlike the Jew ish, 
the rise has been due in only a slight degree to immigration. No 
accurate estimate can be m ade of the num ber of Arabs who have 
come into Palestine from  neighbouring Arab lands and settled 
there, but it m ay be reckoned that roughly nine-tenths of the 
growth has been due to natural increase, and it has been a growth 
of over 50 per cent, in 17 years. Those are rem arkable figures, 
especially in view of the general belief that the population of 
Palestine under the O ttom an regime was more or less stationary. 
If, fu rth er, we consider the growth in the prosperity of Pales­
tine as a  whole, it is difficult, on the face of it, to believe tha t the 
Arab population has had no share in it. The inference, how­
ever, is th e  subject of sharp controversy. The Jew s in evidence 
before us sought to confirm it with a  wealth of argum ents and 
statistics. The Arabs denied it outright. They were better off, 
they to ld  us, before the days of the British Occupation. I t 
was c learly  our duty to probe the case on either side, and 
we have done w hat we could to form  a  judgm ent on it. But, 
since, until a year or so ago, the technical equipment of the 
Palestine Government for exact sociological inquiry was deplor­
ably inadequate, our judgm ent must be taken as only a  rough, 
though w e believe it to be a fair, opinion on a complicated 
question.
24. The effendi, to begin with, have suffered one definite loss. 
They do not enjoy "  the sweets of office ”  under the present 
Administration to the extent that they enjoyed them  before the 
War. But this is not an injury tha t worsens with time. On the 
contrary a steadily increasing num ber of effendi and other 
educated Arabs have obtained posts in the Government service 
since the British Occupation, and some of them high-salaried 
posts. Apart from that, it is difficult to detect any deterioration 
in the economic position of the A rab upper class. Landowners
ave sold substantial pieces of land at a figure fa r above the
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price it could have fetched before the W ar. In  the early days, 
it is true, much of the selling was done by Arab owners domiciled 
in Syria; b u t in recent transactions m ainly Palestinian Arabs 
have been concerned, and those transactions have b e en  con­
siderable. In  1933 £854,796 was paid for the purchase of Arab 
land, mostly from owners of large estates, £1,647,836 in  1934, 
and £1,699,448 in 1935. Partly, no doubt, as the result o f land- 
sales the effendi class has been able to m ake substantial invest­
ments of capital. Some of this has gone towards in c re a s e d  pro­
duction, especially of fruit, from the land they have retained. 
A t least six times more Arab-owned land is now p la n te d  with 
citrus than in 1920. Arab citrus plantations in the Maritime 
P lain now cover 135,000 dunums, and represent an investm ent 
of £6,500,000.
25. Some of the capital has been directed to building houses 
for lease or sale or to industrial enterprise. T h e  developm ent 
of Arab industry, though not com parable, of course, w ith  that of 
Jewish industry, has m ade progress. I t  appears from th e  Gov­
ernm ent R eport for 1933 th a t the num ber of Arab “  industrial 
undertakings ” , which was about 1,200 before the W a r ,  had 
risen to about 2,200. Among relatively large-scale indus­
tries are soap, flour-milling, bricks and tiles, c ig a re tte s  and 
tobacco, cotton, wool and silk weaving, salt-quarrying, stone 
and lime, bedsteads, nails, wearing apparel, confectionery, and 
alcoholic liquor. No official statistics are available as to the 
am ount of capital invested in this industrial field as a  whole; 
but it has certainly increased in the course of the last few years, 
as has the am ount of A rab bank-deposits.
26. In  the light of these facts we have no doubt that many 
A rab landowners have benefited financially from Jewish immi­
gration. They have sold a  large am ount of land to Je w s  at a 
price far higher than  its pre-w ar value. A member of th e  Arab 
H igher Committee adm itted to us that “  nowhere in th e  world 
were such uneconomic land-prices paid as by Jews in Pales­
tine ” . Some of the Jewish money has been spent also on the 
products of A rab industry, such as stone and other building 
m aterials, on ren t for Arab-owned houses and in wages for Arab 
labour. ,On the other hand it is evident that Arab industry 
cannot in the long run  compete with Jew ish where technical skill! 
or the use of im ported raw  m aterials are needed. I t seems to j 
us inevitable that, as the industrial enterprise and equipment of 
the National Home expand, so A rab industries will decline. 
A lready, indeed, the m ajor A rab industry, Nablus soap, has 
severely felt the effects of Jewish as well as Egyptian com­
petition. I
27. I t  is the condition of the fellaheen, still the great m ajority  
of the Arab population, that m ust be regarded as the do m inan t
factor in any estimate of the economic progress of Arab
127 Chapter V.
P a le s t in e .  I t cannot, unhappily, be questioned tha t the standard 
of l i v in g  among the fellaheen is still low. Like other agricultural 
c o m m u n i t i e s  they have suffered from the world-wide fall in 
prices. They have suffered, too, from severe and repeated 
droughts and consequent bad harvests. Some of the obstacles 
to th e ir  progress have been partially removed. Some of 
the cramping mash"a system of land-tenure has been re­
placed by individual ownership. Their burden of debt has been 
eased. The Government has done much to relieve them by 
reducing and rem itting taxation and providing loans. Tithe 
was reduced, com muted, and finally replaced by  a more 
equ itab le tax on ru ral property. The development o f  co­
operation  has been slow and somewhat discouraging, bu t a t 
least a  beginning has been made and over 6 0  Arab Co-operative 
Societies are now in existence. There is evidence, m ore­
over, t h a t  some fellaheen are a t any rate on the w ay to be­
com ing better cultivators. If the great m ajority are still wedded 
to their old prim itive w ays, there are some who are learning 
better methods, using better seed and better tools, under official 
guidance and inspection.
28. There is one point on  which the fellaheen have lost ground. 
In 1920 they had  little enough land on which to m aintain them ­
selves and their families. Their numbers have greatly increased 
and to -d a y  there are m any for whom no land is available. 
Inevitably, therefore, in Palestine, as in most other parts of the 
world, a drift has begun to set in  from the country to the towns. 
But, though there again exact statistics are unavailable, it 
appears that industrial development has gone far to provide 
em ploym ent for those Arabs who can no longer m ake a living on 
the lan d . The num ber of Arabs engaged in industry m ust now be 
well above the 60,000 a t which it was estimated in  the Census of 
1931. Work in the towns accounts, too, for the growth of such 
excrescences as the collection of “  shacks ”  on the outskirts of 
Haifa, opprobriously known as “  Tin T ow n." B ut, if there are 
signs that the growth of an  urban  proletariat has begun, this is 
a social symptom not peculiar to Palestine, and in Palestine, as 
far as we could judge, it has not yet m eant destitution or 
degeneration. The official estimate for A rab unemployment, 
adm ittedly a very rough one, was 6,000 a t the time of our visit 
to P a les tin e , which in the circumstances and especially i n  view 
of the “ disturbances ” is not an alarm ing figure. A nd for the 
employed the rate of wages has steadily gone up. The daily 
wage p a id  to an Arab for skilled labour is now from  250 to 600 
mils, a n d  for unskilled labour from  100 to 180 mils.* In  Syria 
the w age ranges from 67 mils in older industries to 124 mils in 
newer o n es. Factory labour in ‘Iraq  is paid from  40 to 60 mils.
* 1 0 0  m i l s  =  2  s h i l l i n g s .
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29. Nor i s  it only in the towns tha t the landless fellah finds a 
livelihood. The Governm ent's program m e of p u b l ic  works 
means a  continuous dem and for labour, and a large n u m b e r  of 
A rabs are employed on roads and bridges and the like. More­
over, the great expansion of citrus-cultivation, Arab as w ell as 
Jew ish, has greatly increased the dem and for agricultural
labour; and for that, too, the rate of wages has risen. For
general agricultural work it was 80 to 120 mils a day in  1931, 
and 100 to 150 mils in 1935. F o r tree-planting and nursery
work it was 100 to 150 mils in 1931, and 150 to 200 m ils in
1935-
30. I t  is not easy to say whether the rise of wages has meant a 
rise of real wages. The A rab H igher Committee asserted that 
the cost of living has gone up and th a t this is partly due to 
the artificial protection of Jew ish industries. Undoubtedly the 
cost of living is higher than it was before the W ar; but the 
Jew ish Agency cited official calculations to show that for some 
years past it has been steadily falling.
31. In  the light of the foregoing considerations we h a v e  come 
to the conclusion that, despite the disproportion between their 
num bers and the am ount of cultivable land they occupy, the 
fellaheen are on the whole better off than they were in  1920. 
B ut there is another consideration which we have not yet men­
tioned, and one on which there can be no controversy. The 
whole range of public services, the initiation of w hich  we | 
described in the preceding chapter, has steadily developed, to 
the benefit of the fellaheen. Except in periods of “  disturbance,” 
their lives and property have been reasonably safe. T h e ir  civil I 
rights have been safeguarded by  the Courts. The growth in their 
num bers has been largely due to the health services, combating 
m alaria, reducing the infant death-rate, im proving water-supply 
and sanitation. Education, if as yet it only meets half the I 
dem and, has to tha t extent enabled the rising g en era tio n  to I 
profit more easily from  the technical instruction given in the | 
A rab Agricultural College or by official advisers in the villages. 
Better roads and quicker transport have m eant higher returns I 
on m arket-produce. In  sum, it m ay be said that, though much I 
more could have been done if more money had  been available, 
the equipm ent of Palestine with social services is more advanced 
than that of any of its neighbours,* and far more advanced | 
than that of an Indian province or an  Africain colony.
32. I t  rem ains to examine the validity of the Jewish claim I 
th a t this advance has been largely due to the establishment of I 
the N ational Home. After considering the evidence submitted!
* A table comparing the revenue expenditure and trade o f  Palestine I 
with those of neighbouring countries is given in Appendix 3 .
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to us, both orally and in writing, by the Jewish representatives 
on this question, we have come to the following conclusions : —
(i) The large im port of Jewish capital into Palestine has 
had a general fructifying effect on the economic life of 
the whole country.
(ii) The expansion of Arab industry and citriculture has 
been largely financed by the capital thus obtained.
(iii) Jewish example has done much to im prove Arab 
cultivation, especially of citrus.
(iv) Owing to Jewish development and enterprise the 
employment of Arab labour has increased in urban areas, 
particularly in the ports.
(v) The reclamation and anti-malaria work undertaken 
in Jewish “  colonies ”  have benefited all Arabs in the 
neighbourhood.
(vi) Institutions, founded with Jewish funds prim arily 
to serve the National Home, have also served the Arab 
population. Hadassah, for example, treats Arab patients, 
notably a t the Tuberculosis Hospital at Safad and the 
Radiology Institute a t Jerusalem , admits A rab country­
folk to the clinics of its R ural Sick Benefit Fund, and 
does much infant welfare work for Arab mothers.
(vii) The general beneficent effect of Jewish im migra­
tion on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact tha t the in­
crease in the A rab population is m ost m arked in urban 
areas affected by Jewish development. A comparison of 
the Census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that, six years 
ago, the increase per cent, in H aifa was 86, in Jaffa 62, 
in Jerusalem 37, while in purely Arab towns such as 
Nablus and Hebron it was only 7, and at Gaza there was 
a decrease of 2 per cent.
33. The further claim, based on the Jewish contribution to 
revenue, seems to us indisputable. Arab witnesses argued tha t 
the Government could have spent more money in social services 
if the National Home had not, on the one hand, necessitated 
a more elaborate and  costly adm inistration than was needed 
for the Arabs, and if it had not, on the other hand, involved 
so large an expenditure on security to protect it from attack. 
But they could not deny tha t such public services as had in 
act been provided had  benefited their people; nor could they 
deny that the revenue available for those services had been 
argely provided by the Jews. I t  is impossible to calculate 
th anything like precision w hat share of taxation is borne 
y the Jews. But it is certain that much the greater part of 
e customs duties are paid by  them, and the rising am ount of 
ustoms-revenue has formed from 1920 to the present day the 
iggest item in the rising total revenue.*
* For th e figures see page 206.
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34. Our conclusion, then, is that, broadly speaking, the Arabs 
have shared to a considerable degree in the material benefits 
which Jew ish immigration has brought to Palestine. The obliga­
tion of the M andate in this respect has been observed. The 
economic position of the Arabs, regarded as a whole, has not so 
far been prejudiced by  the establishment of the National Home 
B ut we would add a  rider to that judgm ent. First, the continu­
ance of such economic benefit as the Arabs derive from the 
National Home depends on the continuance of its prosperity. 
If  it were to encounter a serious set-back, if there were wide­
spread unemployment, we think that A rab labour would be the 
first to suffer. Secondly, such economic advantage as the Arabs 
gain from Jewish immigration will steadily decrease and ulti-1 
mately disappear if the political breach between the races 
continues to widen. Two peoples a t w ar cannot promote each 
other’s welfare. Boycott and bloodshed and all they mean in j 
the breakdown of economic relationships, in the shrinking of 
trade, in the cost to Government and the contraction of public 
services—these things, if they continue, will soon undo all the ; 
good the coming of the Jews has done to Palestine as a whole.
3. Arab Nationalism.
35. I t  was not till we had  announced the date on which we 1 
intended to leave the country tha t the H igher Committee decided 
to abandon its “  boycott "  and co-operate with us in trying to I 
find the w ay to peace in Palestine ; and when at last they came 
before us, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem , the first words of 
the prepared statem ent he made to us, were these : “ The Arab 
cause in Palestine is one which aims a t national independence. I 
In  its essence it does not differ from similar movements amongst I 
the A rabs in all other Arab territories.”  And at the close of his j 
statem ent he stated that the first cause of the “ disturbances ” 
was “  the fact that the Arabs in Palestine were deprived of their 
natural and  political rights and he summed up the Arab I 
dem ands as (1) “  the abandonm ent of the experiment of the I 
Jewish National Home " ,  (2) “  the immediate and complete 
stoppage of Jewish immigration ” , (3) “  the immediate and 1 
complete prohibition of the sale of Arab land to Jews ", and I 
(4) “  the solution of the Palestine problem on the same basis as j 
tha t on which were solved the problems of 'Iraq , Syria and the! 
Lebanon, namely, by  the term ination of the Mandate and by I 
the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine I 
by virtue of which a  national and independent government in I 
constitutional form will be established ” , I
36. Thus it is clear tha t the standpoint of the Arab leaders hyI 
not shifted by an  inch from  that which they adopted when urstl 
they understood the implications of the Balfour D eclaration . 1 el 
events of 17 years have only served to stiffen and em bitter their I
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resistance, and, as they argue, to strengthen their case. And the 
core of their case, it m ust be stressed again, is political. There 
has been, no doubt, a  sense of economic rivalry between the 
races; and the Arabs have been alarm ed a t the business capacity 
the Jews have shown and the financial resources they can com­
mand. But so far (as we have just explained) they have not 
suffered. On the balance the N ational Home has m eant a sub­
stantial material gain to them. Not unnaturally they deny it. 
But, even if they could be persuaded to admit it, we are quite 
convinced it would not appreciably weaken their antagonism. 
Their feeling in the m atter has been put in some such figurative 
language as this. “ You say we are better off: you say m y 
house has been enriched by  the strangers who have entered it. 
But it is my house, and  I  did not invite the strangers in, or ask 
them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if 
only I am master in it. ”
37. Nor is the conflict in its essence an interracial conflict, 
arising f ro m  any old instinctive antipathy of Arabs towards 
Jews. There was little or no friction, as we have seen, between 
Arab a n d  Jew in the rest of the Arab world until the strife in 
Palestine engendered it. And there has been precisely the 
same p o litica l trouble in ‘Iraq , Syria and Egypt—agitation, 
rebellion and bloodshed—where there are no “  National 
Homes.”  Quite obviously, then, the problem of Palestine 
is political. I t  is, as elsewhere, the problem of insurgent 
nationalism. The only difference is that in Palestine Arab 
nationalism is inextricably interwoven with antagonism to the 
Jews. A n d  the reasons for that, it is worth repeating, are 
equally obvious. In  the first place, the establishment of the 
National Home involved a t the outset a blank negation of 
the rights implied in the principle of national self-government. 
Secondly, it soon proved to be not merely an obstacle to the 
development of national self-government, b u t apparently the 
only serious obstacle. Thirdly, as the Home has grown, the 
fear has grown with it tha t, if and when self-government is 
conceded, it may not be national in the Arab sense, but govern­
ment b y  a  Jewish m ajority. T hat is why it is difficult to be 
an Arab patriot and not to hate the Jews.
38. T he logical consequence of this became increasingly clear 
is the Arab evidence proceeded. The demand for national 
independence takes priority of the dem and for the stoppage 
°f Jew ish immigration and land purchase. Given inde­
pendence, as the Mufti of Jerusalem  said, the A rabs will deal 
wth the Jews themselves. I t follows that, even if it were 
possible to  crystallize the N ational Home as it stands, to forbid 
another J e w  to enter Palestine, or another Arab dunum  to be 
bought, th e  mainspring of Arab agitation would rem ain un­
touched. W e  cannot, in fact, avoid the conclusion that
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restrictions on the growth of the N ational Home, whether or 
not they m ay be desirable for other reasons, would not remove 
the basic cause of A rab discontent. The National Home in 
A rab eyes is already too big. B ut even if it were far smaller, 
even if it had  been crystallized in 1925, the Arab attitude would 
be much the same. Big or small, it blocks the way to national 
independence. Big or sm all, the Arabs insist on their right to 
govern it as part of a self-governed Palestine.
39. The story of the last seventeen years is proof that this 
A rab nationalism with its anti-Jewish spearhead is not a new 
or transient phenomenon. I t  was there a t the beginning: its 
strength and range have steadily increased; and it seems 
evident to us from w hat we saw and heard that it has not yet 
reached its climax. Both internal and external factors are 
forcing on its growth. Two of the internal factors are pre­
dom inant. F irst, the movement is now sustained by a far more 
efficient and comprehensive political machine than existed in 
earlier years. The centralization of control which we noted 
as an alarm ing feature of the outbreak in 1933 has now been 
as fully effected as is possible in any A rab country. All the 
political parties present a "  common front ”  and their leaders 
sit together on the Arab H igher Committee. Christian as well 
as Moslem A rabs are represented on it. There is no opposition 
party . I f  anything is said in public or done in daylight 
against the known desires of the Arab H igher Committee, it is 
the work not of a more m oderate, bu t a more full-blooded 
nationalism  than theirs. In  every town there is an Arab 
National Committee, which has its representatives in the neigh­
bouring villages. How widespread is this organization and 
how well it does its work was shown by  the conduct of the Arab 
population as a  whole in the course of the disturbances last 
year. Our own experience was a  further proof of it. As long 
as the A rab H igher Committee m aintained the “  boycott,” no 
A rab came near us: and, even when it was withdrawn, t’ 
only witnesses perm itted to give evidence before us were, with 
four exceptions, members or agents of the Higher Committee. 
The exceptions were the MelMte Archbishop of Galilee and 
the Rev. N. M amura, who appeared with the full assent of 
the Arab H igher Committee and in company wih one 
of its Christian Members; Mr. George Antonius, whose 
appearance was likewise approved; and H assan Sidki Bey 
D ajani, who is at least a  sufficiently ardent nationalist to have 
been interned a t Sarafand. All those four witnesses supported 
in toto the Arab H igher Committee’s case.
40. This nationalist organization is served by a copious and 
vigorous Press. There are four daily newspapers printed in 
Arabic. A l Liwa  (circulation 3,000 to 4,000) is the official organ
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of the Palestine Arab Party , the Mufti’s P arty , and Jam al Bey 
El Husseini is its proprietor. Falastin (4,000 to 6,000), which 
is in Christian Arab ownership, supports the N ational Defence 
Party, the President of which is Ragheb Bey Nashashibi. 
Al Difaa (4,000 to 6,000) speaks for the Istiqlal P arty , of which 
Awni Bey Abdelhadi is the Secretary-General. Al Jamia al 
Islamiya (about 2,000) is more independent of party  organiza­
tions, but is strongly nationalist. There is also a weekly journal, 
printed in English, Palestine and Transjordan (about 1,500), of 
which the Managing Editor is Fuad  Eff. Saba, Secretary of the 
Arab Higher Committee. I t  will be observed that all these news­
papers but one are associated more or less closely with members 
of the Arab Higher Committee; and, while they differ often 
enough on personal issues or points of tactics—Falastin, for 
example, during our stay in Jerusalem  took a less intransigent 
line on the question of the “  boycott ”  than the others—they 
reiterate in unbroken unison the full A rab claim for national in­
dependence. Nor is there a trace of moderation in their tone. 
During the “  disturbances "  last year Arab newspapers were 
suspended 34 times and officially warned 11 times. And if evi­
dence were needed to show that the ending of the "  strike "  
meant little change of heart, we could find it ourselves in the 
general temper and often in the actual language that appeared 
in print from day to day while we were in the country. 
Al D'ifa’a, for instance, published an article on the 21st Decem­
ber headed "  The Claws of the Wolf ” . “ The Arabs of Pales­
tine ", it declared, "  are looking at the Government with an 
eye of hate ” ; and, fixing the responsibility for all the trouble 
“ first on the Government and then on the Jew s ” , it hinted that 
more “ sacrifices ”  might be needed to save the country from 
" the madness of imperialism ” .
41. The second internal factor in the growth of Arab national­
ism is education. Except for a  few private schools, the whole of 
the Arab educational system, unlike the Jewish, is m aintained 
y the Government : but, for reasons which will be examined 
in a later chapter,* it is a t least as purely Arab in its character 
as the Jewish system is Jew ish. At both the prim ary and 
econdary stages the teaching is in Arabic only: apart from 
-ientific subjects, the curriculum is almost wholly devoted to the 
terature, history and traditions of the A rabs; and all the school- 
asters from the humblest village teacher to the head of the 
overnment Arab College are Arabs. A school-system thus 
urely Arab may be better for Arab children than a "  mixed ”  
tem with a British element in its staff and in its field of in­
action; it is the right w ay, it is said, to m ake them  “  good 
abs ” , Whether tha t is so or not, it certainly makes them 
ood Arab patriots. The general tendency of schoolmasters to
* See Chapter X V I.
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place a  few days after we left Palestine, is also, we are told, 
regarded as political. I t  is not surprising tha t a number of 
A rabs have asked for Government protection.
46. Such, in the briefest compass we could achieve, is our 
analysis of the character and sentim ent of the two national 
groups whose opposition constitutes the problem of Palestine. 
To sum  u p : —
The establishment of the Jew ish N ational Home has 
so far been to the economic advantage of the Arabs as 
a whole.
Jew ish nationalism  is as intense and  self-centred as  Arab 
nationalism . Both are growing forces, and th e  gulf 
between them  is widening.
W hat the A rabs most desire is national independence. | 
W hat they m ost fear is Jew ish domination.
W hat the Jews most desire is freedom to d e v e lo p  fully I 
the  ideas inherent in the N ational Home and in particular 
to adm it to it as m any im m igrants as they themselves think 
can be “  absorbed ” . W hat they m ost fear is a crystalli­
zation of the N ational Home as it is, leaving the Jew s in I 
a  perm anent m inority in Palestine, exposed to  the I 
possibility of Arab domination or even, in certain not in-1 
conceivable circumstances, of suffering the fate that befell | 
the Greeks a t Sm yrna o r the Assyrians in ‘Iraq.
4. The Position of the Government.
47. We doubt whether there is any  country in the world I 
where the position of the Government is less enviable th a n  that I 
of the Government of Palestine, poised as it is a b o v e  tool 
irreconcilable communities, compelled to follow a path between I 
them  m arked out by  an elaborate, yet not very lu c id , legal I 
instrum ent, watched a t every step it takes by both contendingl 
parties inside the country and watched from outside b y  experi-l 
enced critics on the Perm anent M andates Commission and b; 
multitudes of Jew s throughout the world.
48. Its task would have been easier if Palestine had been ; 
British territory. The Government could then have se t itself I 
with a free hand to devise all possible measures fo r  bringing I 
the two races together and building up a sense of common I 
citizenship between them . English could have been m ade the I 
sole official language, and m ight have helped Arabs a n d  Jews,r 
as it has so notably helped the varied peoples of India, to  under-1 
stand each other. The whole educational system could h av e  been I 
kept under effective Government control and directed towards I 
the same unifying purpose. Above all, the personnel of the I 
adm inistration m ight have been entirely British e x c e p t  in very I
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minor posts. If the whole District Administration in particular 
iad consisted of British officials, carefully selected for the work, 
leaking both Arabic and Hebrew, fully conversant w ith the 
istory and claims of both races, and instructed tha t their 
irst d u ty  was to try , by close personal contact with Arabs 
and Jews, to bring about a better understanding between them, 
ien, it is  conceivable that the gulf might not have widened quite 
so fast and so fa r as it has.
4 9 . But all this was inhibited—in general by the m andatory 
îaracter of the adm inistration, and in particular by  the specific
requirements of the M andate.
In general, the principles and intentions of the M andate 
System made it as im practicable for Palestine to be governed on 
normal Crown Colony lines as it was to treat 'Ira q  as if it were a 
irovince of British India or Syria as if it were part of “  overseas 
’ranee " . Thus, a t the very outset, as has been seen it was 
regarded as part of the Governm ent’s duty to appoint as m any 
Arab a n d  Jewish officials as practicable in order tha t they might 
qualify by experience for their ultim ate task of self-government. 
In h a p p ie r  circumstances those “  Palestinian ”  officials might 
have done something, though not as much as British officials, 
to prom ote a better feeling between their respective peoples : but, 
as things were, they could do little, and, as things are, they can 
do n o th in g . No Arab official is given charge of a Jewish Dis­
trict, no Jewish official of an A rab one. Nor can they so 
neutralize their natural feelings as to play the p art of inter­
mediaries between their peoples. In  quiet times, we were 
informed, they have done their full duty to the Government and 
co-operated loyally with each other; bu t in times of political 
conÉct they draw apart and cannot act as one adm inistration. 
It was not denied that, as the “  disturbances ”  of last year grew 
more a n d  more serious, so the Arab District Officers and police, 
with som e notable exceptions, were less and less able to w ith­
stand the strain imposed upon their loyalty. Fortunately, there 
is little present likelihood of an analogous situation on the Jewish 
side: b u t, should it arise, Jew ish officials and police would be put 
in the sa m e  difficult position as their A rab colleagues were last 
year.
50. The particular requirem ents of the M andate were an 
equally insuperable obstacle to the adoption of a thorough­
going policy for bringing the races together and fostering the 
gradual growth of a common devotion to their common home­
land. The M andate, indeed, just because it was fram ed m ainly 
to realize the nationalist ideals of Zionism, could scarcely have 
been b e tte r calculated than it is to keep the races apart. In  the 
first p lace it imposed the use of three official languages. I t  
affirmed, secondly, “  the right of each com munity to m aintain 
its own schools for the education of its own members in its own
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language I t  established, thirdly, a  Jewish A gency to 
“  advise and co-operate ”  with the Government—a  provision 
which was counterpoised in due course, though not fairly 
balanced, by the establishment of the Supreme Moslem Council 
and the A rab Executive and its successor. In  the resu lt, the 
two communities, instead of being draw n together by the common 
forms and symbols of a single citizenship, have a d o p te d  the 
forms and symbols of separate nationhood. There a re  three 
national flags flown in Palestine—the Union Jack ; the red, white, 
green and black A rab flag; and the blue and white banner of 
Zionism. Nobody wants a Palestinian flag. If there are not 
three N ational Anthems, it is only because there is no A ra b  hymn 
to sing with “  God Save the K ing "  and the Zionist “  Hatikva ", 
And last, and  most prejudicial to the cause of peace, there are 
three political bodies in Palestine which lay claim to the allegiance 
of Palestinians—the M andatory Administration, the A ra b  Higher 
Committee allied with the Supreme Moslem Council, and the 
Jew ish Agency allied with the Va"a d  L e u m i.  They might 
alm ost be called three Governm ents; and it is the sim p le  truth 
that of the three the Government of Palestine makes the  least 
appeal to the natural loyalty of either the Arabs or the Jews.
51. Its hands tied by the M andate, the Government o f Pales­
tine has been quite unable to prevent the steady frustration of its I 
hopes of concord and co-operation. Such positive efforts as it 
has m ade from  time to time to bridge the gulf have a ll provedl 
useless; and it has tended more and more to adopt the rôle of the] 
im partial arbiter. B ut here again, unfortunately, th e  Mandate] 
has not been helpful: for a  strict obedience to its provisions! 
against discrimination between the races has fostered th e  growthl 
of a kind of mechanical im partiality which makes neither fori 
good governm ent nor, in fact, for better relations betw een the! 
races.
52. A clear illustration of this is the process of recruitment! 
If  there had  been no M andate, the Government might from thl 
outset have adopted the principle that, A rabs and Je w s  being! 
members of one political community, capacity would b e  the soil 
test for official employment. B ut under the Mandate it has beei 
assumed th a t the num ber of official posts should b e , as far a l 
possible, shared between A rabs and Jew s in proportion to theil 
total numbers. N ot only, therefore, m ust a  vacancy in  an  Aral 
or Jew ish area be filled by  an A rab or a Jew ; but, for posa 
which do not involve direct contact with the p e o p le , the fifil 
question, we understand, is often not whether the m an  is the 
best m an for the post, b u t w hether it is the turn of an  Aral 
or a Jew  to be appointed. ]
53. This principle of proportional treatm ent goes far beyonl 
the question of personnel: it perm eates the whole field of ml
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administration. In  1 9 3 3  the Government decided that from
0 to 33 per cent, of the labour employed on public works 
lould be  Jewish, the percentage being calculated on wages and 
not on the total num ber of working days. This percentage was 
jased on two factors: the Government accepted 3 7  per cent, as the 
jercentage of Jewish contribution to public revenue and 18 per 
:ent. as the approxim ate proportion of Jews in the population. 
ie calculations involved in basing the am ount of the Govern­
ment grant to Jewish education on (a) the am ount spent on 
Arab education and (&) the ratio between the Arab and Jewish 
"school-age ” populations have led to a  sharp dispute between 
ie Department of Education and the Va'ad Leum i. The 
-rant fo r health services is similarly determined. In  every 
epartm ent and in every detail the most scrupulous care is 
taken to  preserve the balance. I t  is a very small point, but 
none the less significant, that the three cars provided by Govern­
ment fo r our personal use were hired from Moslem A rab, 
Christian A rab, and Jewish firms respectively. We doubt, 
indeed, if anywhere else the principle of im partiality between 
different sections of a community has been so strictly applied. 
The Government of Palestine might almost be described as gov­
ernment by arithmetic. And the worst of it is tha t the more 
strictly a n d  widely it operates, the more it nourishes the spirit of 
antagonism between the races. Both the Arab and the Hebrew 
newspapers are jealously on the watch for the slightest devia­
tion from the narrow path, and during our stay in Palestine 
indignant protests were published on the following, among 
other, grounds—tha t Jewish scavengers in Jerusalem  were not 
supplied with winter clothes as A rab scavengers had been; that 
a Jewish doctor was appointed to the hospital a t Jaffa while 
there are no Arab doctors in Tel Aviv; that trunk-calls to and 
from Tel Aviv have to pass through the Jaffa Exchange ; tha t 
on the main gate of the Jerusalem  Museum the title of the 
institution is inscribed in English and Hebrew, but not in 
Arabic.
54. Whether or not it was necessary to extend the principle 
of impartiality or non-discrimination so far as it has been 
extended, the m aintenance of the principle as one of the bases 
of the Government’s policy is, of course, unquestionably right; 
and, though individual officials have sometimes by  incautious 
language betrayed a personal bias out of keeping w ith the two­
fold obligation of the Mandate, the Government as a whole 
can claim to have honestly m aintained the principle. The point 
we wish to emphasize is that official im partiality has had no help­
ful effect on the relations between the races. N either of them 
believes in its sincerity; and it has whetted rather than blunted 
their jealousy and antagonism.
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55. The same is true of another m arked feature of the 
Governm ent’s policy. From  first to last it has been conciliatory. 
As regards the Jew s, it has gone far, if not always as  far as 
they have wished, to m eet their claims. In  a p p ly in g , for 
example, the principle of economic absorptive capacity as the 
limiting factor for im migration, the case submitted b y  the 
Jewish Agency has always been m ost carefully e x a m in e d . In 
municipal m atters Tel Aviv has been ridden on a v e ry  light 
rein; no attem pt has ever been m ade to compel a strict observ­
ance of the Ordinance. B ut the Jew s, of course, sin ce  they 
accept the M andate, need conciliating less than the A ra b s , who 
repudiate it. A nd, if one thing stands out clear from the record 
of the M andatory adm inistration, it is the leniency with which |  
A rab political agitation, even when carried to the p o in t of 
violence and m urder, has been treated. The facts recorded 
in C hapter I I I  speak for themselves. After each successive 
outbreak, punishm ent was sparing and clemency th e  rule: 
there was no real attem pt a t disarm am ent, nor any general 
repression : freedom of speech was not curtailed. On the 
Governm ent’s handling of the last outbreak it is not o u r  duty 
to express opinions : the m atter was implicitly ruled o u t from I 
our term s of reference; bu t we feel bound to say, and w e think I 
the Government itself would be the first to adm it, that it carried [  
the policy of conciliation to its farthest possible limit. Again |  
we are not discussing the wisdom of the policy. T hrough- all 
these years, indeed, it has been obvious th a t the only chance I 
of peace in Palestine, the only hope of attaining that ultimate 
harm ony and co-operation on which the whole future of the 
M andate depended, was to try  to reconcile the A ra b s  to it. 
Our p o i n t ,  once more, is that conciliation, like im partiality, 
has failed. If the patient treatm ent of the Arabs la s t year 
has been sharply criticized, its critics m ust confess that it had 
a t least this m erit. I t  proved to demonstration that concilia­
tion is no use. I t  has now been tried for 17 years, and at the 
end the Arabs, taken as a whole, are m ore hostile to the Jews 
and m uch more hostile to the Government than they were at j 
the beginning.
5. The Arab and Jewish Proposals.
56. The situation thus compels the question what other line 
of policy, if any, has a better prospect of success; and with this 
in our minds we listened with the greatest attention to the pro­
posals pu t before us by the official spokesmen of the two [ 
contending parties.
57. The solution of the problem advanced by the Arab Com­
mittee was, as has been seen, a simple one. The prompt estab­
lishment of national independence, they asserted, is the only way
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to peace in Palestine. In  other circumstances, it is evident from 
the course of British policy in neighbouring countries tha t that 
claim would not be unfavourably regarded by British public 
o p in io n .  But in the circumstances as they are we find it difficult 
to believe that A rab public opinion on its side really thinks the 
claim can be conceded. F or it means the surrender of the Jewish 
National Home to governm ent by Arabs who outnum ber the 
jews by more than two to one.
58. The Arab H igher Committee assured us tha t the welfare 
of the Jewish m inority would be safeguarded not only by  
specific provisions in the Treaty which would accompany the 
grant of independence bu t also by the habitual toleration which 
Jewish minorities have enjoyed in other Arab lands. B ut it 
must be remembered that those Jew ish minorities elsewhere are 
relatively very small and tha t the Jewish minority in Palestine 
is already regarded by  the Arabs as too big. On this point the 
following questions p u t to the Mufti of Jerusalem  and his 
replies should be noted : —
Q. Does H is Em inence th in k  th a t  th is country can assim ilate and  
digest the 400,000 Jew s now  in  th e  country?
A. No.
Q. Some of them  w ould have to  be rem oved b y  a  process k indly  
or painful as th e  case m ay be?
A. We m ust leave a ll th is  to  th e  future.
We are not questioning the sincerity or the hum anity of the 
Mufti’s intentions and those of his colleagues; bu t we cannot 
forget what recently happened, despite treaty provisions and 
explicit assurances, to the Assyrian minority in 'I ra q ; nor can 
we forget that the hatred  of the A rab politician for the National 
Home has never been concealed and tha t it has now perm eated 
the Arab population as a whole.
59- Nor is it only a question of hum anity. We have tried to 
show that the National Home is essentially a European insti­
tution, essentially modern, and, on its economic side especially, 
intimately linked with the outer world. We mean to im ply no 
reflection on the natural ability of Arab leaders if we say that 
the National Home, with its peculiar and delicate economic 
constitution, cannot prosper under a  governm ent which has 
had little experience of modern capitalism and is no t fully 
acquainted with financial and  commercial problems on a  world­
wide scale. I t seems clear to us, in fact, that the establishment 
f an independent governm ent of Palestine a t this time would 
olate the undertaking in Article 2 of the Mandate to place 
e country “ under such political, adm inistrative and economic 
conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish 
National Home N or, we think, can it be argued that, since 
a Home has been established, we can honourably cease to
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interest ourselves in its security. Here, indeed, as in  other ■  
aspects of the problem, the actual circumstances of to-day are ■  
as compelling in themselves as any previous commitments. B  
There are 400,000 Jew s in Palestine. They have come there ■  
not only with our permission but with our encouragement. We ■  
are  answerable, within reason, for their welfare. We cannot H  
in the present state of affairs, abandon them  to the good in ten-■  
tions o f an A rab governm ent. I
60. This seems to us quite plain, and we cannot help H i 
thinking it m ust be plain to any thoughtful Arab statesman H  
also. D isputants are bound to put forw ard their m a x im u m * 
claim s when their case is up  for trial; and the Arab Higher■  
Committee could scarcely be expected to ask for less than th e H 1 
national independence which, on their interpretation of th e H 1 
agreem ent, was promised to King Hussein, and which is n o w *  
enjoyed or about to be enjoyed by all A rabs in Asia o u ts id e * 
Palestine. B ut surely they m ust realise, even on their own show-1 : 
ing, that two wrongs do not m ake a right; and we doubt w h e th e r* 
British prestige and the belief in British good faith w ou ld  s ta n d * 
higher anywhere in the A rab world if we tried to escape from  o u rB ' 
difficulties in Palestine by an  open betrayal of the Jews. H
6 1 . Jewish opposition, moreover, would have to be reckoned*] 
with. The Jew s, as has been observed, are believed to HaveBi 
secretly arm ed themselves to a certain extent. C o n v in ced  a s * l  
they are tha t an  Arab governm ent would mean the fru stra tio n * ) 
of all their efforts and ideals, that it would convert the N ational* 
Home into one more cram ped and dangerous ghetto, it seemsMc 
only too probable tha t they would fight rather than subm it t o »  
A rab rule. And to repress a Jew ish rebellion against B ritish* , 
policy would be as unpleasant a task as the repression of ArabM» 
rebellions has been. ■
6 2 . To the Jew ish extremists the solution of the p ro b le m  is aj 
simple as that put forw ard by  the A rab Higher Committee! 
M r . Jabotinsky and the Revisionists dem and that th e  expansion 
of th e  N ational Home should continue a t an a c c e le ra te d  pad  
T rans-Jordan should be opened to Jewish immigrants a n d  room 
quickly found in this larger Palestine for m any millions of Jews] 
The whole country would thus become in fact E re tz  Israel and 
in due course obtain its independence as a  Jewish S ta te . It fl 
true that, as explained in C hapter I I , the Jews understood 
in the days of the B alfour D eclaration, that som e sucl 
result as this m ight b e  its final outcome. But th e  wholj 
situation has been changed by  w hat has happened in tffl 
interval. In  present circumstances the R e v is io n is t  pr<j
gram m e is no t merely a t plain variance with our legal ant
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moral obligations : its execution would convert the friendship 
0f all the A rab peoples into implacable resentm ent and react 
b e y o n d  their borders throughout the Moslem world.
63. More serious and prolonged consideration m ust be given 
to the Jewish proposals as submitted to us by  Dr. W eizmann 
and his colleagues on behalf of the Jew ish Agency and the 
fn’ad Leumi. Those witnesses are men of the world, who 
realize, better, perhaps, than the Arabs, the difficulty in which 
Your Majesty’s Government is placed, and who realize, too, 
the dangers that confront themselves. Their representations, 
it was clear, had been very thoroughly and anxiously con­
sidered: they were put before us at full length and with a 
multitude of corroborative facts and figures. Indeed, the Jewish 
evidence, oral and in writing, was an impressive perform ance, 
characteristic of the industry and scientific standards of the 
National Home. Nor was it surprising that such a full-scale 
effort should be m ade on its behalf in view of the fact that its 
[ate, at th is  moment of crisis, might be seriously affected for 
jood or ill by our Report. F o r tha t reason also it was 
latural, no doubt, that the Jew ish case, like the A rab, should 
ie maximal; that the Jew s, like the A rabs, should ask, or 
ather ins is t on having, 100 per cent, of w hat they claim as 
heirs by right. N or could we forget w hat the Jews in Pales- 
ine never forget—the sufferings of the Jew s in Europe, and 
he incentive they constitute for trying to stretch the bounds 
if the National Home to their utm ost limit.
64. T he proposals can be clearly summarized. W e were 
old that peace could only be attained in Palestine by the appli- 
:ation of the M andate interpreted at every point in accordance 
nth the full Jew ish claims. There must be no new restriction 
in immigration. Its rate m ust continue to be “ determ ined "  
inly by th e  “ economic absorptive capacity "  of the country, 
uid m ust be kept up to the limit of that capacity. No new 
estrictions must be placed on the sale of A rab land to Jews, 
lo m easures m ust be taken to prevent the Jew ish population 
tom becoming in due course a m ajority in Palestine ; and,
i and w h e n  it becomes a m ajority, no veto should be put on 
’alestine becoming a Jew ish State, in the sense that the Jew s 
rould have a m ajor voice in its governm ent. At this point 
tiy was a concession m ade. The Jew s did not wish, they 
aid, to be  “  dominated ”  by  the Arabs, neither did they wish 
0 “ dominate ”  them . They were prepared, therefore, to  
dhere to the principle of “  parity .”  I f  a Legislative Council 
rere now established, and if the present Jewish m inority were 
iven an  equal num ber of seats thereon with the present A rab 
Jajority, the Jew s would never claim more than that equal 
umber, whatever the future ratio between Arab and Jew ish 
opulation might become.
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65. If  the Government would adopt this policy without L 
hesitation or equivocation and  m ake it clear that any illegal I 
agitation against it would be prom ptly and firmly r e p re s s e d ,  f 
then, the Jew ish witnesses assured us, all would be well. Thé 
A rab extremists, it was suggested or to be inferred, would 
a t once lose their hold on public opinion. The m o d e ra te s  L 
would come to the front and co-operate with G o v e r n m e n t .  I  
Common economic interests between Arab and Jew would | 
re-assert themselves. Educated A rabs for the most part would I 
come to acquiesce in the frustration of their national a m b i t io n s ,  I 
while the fellaheen, anxious only to be left to till their fields I 
in peace, would welcome the collapse of a  dangerous and costly I 
agitation in  which their hearts had never been engaged. In i 
other words, the policy laid down in Mr. Ram say M a c D o n a l d ’s I  
letter requires no alteration, bu t only enforcement. T h e  a p p a-f 
ren t obstacle is an unreal obstacle. Arab nationalism in I 
Palestine has been artificially puffed up by  methods which I 
the Governm ent should never have allowed. Only a  little| 
firmness is needed to deflate it.
66. We understand tha t this optimistic outlook is widely I 
shared in England and elsewhere outside Palestine; and it I 
is not to be lightly brushed aside. If, indeed, it were justified|  
by the facts, the difficulties of the problem , it is obvious, would 
be greatly reduced. B ut we are convinced it is not justified.I 
I t  is founded, in our opinion, on two false estimates. It under-1 
rates the strength of Arab nationahsm  throughout the country| 
and particularly am ong the young. And it overrates the ' ' 
which A rab m oderates would be willing or able to render ii| 
the continued enforcement of the policy of 1931.
67. I t  is far from  our purpose to cast any reflection on thel 
attitude of the m oderates in the past. I t  is greatly to their credi1 
th a t they should have yielded as much as they have to ' 
pressure of successive H igh Commissioners and co-operate  
as m uch as they have with the Government and in s o m e  cases! 
with the Jew s. Thus before the recent deterioration in thel 
situation, only a  few of the Arabs invited to sit on “ m ix ed 1 j 
Governm ent boards or committees refused outright to do so on 
the ground that they included Jew s or, in their view, to o  large 1 
proportion of Jew s. Even now Arabs are still serving on sud 
bodies as the General Agricultural Council, the Standing Com 
mittee for Commerce and Industry , or the H arbour and Roadj 
Boards. But these A rabs, we are inform ed, do not regard them 
selves as co-operating with the Jew s, bu t only, as they wen 
asked to do, with the Government, whose official representative! 
is always in the chair.
68. In  the “  m ixed ”  municipalities Arab mayors 
councillors have succeeded in working with Jewish colleaguesj 
in the past, except, of course, in periods of “  disturbance
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Friction has always been less m arked in H aifa than elsewhere, 
and a policy of co-operation with the Jew s has been pursued. 
Jewish interests in Jaffa have received a  fair share of municipal 
attention. In  Jerusalem , where the m ayor has always been an 
Arab though the m ajority of the taxpayers have for some time 
past b een  Jew s, m unicipal questions have not been determined 
as a rule on racial lines; bu t the strength of latent feeling was 
revealed last year by  the b itter quarrel which broke out when 
the “ disturbances "  began and the m ayor became a member 
of the Arab H igher Committee.
69. In business, likewise, moderate-minded A rabs have 
worked in quiet times with Jew s. The members of the Je ru ­
salem Chamber of Commerce have m aintained a fair m easure 
of co-operation: bu t A rab and Jew ish citrus-growers are 
separately organized and have not often succeeded in adjusting 
their conflicting interests. And, of course, there has been con­
siderable commercial, though Ettle social, intercourse between 
individuals. Even the breach created between Tel Aviv and 
Jaffa in  1929 was overcome; and  before the troubles of last
ear many Arabs of Jaffa, particularly women of the upper 
’asses, shopped a t Tel Aviv.
70. That is by no means a  negligible record; b u t two com- 
ents must be passed on it.
First, Arab "m oderation ”  has never extended to the higher 
lane of politics. Willingness to co-operate with Jew s in muni- 
'pal government is unhappily no evidence a t all of willingness 
0 co-operate on a national scale : and Arab councillors, who 
an agree with Jew s about im proving an urban water-supply or 
egulating a m arket or laying out a  park , cannot agree with 
em a b o u t the rate of im migration or land-purchase or the con- 
titation of a Legislative Council. Practically all the Arab 
ayors, it will be rem embered, attended the nationalist meeting 
t Jaffa which preceded the outbreak of 1933.* A nd of course, 
e moderates among the A rab politicians have always made 
oramon cause with the extremists on m ajor national issues.
71. Secondly, the will to co-operate has never been strong 
rough to  survive a crisis. W hen race-feeling was aroused, 
hen an  outbreak became im minent, then, if ever, was the time 
or the moderates to cling to the principle of co-operation, to 
‘k for common ground, to use ail their influence to avert the 
orm. But in public a t any rate, w hatever m ay have happened
private, they were never strong enough to take the line of 
ompromise and conciliation. And in each case, of course, 
e th reads of co-operation were broken by the outbreak itself, 
d only slowly and partially knitted up again when it was 
ver. A t the present moment, with few exceptions, the two
* See page 83.
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races are holding rigidly apart. The Jerusalem  Municipality, as 
a “  mixed ” body, is virtually out of action. A separate Arab 
Cham ber of Commerce has been established. Jaffa and Tel 
A viv are once more a t open war, em bittered now by  the buüd-1 
ing of a new jetty a t Tel Aviv, which was necessitated by the 
cessation of work last year a t Jaffa port. There is lit t le  or no I 
A rab shopping now a t Jewish shops and social intercourse has 
practically ceased. In  Galilee this is peculiarly significant. Be­
fore 1929, at any rate, the relations between the Arabs of Galilee 
and the old-established Arab-speaking Jews w ere not 
unfriendly. Now there is serious tension in Tiberias and the | 
Jew s of Safad are segregated into something like a ghetto.
72. Another reason for questioning the wisdom of trying I 
to base a  settlement on moderate A rab opinion is the difficulty! 
of finding anyone now to profess it. The moderates have always! 
been nationalists. They have been exposed like o th e r  Arabs! 
to the pressure of events and influences which have operated,! 
as has been pointed out, to inflame and intensify their I 
nationalism. And if it has never been easy for an A ra b  who is I 
proud of his race to hold aloof from his more a rd e n t  com-1 
patriots, it is harder than ever now—and not only, or even] 
m ainly, because it is more dangerous.
7 3 . Our last reason is draw n from  experience. As w e pointed! 
out in discussing the situation in 1925, the extremist h a s  usually! 
kept the lead, the m oderate has rarely counted, in a struggle fori 
national independence. We see no reason why the history of I 
nationalism  in Ireland, Ind ia , Egypt—to mention only countries I 
with which Britain has been concerned—should not re p e a t itself| 
in  Palestine.
74. F or these reasons we find ourselves reluctantly con-J 
vinced that no prospect of a lasting settlement can be founded! 
on moderate A rab nationalism. At every successive crisis ini 
the past tha t hope has been entertained. In  each case it  has| 
proved illusory.
7 5 . If the opinions we have stated in the preceding para-J 
graphs are well-founded, it is clear tha t the policy recom­
mended  by the Jew ish Agency and the Va ad Leumi will not 
bring peace to Palestine. Its execution, we have n o  doubt,! 
would be resisted by  the whole force of Arab nationaJ'snil 
w hether in some general outbreak or in recurrent “ disf 
turbances.”  F or it would m ean the influx of the maxima 
num ber of Jew s for which the N ational Home and its sup­
porters oversea could find or m ake employment. I t  would] 
m ean a Jewish population m ounting steadily, if all w ent w< 
tow ards a m ajority over the A rab population, with th e  prospei 
which that implies of ultim ate Jewish control over th e  whole
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country. The Arabs, therefore, would be bound to regard 
the process as the gradual conversion of Palestine into a Jew ish
State.
76. It has sometimes crossed our minds that this conversion 
might conceivably have been accomplished, once for all, as 
an act o f  war. In  term s of Realpolitik the British had  
conquered the country from the Turks and were entitled to 
jo  w hat they liked with it. If any A rab contribution to victory 
had been ignored and any undertakings to them  brushed aside 
and if th e  new frontier had a t once been draw n and the new 
ewish State a t once established, it is possible, perhaps, that
the A ra b s  would by now have acquiesced. B ut it is far harder 
to im ag in e  the conversion of Palestine into a  Jewish State in 
the p re s e n t circumstances as, so to speak, an act of peace. 
It is tru e  that Jew ish im migration is not merely sanctioned 
but r e q u ire d  by solemn international agreements. I t  is true 
that th e  Jews enter Palestine “ as of right and not on suffer­
ance." None the less, the Arabs regard their entry, sustained 
is it is from time to time by  force in the teeth of their 
resistance, as in the nature of an invasion, and the process 
>y w hich they gradually rise towards a m ajority in the country 
is a so rt of creeping conquest.
77. B u t, if A rab opposition to the policy recommended by 
he Jew ish Agency and the Va ad Leum i seems to us inevitable, 
ve do not suggest it would be formidable. I t  would be 
udicrous to suppose that it is beyond the resources of Y our 
Majesty’s Government to deal with a rebellion on so small a 
icale and  so ill-equipped for m odem  w arfare. B ut we do 
uggest th a t ,  before committing itself to a course of repression, 
iritish public opinion would have to be convinced that there 
î no o ther means by which justice can be done in Palestine, 
tod we go further. W e venture to think tha t Jewish public 
ipinion throughout the world, if it could realise as clearly as 
ve do th a t  the policy advocated by  its spokesmen entails the 
ecurrent use of force, would likewise hesitate to press for 
tsadoption, unless, again, there is dem onstrably no other way 
•y which its aspirations can be fairly satisfied. The instru­
ments of force, it is true, the soldiers and aircraft, the bombs 
id machine-guns, are B ritish: they m ust be British, for Y our 
lajesty’s Government cannot stand aside and let the Tews 
Jid A rabs fight their quarrel out. B ut that does not veil 
rom Jew ish  eyes the harsh realities of repression; and, if it 
ould be shown tha t a reasonable chance existed of solving:
problem by other m eans, we believe that the spirit of 
lonism, as we understand it, would revolt against the use of 
toe, all the more strongly because it is not its own.
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78 I t  is clear to us, therefore, that neither the Arab nor the 
Tevrish proposals, as officially put before us, afford a basis or 
fp e a c e fu l or lasting settlement. W e have sought accordingly, 
with S e  aid of all those witnesses who took a  moderate line, 
to  find a  middle ^ >ath. W e have exhaustively considered what 
m ight be done in one field after another m  execution of the Man­
date to im prove the prospect of peace. In  the ensuing second 
part of this R eport we have embodied the results of this inquiry,
PART II
THE OPERATION OF THE 
MANDATE
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ADMINISTRATION.
1. Palestine under Turkish Rule.
1. Turkish governm ent in Palestine before the Great War 
was in effect a  despotism, modified to some extent by the delega­
tion of authority to the leading families in Syria w h o  held 
estates in Palestine. The head of the Administration w as the 
Vali in  Beirut, Jerusalem  being an  independent Sanjaq 
(County). The S a n ja q  of Jerusalem  stretched from the 
Egyptian frontier to just north of Jaffa: the rem ainder of what 
is now Palestine was included in the V ila ye t  of Beirut—in the 
S a n ja q s  of B eirut, Acre and B alqa (N ablus). Each Sanjaq was 
divided into Q adas  (Districts), the latter combining several 
N a h ia s  (village or com bination of small villages). E ach  of 
these adm inistrative units had  its own Council and posse of 
executive officials, as, for exam ple, the K a im a k a m  in the Qadu, 
appointed by the Turkish Government, bu t responsible to the 
M utasarrif  or Chief Executive Officer of the S a n ja q .  In th e  case 
of Jerusalem  the la tter was in direct touch with Constantinople, 
These Executive Officers in all the higher grades form ed a 
distinctive Turkish bureaucracy. Turkish was the official 
language.
2 . The revenues of the V ila ye t,  p a rt of which h a d  to be 
paid  into the Im perial Treasury, were derived chiefly from 
the taxation of land and buildings, customs, stam p d u tie s , and 
Court fees. O ther imposts were levied: such as a  tax on 
anim als, paym ent in lieu of forced labour on roads, or to  obtain I 
exem ption from  m ilitary service. At a later date spec ia l war I 
taxes were im posed on buildings, salaries and p ro fe s s io n s . I
3 . The m ain tax  on land was the tithe ( Ushr) calcu la ted  at I 
I2 | per cent, of the gross yield of the land. While the incidence I 
varied according to the harvest, the annual assessment in the I 
field or on the threshing floor gave opportunity for g re a t  abuse. I  
The system of the tithe dates from  the Q oran. The tith es  were! 
farm ed out by public auction, usually to influential persons of I 
means who were able to provide adequate security. “ Thel 
rich m an rarely , if ever, paid his fair assessment; and the loss I  
of revenue from  this evasion was m ade good by overcharging! 
his poorer neighbours. The Turkish Government, in accepting I  
the final highest bid for a village or locality, was only interested! 
in  so fa r as the full collection of the sum  due to them w as paid. I  
Any sum over and above this w ent into the contractor’s pocket,! 
and, in practice, by  a division of spoil between the contractor, I  
the rich landowner, and the M u k h ta r  [village headman] great!
Chapter VI
pressure could be, and was exerted upon the p easan try .'’* 
S om e of the fine houses adjacent to the large towns are evidence 
to -d a y  of the profits made by the Turkish t a x  collectors.
4. A n im portant feature of the Turkish regime was the re­
cognition of religious endowments known as W aqf or, in the 
plural, Awqaf. U nder Moslem law “  where a  property is m ade 
waqf th e  proprietory right of the grantor is divested and it 
remains henceforth in the implied ownership of the Almighty. 
The usufruct only is applied for the benefit of hum an beings and 
the subject of the dedication becomes inalienable and non- 
heritable in perpetuity .”  This form of endowment was also 
adopted b y  most of the other religious communities in Palestine.
5. Intimately connected with these trusts were the Shari’a, or 
religious, Courts. D uring the Ottoman regime a num ber of 
laws affecting the constitution, jurisdiction, procedure and in­
ternal organization of the Shari’a Courts were prom ulgated by 
the S u ltan , who was also the Caliph, and, after the establish­
ment of the Constitutional Government, by  the legislative body 
—a Moslem authority. This authority did not adm it any 
restraint on its legislative power and in fact am ended the Shari’ a 
law whenever it thought it desirable, as, for example, by a law 
dealing with the inheritance of land. As regards the adm inistra­
tion of Awqaf, the Shari’a Courts registered any dedication and 
enforced its term s, while the Ministry of Aw qaf supervised the 
adm inistration of trust property. The Ministry of Justice in 
Constantinople exercised adm inistrative powers in regard to 
the procedure and internal organization of the Shari’a Courts, 
the rules of procedure for which were established by  law, not by 
orders isu e d  by the Ministry. These Courts were an im port­
ant p a rt of the Turkish Administrative system. Religious 
Courts were also recognized for the different religious com­
munities. These, under the Ottom an principle of laissez-juger, 
dealt w ith  m atters of personal status.
6. As a  result of the revolution in 1 9 0 8 , an Ottoman Parlia- 
ent w as created consisting of a Senate and a Cham ber of 
eputies, the latter being elected by an electoral college on the 
asis of one D eputy for every 5 0 ,0 0 0  male subjects. The 
umber o f Deputies elected from  the territory which is now 
alestine was six. The unit for the prim ary election was the 
ahia, th a t  is, a village of over 2 0 0  houses, or a collection of 
"ages w ith  that population. I t  is interesting to note tha t com- 
unal representation was recognized in the Nahia Councils 
d in their “  Council of E lders.” The Im am  (Moslem 
nest) a n d  representatives of the non-Moslem religious com- 
unities were ex officio members of the latter. The President 
as the Mudir appointed by the Vali or Governor of the
* A nnual R eport for 1920-21, page 9.
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Vilayet. The adm inistrative officers of these village Councils 
were known as Mukhtars and were elected by th e  same 
persons as were entitled to elect the Council of Elders, 
E very  village had one Mukhtar, bu t if a  village consisted of 
more than one quarter or w ard or contained more th an  one 
community with the qualifying num ber of houses, it h a d  one 
Mukhtar for each quarter or community. This office of village 
headm an has survived, and to-day forms the chief point of 
contact between the officials and the countryside. T h e  func­
tions of the Council of the Nahia  were the preservation of peace, 
collection of taxes and  m aintenance of public accounts. The 
Council of Elders was expected to supervise e x p e n d itu re , the 
apportionm ent of taxation and the settlement o f  disputes, 
including com munal disputes, and  to report cases o f persons 
who died leaving property and absent heirs, or land going out 
of cultivation.
7. U nder the Ottom an Government a Court of F irst Instance, 
composed of three Judges, was established in each Qada or Km, 
with a Court of Appeal composed of five or more M em b ers in 
each Sanjaq. In  Palestine there were, therefore, 13  Courts 
of F irst Instance and three Courts of Appeal. The predilec­
tion for boards or committees, and  the multiplicity of officials 
is noticeable. There were in addition single Judges or Justices 
of the Peace in the principal towns. Thus there were numer­
ous Courts throughout Palestine, with num bers of Judges, whose 
salaries were by  no means com mensurate with t h e i r  respon­
sibilities.
8. The position of the foreigner in Palestine under Turkish 
rule was usually safeguarded by the consular authority of his 
country. Arab Christians also availed themselves of th e  services 
of foreign consuls. The interests of minorities were thus pro­
tected. Im m igration, except by Ottom an nationals, w a s nomin­
ally prohibited, but the door could generally be opened on pay­
ment. Foreigners could not be registered as owners of land, 
unless prepared to forego consular protection, bu t nevertheless 
some fairly prosperous Jewish colonies were started b y  Baron 
Edm ond de Rothschild, and relations between the colonists 
and their Arab neighbours were on the whole friendly. Palestine 
was in fact a very poor, backw ard country, which, as to-day, 
had to rely for any progress on im port, hum an and material.
9. I t  is right to recognize also tha t the rule of the T u rk  before 
the W ar was, in the m atter of law and order, extrem ely effec­
tive. The Vali in Beirut retained in his own hands the portfolio 
of internal security. The Courts m ay have been co rrup t; dis­
honesty m ay have pervaded public finance; the methods em­
ployed for the prevention or detection of crime may have been 
antiquated and, like Turkish penology, repugnant to  modern 
ideas; bu t the evildoer did not prosper. Sedition, banditry or
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robbery were pu t down with a firm hand. The Turkish police­
man w as feared—and respected. Except in a  few outlying 
places th e  ordinary citizen could go about his lawful occasions 
unm olested.
10. During the G reat W ar there was a reversion to m ilitary 
despotism , and towards its close the Turkish commanders, 
having reason to doubt the loyalty of their Palestinian subjects, 
adopted severe repressive measures. A part from frequent 
public executions and intensive conscription, the countryside was 
denuded of animals, fuel and food supplies. Landowners were 
forced to mortgage their properties to meet the dem ands m ade 
on them  by the m ilitary authorities. Paym ent, when m ade, 
was in a depreciated currency. Turkish Treasury notes had 
fallen to  one-fifth of their face value; the prices of staple food­
stuffs a n d  other commodities ruled abnorm ally high in a  country 
always dependent on im ports. In  their retreat the Turks took 
with th e m  not only the agricultural stock and produce of the 
country, but also the records, cash balances and principal offi­
cials of the Government.
11. There is no doubt that in 1 9 1 7  and 1 9 1 8  the British 
troops were welcomed as liberators from this state of general 
chaos and depression, and tha t the attitude of the A rabs in 
Palestine, passive and  active, contributed to their success.
2. The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration: 1918-1920.
12. T h e  norm al rule of m ilitary adm inistration of occupied 
territory is to preserve the status quo, to avoid the introduction 
of m ark ed  change in the laws of the country or their m anner 
of a p p lic a tio n , and to carry  on with the least disturbance of 
public life pending the appointm ent of a perm anent Govern­
ment. This transition period is usually of short duration.
"  The financial adm inistration [of Occupied E nem y Territory] 
passes into the hands of th e  occupant, b u t all fiscal law s rem ain opera­
tive. If he collects th e  taxes, dues and to lls payable to  th e  State, he  
is in consequence bound to  defray th e expenses of th e  adm inistration  
of the occupied territories to  the same ex ten t as the national govern­
ment was fiable. T he collection m ust be m ade, as far as possible, 
in accordance w ith th e  rules in  existence and th e  assessm ent in force. 
The occupant is entitled  to  appropriate to  th e  use of th e arm y any  
balance remaining over after the disbursem ent o f these expenses. The 
occupant m ay use local rates only for th e  purposes for w hich th ey  are 
raised.” *
So also the M anual of Military Law defines the procedure for 
the occupant of enemy territory: —
" It is no longer considered perm issible for him  to  work h is w ill un ­
hindered, altering th e  existing form of governm ent, upsetting the  
constitution and dom estic law s, and ignoring th e  rights o f th e  inhabi-
tants.”t
* M anual o f M ilita ry  Law, Chapter X IV , paragraph 369. 
t Ibid, paragraph 354.
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13. In  Palestine the Administration was a military organi­
zation, acting under a  Chief Adm inistrator who rece ived his 
orders from the Comm ander-in-Chief (General Allenby) 
through the General Officer Commanding. There were 13 
M ilitary Governors of D istricts, reduced in 1919 to 10, with 
59 m ilitary officers as assistants. The services of such o f the 
subordinate Turkish officials as rem ained were utilized, but 
almost the whole of the staff employed was new to adminis­
trative work. Necessarily the adm inistration had to ca rry  on 
without m any of the facilities tha t are usually regarded  as 
essential. F requent changes in the personnel and shortage 
of staff increased the difficulties.
14. I t  was no easy task that these m ilitary o ffic er s  had to 
undertake. A part from  m aking necessary provision for the 
m aintenance of public peace, a  judiciary had  to be created 
and revenues collected. Enquiries regarding the ownership 
of land disclosed a general state of confusion, and a lm o st the 
first task of the O .E .T .A .* in 1918 was to prohibit transac­
tions in land and close the land registries. They also  sus­
pended a num ber of vexatious imposts.
15. Owing to the im poverishment of the people it w as found 
necessary to issue agricultural loans on a generous scale. The 
Ottoman Agricultural B ank had 13 agencies operating in 
Palestine a t the time when the territory was occupied. The 
records and cash, however, had been removed before British 
occupation. I t  was soon realized tha t a generous system of 
credit would be necessary to restore the condition o f agricul­
ture, and an  agreem ent was reached in 1919 between the 
M ilitary A dm inistration and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank 
Limited—now am algam ated in Barclays Bank (Dominion, 
Colonial and Overseas)—whereby the B ank agreed to advance, 
if and when required, £500,000 for the issue by  the Adminis­
tration of loans to cultivators.
16. The usual Departm ents were created—Finance, Generali 
(including Police), Commerce, Law , and Public H e a lth . Thel 
Budget for 1919-20 took the total income a t £735,200. Thel 
estimates of expenditure were governed by  the princip le  of I 
absolute necessity. General adm inistration was expected toi 
cost £178,200; Police and Prisons £128,400; Public Health I 
£90,500; Public W orks £85,750. Only £46,000 could bel 
spared for Education, and £16,500 for Agriculture. Thel 
period of occupation, w ithout any  settlement as to th e  political 
and economic future of the country, was unduly prolonged! 
and, despite shortage of funds, the Administration was com-l 
pelled to assume all the ordinary functions of a peace-time! 
Government. The Turkish system had  still to be continued;!
* Occupied E nem y Territory Adm inistration.
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the n e c e s s a r y  clerical and m anual employees had to be re­
cruited l o c a l l y .  The form er were m ainly obtained from Arab 
C h ris tia n s  educated by the various Missions.
17. Yet, even so, a  start was made in social services. 
Veterinary provision was made for the elimination of cattle 
disease, which was prevalent. The establishment of this ser­
vice co n s is te d  of an  officer of the Army V eterinary D epart­
ment w ith  a  staff of five Veterinary Inspectors. Q uarantine 
Posts an d  Veterinary Infirm aries were opened.
18. I n  Public W orks, expenditure on works was confined to 
the maintenance of necessary roads and buildings. Only essen­
tial r o a d s  were m aintained pending the peace settlement. No 
steps c o u ld  be taken to develop the country either in the w ay 
of irrigation or in the construction of new roads, which in 
ord inary  circumstances would be regarded as necessary and in 
some c a s e s  rem unerative. The improvement of the water- 
supply of towns and villages and of conservancy did not adm it 
of d e la y . The total lack, for exam ple, of a proper drainage 
system in Jerusalem  was a cause of grave anxiety, and it was 
found necessary to restrict the water-supply.
19. Expenditure on education was confined to the continu­
ance under more efficient adm inistration of the provision made 
by the Turks before the W ar, the m anagem ent of the schools 
being relegated to local Educational Committees. M any of 
the Mission schools, including certain denom inational techni­
cal schools provided b y  the Catholic monastic communities, 
had been despoiled by the Turks during the W ar.
20. £64,700 had to be spent on special relief measures to 
meet the abnorm al conditions produced by the W ar. “  Many
'es,”  i t  was reported, “  have not returned, villages ruined 
by the W a r  still rem ain unbuilt, and there is a general feeling 
f insecurity as to the future of land tenures.”  I t  was found 
ecessary to control the prices of the principal commodities. 
Jerusalem  one-sixth of the population was in need of relief, 
d in 1919, owing to the w ithdrawal of the American Red 
to ss  Commission, the Syria and Palestine Relief F und and 
" er charitable institutions, the work undertaken so ably by 
hilanthropic associations devolved upon the Adm inistration. 
V ‘ American Committee for Relief in the N ear E ast ”  still 
ntinued its operations.
21. The Police were reorganized, the num ber being reduced 
om 1,273 to 1,110 of all ranks. I t  was noted a t the time that 
this strength is still relatively high, especially under a mili- 
iy occupation, b u t the special character of the country and 
e relative smallness of the m ilitary forces a t the disposal of 
e authorities, also the possibility of fanatical or nationalist 
Mbreaks during the present period of uncertainty, are factors
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tha t cannot be neglected.” An endeavour was made to  im­
prove the quality of the regular Police and to resuscita te , so 
far as possible, the old oriental system of local responsib ility  
for watch and w ard, with a  small, highly trained force in 
reserve for emergencies. The riots in  Jerusalem  in  1920 
showed that the Police Force actually was inadequate.
22. A Public H ealth D epartm ent was organized, the expen­
diture being directed to anti-m alarial measures, and provisions 
for the general public health. These included the inspection 
and sanitary organization of every town and village in the 
country, m ost of the cost being m et by local funds.
23. Despite the difficulties, there was a noticeable improve­
m ent in general conditions evidenced by  an  increase in the 
population, in the stock of animals and in the area under 
cultivation. The population on 31st March, 1919, was 
approxim ately : —
The tax  on animals was estimated to produce £21,300, as I  
against £5,700 in the previous year; Customs revenue £110,500 I  
as against £30,600. Of the estimated receipts of £224,835 from I  
tithes, £103,000 was assigned to the Ottoman d e b t, and I  
£21,235 to the Awqaf. The assessments of the H ouse and I  
Land Tax were based on those m ade by  the Turks some fifty I  
years previously. I
24. The notable features of the Military Administration were, I  
first, the direct rule by  British officers, though in 1919 seventeen H  
“ Syrian officers ”  were appointed; and, secondly, the regard ■  
paid to the claims made on the Administration by religious ■  
bodies. The Shari’a Courts continued to function, the Judges ■  
being appointed by the Senior Judicial Officer of the Adminis- H i  
tration, after consultation with a  Committee consisting of the ■  
Moslem members of the Court of Appeal and the Inspector of H i  
Shari’a Courts. The needs of the Awqaf were satisfied, ■ <  
adm inistration of the funds being left to a W aqf Council w ith*, 
a Director-General of Awqaf, in  place of the former Ministry ■ (  
of Awqaf a t Constantinople. A British officer was present at ■  
all their meetings, and their accounts were audited by th e »  
Administration. Thirdly, the system was Turkish, with the* , 
village Mukhtar as the liaison officer between the rural popula- H j  
tion and the Governors of Districts. W herever possible th e *  
various committees which had been constituted under Turkish ■ ,  
rule were encouraged to function. ■ >
Moslems 
Jew s ... 
Christians 
Others
515,000
6 5 ,3 0 0
62,500
5,050
647,850
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25. On the whole, this system of tem porary governm ent by 
the Military authorities worked well. There was, however, one 
disturbing factor, the visit and the attitude of the Zionist 
Commission. The Balfour Declaration did not a t the time 
a ttrac t as much attention in Palestine as might have been 
ex p ec ted . The W ar was in  progress ; the future uncertain. 
The arrival in Palestine of a Commission authorized by the 
B ritish  Government to travel, investigate and report on the 
prospects of a National Home, as well as “  to help in estab­
lishing friendly relations with the A rabs and other non- 
Jew ish communities ” , aroused the Arabs to the realities of the 
situation. No steps were taken to represent the Arab side of 
the c a s e . Doubtless enthusiasm  for the Zionist cause led to 
the disregard of other people’s feelings at a time when the 
greatest tact and discretion were necessary. The subsequent 
efforts o f  Dr. W eizmann to allay suspicions were unsuccessful. 
Many o f  the demands pu t forward by the Jews provoked resent­
ment. It was urged that they should a t once participate 
in th e  Military Administration : there should be a  Land
Commission, with experts nom inated by  the Jew ish Organiz­
ation “ to ascertain the resources of Palestine ” . I t  was 
co n ten d ed  that under the Balfour Declaration Jew s in 
Jaffa s h o u l d  be allowed to provide their own bonded ware­
houses : that the Anglo-Palestine B ank, a Jew ish Company, 
should advance the m oney required for loans to Arab agricul­
turists. They desired to select, and supplement the pay  of, 
Jewish candidates for the Police. They dem anded and began 
to tra in  their own Military Defence Force. Hebrew should be 
recognised  as an  official language. All this during the pro­
longed period of m ilitary governm ent designed to “  carry 
on ” temporarily and to preserve the status quo.
26. At this early stage there was in effect a separate Jewish 
Judicature, developed from  the Peace Courts, an ancient Jewish 
ystem of arbitration. The American Zionist Medical Unit 
referred that their excellent work should be carried on inde- 
endently of the Adm inistration. I t  was obvious tha t the Jews 
ad created a very efficient intelligence departm ent, from which 
as is indeed  the case to-day) the Administration could keep 
ttle secret. W hen the E aster riots of 1920 occurred, the Zionists 
00k up an attitude openly hostile to the Administration. And 
'1 this occurred while the M andate for Palestine was under 
nsideration.
27. One unhappy result of this situation was that some of the 
ivil Servants in Palestine did not, as in  the United Kingdom 
i in India, stand entirely aloof from religious faction or political
fe, but found themselves in some cases forced into the 
sition of partisans to represent the Arab cause. There 
"s at the time no one else who could, represent their case, 
Me the Zionist Commission was touring the country.
Chapter VI. 158
28. The Arabs, as we have already stated, considered that 
they had  been betrayed. The Jew s in 1920 regarded the Military 
Administration as “  anti-Zionist and perhaps anti-Jewish . 
Arab fears and Jewish hopes m ay have alike been extravagant' 
bu t the cleavage which was in the future to make every 
adm inistrative act a political issue had begun.
29. The flames of racial hatred which broke out in Easter, 
1920, in the H oly C ity might well have drawn atten tion  to I 
the volcano underneath. They certainly indicated th a t co­
operation between the two races in the administration of the 
country would be difficult to secure for some years to  come. 
They might well have suggested the desirability of firm  British 
rule under British officers who, im partial in their ou tlo o k  and 
attachm ent, wcmld enforce respect for law and order. ,
30. The M ilitary A dm inistration witnessed during the last 
three months of its protracted existence the first outbreak, un­
happily the precursor of several “  disturbances ” . Its successor, 
inheriting this legacy, was still handicapped by the general un­
certainty as to the future of Palestine. I t  was not till two 
years later that the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, 
prescribed the composition and organization of the Government. 
Meanwhile the Mandate was being drafted, and the new 
adm inistration decided to anticipate and adopt the principles 
which were later to be enunciated. A new framework of govern­
m ent had  to be constructed; it was found necessary to introduce 
new laws and regulations, and , it was announced, "  as the 
prelim inary work is completed, and as Palestinians possessing 
the necessary qualities can be chosen and trained for adminis­
trative work, it is intended to reduce the num ber of British andl 
to raise the num ber of Palestinian officials ” . This process began! 
with the introduction of the new regime. I t  was hoped that il 
training would be provided towards Palestinian self-governmentl 
and tha t effective co-operation between the races would arise! 
In  the latter respect it is now frankly adm itted that this policyl 
has failed. “  I t  is so difficult for A rab to work under Jewish orl 
Jew  to work under Arab superiors.”
31. The High Commissioner, assisted by an Executive! 
Council, was given the power to promulgate Ordinances, after! 
consultation with an Advisory Council, which was then comj 
posed of ten official and ten nom inated members, the latterl 
being four Moslems, three Christians and three Jews. There! 
was a spate of legislation, no less than 38 Ordinances beina 
produced in the first year. In  anticipation of the provision* 
of the M andate three_ official languages were recognized, andl
3. The Civil Administration: 1920-1936.
the drafts of all measures to be submitted to the Council wei
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c ir c u la te d  in advance in English, Arabic and Hebrew, the 
d is c u s s io n s  being held through the medium of Arabic and 
Hebrew interpreters. In  the following year during eight sessions 
of the Advisory Council twenty-six ordinances and six amending 
o rd in a n c e s  were passed. The Financial Commission under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Samuel O’Donnell reported in 1931 that
" the condition of th e law  itself is little  short of chaotic. I t  is  
contained partly in an enormous number of ordinances, and partly  
in Ottoman Codes w hich have been modified or superseded to  an  
extent not alw ays easy  to  determ ine b y  the ordinances."
32. In  1923, after the attem pt to constitute a Legislative 
Council had failed, the Order in Council was amended to allow 
the H igh  Commissioner to appoint such an advisory body as 
might be approved by  the Secretary of State. At present it is 
an e n tire ly  official body, consisting of the Chief Secretary, the 
Attorney-General, the Treasurer, ten other heads of depart­
ments, the Irrigation Adviser and the three District Commis­
sioners. Evidence we received shows tha t it is used rather for 
formal assent to legislation than for the purposes of consultation 
or discussion.
33. It took time, naturally, to develop the civil adm inistra­
tion. T he  old titles of District and Assistant District Governors 
were in  1925 altered to those of District and Assistant District 
Commissioners. These posts have, quite rightly we think, 
though i t  was made the subject of criticism by A rabs, been 
reserved for British officers, the m ilitary element being 
gradually replaced by  members of the Colonial Civil Service. 
The ten Districts were in 1920 reduced to seven, later on to 
four, and finally to three—N orthern, Southern and Jerusalem . 
There are now three District Commissioners, twelve Assist­
ant D is tric t Commissioners and thirty-seven District Officers. 
All of the last class are Palestinians. Similarly in the various 
departments, while the head and some senior officers are British, 
the subordinates, whether a t headquarters or in the districts, 
are, w ith  the exception of experts, m ainly Palestinian.
34. W e  were m uch struck by the unanim ity of evidence 
reg ard ing  these Palestinian officers. In  norm al times, we were 
told, th e y  work well; in times of trouble they are unreliable.
'' Among both  Arab and Jew ish officials it  is increasingly clear th at 
racial loyalty is placed before lo y a lty  to  G overnm ent.”
“ Because o f th e m utual distrust due to  political and racial 
differences, it is essential th a t there should be a  sufficient number of 
British Assistant D istrict Commissioners really to  see, know  and guide 
what is going on throughout P alestine."
" If an 1 Arab or a  Jew ish officer is placed in  charge of a  m ixed  
population a com plete failure of liaison results betw een him  and th e  
community to winch he does n ot belong.”
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" I t  is not possible to obtain reliable information from s i  
times of emergency, or from Jews when the information is contrary 
to their national interests. Above all, the supply of information 
tended to dry up at critical moments."
" The Palestinian District Officers are moderately efficient and loyal 
up to  their lights but racial feelings are always in the ascendancy."
Quotations to the same effect could be multiplied. We have 
elsewhere referred to the petitions signed by  Arab officials*
35. The development of the Palestine Administration since 
it came under the control of a  civil High Commissioner in July, 
1920, has unavoidably, in the circumstances, been to a con­
siderable extent one of im provization carried out. until later 
years, without expert advice.
“ It is im portant,” said a witness, "  to remember how this 
Administration grew up in Palestine. It was started by l  
amateurs, led by amateurs. There was practically nobod
Administration who had ever worked in an administratio
It was the blind leading the blind, and that is what this  
suffered from for years.”
The British Adm inistration, recruiting its personnel as
could and having to improvise a  body of officials, had 
of restoring the country to solvency and prosperity. T
a task which, in any event, called for a maximum of
but on it was superimposed the execution of the policy la
in the M andate, i.e. the development and establishm
National Home for the Jew s without detrim ent to the 
of the indigenous population. The Jews have continuo l  
insistently pressed for the early if not immediate execution of 
public works and the adoption of other measures to facilitate 
the development of their Home. This has necessitated much 
legislation and the preparation of m any Ordinances which, by 
the light of experience, have had  to be amended. Immigration 
has had to be controlled, land registration and settleme
expedited and a variety of new industries fostered.  
and police forces have had to be enlarged. During thi
serious disturbances occurred a t short intervals which
to throw  the country back and to exacerbate the  
between Arabs and Jew s, thereby still further increasi  t  
difficulties of adm inistration.
The governm ent of the country has, in fact, from the very 
start been driven to work a t high pressure and has never had 
an opportunity for calm reflection.
36. The principal adm inistrative officer is the Chief Secre­
ta ry , whose departm ent controls the activities of the other 
departm ents. The Attorney-General is the Legal Adviser to
Government. The Treasurer is in charge of financial and
* See page 99 and Appendix 2.
i6i Chapter V I.
a c c o u n t in g  operations. These three officers are members of the 
E x e c u t iv e  Council. There was a t first a Financial Secretary 
but th i s  post was abolished later. W ith the expansion of other 
a c t iv it ie s  of Government and the creation of special depart­
ments t h e  Secretariat has increased enormously, though stiU 
w ith only one officer a t its head as the channel of communi­
cation  with the H igh Commissioner. There are to-day an 
A s s is ta n t Chief Secretary, nine Assistant Secretaries—seven 
B r it ish , one Jew  and one Arab—and an  Establishment Officer.
3 7 . As pointed out by the Financial Commission, it is clearly 
desirable that all Assistant Secretaries should have had District 
experience.
“ Without such experience a Secretariat tends to become a caste, 
out of touch with the realities of the Administration, and out of 
sympathy with the officers in the districts, whose difficulties it  is 
unable to appreciate."
This defect still persists. "  There is not a m an "  (we were 
told) “ in the Secretariat who has been in the Districts within 
the memory of m an .” W e received several complaints of over­
centralization. U nder existing conditions, against every order 
passed in a District there is an appeal or a protest to the High 
Commissioner. A small incident, even the enforcement of 
law against a trespasser, m ight provoke a riot. Hence there is 
a natural desire at H eadquarters that they should be consulted 
before action is taken.
38. We received complaints about the delay th a t occurred 
in dealing with requests addressed to the Government for such 
matters as the completion of agreements, financial assistance 
in the construction of roads, decisions regarding the sale of 
land, extensions of the telephone service, and so forth. The 
present system under which one officer, the Chief Secretary, 
who may have had no previous experience of the country, 
is the only channel of approach to the High Commissioner 
appears to us to be unsatisfactory, whether from the point of 
view of the public or of the Heads of the various Departm ents 
or of the officers serving in the districts.
39. In Jerusalem , working under the Secretariat, bu t apart 
from it, there are a large num ber of Departm ents, such as 
Agriculture, Antiquities, Education, Customs and Excise, 
Health, Lands and Surveys, Forests, Co-operative Societies, 
Migration and Statistics, and Public W orks. In  succeeding 
chapters we deal with the activities of some of these De-
artments. I t appears to us that the connection between 
ese Departments and the District Administration is not as 
ose as it should be. F or example, no enquiries are made from 
e District Commissioners or through them from the District 
fficers as regards immigration possibilities, the num ber of 
employed, the extension of irrigation and the like. Some o f
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the D epartm ents, such as Agriculture, Land Development 
and Co-operative Societies, have been established on the advice 
of Sir John  Hope Simpson in pursuance of “ an active policy 
of agricultural development, having as its object close settlement 
on the land and intensive cultivation by both Arabs and Jews ”, 
They have been increased, it would appear, a t the expense of 
the regular D istrict Administration. In  the words of a  witness,
" A t present the whole trend of administration in Palèstine seems 
to be towards departmental Government with a District Administration 
uneasily super-added. The Heads of Departments are inclined to act 
on their own initiative without reference to  District Commissioners."
A nother witness stated :
" In m y opinion this Administration is over-centralized and over­
departmentalized . A reversion to a more primitive type of Govern­
m ent would be more effective, better understood and less expensive, 
The Secretariat has accumulated such a vast staff that every adminis­
trative official is anchored to his desk answering queries. Touring in 
the proper sense of getting to know the people and their troubles is dis­
couraged by this continual demand for pace and paper.”
There is
“  continual reference to the Central Government on trivial issues, con­
tinual intervention in what should be left to the local official to decide, 
and less and less initiative and willingness to take responsibility."
40. The staffs of the Secretariat and the Departments in 
Jerusalem  appear unduly large. B ut the conditions under 
which the H igh Commissioner has to work are excep­
tional. Zionist leaders, Members of Parliament, the 
Perm anent M andates Commission, all take an active interest in 
the details o f adm inistration. At frequent intervals throughout | 
the year actions have to be explained or policy defended. But, 
given confidence in the District staff, it should be possible to 
use the natural channels of the District Commissioners and j 
theii subordinates to a far greater extent than at present. 
Especially does this apply to all problems connected w ith the I 
land, and to the Departm ents of Agriculture, Co-operative | 
Societies and Land Registration.
41. The present link between the Government official and the I 
peasantry is the Mukhtar or village headm an, elected as 
under Turkish rule and giving his loyalty to the village 
rather than to Government. Though his pay  has been doubled 
his w ork is far from  satisfactory, whether in collecting taxes or 
giving inform ation. H e is usually illiterate, and “ em ploys any I 
chance literate person there m ay be in his village to assist him I 
with his papers In  any period of political tension he either I 
ceases to function or is an active partisan. The rep o rt on the | 
riots of 1921 contains the following passage.
" W e did, however, call the Mukhtars of those villages, agai 
whom there was the least specific evidence, such as a statement that I 
one of the villagers had been seen among the raiders. All of them I 
in our opinion committed perjury with dignity and deliberation.
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fhe difficulty of obtaining either inform ation in advance or 
evidence subsequently is one of the gravest handicaps on the 
maintenance of order. If  we recommend the replacement of 
this humble village officer, a fortiori there should be no hesitation 
in dispensing with the services of officers of higher rank whose 
loyalty or im partiality is uncertain.
42. The complaint was m ade by the Jew s that several officers 
displayed pro-Arab sympathies ; that, even if they did not 
dislike, they did not understand the M andate and their obliga­
tions thereunder. This evidence received support from other 
quarters.
“ Information was very difficult to get, as the feeling of all Arab 
officials and many British officials was very strongly anti-Zionist and 
v e ry  sympathetic to the Arab cause, but I do not know of any case 
when information which should have been passed on was withheld 
b y  British officials. The Arab District Officers are an entirely different
story...........................Many of them  actually Elided and warned many of
the rebels.”
We were told by a Jewish witness : —
" The fact is that Government has suffered more from a conflict 
of loyalties. . . .  A great many officials here have been put to  the 
very severe test of carrying out a policy with which they disagree in  
terms, and it  is asking a great deal from flesh and blood to  do a thing 
like that.”
And again:—
" We had flagrant cases of people who were definitely hostile to the 
policy which they had come to administer.”
The same witness very fairly added : —
" We are not an easy people to  deal with. First of all to a Jew  
who comes from the East of Europe, an official is a ' T ch in ovn ik .’ He 
must be corrupt. H e must be hostile. H e is the enemy of the public. 
It takes many years to drum into their heads that the British official 
is, to begin w ith , the servant of the public, a friend.”
He also said : —
“ There was a constant tug-of-war and the Government was accused 
by both sides of being either pro-Arab or pro-Jew, and it has 
developed into the feeling that if one is pro-Arab one must necessarily 
be anti-Jew, or vice versa, which is not necessary at a ll.”
No one could tour in Palestine without realizing the extremely 
difficult position of the British official and, indeed, of the whole
Administration.
43. The difficulty is prom inent, b u t need not be per­
manent. We consider that officers intended for service in 
Palestine should—as in our view has been the case in recent 
years—be carefully selected, whether as cadets or from  those 
already in  the Colonial Administrative Service. The latter pre­
ferably should not be so senior in service as to find difficulty
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in learning a new language. Cadets should undergo, like  pro­
bationers for the Indian Civil Service and several branches 
of the Colonial Service, a prelim inary course of instruction 
which in  their case would include the histories of Palestine and 
of the Jew ish and A rab peoples, with their social and religious 
customs and traditions. Officers transferred from  other Colonies 
m ight, where considered suitable, be given a similar, though 
shorter, course of prelim inary instruction. I t  should not be, but 
it is, necessary to add tha t an intim ate knowledge of the Man­
date and  all its implications should be expected of all officers 
appointed to the Palestine Service: it should, of course, form 
p art of the syllabus for probationers. In  order to qualify 
fo r advancem ent officers should be required to pass examina­
tions in Arabic and Hebrew. Out of 270 British officers in  the 
First Division of the Civil Service in Palestine 20 can speak both 
Arabic and H ebrew, 106 can speak Arabic (though not a ll of 
them  fluently) and 6 Hebrew.
44. The cadre is too small to adm it of a  Civil S e rv ic e  only 
for Palestine. The Administration m ust continue to d ra w , as 
a t present, on the Colonial Service. B ut we regard it a s  desir­
able tha t the ordinary period of service in Palestine sh ou ld  be 
no t less than seven years. We suggest that steps sh o u ld  be 
taken to ensure tha t an officer retained for service in Palestine 
will not receive a  salary less than the equivalent of that d ram  
by  his contemporaries in other fields of the Colonial Service.
Lastly we would stress the need for appointment in the 
Secretariat of officers who have served in the Districts, and who 
know the people and their language.
45. A part from Benches of H onorary Magistrates and certain 
adm inistrative officers, whose powers are limited to the terms 
of their w arrants, there are 29 Palestinian Magistrates, and 
four Chief Magistrates (British) for the large towns. British 
Magistrates have larger powers than Palestinian both in civil 
and crim inal cases.
46. Above them  are the four D istrict Courts, w h ich  for 
appellate work in  civil cases are composed of a  President and 
one Judge, and in crim inal cases of the President and two 
Judges. As well as their appellate jurisdiction the District 
Courts have unlim ited civil jurisdiction except so far a s there 
is jurisdiction in the M agistrates’ Courts and the Land Courts. 
In  Civil cases the Court consists of two Judges, w here the 
am ount is not over £500 two Palestinian Judges, and over that 
am ount a British Judge and a  Palestinian Judge. On appeal in 
civil cases the constitution of the Court is a  British Judge and 
a  Palestinian Judge. A com plaint was m ade that it can happen 
that a  case m ay be brought by a plaintiff and, although the I 
British Judge m ay be in his favour, he will lose, b ecause the I
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other Judge is against him  : he m ay appeal and the same result 
may happen. Thus it is possible for a litigant to have two 
British Judges in his favour and still lose. We are glad to 
learn th a t approval has been given to a  proposal, in  which we 
concurred, that this position should be remedied by the appoint­
ment of an additional Puisne Judge, so that there can be an 
Appeal Court of three, giving a British m ajority, if either of the 
parties a sk  for it. At the present time the work of the Supreme 
Court is two years in arrear and it is not possible to allocate 
three Judges for a  civil appeal.
The District Courts with three Judges also try  all criminal 
cases unless they involve a capital sentence. W here the capital 
sentence is involved the Court of Assize consists of two British 
Judges and a Palestinian Judge and is presided over by a 
udge of the Supreme Court.
47. The Arabs complained of departure from the principles 
of Ottoman law, and the reservation of the posts of President 
and Chief Magistrate for British lawyers. They objected to 
the reduction in the num ber of A rab Judges, and in the jurisdic­
tion and powers of A rab Magistrates. They alleged tha t English 
was gradually replacing Arabic as the Court language, and 
that too many foreign lawyers were allowed to practise. The 
numbers at present are two English, 112 Arabs, and 264 Jews. 
This number of advocates seems to be in excess of the needs 
of the country for strictly professional work.
Lastly we were told th a t the application of English Law  and 
Custom resulted
" in a conflict o f laws, disagreeable to  th e morals, custom  and usage 
of the country. . . . L aw s are connected w ith the schem e
of establishing a  Jew ish N ational H om e . . . .  irrespective of the  
inhabitants’ opinion, and the result is th e dom ination of injustice over 
the law .”
48. T h e  Jews on the other hand complain of under-represen- 
tation in  the Judicial Service and would welcome more British 
Magistrates. In  their view the scale of pay of Palestinian 
Magistrates is not sufficient to attract practising advocates. They 
stated that the m ajority of appointments to the magisterial bench 
ad been made from clerks and  interpreters. The present basic
le is from £300 by 19 increments to £550 and we think that 
s scale of pay should be increased and the prospects of the 
rvice improved.
The Jews condemned the dilatory procedure of the Courts 
pecially in cases connected with the land*, and declared that 
ere was "  a  complete failure of the m achinery of crime 
rosecution " . They objected to the record of proceedings in 
me Courts being kept in Arabic, and considered th a t the use
* Chapter IX , paragraph 37.
Chapter VI. 166
of the Hebrew language was discouraged. As regards the 
records of the Courts it is to be noted tha t these have been kept 
in Arabic since the time of the occupation of Palestine, when it 
was decided that the records, which had previously been kept in 
Turkish, should be kept in A rabic as tha t was the predominant I 
language of the country. On the balance of convenience it is 
far better that all records and registers, where possible, should be 
kept in English and we understand tha t steps are now being 
taken to tha t end in the D istrict Courts and in the Supreme 
Court.
49. W ith regard to the Courts generally, we feel th a t  it is 1 
impossible to reconcile these divergent claims, which reflect 
the distressful racial antagonism pervading the whole adminis­
tration. Obviously, the difficulties of providing a  judicial] 
system suitable to the needs of the mixed peoples of Pales­
tine are enhanced by  three languages and by th ree  days] 
of rest in each week, F riday for the Moslems, Saturday 
for the Jew s and  Sunday for the Christians. There a re  three 
sets of official holidays, and  three systems of law, th e  Turkish! 
law, the Ordinances passed by  the M andatory Power, and I 
English common law and equity incorporated by  th e  Order in 
Council. The difficulties experienced were thus described  by I 
a w itness:—
“ I t  m ay  be necessary for th e Court of A ppeal to  have judgment I 
w hich have been delivered below  in  one language translated into the I 
other tw o languages. T he docum ents in th e  case . . . require I
translation and in  crim inal cases th e  depositions are translated.
E ven in Court th e oral evidence has to  be translated .’’
As regards the holidays :—
" The Court m ay consist o f three individuals each of whom i l  
entitled  to  a  different day o f rest, and the accused m ay be entitled I 
to  one of th ese three days. T he prosecution, th e  police, the counsel I 
defending and th e  w itnesses a ll have their particular rights with regardl 
to  days o f r e st.”
The complications, and inconvenience, and delay a re  directly| 
due, in our opinion, to Articles 22 and  23 of the M andate .
50. I t  was inevitable tha t the first appointments sh o u ld  L 
to Arabs. The large im migration of Jew s would not j u s t i f y  their I 
rem oval. In  the case of new appointm ents due regard is paid! 
to the needs of the Jew ish population for Jewish M agistrates. I 
B ut the fact rem ains th a t the distrust, w hether of o ffic e  stafi,| 
interpreters or M agistrates, is reciprocated.
51. Jew ish suspicion with regard to the conduct of crimim 
prosecutions was particularly m arked. Evidence w a s  given asl 
follows:— I
" T he position is th a t th e  prosecution of crime in  this country 5 1 
alm ost w holly  in Arab hands. . . . T he Government Advocate $ 1
an Arab. H is assistant a t headquarters is an  Arab. With the escspl 
tion o f one Jew  all th e  Junior Governm ent A dvocates are Arabs. Tn»|
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one Jew is only doing office work. . . . W e had 82 Jew s killed
in these disturbances. . . . There were no death sentences for
killing a Jew. . . . E very  w eek one reads reports of th e  results
of cases where the Judge had to  acquit a person because of negligence 
on the part of th e  prosecution."
52. On this last charge two specific cases were brought to our 
notice. In the first case a  Sub-Inspector of Police gave evidence 
in the Committing Court, resulting in the conviction of a m an 
and a sentence of twelve years’ penal servitude in the District 
Court. He had been found near a cinema in possession of a 
bomb. Between the commitment and the trial in the District 
Court th e  Sub-Inspector was m urdered, a notorious crime which 
attracted public attention. A  police officer, who was not cross- 
examined, stated at the trial “  Inspector N a i f  now dead, since 
a m onth, murdered On this statement the Judges at the 
trial allowed the deposition of the m urdered Sub-Inspector to 
be read. On appeal the conviction was quashed by the Supreme 
Court because “  no evidence w hatever of the cause of non­
production of this witness, who, it is suggested, was dead, was 
brought before the Court of Trial as required by Section 34 of 
die T rial Upon Inform ation Order In  the second case the 
evidence, recorded by  the committing M agistrate, of soldiers who 
had subsequently left the country, was not accepted by the 
Court a t  th e  trial, on the ground tha t the evidence that they 
had left the country was not sufficient. On an exam ination of 
the circumstances we came to the conclusion that on these two 
cases the charge of negligence was not substantiated. The most 
that can be said, in our opinion, is tha t errors of judgm ent were 
made as to the kind of evidence required.
53. In a land where perjury is common, and evidence in 
many cases unobtainable, the Legal D epartm ent work under the 
greatest difficulties. As an example, a witness stated: —
11 We had a bom b throw n a t Jaffa Gate one m orning: in  five inm ates 
we had two accused, one sworn to  b y  six  Arabs and one sworn to  by  
six Jews, and the investigating officer said he could n ot make up his
mind."
54. On a consideration of the evidence as a whole we are 
ed to the conclusion that the animosity between the two races, 
particularly in times of crisis, has shown its influence to the detri­
ment of the work of the Legal D epartm ent in the conduct of 
rosecutions. We recommend that the prosecuting section of 
at Department should be strengthened by the appointm ent of 
British Senior Government Advocate.
55- We pass now to an adm inistrative difficulty which arose 
om the taxation of land. In  a m ainly agricultural country like 
Palestine a contented peasantry able to pay their taxes is 
minently desirable. The Government of Palestine have been
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singularly unfortunate, from circumstances beyond their con­
trol, in  their efforts to adjust the inequitable system of land 
taxation which they inherited. The collection of 12 J per cent, 
o r one-eighth of the gross produce, dem anded by the Turks 
was reduced in 1925 to 10 per cent, and from 1928 onwards was 
gradually replaced by a  commutation of the Tithe, prices being 
fixed on the average of the past few years. Unhappily this 
beneficial reform  coincided with a disastrous fall in the value of 
agricultural produce, and it was reported in 1929 that “ the 
fixed redem ption prices of the Tithe, calculated on the natural 
Tithes for the previous three years, exceed the present market 
prices of cereals, with the result th a t taxation is higher in rela­
tion to income than  it was in  the previous y ear.”  Visits of 
locusts and bad harvests were an additional complication and 
large remissions had  to be m ade, as follows : —
1930
1 9 3 1
1932-33
19 3 3 -3 4
1934-35
£
113,670
150 ,258
1 1 1 , 5 4 2
193,500
130 ,731
Tithe has now been replaced (except in a few areas) by th e  Urban 
and R ural P roperty Taxes, on assessments made by official 
valuers. The U rban Property Tax produced £ 2 4 1 ,0 4 1  in  1935-6, 
and collections of R ural P roperty T ax in the sa m e  year 
am ounted to £ 1 0 0 ,5 3 0 .  This assessment of the Rural Property 
Tax is approxim ately one-half th a t of the Tithe and th e  House 
and Land Taxes, which it replaces, in ru ral areas. I t  h a s  meant 
a reduction of 7 0  per cent, on the average in the taxation payable 
by  cultivators of cereals. This is not appreciated by th e  Arabs, 
who rem em ber the dem ands m ade rather than  the remissions 
granted or the subsequent final reduction in assessment.
4. Roads.
56. Since the Civil Government was established in 1920 con­
siderable sums have been expended by  it on the construction, 
im provem ent and maintenance of roads. In  1920 the total 
length of all-weather roads was about 280 miles, most o f which 
were of every poor construction and suitable for lig h t traffic 
only; now the length of all-weather roads is about 750 miles, 
most of which are asphalted and of a high standard of construc­
tion. Roads have been im proved to m ake them safer and more 
suitable for modem  traffic by  widening, eliminating dangerous 
curves and steep gradients, realigning and constructing bridges.
57. From  1921 to the 31st March, 1937, £1,605,000 has 
spent on the construction, and  £1,265,000 on the m a i n t e n a n c e  of 
roads. The d raft Estim ates for 1936-7 included £327,491 f°r
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road construction and £154,000 for maintenance, but, mainly 
owing to the disturbances, m uch of the work could not be carried
out.
58. Complaint has been m ade by the Jew s tha t a road has not 
been constructed before now from  Jaffa-Tel Aviv to H aifa, 
which in their opinion is urgently required to assist in dealing 
with the transport of the rapidly growing volume of citrus fruits. 
This ro ad  in March, 1 9 3 6 , had been completed as far as Tel 
Mond, i8 ÿ  miles north of Tel Aviv, and in the draft Estim ates for 
1936-7 provision was m ade for £ 6 1 ,0 0 0 ,  being the first instal­
ment of a four-year program m e for the completion of the road 
at an estimated cost of £ 2 4 4 ,0 0 0 .  But, owing to the disturb­
ances, for urgent reasons of public security it was decided to 
advance the first year’s work much further than  was originally 
intended, and a sum of £ 1 0 2 ,0 0 0  was authorized for the road 
to be carried 1 3^  miles from Tel Mond to H edera. This section 
was fin ished by the end of A pril, 1 9 3 7 , leaving about 2 3 J  miles 
still to be constructed before the road reaches H aifa, ou t of a 
total len g th  from Jaffa of approxim ately 6 0  miles. We are of 
opinion that, in the interest of the country generally, this road 
should be  completed as speedily as possible.
59. The Jews com plained tha t there were not enough feeder 
roads in  the citrus districts. I t  was pointed out by  the 
G overnm ent th a t it is a well established policy in Palestine, 
in the absence of local taxation for roads, as understood in
ngland, to require the construction of roads of purely local 
' terest to  be financed with the assistance (usually assessed a t
0 per c e n t .)  of the com munity concerned. In 1 9 3 5 -6  a  sum 
f about £ 2 3 ,0 0 0  was allocated for the construction of rural 
oads a n d  railway feeder roads in the citrus areas, bu t little 
rogress was possible owing to the failure of the areas concerned
0 produce their contributions. In  1 9 3 6 -7 , £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  was pro- 
ded in the Estim ates for feeder roads to the Railw ay, bu t 
wing to the "  disturbances ”  no progress was possible either 
the direction of settling a programm e or of carrying out 
nstructional work.
60. Needless to say, while the Jews, as noted above, dem and 
eater expenditure on communications for their colonies, A rab 
fitnesses attributed the neglect of Arab villages to the develop­
ed  of feeder roads in Jew ish settlements. Here, as in m any 
ther cases, the rem oval of an A rab grievance creates a  Jewish 
'evance and vice versa.
5. Railways.
61. It is one of the com plaints of the Jewish Agency tha t ‘ ‘ the
stock at the disposal of the Palestine Railways is insuffl­
ant for dealing with th a t p a rt of the citrus crop which is shipped
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prosperity of Jaffa, and, in justice to the Arabs, the Administra­
tion has been unable to consent to such a proposal. Neverthe­
less the Jewish argum ent against dependence on Jaffa remains 
Obviously the best solution of the problem is the proposal, now 
under consideration, that the new deep-water port should be 
constructed, if at all, a t the junction of Jaffa and Tel Aviv 
equally accessible from  each. The Mayor of Tel Aviv admitted 
to us that he would welcome such a compromise.
7. The Jewish Agency.
68. Article 4 of the M andate for Palestine makes provision as 
follows for the recognition of a Jewish Agency : —
" An appropriate Jew ish agency shall be recognised as a public 
body for th e  purpose o f advising and co-operating w ith th e  Adminis­
tration of P alestine in  such econom ic, social and other matters as may 
affect th e  establishm ent of th e  Jew ish national hom e and the interests 
of th e  Jew ish population in  Palestine, and, subject always to the 
control of th e A dm inistration, to  assist and take part in the  develop­
m ent o f th e  country.
The Z ionist organisation, so long as its  organisation and constitu­
tion  are in  the opinion of th e M andatory appropriate, shall be recog­
nised as such agency. I t  shall take steps in  consultation with His I 
B ritannic M ajesty’s G overnm ent to  secure th e  co-operation of all 
Jew s w ho are w illing to  assist in  th e establishm ent of the Jewish | 
national h om e.”
69. The Zionist Organisation, founded in Basle in 1897, is an 
international body divided into Federations, each o f which, as 
a rule, is co-extensive with the boundaries of a State. There 
exist a t present Zionist Federations in 45 countries in all parts 
of the world (except in Russia, Turkey and so m e  Oriental 
countries in which Zionism is declared illegal). After ten  years 
of protracted negotiations between Zionist and non-Zionist 
Jew s, an  agreem ent was reached between these two sections of 
the Jewish com m unity and  formally confirmed at th e  Zionist 
Congress in 1929. This agreement resulted in the creation  of 
the enlarged Jewish Agency, which was officially recogn ized  by 
the British Government in a letter dated the 6th August, 
1930. The enlarged Jewish Agency for Palestine is a b o d y  com­
posed as to one half of representatives of bodies of Jews in 
various countries not affiliated w ith the Zionist Organisation.
70. The supreme governing body of the Jewish A gency  is 
the Council composed of 112 representatives of th e  Zionist 
O rganisation elected by the Zionist Congress and 112 repre­
sentatives of Jew s in various countries, appointed in  each 
country in a m anner best suited to local conditions. Ordinary 
meetings of the council take place once in two years in  close 
connection with and immediately after the sessions of the | 
Zionist Congress.
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71. There is an Adm inistrative Committee of the Jewish 
Agency which meets in the interval between meetings of the 
Council to  receive reports from  the Executive, to decide during 
such in te rv a l questions of policy and to exercise general super­
vision o v e r the activities of the Agency. I t  consists of 40 
members, 20 of whom are appointed by  the Zionist and 20 
by the non-Zionist members of the Council, and it usually 
meets simultaneously with the Zionist General Council. The 
Executive of the Jewish Agency is appointed by the Council 
and consists a t present of all the members of the Zionist Execu­
tive and three non-Zionist members. The office of the President 
of the J e w ish  Agency is vested in the President for the time 
being of the Zionist Organisation, and the executive offices of 
the Jew ish  Agency are situated in Jerusalem .
72. The expenditure of the Jewish Agency for colonizing and 
other activities in Palestine is covered by the proceeds of the 
Palestine Foundation Fund, the control of which was in 1929 
transferred by the Zionist Organisation to the enlarged Jewish 
Agency. The annual expenditure from that F und in 1935-6 
was £330,000. The total expenditure for 1921-36 was 
£6,215,000 including £ 1 ,goo,000 for agricultural colonization, 
£478,000 for urban colonization, £1,487,000 for education, 
£817,000 for immigration and £523,000 for public works, etc.
73. The Jewish Agency occupies an imposing building in 
erusalem. Is divided into a variety of Departm ents such as 
the Political, Colonization, Im m igration, Education, Treasury,
onomic and Trade and Industry  D epartm ents, as well as a 
•partaient for the Settlement of German Jews.
74. As stated in C hapter X  of this Report, the Jewish Agency 
tributes through its Palestine Offices in Europe and other 
untries the labour certificates which it has received from the 
'gration Department of the Government. I t  m ay therefore
said to control the character of Jewish im migration into 
alestine and to decide, according to their needs, the countries 
hich are to furnish the largest proportions of immigrants.
75. The activities of the Jew ish Agency are by no means con­
ed to demands connected with the preparation of the half- 
arly Labour Schedules and to immigration questions generally, 
t daims to be heard and to advise on a variety of other questions 
f an administrative or fiscal order.
76. The principal aim of the Jewish Agency has been and is to 
ure the admission into Palestine of as m any Jew s as the 
untry can absorb from an economic point of view. Realizing 
t the settlement of Jews on the land is a com paratively slow 
d limited process, the Zionist leaders em barked on a policy of 
dustrial and town development, which seemed to offer possi- 
ilities for the absorption of large numbers of Jew s. In  con-
ction with the Jew ish M anufacturers' Association, for
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exam ple, it interests itself in the question of tariff protection for 
nascent industries. I t  endeavours to secure the application  of 
the proportional principle to the employment of Jew s on Public 
W orks and in the Public Service. Its  field of action likewise 
extends to local and m unicipal adm inistration. As regards 
social services, for instance, Government grants to  Jewish 
hospitals, e tc ., are based on formulae agreed upon in the first 
instance w ith the Jewish Agency. In  fact there is no  branch 
of the Administration with which the Agency does n o t concern 
itself.
77. We do not th ink th a t the Agency is open to critic ism  on I 
this ground. From  the outset of the M andatory system  it  was | 
clearly the intention th a t the building of the National Home 
should be m ainly the work of the Jew s themselves; and the 
powers vested in the Jewish Agency were similar to , though I 
n o t so wide as, those vested in the past in Chartered Companies 
charged w ith the task of colonization. The words of Article 4 
entitle the Agency to advise the Government and  co-operate 
with it in almost anything tha t m ay affect the interests of the [ 
Jewish population in Palestine.
78. Like so m uch else in the M andate, Article 4 was doubtless I 
expected to operate in  a relatively peaceful atmosphere. If 
A rab antagonism  to the N ational Home had  been o v e rco m e , the | 
G overnm ent and the Agency m ight have co-operated in comfort. 
But, in the actual circumstances, the privileged position of the I 
Agency intensifies A rab antagonism . The Nationalist leaders 
have constantly protested against it; and it has not re-assured 
them  to be told, as they were, for exam ple, in 1922, that 
Article 4 does no t entitle the Agency “  to share in any degree 
in  -the Government of Palestine " .  T hat is, of course, th e  truth. 
The Agency is obviously not a "  governing ” body: it can 
only advise and co-operate in a certain wide field. B u t ,  allied I 
as it is w ith the Va ad Leumi, and  commanding the allegiance 
of the great m ajority  of the Jew s in Palestine, it unquestionably  I 
exercises, both in Jerusalem  and in London, a  considerable | 
influence oq the conduct of the Government.
79. Speaking generally, it m ay be said  tha t the J e w is h  Agency I 
has used to the fullest extent the position conferred o n  i t  by the I 
M andate. In  the course of time it has created a complete I 
adm inistrative apparatus. This powerful and efficient organiza­
tion amounts, in fact, to a Government existing side by side with | 
the M andatory Government.
8. The Supreme Moslem Council.
80. In  M arch, 1921, an O rder was issued providing for the I 
constitution of a  Supreme Moslem Council for the con tro l and I 
m anagem ent of Moslem A w qaf and Shan  a affairs in Palestine. I 
There was opposition from the public to the terms of th is  Order,
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and in December, 1921, it was replaced by the O rder which
now regulates the activities of the Supreme Moslem Council.
81. The most im portant sections of the Order of December, 
1921, are as follows:—
1. A Moslem body shall be constituted for the control and m anage­
ment of th e M oslem A w qaf and Shari'a affairs in  P alestine, to  be  
known as th e Supreme M oslem Shari’a Council, having its  Headquarters 
in Jerusalem.
2. The Council shall consist of a President to be know n as R ais el 
Ulema* and four mem bers. Of th e  four m em bers, tw o shall represent 
the Liwaj of Jerusalem , and th e rem aining tw o shall represent th e  
Liwas of N ablus and Acre respectively.
The Rais el U lem a shall be the perm anent President o f th e Council. 
The members shall be elected for a period o f four years.
4. The R ais e l U lem a shall be elected b y  general election, th e
method of w hich shall be prescribed b y  th e  Council in a special law
that shall also la y  down h is functions, status and precedence.
5.—(1) Each m em ber o f th e  Council shall be elected b y  th e  secondary  
electors elected b y  th e  inhabitants of th e Liwa w hich th e  mem ber is 
to represent in  accordance w ith  th e O ttom an Law of E lections to  the  
Chamber of D eputies.
82. The main duties of the Supreme Moslem Council as 
described in Section 8 of the Order are as follows : —
(а) To adm inister and control Moslem A w qaf  and to con­
sider and approve the annual Awqaf Budget, and after 
approval to transm it the budget to the Government for 
information.
(б) To nom inate for the approval of the Government, 
and, after such approval, to appoint Qadis of the Shari’a 
Courts, the President and  members of the Shari’a Court of 
Appeal, and the Inspectors of Shari’a Courts. If  the 
Government withholds its approval, it shall signify to the 
Council within fifteen days the reasons therefor.
(c) To appoint Muftis from  among the three candidates 
to be elected by the special Electoral College in accordance 
with a special regulation to be passed by the Council ; pro­
vided always th a t the election of Muftis in Beersheba 
District shaU be m ade b y  the Sheikhs of the Tribes.
The Supreme Moslem Council also has the power to dismiss 
Û1 Awqaf and Shari’a officials employed in any Moslem institu­
ions maintained from  W aqf funds. W hen any such official is dis- 
nissed notice thereof m ust be sent to the Government, with the 
■casons for dismissal.
83. It is advisable a t this point to describe the origin of the 
alestine Arab Executive Committee, with which the Govern­
ment for a num ber of years kept in touch regarding certain
* Head of Alem. Alern is a  specialist in  religious knowledge. f  D istrict
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m atters affecting the A rab population. Before the British 
Occupation, Palestine was an  integral part of the Ottoman 
Em pire and did not exist as a separate entity. Although there 
were several A rab political parties in existence u n d e r the 
O ttom an regime, no special party  dealing with Palestine 
affairs was form ed until the British Occupation. The 
General Syrian Congress held a t Damascus on the 8th of June, 
1919, was attended by delegates from  Palestine, an d  dis­
cussed Jew ish im m igration under the Balfour D e c la ra tio n . It 
was considered by  the A rabs of Palestine to be the first Palestine 
Congress., Six further Congresses were held b e tw een  the 
27th February , 1920, and the 20th June, 1928. The various 
Congresses elected A rab delegations which visited E g y p t, Tur­
key and Lausanne, and  paid four visits to London. The fourth I 
A rab delegation, which proceeded to London on the 21st of 
M arch, 1930, comprised five members of the Arab Higher Com-1 
mittee which came into existence in April, 1936.
84. From  the date of the British Occupation until December, I 
1934, the A rab political movement was controlled by a Com-1 
mittee elected by the various Congresses and entitled " The I 
A rab Executive Committee From  1928 until 1934 the I 
Executive Committee was itself represented by an Office called I 
“  The Office of the A rab Executive Committee " . W hen the! 
Shaw Commission started its enquiry, it was felt necessary that I 
an  A rab body should represent the A rab case before the Com-[ 
mission, and Government recognized the Arab Executive! 
Committee as representing the Arabs of Palestine for 
purpose.
85. An A rab party , entitled the National Defence P a r ty , was! 
formed in  December, 1934, and three more parties, namely,|  
the Palestine A rab P arty , the A rab Reform  Party , and 
National Bloc P arty , were formed in the following year.l 
Previous to this, the Istiqlal P arty  (Independence P arty ) asj 
well as the A rab Y oung M en's Congress Executive h a d  t 
formed in 1932. On the form ation of these parties the  Arab! 
Executive Committee of A rab Congresses, which fo rm e r ly  repre-j 
sented all the parties, ceased to function.
86. Some account m ust be now be given of the system under I 
which the Mufti of Jerusalem , who, in accordance with Turkish! 
precedent, holds his office for life, is also apparently irremovable| 
as President of the Supreme Moslem Council.
87. I t  is im portant to bear in m ind that A rab internal afiaiisl 
were largely dom inated and influenced by  the rivalry between! 
the members of the Husseini and the Nashashibi factions! 
though both factions are united in uncompromising hostility toi 
the policy of the N ational Home. The two most im p o r ta n t | 
posts in Palestine in the A rab world under the Turks were f
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posts o f the Mayor of Jerusalem  and the Mufti, and both those 
posts had been held by  the Husseini faction. The M ayor was 
Musa Kazem Pasha el Husseini and a cousin of his, Kamel Eft. 
El H u sse in i, C.M .G., who had  earned the universal respect 
of the British A dm inistration, was the Mufti. The Mayor 
had b e en  dismissed by the Military authorities and Ragheb 
Bey Nashashibi had  been installed as Mayor. There was 
therefore a Nashashibi as M ayor and a  Husseini as Mufti. The 
Mufti died in March, 1921, and the problem  of choosing his 
successor was very difficult.
88. The Administration had recourse to the Turkish system, 
which was to the effect tha t a  certain num ber of Ulema and 
other Moslem leaders in different parts of the country chose a 
panel of three nam es, from which the Government selected one 
of the candidates. W hen the above-mentioned vacancy took 
place, there was a Husseini who had been trained for the post 
of M ufti, i.e. the present Mufti, H aj Amin, a half-brother of 
the late Mufti. H aj Amin had been on a pilgrimage and had 
also studied a t the A zhar University in Cairo, where he had 
received a Moslem theological training with a view to repre­
senting the Husseini fam ily in the post. W e were informed by 
a competent witness that H aj Amin was the only m an in 
Palestine at tha t time having the necessary qualifications for 
the post.
89. The election for the post of Mufti duly took place, but 
the opposition party  secured the omission of H aj Am in’s 
name from the panel of three candidates. H e was, how­
ever, fourth. The three candidates were, in fact, nominees 
of R agheb  Bey N ashashibi, and we were told that the election 
of one of these three persons would have caused great dissatis­
faction amongst the people of the country at large. Subse­
quently one of the three selected persons resigned in order 
to enable H aj Amin Eff. E l Husseini to become the third
I candidate and to be included in the panel. H aj Amin was then 
I appointed, but no letter informing him of his nom ination as 
I Mufti of Jerusalem  was despatched to him , nor was his appoint- 
I ment ever gazetted.
90. Haj Amin Eff. E l Husseini is an ex-officer of the Turkish 
I Army. He served with the Em ir Feisal in Damascus and with 
I Hadad Pasha, a Political Officer on the staff of the Military 
I Governor of Jerusalem . In  1918 he helped the British Authori- 
I ties to get recruits for the Sherifian Army amongst the population 
I  of Palestine. His attitude subsequently changed—doubtless as a 
I  result of the Balfour Declaration—for he was sentenced to ten 
■  years' imprisonment in absentia for an inflam m atory speech
I made b y  him at the time of the Jerusalem  riots in 1920. He
I  had fled in the meanwhile to T rans-Jordan bu t benefited 
|o y  a complete am nesty granted by the High Commissioner.
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H e returned to Palestine under the am nesty and s h o r t ly  after 
wards was appointed Mufti. An election of the P re s id e n t an, 
Members of the Supreme Moslem Council was held in  1922 u, 
accordance with the O rder of December, 1921, and it was at 
th a t election th a t the present holder of the office of President 
was elected.
01. I t is im portant a t this point to emphasize the fa c t that 
from the time of the 1922 election until the present tim e Haj 
Amin has combined in his person the offices of Mufti of 
Jerusalem  and President of the Supreme Moslem C o u n c il. In 
the latter capacity he has the control of the Awqaf h in d s  (which 
am ounted to £67,000 a year m 1936) as well as of th e  Sham 
Courts H e also supervises the adm inistration of o r p h a n  funds 
which are controlled by  Qadis. These funds am ount to £50,000 
a vear H e is, in fact, the most influential Arab in  Palestine 
and had  occupied tha t powerful position for seven y e a rs  when 
the disturbances of 1929 took place.
02. The Shaw Commission duly enquired into the rôle of the 
Mufti immediately before and during th o s e  disturbances. They 
came to the conclusion that, while he had no intention 0 
utilizing t h e  religious cam paign for the defence of the Moslem 
H o t Places, which he had  fostered, as a  means of incitement to 
disorder yet, inasm uch as the movement, which he m part
created, becam e through the force of S f ^ ^ ^ e a l T Î  
portant factor in the events which led to the outbreak, 
Mufti like m any others who directly or indirectly p la y e d  upoi 
public feeling in Palestine, m ust accept a share in  the respona 
K  for the disturbances. One Member m  a note o resen 
tions took a more serious view than did his colleagues 
responsibility of the Moslem and A rab leaders and particular!
of the Mufti.
no D uring the period which elapsed between the «hsturbancf 
of 1929 and those of 1936 the M ufti was able still further 
consolidate his position. Following on the shooting m  Jaffa 0 
the 19th April, 1936, the five A rab P arty  leaders called a gener 
strike of all A rab transport, labour and shops on * e 22 d 
April At an all-party meeting held on the 25th of A p ril, 
decided to establish a Supreme A rab Committee (subsequent 
styled the Arab H igher Committee) to control A ra b  natiod 
activities during the emergency. H a] Amin Eff., the  
became President of the Committee.
94. W e have described in C hapter IV the policy P u rs” edJ  
the A rab H igher Committee during the strike At anea  lys^ 
in  its course the Mufti and  the Members of ffie Cornmittee ff 
allowed to m ake a  tour throughout P a l e s t i n e .  We^were mfo 
th a t one District had  been fairly quiet until J e  Mufc w asj^ 
this permission and  held conferences a t which n P
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officials were allowed to be present. From  the date of the tour 
the strike  had spread and  stiffened. I t  is unquestionable that 
the Committee was to a  large extent responsible for m aintaining 
and protracting the strike. They constituted, in fact, the head­
quarters of the Arab nationalist movement. The Mufti, as 
President of the Committee, m ust bear his due share of 
responsibility.
95. When he appeared before us, the Mufti expressed the 
vest anxieties as to the ultim ate intentions of the Jews. W hen
m inded of Articles 13 and 14 of the Mandate, containing an 
d e rta k in g  solemnly given by the M andatory Power to the 
ations of the world, he replied that in m any cases undertakings 
nd p led g es are not carried out.
96. To a question w hether the power of the Jew s would some- 
ow impel the British Government to allow the desecration or 
emoval of the Moslem sacred shrines he replied in the affirma- 
Ye. Asked whether they would be able to remove the 
andatory Power, the Mufti replied th a t his experience up till 
ow showed that
“ the Jew s can do anyth ing as far as Palestine is concerned
97. As regards the M ufti's activities in general during the 
trike, one im portant witness informed us that, at the beginning 
f the disorders, his influence had on the whole been a m oderat- 
g one, in  the sense th a t he had not raised the religious issue in 
e m osques. H e had  seen to it that the pronouncem ents in 
e m osques were restrained until two o r three weeks after the 
sturbances had begun. B ut w hatever m ay have been the 
pparent moderation of the M ufti’s attitude at the commence- 
ent, the manifestoes issued by  the H igher A rab Committee 
der his Chairm anship, endorsing the strike and then urging 
e A rabs to continue it until certain political aims had  been 
chieved, were clearly prejudicial to law  and order. N or, as
as we are aw are, did the H igher A rab Committee a t any 
e condemn the acts of sabotage and terrorism  which became 
ore frequent as the strike continued, and the Mufti as Chair- 
an m u st, in our view, bear his full share of responsibility 
r those disorders.
98. We must now recount the circumstances which have led 
the M ufti having been able to retain so m uch pow er in his 
rson. Although he claim ed that, under Section 2 of the Order 
1921 constituting the Supreme Moslem Council, he, as having 
ce been elected, was the perm anent President of the Council, 
ection 4 of the same O rder provides that—
" th e  Rais el JJlema [ i.e . the President of th e  Council] shall be  
elected  by general election, th e  m ethod o f w hich shall be prescribed  
by  th e  Council in a special law  th a t shall also la y  down his functions, 
s ta tu s  and precedence.”
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gg. The present President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
has never been elected by general election but only by a mere 
rem nant of the secondary electors of the electoral college of 
the last Ottom an Parliam ent. N or has the law envisaged in 
Section 4 of the O rder quoted above ever been p re p a re d . One 
of the consequences has been tha t the functions, status and 
precedence of the existing President have not been defined and | 
there has therefore been no legal limitation of his powers.
100. An election was held in 1926 for new members o f the 
Supreme Moslem Council to replace those elected in 1 9 2 2 , whose 
term s of office had  expired. This election was declared v o id  and 
it became necessary to prom ulgate the Supreme Moslem Sharia 
Council Ordinance of 1926 to m ake provision for the f i l l i n g  o f the 
Council pending the holding of fresh election. The O rd in ance  
further provided for the appointm ent of a Committee of M oslems] 
to prepare a revision of the O rder of 1921.
101. This Committee in 1928 subm itted a draft O rg a n ic  Law 
for the constitution of the Supreme Moslem Council to replace 
the Order of the 20th December, 1921. In  this draft the term of I 
office of the President was prescribed as nine years and  the I 
principle of the perm anency of the President was definitely! 
abandoned. A body of Government officers duly e x am in ed  the 
proposals subm itted by  the Committee, and in J u n e ,  192g, 
the Government m ade public the draft Ordinance containing I 
them. Owing to the riots which took place in August, 1929, the 
Ordinance did not receive the careful and general study by the I 
Moslem community which it required. Several co m m e n ts  and] 
criticisms were, however, subm itted to Government.
102. On the 18th June, 1929, the draft Ordinance su bm itted  by I 
the Committee, together with the report of the Government| 
officers thereon, were sent to the Secretary of State, with an I 
intim ation tha t the High Commissioner would su b m it his I 
recom mendations on the proposals as soon as the comments I 
and criticisms of Moslem opinion on these documents had been| 
received and exam ined.
103. W e  think it unfortunate tha t since tha t date the Admini-I 
stration of Palestine should have taken no action to endeavour I 
to regulate the whole question of elections for the Supreme I 
Moslem Council and the position of the President of that body, r
104. B ut it is true that the Administration is  b o u n d  to a I 
certain extent by  the undertaking given to the Mufti in  1928 by |  
Lord Plum er to the effect tha t—
“  legislative sanction w ould not be given  to  th e  proposed revision I 
o f the R egulation of 1921 [constituting th e  Supreme Moslem Council] J  
except in so far as is necessary for th e  holding of e le c tio n s , until I 
i t  has been subm itted  to  th e  elected A ssem bly. In th at w a y  Govern-1
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m e n t would ensure th a t the reform of th e  adm inistration of Moslem  
afiairs would be effected not on ly  on th e advice of an authoritative  
M oslem  Com m ittee, b u t also w ith  th e  concurrence of an A ssem bly duly  
elected by the representatives of the Moslem com m unity .”
This is tantam ount to saying that nothing will or can be 
done to reform the Supreme Moslem Council if such reform 
Would have the effect of diminishing the power and position 
of the Mufti. The Administration of Palestine is, in fact, in a 
vicious circle, which will have to be broken sooner rather than 
later.
105. The existence of the Supreme Moslem Council need not, 
in itself, have led to the development of an A rab imperium  
inimperio. B ut the functions which the Mufti has contrived to 
accumulate in his person and his use of them have had that 
effect. He is now such a  power in the land that, supported by  
the National Committees in the different towns of Palestine, 
he may truthfully be described as the head of yet a third 
parallel Government.
9. The Suggestion of an enlarged Arab Agency.
106. T h e  contrast is most striking between the Jew ish Agency, 
with its carefully studied organization and departm ental activi­
ties, w ith a personnel draw n not only from  Palestine bu t from 
Jewish communities all over the world, and any m achinery 
which the  Arabs possess for presenting their case to the Govern­
ment in Palestine or in England. The suggestion was m ade to 
11s that it might be possible to construct an enlarged Arab 
Agency which would restore the balance and enable the Arabs
0 secure a full hearing, and give to the A rab population the 
issurance that their interests had not suffered through any 
ack of force or skill in the presentation of the case.
107. In 1923 an effort was m ade by the British Government
0 establish an Arab Agency. The Secretary of State of tha t day 
the D uke of Devonshire), in paragraph 7 of his despatch to the 
Egh Commissioner of the 4th October, wrote as follows:—
" His M ajesty’s Governm ent are accordingly prepared to  fav o u r 
the establishment of an Arab A gency in  Palestine, w hich w ill occupy  
a position exactly  analogous to  th a t accorded to  th e  Jewish A gency  
under Article 4 of th e  M andate, i.e ., it  w ill be recognised as a public 
body for th e purpose of advising and co-operating w ith th e  adm inis­
tration in such econom ic, social and other m atters as m ay affect 
the interests of th e  non-Jewish population, and, subject to  th e control 
of the adm inistration, of assisting and taking part in  th e  develop­
ment of th e country. As regards im m igration (Article 6 of the  
Mandate) th e Arab A gency w ill have th e  right to  be consulted as to  
the means of ' ensuring th a t th e rights and position of other (i.e ., 
non-Je wish) sections of th e population are not prejudiced  
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108. While the Government realized tha t in regard to th e  estab­
lishm ent of the Jew ish Home they had in the Jewish Agency a 1 
representative body com petent to advise and c o - o p e r a te ,  they 
realized tha t they had  no com parable A rab organization avail­
able for consultation on the other side of the Mandate—th e  well- 
being and interests of the existing inhabitants of the country. 
B ut the proposals of 1923 did not recognize the profound differ­
ence between the Jewish and the suggested Arab Agency. On 
the one side there was a  body representing the J e w s  of the I 
D iaspora— a  people of over 16 millions, with wide f in a n c ia l  and 
political influence and containing m any men most competent I 
and experienced in all branches of public affairs. O n  th e  other I 
side there was to be an  Arab Agency representing s o m e  800,0001 
A rabs in Palestine—a poor and to a large extent an illiterate! 
com m unity, with m any able leaders, bu t not c o m p a ra b le  ini 
resources or experience to the rival community. T h e  dis-1 
crepancy was too wide and the parties, if they were to reach I 
agreem ent, m ust be more evenly constituted and have a  better |  
balance of bargaining power.
109. The suggestion is tha t an A rab Agency should be formed I 
in London and Palestine, with the same duties and the same| 
status as in the proposals of 1923, bu t including in addition I 
the A rabs of Palestine representatives of Trans-J o rd a n , ‘Iraq,I 
Saudi-Arabia, Syria and perhaps Egypt. The advantages of| 
the proposal m ight be summarized as follows:—
(i) The disparity between the position of Jews and Arabs] 
under the M andate would be lessened.
(ii) H itherto any suggestions for discussions or of 
ing R ound Table Conferences have been roughly rejects 
by the Arabs. Reinforced by their cousins in A rabia 
A rabs’ leaders m ight be more willing to meet the Jews in| 
conference. On the other side the Jew s would fin d  a bod] 
of responsible men with whom difficulties might be discus: 
and even possible compromises contemplated. Men 
experience draw n from  countries less exposed to la 
animosities m ight cool the atmosphere of debate.
n o .  There might too be some advantage if the f i r s t  hand 
of inter-racial differences were entrusted to these A g e n c ie s . Atj 
la ter stage the Government would come forward as a  Court 0 
Appeal to decide the issue. I f  proposals affecting one com 
m unity or the other were brought forward the G overning 
m ight decline to consider them  until there had  been discussioj 
on  the subject between the two Agencies. Even if  th is  effor 
failed the Government would have the advantage o f  consult^ 
with a  more responsible body and keeping in to u c h  with 1 
w ider expression of Arab opinion.
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Hi. Let us examine the chief objections that would be raised 
to this proposal. I t  is felt that Y our M ajesty's Government 
might in this w ay give recognition to the idea that the Arab 
States have a right to interfere in the affairs of Palestine. 
But in fact the car, the plane and the railway have already 
brought these countries closer together. Constant communica­
tions and meetings between leading Arabs in these countries is 
an e v ery d a y  incident. Might not this scheme conduct their 
existing interests into a  more defined and limited channel and 
perhaps lessen the need for more secret and uncontrolled com­
munications ?
112. I t  is not suggested that the members of the Agency would 
have an y  diplomatic status or be treated as representatives of 
their respective Governments. They would in no way compete 
with the accredited Ministers who carry on the regular official 
business of W hitehall. They would have no more authority  
and e x a c tly  the same position as the members of the Jewish 
Agency already in London. They would not have any special 
right of access to the Colonial Office, but would be available 
for consultation and would no doubt be consulted wiien 
difficulties arose.
113. I t  may be asked how then would these representatives of 
Arabia be  chosen ? There is no m achinery at present in existence 
for selection. They could hardly be appointed directly by their 
cspective Governments, though the la tter might nom inate a 
anel fro m  whom individuals could be draw n after consulta- 
on be tw een  the Government of Palestine and the Palestinian 
embers of the Agency. They could not be paid by  the Govern- 
ent of Great B ritain or by their own Governments. They 
'ght, however, be supported b y  the Arab organization in 
alestine. No contribution is m ade by  the Government of 
alestine to the Jewish Agency and the principle of discrimina- 
on as se t out in the M andate would forbid any different treat- 
ent of th e  Arab Agency.
114. Would these proposals, it m ay be asked, commend them- 
lves to the Jews ? To judge by their vigorous protests against 
e intervention by the Arab Kings they would at first object, 
ven though direct appointm ent by  the rulers were excluded.
ey m ig h t feel, however, th a t it was impolitic to offer an 
yielding refusal in view of the inequalities of the present 
tuation. They m ight reflect th a t a concession to other A rab 
ountries might soften anti-Semitic feeling by showing an  
xample of reasonable appreciation of A rab requirem ents.
115. The Arabs rejected out of hand the original offer of an  
gency, on the ground that it would be a recognition of its 
ewish counterpart; b u t the new plan might not provoke the 
me sw ift judgm ent and condemnation. The Istiqlal party  
ght be attracted by a  scheme which was not inconsistent with
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the idea of A rab unity. Many of the m oderate Arabs less 
interested hi high politics would be glad to scrutii^ze and com- 
nare Government and Jewish figures of im m igration, to test Je 
S m a t e l  of economic absorptive capacity and to secure the 
opportunity of more effective criticism.
116 We are well aware tha t the proposal has its defects as 
well as its advantages. B ut, if the present M andatory system 
continues we feel th a t some such scheme wiU have to  be  con- 
s f t o d  F o r, in the first place, if the Arab leaders were o 
c l a S i  tha t the inequality should be redressed between he 
n o ^ r f S  organization of the Jewish Agency, a t once world- 
S  and  concentrated on Jerusalem , and any such p u re ly  local 
S eaitiza tion  as they can establish in Palestine it would become
i S l f r S c ^ n ' r f ^ e n t e T n p S e s t i i r o n  the Arab world out-
d r e s s in g  A rab opinion in general on Palestinian affairs. At 
between6 a^body  Uke^the ^ew iSi^A gency! which represent
^ a ^ n k ? g ” dUS  S ^ ^ ^ ^ a ^ p S ;
of neighbouring States.
CH A PTER V II.
PUBLIC SECURITY.
1. The British Garrison in Palestine in the year 1921-2 cost 
about £3,000,000. Its prim ary duty was the external defence 
of Palestine and T rans-Jordan against attack from Central 
Arabia. I t had also the secondary function of supporting the 
Palestine and T rans-Jordan Governments in the m aintenance 
of public security. The riots of May, 1921, in Jaffa,* result­
ing in 95 persons being killed and 219 seriously wounded, 
showed that it was still necessary to retain a  considerable 
garrison. Yet considerations of economy dem anded a reduc­
tion, since every fighting m an retained in Palestine was reported 
to cost £500 a year. The aim of the Palestine Government 
was therefore to create and train  an efficient force of Police 
to preserve internal order. Such a force, it was hoped, would 
be able to deal with any small incursions from outside which 
did not call for m ilitary intervention, though it was recognized 
that for some time to come this force would need the moral, 
and possibly also the m aterial, support of the British Garrison. 
This chapter, therefore, deals m ainly with the steps taken by 
the Administration to m aintain law and  order in Palestine.
2. When the Civil Administration took over charge the Police 
Force was far from satisfactory. U nder the M ilitary Adminis­
tration local forces of Police had been recruited to replace the 
vanished Turkish Gendarmerie. These district units were 
described as being “  susceptible to local influences, racial and 
religious ” , and the personnel was hastily chosen. There was 
no uniformity of organization, no systematized training, no 
co-ordination of action between districts. The Courts and the 
Public Prosecutors were regarded as responsible for the investi­
gation of crime, the Police being “ to an undue extent used 
merely as process-servers, messengers, guards and tax  collectors.
. . . With an over-worked and harassed force, unreinforced 
by reserves, methodical reconstruction was impossible and, in 
consequence, m ilitajy assistance had repeatedly to be invoked 
in dealing with civil disturbances ” . E arly  in 1921, 60 per 
cent, of the Force resigned on the grounds of being underpaid 
and b a d ly  housed. The promulgation of the Police Ordinance 
of 1921 stabilized conditions of service and laid the foundations 
of an improved system of Police adm inistration. A Palestine 
Gendarmerie 550 strong, m ounted and foot, was raised, a similar 
ormation being created in T rans-Jordan and known as “ the
ab Legion The Ghaffir Force of village watchmen was 
econstituted. The Municipal Police were included in the cont­
rition of the regular Police Force.
* Page 51
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3. In  1922 a battalion of British Gendarmerie was enlisted, 
w ith a strength of 38 officers and 724 other ranks, m o s tly  from 
ex-members of the Royal Irish  Constabulary. There appears 
to  have been some uncertainty as to their status and duties, 
w hether they were to be policemen with a small m ea su re  of 
m ilitary training, or soldiers who could perform  certain police 
duties w ithout detrim ent to their m ilitary efficiency. Though 
the cost was high there was dissatisfaction with the te rm s  and 
conditions of service. Enquiries m ade in 1923 showed som e of 
the special difficulties which the civil Police and G endarm erie  
h ad  to meet. Brigands and criminals from Sinai, S y ria  and 
T rans-Jordan found Palestine a “  happy hunting g ro u n d  ”, 
Denied the adoption of “  oriental methods ”  in o b ta in in g  evi­
dence the Police got bu t little assistance from the p u b lic . They 
were regarded, according to the opinion expressed by  a n  officer 
in  1923, as forcing on the m ajority of the country a p o lic y  which, 
as they understood it, they detested. Hence w itn e s se s  were 
threatened with “  blood-feuds ”  and the influence of th e  local 
sheikhs, notables and m ukhtars was against them. The cost of 
the British Section of the Gendarmerie was met from United 
K ingdom funds. There had been a continuous reduction in the 
cost of the garrison, which in the year 1923-4 h a d  been | 
diminished to £1,500,000.
4. E arly  in 1925 the mounted squadron and one c o m p a n y  of I 
the British Gendarmerie were disbanded. The P a le s t in ia n  Sec­
tion was m aintained a t full strength, the composition being
9 British Officers, 9 British W arrant Officers, and 475 other 
ranks—262 A rabs (35 being Christians), 97 Moslem C ircassians, |
10 Druzes, 100 Jew s and  6 others.
5. D uring this first quinquennium  expenditure on “ Police I 
and Prisons ” , including Gendarmerie (but not the cost of the I 
B ritish Section during the years 1922-3 and 1923-4), w as as| 
follows*:—
1 st J u ly , 1920,
to '  1921-22 . 1922-23 . 1923-24. 1924-25.
31st March, 1921.
£ £  £ £ i
205,138 320,806 307,848 265,273 464,942
6. The following table shows the m urders and highway rob-J 
bery reported during this period :—
1921. 1922. 1923. 1924. i ç 25-
Murder .................. 128 142 121 95 98
H igh w ay R o b b ery . . .  135 180 177 93 7 1
7. By 1925 the garrison of Palestine had been reduced to onel 
regiment of cavahy , one squadron of aeroplanes and one com-f 
pany of arm oured cars, and cost the British taxpayer in  1925I 
only £640,000 instead of the £3,000,000 in 1921. The strength |
* Figures taken from Annual Administration Reports.
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of the Arab Legion was 42 officers and 972 men. Grants-in-aid 
from the British Government for this force and to cover the ex­
penses of the British Representative and staff averaged over 
.£100,000 a year. The R oyal A ir Force m aintained a t Amman 
a flight of aeroplanes and a  section of four arm oured cars. Two 
raids from the desert attem pted in 1922 and 1924 b y  considerable 
forces of W ahabis from Nejd were repelled. The Civil 
Police Force in Palestine, as a result of the establish­
ment of the Gendarmerie, had been reduced from  78 officers 
and 1,159 other ranks in 1922 to 73 officers and 966 other 
ranks in 1925. Sir H erbert Samuel, in his survey of the five 
years, referred to the “  rapid pacification of the country ”  as 
being in part due to the formation of effective Police and 
Gendarmerie Forces.
" The spirit of law lessness has ceased; th e atm osphere is no longer 
electric; there have been no more raids from  Trans-Jordan; all th e  
brigands h ave been hunted down and either shot, executed  or im ­
prisoned. . . . F o r  som e tim e past P alestine has been th e  m ost
peaceful country of an y  in  th e Middle E ast."
8. During the second quinquennium , in compliance with a  de­
mand for economy, the Gendarmerie, British and  Palestinian, 
was abolished in 1926, and a  Trans-Jordan F rontier Force took 
the p la ce  of the Arab Legion.* Five officers and 212 other ranks 
were transferred from the British Section of the Gendarmerie and 
290 mounted and  28 dismounted other ranks from  the Pales­
tinian Section to the Civil Police, the composition of which in 
1926 was:—
N on-British .
B ritish . Moslems. Christians. Jews.
Officers ...............................  48 45 17 15
Non-commissioned officers 21 108 24 22
Constables..................................... 176 875 226 175
T otal 245 1,028 267
j There were therefore 125 officers and 1,627 other ranks.
9. T h e  T rans-Jordan Frontier Force consisted of four Com- 
Ipanies under the charge of British officers. The classification
was: —
B ritish. M oslems.
N on-British
Christians. Jews.
Officers 16 18 2 —
Warrant officers ... 1 3 — — —
Non-commissioned officers 2 3 0 4 8
Troopers ... — 560 9 0 29
Total ................. 3 i 611 9 6 37
I  Force.
4 6 4 9 7 G 4
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The Force was organized for the protection of the common 
frontiers of T rans-Jordan and Palestine. A clear d istin c tio n  as 
regards functions and organization was intended to b e  made 
between the forces to be employed on police duties, a n d  those 
who might be required to engage in m ilitary operations. Pales­
tine and Trans-Jordan were to be m ade as nearly a s  possible 
independent and self-contained as regards internal se c u rity . A 
Frontier Force Ordinance was passed in 1926. W hat exactly 
should be the duties of this Force is still a  debated question 
to-day.
10. The following statem ent of expenditure m ay be contrasted 
with tha t given in paragraph 5 above.
Expenditure.
P olice and Prisons 
Trans-Jordan Frontier 
Force.
Gendarmerie ... 
D efence
T otal ...
1927  
1926—27. 9 months. 
305,943 251,131
166,113
19,172
1 2 7 ,5 3 8
7 4 2
1928.
3 4 2 , 7 9 5
193,245
360
5 3 . 5 0 0
1929.
376,060
149,178
1930.
475-851
232,080
37,070 109,675
£491,228 379,411 589,900 562,308 817,606
The gradual growth in expenditure is noticeable. I t  was due 
chiefly to an increase in the strength of the British Section of 
the Police.
11. The new heading “  Defence ”  relates to the contribution 
m ade by the Palestine Government towards the cost of the 
Arm y and Royal Air Force units. In  1930 there was also 
a  paym ent of ,£101,135 on account of damage incurred in the 
riots in 1929, which brings the total expenditure on internal 
security in 1930 to £918,741.
12. The composition of the Police Force in the year 1930 
w as:—
Officers. Other Ranks.
Christians.
Moslem. Jew s. Others.
Christians.
Moslem. Jews. Ofta
B rit. Palest. B rit. Palest.
D istrict
Officers.
42 20 4 3 1 7 1 — 221 891 205 3
B ritish  Police 9 — — — — 631 — — — -
Prisons 9 — 5 3 — 27 205 1 5 —
M unicipal
Police.
1 1 1 3 3 251 8b
T otal 61 20 4 9 21 1 631 281 1 , 3 4 7 306
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There were thus 152 officers and 2,568 other ranks, as com- 
with 125 and 1,627 respectively in 1926.
1926. 1927. 1928. 1929. 1930.
9 5 81 118 178 126
5 6 82 90 232 179
9 4 9 5 70 3 4 28
13. The incidence of serious crime during this second quin­
quennium was: —
Murder
Attempted Murder
Highway Robbery
14. In connection with the disturbances in August, 1929,* 
an Ordinance was passed vesting the powers of the District 
Court in  a single British Judge, and the powers of the Court 
of Criminal Assize in two British Judges, while appeals from 
a British Magistrate were to be heard by  a single British Judge. 
The Collective Punishm ents Ordinance, 1926, was applied to 
towns and villages whose inhabitants had taken p art in con­
certed attacks on Jew s, and fines to the am ount of £17,840 
were imposed. N early 1,300 persons were brought to trial, but 
in the higher Courts of Crim inal Assize com paratively few 
persons were convicted.
15. The table below shows the result of action taken against 
the rioters of 1929 in the Courts.
Arabs. Jews. Total
(a) Tried Summarily b y  British M agistrates .. 891 7 4 965
(6) Sentenced b y  D istrict Courts 241 30 271
(c) Sentenced by  Court of Criminal Assize 5 6 3 5 9
(d) Capital sentences passed 27 2 29
(e) Capital sentences confirmed on appeal 26 1 27
Actually only three m urderers suffered the extreme penalty. 
We have elsewhere alluded to the difficulties which attend  a 
prosecution in Palestine, and  to the conciliatory policy of the 
Government, t  In  1936 convictions were even fewer. Yet 
the prompt and adequate punishm ent of crime is a vital factor 
in the maintenance of law  and order. The following table shows 
the results of m urder cases during the years 1929-36.
1929 1930. 1 9 3 1 1932. 1 9 3 3 - 1934 1935 1936. Tan.-Mar. 1937-
reported 
' nvictions 
ath sentence 
carried out.
~ eves
178
107
7
126
157
7
13
119
72
6
119
7 5
6
8
108
69
2
109
58
11
8
115
7i
6
260
67
4 4
3
o
On the 31st March, 1937, seventeen persons were still aw aiting trial for 
' murders com m itted during 1936.
* Pages 67-68. 
f  Pages 140 and 167.
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16. The Shaw Commission* in their report in 1930 arrived 
a t the following m ain conclusions relating to internal s e c u r i ty :—
(i) The policy of reducing the garrison in Palestine had 
been carried too far.
(ii) The conduct of the British Police d e se rv e d  the 
highest com m endation: the Palestinian Police w r  t 
to be relied upon for fighting a t close quarters: the rontier 
Force behaved with exem plary loyalty.
17. They recom m ended: —
(i) An enquiry into the m ost suitable form of rris  
for Palestine.
(ii) An independent enquiry by an experienced officer 
from  some other Dependency into the organization and 
future development of the Police Force.
(iii) The creation of an adequate Intelligence . 
“  A system should be established whereby, so 
possible, the Government is kept in touch with e v e  
of subversive activity in Palestine."
(iv) The curtailm ent of the mischievous activities of the
18. After discussion it was decided tha t two 
battalions should be stationed in Palestine, ready to 
various posts as a  precautionary m easure if trouble w a s ti ­
pated. The R oyal A ir Force would m aintain in P a le s t
T rans-Jordan one squadron (later increased by one fli t
one com pany of arm oured cars. These with the T ran s-Jo r
Frontier Force would be the norm al garrison, and s l
was thought, be sufficient to cope with any emergency. 
quarters of the cost of this last Force and  the cost of a ll it l
works for the Force in  T rans-Jordan are m et by a grant-i - i  
from  the United Kingdom, the average annual c o n tr ib u tio n  in 
recent years being about £140,000. The Palestine Government 
meet the excess cost (over their cost a t their norm al stations) of 
A rm y troops stationed in Palestine and one-half of th e  excess 
cost of R oyal A ir Force stationed in Palestine and T rans-Jo rdan , 
besides the capital cost of works services in Palestine a n d  Trans-1 
Jo rdan  for both Forces. This expenditure is shown u n d e r the!
19. Sir H erbert Dowbiggin, Inspector-General of Police 
in Ceylon, subm itted in 1930 a valuable report after a detailed 
exam ination of the Police Force and its requirements. In 
it he stressed the need for allocating definite responsibility not 
only as between the various Civil officers, bu t as between them 
and the M ilitary Authorities. H e regarded “  a good under­
standing between the different races "  as essential for the main­
tenance of order. H e pointed out tha t : —
" A lm ost every word of th e  résum é o f th e  1921 Commission Repoitl 
applies to  th e  disturbances o f 1929. T he lessons of 1921 bad n0J 
been rem em bered. I t  is subm itted th a t we cannot afford to forge ■
Press.
head "  Defence
again.
* See page 6 8 .
i g i  Chapter V II.
20. Among his recommendations, apart from detailed sug­
gestions for adm inistrative action and improvements in  condi­
tions of service, were the following:—
(1) An increase of the British Section of the Police to 650, 
of whom 100 should be mounted.
(2) An increased num ber of sealed arm ouries for Jew ish 
colonies, with one officer and 129 other ranks to be detailed 
for their protection in time of emergency. This would be 
an addition to the strength of the Police Force.
(3) The im provem ent of the Police Training School, and 
a generous system of language allowances.
(4) B arracks for men and m arried quarters.
(5) A new Criminal Investigation Departm ent.
(6) The establishment of a perm anent Special 
Constabulary reserve.
(7) The eventual separation of the Prisons Service from 
the Police.
(8) The appointm ent of three more British and  two 
Palestinian Stipendiary Magistrates.
He found that, with one notable exception, inform ation was 
not being collected and com municated. The C .I.D . was "  the 
weakest spot in the Force ” .
21. The tables given below show the action taken by the 
Administration to improve the Security Services, in accordance 
with Sir H erbert Dowbiggin's advice, during the third 
quinquennium.
The strength and  composition of the Police Force on the 31st 
December, 1931, was as follows: —
Officers and Inspectors. Other Ranks.
Chris­
tians.
M
o
sl
e
m
s.
Je
w
s.
O
th
e
rs
.
To
ta
l 
O
ffi
ce
rs.
Chris­
tians.
M
o
sl
e
m
s.
Je
w
s.
O
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er
s.
To
ta
l 
Ot
he
r 
R
a
n
ks
.
B
r
iti
sh
.
-
P
a
le
st
in
ia
n
s.
B
r
iti
sh
.
P
a
le
st
in
ia
n
s.
friot Police 47 1 9 4 2 2 0 I 129 - 224 917 248 3 1 , 3 9 2
tish Police - — - -
3 6 4 5
— — — — 645
sons and 8 I
■> 2 - 16 42 178 16 — 236
ail Labour
-ompanies.
nicipal
— - 1 I - 2 - 29 224 89 — 3 4 2
Police.
tad ... 58 20 48 2 3 I 150 6 4 5 295 i , 3 i 9 2 5 3 3 2,615
Chapter V II. 192
The Trans-Jordan Frontier Force was composed as follows:—
Arabs.
B
r
iti
sh
M
o
sl
e
m
s
C
hr
is
tia
n
s
Je
w
s
C
ir
c
a
ss
ia
n
s
D
ru
ze
s
1 
Su
da
n
e
se
3
fS I
Officers ... 23 8 6 2 8 I 48 I
W arrant officers 7 - - — - — - 7 ]  
3 1Staff sergeants 3 - - - - - -N on-com m issioned officers and - 4 3 7 162 3 2 163 3 8 847 1
men.
T otal 3 3 4 4 5 168 3 4 171 16 3 8 905 I
R eserve N on  - com m issioned 9 1 20 1 13 Q :34  I
officers and men.
Total 3 3 5 3 6 188 3 5 184 25 3 8 ï .°39 I
22. At the end of 1936 the composition of the Police Force
w as:
B ritish. Arabs. Jews. Total.
Superior police officers 4 5 10 4 5 9
Inspectors 27 68 3 0 125
Other ranks ... 858 1,824 4 5 0 3 , 1 3 2
T otal ... 9 3 0 1,902 484 3 , 3 1 6
Thus com parative strengths in the years for which we have 
given detailed figures were as follows : —
Officers and Other
Inspectors. Ranks.
1926 ... . .. .. .  .. .  ... 125 1,627
1 9 3 ° ...........................................................  152 2,568
1 9 3 2   150 2,615
1 9 3 6 ...........................................................  184 3,132
23. Expenditure on public security mounted rapidly: —
1 9 3 1 - 1932-33- 1933-34- 1934-35- 1935-36- 1936-37*
£ £ £ £ £ I
Police 469,516 475,042 486,605 506,712 527,467 744,455
Trans-Jordan  
Frontier Force.
182,893 174,835 185,393 191,757 189,664 189,168
D efence ... 121,681 105,922 110,125 144,118 145,289 1,297,000
T otal 774,090 7 5 5 . 7 9 9 782,123 842,587 862,420 2,230,623
* Provisional figures.
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24. The incidence of serious crime in the third quinquennium  
was c la ss if ied  as below. “  A grarian crime "  relates chiefly to 
feuds between Arab villages originating in fam ily differences or 
boundary disputes. I t  also includes mischief and destruction 
in Jew ish  settlements. I t  took the form of burning forests, 
destroying trees or wounding cattle.
25. In Chapter I I I  we have described the disturbances which 
occurred in 1931  and 1 9 3 3 ;  and in Chapter IV the revolution­
ary outbreak of 1 9 3 6 . This last outbreak, like that of 1 9 3 3 , w as 
directed against the M andatory Government as well as against 
the Jews. A novel feature of it was the extensive use of firearms 
and explosives. The expenditure on Public Security, which had 
risen fro m  £ 2 6 5 ,0 0 0  in 19 2 3  to £ 7 7 4 ,0 0 0  in 1 9 3 1  and to over 
£862,000 in 1 9 3 5 -6 , was, it appears, still insufficient to ensure 
the maintenance of the public peace.
26. As in 1 9 2 9 , so in 1 9 3 3  and 1 9 3 6  the Press helped to fan 
the flam es. A censorship was imposed by  the Press Ordinance 
of 1933, under which no newspaper can be published or printing 
press kept without a perm it. The H igh Commissioner was given 
powers to warn or suspend any newspaper publishing m atter 
likely to endanger the public peace. A convicting Court could 
prohibit the publication of the newspaper for three years, and the 
proprietor or editor from  taking part in any other publication. 
In 1934 two Hebrew newspapers were prosecuted (one tw ice), 
and four Arabic newspapers were suspended (one of them  three 
times a n d  another twice) for periods varying between one week 
and three months. In  1 9 3 5  there were no prosecutions, bu t one 
Hebrew and three Arabic newspapers were suspended. In  1 9 3 6  
the O rd in an ce  was am ended, so as to provide also for suspension 
for publishing “  false news or false rum our calculated, in the 
opinion o f the High Commissioner-in-Council, to create alarm  or 
despondency ."
27. In  our opinion the penalties provided by this Ordinance 
and the action taken under it are insufficient to cope with an 
aggravated evil like the Palestine Press. Several newspapers 
were suspended during our residence in Palestine, yet inflam­
matory articles which would not have been tolerated in most 
other countries continued to appear. One witness declared tha t 
suspension was really a  source of profit to the publishers. I t  
saved th e m  expense; gave the newspaper wide advertisem ent; 
and when in due course it reappeared, ensured them  an increased
Murder ...
Attempted Murder 
Highway Robbery- 
Agrarian Crime .. .
IÇ3I. 1932. 1933. 1934. 1935.
119 119 108 109 115
145 118 97 122 115
9 8  5 7  3 4  3 2  32
1,043 M ° 3  829 425 443
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circulation. We were told that if a newspaper were closed down 
it would reappear under another nam e, and it was not possible 
under the law  to attach a defaulting press.
2 8 . We would recommend the adoption of a  Press Ordinance 
providing for a cash deposit which can be confiscated. We 
would include in the penalties imprisonment as well as fine and 
in the case of a repetition of the offence, the forfeiture of thé 
press and its material to Government. The risk of d r iv in g  sedi­
tion underground or of allowing wild rum ours to spread is, we 
consider, less in Palestine than the certainty of mischief caused 
Iby the daily output of intem perate incitement. “  The trouble 
:in the N orth, and in the H aifa area particularly ” , we w ere  told, 
"  was on account of the fact that the Press was allowed so much 
Tope . . . .  The strike in H aifa would have stopped, or would 
never have started, if the Press h ad  not been allowed to criticize 
H a ifa 's  actions ” .
2 9 . As regards action taken under the Collective Punishm ents 
Ordinance, in 1 9 3 3  2 0 6  villages in the N orthern District were 
scheduled and thus rendered liable to a  collective fine, should I 
any village indulge in the destruction of property, tree-cutting, I 
maiming of animals and  the like. I t  was stated in the Annual I 
R eport for 1 9 3 3  that “  the results of the special action ta k e n  are I 
already visible in a  sensible dim inution of the incidence of I 
agrarian crime ” . I
3 0 . I t  will be convenient here to record the results of th is  form I 
of collective punishm ent. D uring the eight years 1929-36 in-1 
elusive, collective fines totalling £ 6 0 ,9 8 8  were imposed, £33,340! 
relating to the damage done during the riots o f 1929J 
£ 2 1 ,2 7 2  in respect of 1 9 3 6 . Only £ 1 8 ,1 5 9  out of the to ta l has I  
been collected up to date, £ 8 ,5 2 0  in respect of the d e m a n d  fori 
1 9 2 9 . In  1 9 3 5  the H igh Commissioner rem itted the w hole  out-1  
sta nding am ount of the collective fines imposed upon certain I  
A rab villages and  tow n-quarters in the Jerusalem , G a za  andl 
H ebron Sub-Districts. ' General satisfaction was show n b y l 
Arabs and Jew s throughout the country at these acts o i l  
clemency If  collective fines are to have a deterrent effect,itfl 
would seem desirable to limit the fine to a sum  that can bel 
realized, and to quarter a  body of punitive police on the town orfl 
village until it has been collected. I
3 1 . As from the year 1 9 3 2  the Crim inal Investigation D epart-B  
m ent was reorganized and strengthened. A Deputy In s p e c to r - !  
G eneral with a Deputy District Superintendent was placed ■  
charge, with three senior Police Officers. The British s ta ff  c o m  
sisted of one Corporal and three Constables: the P a le s tin ia n *  
personnel of three Inspectors, two Sergeants and six C o n s ta b le s .*
* A nnual R eport for 1935, page 7.
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The duties of the D epartm ent were defined as—
“ to prevent and detect crime b y  th e collection and com m unication  
of intelligence, inform ation and evidence, and b y  investigation; t o  
watch and report upon political m ovem ents, particularly com m unism , 
to repress seditious activities; to  m aintain criminal records and a 
Finger-print and Photographs Bureau; to  exam ine the vernacular press 
and occasional pam phlets w ith  a v iew  to  action in case of seditious, 
inflammatory or obscene articles; to  prevent the sm uggling of arm s 
and drugs; to  scrutinize applications for naturalization; to  arrange 
deportations and extraditions; and to  preserve liaison w ith  th e  corre­
sponding departm ents in  E gyp t, Syria, Trans-Jordan, India, ‘Iraq and  
Europe. Censorship of newspapers from abroad is also undertaken  
by this D epartm ent."
32. T h e  staff was further increased in 1934 to cope with 
illegal immigration. In  1935 the personnel (under the command 
of a D e p u ty  Inspector-General) consisted of 5 Assistant Super­
intendents, 5 Inspectors, 3 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 21 Detectives 
and 15 C le rk s . In  the following year a Superintendent of Police 
was ad d ed .
33. Y e t even so the collection of intelligence, particularly as 
regards political m atters, was far from satisfactory, the reason 
being th a t  the H eadquarters Staff m ust depend on the D istrict 
Staff fo r early and reliable reports, which they could not or d id  
not get when the strike had  been declared in 1936. As one 
witness put it: “ I  think we can get very good inform ation 
when there are no troubles, but in times of trouble, when there- 
is so much national feeling throughout the country, m any 
people do  not arm  themselves, bu t their tongues are tied .”  W e 
were to ld  that the civil officers in the Districts were not "  in a 
xjsition to give inform ation, as they were really dependent fo r 
heir information on the police . . . H aving regard to the
act th a t every policeman is a potential intelligence agent, the  
nformation we obtained from  the police in the country was- 
ray p o o r generally.”  Another witness said tha t information 
' in tim e of peace is fairly valuable : in time of emergency o f
10 value at aU.”
34. We received a com plaint from  the Jew s th a t the A rab 
nembers of the Crim inal Investigation D epartm ent were un- 
mstworthy, gave away inform ation, and  took no trouble to  
fork up cases of a  political nature. They asked th a t all 
esponsible duties in the Crim inal Investigation D epartm ent 
lould be entrusted to British officers.
Enquiries we m ade do not justify this complaint. A part from 
ie fact that British officers would be of little use as detectives 
nd m ust therefore be compelled to rely on Palestinian subordi- 
ates, the fact tha t one Inspector and three of the plain clothes 
etective s ta f f ,  all Arabs, were assassinated in 1936 supports the 
(intention that the m ajority of the Palestinian officers and the 
ispectorate in the Crim inal Investigation D epartm ent are 
îoroughly devoted and  loyal. As regards the junior ranks,.
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intim idation and doubtless in some cases political sympathies 
place them  in the same category as the m ajority of the D istrict 
Police—useful in times of peace, unreliable in time of trouble.
35. Sir H erbert Dowbiggin’s suggestion for a new Criminal 
Investigation D epartm ent has therefore been ta rried  o u t. As a 
factor in preserving the public peace it does not play th e  part 
which he hoped it would. For it cannot function w hen  the 
sources of inform ation dry up. Its officers are thus placed in a 
dangerous and difficult position, only really to be appreciated 
by those who have served under such conditions. Such a  situa­
tion can, in our opinion, only be remedied by the introduction of 
“ m artial law .”
36. Similar considerations apply to the Police Force as a 
whole. The Training School, which we visited, is doing excel­
len t work. The recruits obtained to-day are better educated 
than  their predecessors, and receive much better training. What 
the  Force lacks, and  w hat we see no likelihood of its obtaining 
under present conditions, is the m orale tha t is created b y  an 
esprit de corps. “ The lack of th is,”  said a  witness “ is the 
worst feature of the organization of the Palestinian Police 
to -day .”  Speaking of the relations between Jewish and Arab 
officials, another witness said: “  In  peace time they w o rk  quite 
well, bu t in times of disturbance they sit opposite each o th e r  and 
glare: neither trusts the o ther.”
37. As regards the A rab rank and file in the Palestinian 
M ounted Police Force, we were to ld: —
“ On norm al duties the m ounted forces, particularly u n d e r normal 
conditions, perform their work m agnificently against highway robbers 
and all th a t ty p e  of work, bu t when i t  com es to  armed rebellion 
and th ey  have to  take action and fight, shall I  say, against their 
own nationals, I  am  not going to  say  th a t th ey  can be relied on.
As regards the A rab Police as a whole, another witness told 
us: —
“ Y ou m ight find one or tw o  of them  who would even still remain 
loyal, bu t th e vast m ajority w as n o t loyal in th e  la st disturbances.”
38. Though no A rab Police Officer signed the manifesto, 
given as an appendix to this R eport, there was at one tim e an 
apprehension of a strike in the lower ranks. Their families 
were subjected to intim idation; they found it difficult to  obtain 
food; and their position was intolerable. On steps being taken 
to meet these difficulties there was no further open trouble. 
A nother witness told us that—
“  for a short tim e after th e outbreak of th e recent disturbances the 
discipline and esprit de corps instilled  by th e  Inspector-General of 
P olice kept th e Arab P olice in hand, b u t after a while they began 
to  crack beneath  th e  strain, and a t  one tim e were a potential danger 
rather than a support. Jew ish P olice were n ot submitted to quite 
th e  sam e strain, b u t undoubtedly were more loyal to  Jewry than 
±0 G overnm ent.”
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We would not, however, like it to be inferred from w hat we 
have said that all Arab officials and the entire Police Force 
are to be regarded as disloyal. Many instances were brought 
to our notice of good service under great difficulty. One wit­
ness was of the opinion tha t had m artial law been applied at 
an earlier stage the morale of the police would have been pre­
se rv e d . “ A more vigorous policy, directed against violence, 
from above . . . would have made them feel that they were 
really the custodians of law and order.”  From  this and other 
evidence we have formed the opinion that it would be highly 
dangerous to expose the A rab Police of Palestine to another 
strain of the same kind as tha t which they endured last summer.
39. The position as regards the Jews in the security forces 
is unsatisfactory. In  the Police Force it has been difficult to 
retain the services of those who are posted to rural areas. Of 
439 Jewish constables enlisted during the years 1932 to 1936, 
255 resigned or were discharged. In  Tel Aviv the Municipal 
Council grants a local allowance, only Jew s can be posted there 
with safety, and, so we were told, “  their loyalty is to Tel 
Aviv and the Municipal Council and its Chairm an, rather than 
to the Inspector-General and the G overnm ent.”  Originally 
all the Municipalities m aintained their own Municipal Police. 
These were abolished, but Tel Aviv was allowed certain con­
cessions, one of which is the retention of a local force members 
of which cannot be transferred. They get various allowances, 
including a service allowance for length of service whether 
their conduct is good or bad. W e do not think this arrange­
ment is conducive to discipline. Tel Aviv is adm ittedly, 
like Jaffa, expensive to Eve in : house rents are high. B ut 
quarters should be provided, o r in lieu allowances should be 
paid by the Government, and the Jewish constable in Tel Aviv 
should like any other member of the Force be liable to transfer.
40. The Jewish Agency declared tha t Jewish representation 
in the Police Force had  not been m aintained a t a proper level, 
and urged that the Palestinian Section of the Police should 
consist of Jews and non-Jews in equal numbers. “  W ith us 
it is a cardinal point th a t there should be a definite proportion 
fixed." They also asked tha t the m onthly salary should be 
raised from £6  to £ j .  This would entail a  rise in pay  for all 
the Palestinian members of the Force. W e were informed 
th a t Government would welcome more Jewish recruits if they 
w ere willing to serve, as the Arabs are, in the country districts.
41 - A second grievance was that the character of the Trans­
jordan Frontier Force precluded an adequate participation of 
Jews, who only num bered about 2 per cent, of the Force. The 
regulation requiring a  knowledge of Arabic was held to be a 
discrimination against the Jew s, and an infringement of 
Article 22 of the M andate, which guarantees the equality of 
Hebrew and Arabic.
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42. The principal duty of the T rans-Jordan Frontier Force 
is to preserve peace in tha t territory  and to defend its Syrian 
‘Iraq i and Saudi A rabian frontiers. Subsidiary duties are to 
watch the Palestine Frontier and endeavour to  help the Palestine 
Police to stop smuggling of hashish or drugs, gun-running and 
illicit im m igration. In  our view the whole Frontier Force 
could not be used to control and police the Palestine Frontier 
except a t the risk of neglecting the country—Trans-Jo rdan - 
from  which they are m ainly recruited. If this view o f their 
functions is accepted, it is clear th a t the Jews cannot claim 
as of right recruitm ent in a  Force towards which the Palestine 
G overnm ent contributes only one-fourth of the cost, and whose 
duties are prim arily outside Palestine.
43. Though there is no perm anent constabulary reserve  as 
recommended by Sir H erbert Dowbiggin, we were to ld  that in 
actual practice the whole of the British Police Force, when 
disturbances occur, stop perform ing norm al civil p o lic e  duties 
and in effect become a  Gendarmerie themselves. On th e  other 
hand, we received evidence th a t the Police Force was n o t able 
to deal with widespread disorder which took the form o f street 
rioting and urban dem onstration. “  W hen the Jaffa rio ts  took 
place soldiers were brought in a t once and acted as police.” 
“  W hen the troubles first began in 1929 they could h a v e  been 
stopped a t the very outset : they were of no importance a t all. 
B ut there was nobody to stop them  except the Palestine Police, 
who were fairly good but not very disciplined.”  T h e  view 
was expressed th a t there should be a general reserve a t  head­
quarters and local reserves in local areas, and that if necessary 
the Force should be augm ented to  provide for this, with a  much 
higher percentage of British in the Police, since “  th e re  is no I 
Jew  or A rab in the country who is im partial where the dominant I 
issue is concerned ” . j
44. Some witnesses, whose experience gives special value to I 
their evidence, advocated the revival of the British Gendarmerie. I
" T h ey  had officers w ho understood the country. They had a 1  
Camel Corps. T h ey  had cavalry. T h ey  were practically all mounted I 
and th e y  were scattered in  sm all num bers a ll over the country. I  
T hey were in  tou ch  w ith  the people o f th e  country and were a I  
m ost adm irable force to  back up th e  P o lice .” . . . “ It was a I  
profound error ever to  h ave disbanded th e  B ritish  Gendarmerie, and I  
I  th ink  there is a  great deal to  be said for th a t force being recon-1  
stitu ted , and it  w ould be a great econom y, because regular troops I  
are n o t th e  people really needed th ere .”  1
The British Gendarmerie in 1924-5 cost approximately £200,000.1 
The point a t issue, therefore, is w hether the retention of this force I  
would have obviated the heavy expenditure on “  Defence ”, I  
given in paragraph 23 above. I
45. On the other hand we received evidence of r e lu c t a n c e  1  
to resuscitate the Gendarmerie and a preference for an in c r ea se  I
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in the British m ounted force of 2 4 0  troopers, the approxim ate 
cost of which would be £ 6 5 ,0 0 0 .  These m en were to be em­
ployed in patrolling the country in the interests of public 
security throughout the year, arm ed as mounted infantry. In  
event of widespread disorder, or as in 1 9 3 6 , universal disorder,
“ they would form extraordinarily useful m ounted detachm ents in  
these wild h ill areas w hich are very  difficult to  control either from  
motor cars or on foot. T hese m en getting to  know th e  country, the  
language and custom s of th e people, able to  ta lk  to  them  in  their  
own vernacular, w ould have a  very  large effect on rural rev o lt.”
46. We regard it as established, first, th a t central and local 
reserves are necessary; secondly, tha t a  large mobile m ounted 
force is also essential, w hether in the form of a Gendarmerie 
or by increasing the British M ounted Police. The difference 
between these alternatives appears to be one of degree rather 
than of principle. Such a  reinforcement would probably, as 
was the case in 1922, allow of a  reduction in the regular forces 
of the Garrison.
47. Revenue in 1936-37 was £4,639,953. The expenditure on 
Public Security was, as mentioned above, £2,230,623. We 
have also to face the fact tha t, despite the heavy increase in ex­
penditure on the Police Force, the riots in 1936* were on a  larger 
scale th a n  previously. Y et the suggestions which we received 
designed to prevent a  recurrence, like our recom mendation in 
the p reced in g  paragraph, would m ean a  considerable increase in 
the charges.
48. T h e  first—since it repeats the suggestion m ade by Sir 
Herbert Dowbiggin—is for barracks in  the larger towns, with 
adequate provision for the wives and families of the members 
of the Force, who would thus be protected against intim idation. 
Apparently Sir H erbert Dowbiggin assumed tha t both in the 
bachelors' barracks and in the m arried quarters Jew s and  Arabs 
should, a s  at the Training School, “  live, feed, work and play 
together G radually each Police Station throughout the 
country would have its own barrack and complement of m arried 
quarters. The difficulty of getting Jewish and A rab Police to 
intermingle was recognized. W e  were told of a  p lan for twelve 
flats, the four top flats being for Moslems, the m iddle block 
for C h ris tian s, and the lower floors for Jews. A ctually, how­
ever, v e ry  few barracks or m arried quarters have been 
built. Though it was reported in 1921 th a t “  barrack 
accommodation is being provided in the towns of Palestine 
as rapidly as funds will allow, with a view to the Police 
being no longer scattered in houses in the towns to which 
they b e lo n g ,”  b y  1930 nothing had been done in Jerusalem ,
* Chapter IV.
Chapter V II. 200
H aifa, Jaffa or Tel Aviv. B arracks and  m arried quarters 
are in our opinion an urgent necessity in the last two 
towns. “ We realize ” , we were told by a witness, “ that we 
m ust build m arried quarters bu t of course it is a  very expensive 
business.”  Roughly each barrack will cost £100 per resident: 
each m arried quarter for Palestinian £180, for British Police
49. A second suggestion is that, in view of the frequent cutting 
of telephone wires during the riots, an  underground system 
should be provided. The cost of an underground c a b le  from 
Jerusalem  to Jaffa and thence through Tel Aviv and the Coastal 
P lain to H aifa would be £120,000. This would be o n ly  one of 
several required. We think it better to depend o n  wireless 
telegraphy.
50. A third suggestion was that the Jew s should be armed. 
As a m atter of fact, there is good reason to suspect that, like the 
A rabs, the Jew s possess a large num ber of illicit arms. The 
shipment discovered by accident a t Jaffa* in 1935 was probably 
the last of three or four sim ilar shipments. Three hundred 
and fifty-nine drum s contained 254 Mauser pistols w ith  affix- 
able butts, 90 revolvers, 500 bayonets, and 400,000 ro u n d s of 
am munition. Previously, in March, 1930, three ostensibly 
em pty iron safes were consigned from  Vienna to Haifa. On 
unscrewing the backs, the space which is norm ally packed with 
insulating m aterial was found to contain 148 Mauser rifles, 
m inus stocks and butts, 57,875 rounds of rifle and revolver 
am m unition and 2,250 cartridge clips. On this su b je c t Sir 
H erbert Dowbiggin reported : “ I t  is subm itted that th e  best 
preventive for the illicit possession of arm s and the formation of 
secret Defence Societies is for the Government to sh o w  and 
prove th a t it is determ ined to and can m aintain o rd e r  and 
provide for the necessary protection of persons and property.”
51. Though it is only on rare occasions that any J e w  has 
resorted to the use of unauthorized firearms, we were informed 
tha t, in round num bers the Jew s could place in the field 10,0001 
com batants, trained and arm ed, w ith a second line of 40,000.
52. There are obvious objections to arm ing one section of the 
population to enable it to defend itself against another. The 
fact has been recorded above f tha t even the issue o f  a limited 
num ber of Greener shot guns to be held in sealed armouries 
provoked a riot in 1931. Y et the isolated position o f  m any of 
the Jewish settlements dem ands more adequate protection than 
is afforded by sealed arm ouries, even though these can be 
readily opened in any emergency. Further, isolated armouries 
m ay themselves invite attack. I
£500.
* Page 88. 
t  Page 80-81.
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53. In the 1 9 3 6  riots 3 ,0 0 0  Jew s were trained as Supple­
m e n ta l Police to defend the colonies and to guard any railway 
running through their area, the cost of their equipment and 
salaries b e in g  borne half by  Government and half b y  the Jewish 
Agency. A proposal was placed before us tha t these 3 ,0 0 0  men 
should be  retained as an auxiliary force, to parade and drill 
with rifles and uniforms when required and strictly restricted to  
defence duties in their own areas only. The Jewish Agency 
strongly supported this proposal, bu t suggested that 1 ,0 0 0  rifles 
should always be in use by the watchmen in the settlements. 
They pointed out tha t the arm ing of these supernum erary police­
men came “  only after considerable delay and a t the price of 
much avoidable dam age and suffering. At the beginning we 
had a wave of arson in  the country, m ainly agricultural arson : 
the burning of crops, the uprooting or cutting of fruit trees. W e 
had thousands and  thousands of trees destroyed and hundreds 
of dunum s of forest land burned down in  these disturbances."
54. “ The first of all conditions necessary for the welfare of 
any c o u n try  is public security ." So wrote the first H igh Com­
missioner of Palestine when reviewing his five years of office. 
To-day it is evident tha t the elementary duty of providing 
public security has not been discharged. If there is one griev­
ance w hich  the Jew s have undoubted right to prefer it is the 
absence of security. Their complaints on this head were 
dignified and restrained.
55. O u r review has shown that the steps taken a t different 
intervals by the Palestine Administration to strengthen their 
security services, to enforce respect for law and order, to 
guarantee to the Jew s "  quiet enjoyment ”  of their N ational 
Home, have more than  once proved ineffectual. And not 
unnaturally we heard grave doubts expressed as to the future. 
It is o u r duty to submit recommendations for the rem oval of 
any well-founded grievance, and for the prevention of its 
recurrence.
56. These riots, troubles, disturbances, or, as in 1936, re­
bellions, are symptoms of the disease. They are not the disease 
itself, the  cause of which goes much deeper and, as pointed out 
in our earlier chapters, is affected by factors outside Palestine. 
But apart from this, the essential need is to inculcate among the 
opulation of Palestine, both A rab and Jew , in Nablus as well 
as Tel Aviv, a wholesome respect for the authority of the Man­
datory Power. The country is a t present divided into two 
anned camps, with the British Police Force and the Garrison 
between them in the difficult position of trying to m aintain peace 
and order. Any small incident m ay be the spark that starts a 
arge explosion.
57' O u r chief recommendation is this. Should disorders 
break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention
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, 1  xue are under no illusion as to what th is  means.
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. , +r> he taken, we would advocate
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Arabs, if still the , ' t k  “  The prevention of gun-
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60. T h e  evidence we received on the question of disarm am ent 
ffas conflicting. “  I  can see no possible way of disarm ing ” , 
said one  witness, "  except possibly by the use of terrorism , 
which I do not believe the British Government would ever 
allow. If we were to adopt Turkish methods in this country, 
yes, it could be done; b u t with the means which we are allowed 
to em ploy  without intim idation and fear I  do not think it is a 
feasible proposition ” . And another : —“ I would certainly urge 
that e v e ry  effort be m ade to disarm  the population, bu t I  am  not 
sanguine that it would be effective . . . .  The Arabs keep their 
arms hidden in caves and in holes in the ground. The Jews, 
too, a re  heavily arm ed
61. A fte r the riots in  1929 between the 23rd August, 1929, 
and the 20th February, 1930, 239 rifles (18 unserviceable), 204 
revolvers (20 unserviceable), 35 shot-guns, 10,328 rounds of 
rifle ammunition, 1,969 rounds of revolver ammunition and 13 
bombs were seized and confiscated. In  subsequent years the 
confiscated weapons have been : —
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
* Includes 345 p isto ls and revolvers confiscated ex  S.S. Leopold.
The number of licensed weapons in  the country is as follows:
Rifles. P isto ls and Revolvers. Total.
384 442 826
272 247 5 1 9
282 365 647
244 298 5 4 2
3 7 3 324 697
1 4 3 608* 781*
318 316 6 3 4
Rifles .................
R evolvers and P istols 
Shot-guns .................
Jews.
15
217
1,998
Arabs.
96
132
2,410
icensed dealers have to keep their arm s and am munition in 
locked receptacles and are regularly inspected. B ut the control 
sf explosives is not complete. Evidence was given that 
explosives are being m ade in certain parts of the country by  
rivate firm s . Much ingenuity, as rem arkable as it was mis- 
:hievous, was displayed in laying road mines a t the comers 
:n hill roads.
62. While rewards for bringing in  illicit weapons on a 
"enerous scale are reported to have had  some effect, another 
witness was of opinion that this was “  really starting a  trade 
n not too  efficient w eapons, and giving owners of inefficient 
:nes an opportunity of obtaining something tow ards better 
weapons.”  This witness advocated disarm am ent “ strongly 
nd a b so lu te ly .”  The suggestion was m ade that no reasonable 
rson should be refused a licence if he has a weapon and can
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be trusted. Concurrently with that, the penalties for having an [ 
arm  which had  not been declared should be increased. “ The 
great thing, and obviously the first principle of government, is 
to control the weapons in the country, and as long as they are 
licensed, you can control them. I t  does not mean disarming 
the country absolutely, bu t you are getting control of all | 
w eapons."
6 3 . In  the event then of disorders recurring which require I 
the introduction of m artial law we recommend, first, th a t dis-1 
arm am ent, however difficult, should be enforced and, secondly, I 
tha t, to secure the permanence of disarm ament, a n  effective 
frontier organization should be established for stopping I 
smuggling, illegal im migration and gun-running, combined with I 
a  generous issue of licences to perm anent residents, who might I 
be called on in time of trouble to surrender their weapons I 
temporarily. On the completion of A rab disarmament there I 
should be no hesitation in disarm ing the Jew s, if necessary under I 
m artial law, with equal thoroughness.
6 4 . In  the absence of disarm am ent the system of super­
num erary voluntary police for the defence of the Je w ish  settle-! 
ments should be continued, and regarded as p art of th e  internal I 
security arrangem ents. I t  should be a disciplined fo rce . There I 
should be regular parades and drills and probably ra n g e  prac-1 
tice under British supervision. If there is any reason to I 
apprehend attack on th e  settlements rifles should b e  served out I 
to the guards in the different settlements. Effective disarmament I 
would render these measures, undesirable because provocative,| 
unnecessary.
6 5 . We have recommended above that there sh o u ld  be a I 
strong Press Ordinance and no hesitation in applying it. Lastly, I 
it is obvious that there should be some more satisfactory means I 
of liaison between the various officers in the Districts, civil and! 
police, than the Mukhtar. A t present Arab District Officers are I 
sent to Arab Districts, Jewish District Officers to p la c e s  where I 
the Jewish population predominates. In  mixed areas we wouldl 
welcome the appointm ent of British District Officers w h o , living] 
on the spot, should be able to arrange a satisfactory system 1 ' 
intelligence and thus anticipate some of the causes of racialj 
outbreak.
66. If, however, we are asked whether we can with confidence I 
recommend these measures as a solution of the problem  oil 
insecurity, tru th  compels us to say that, with a l l  the difficulties! 
that m any of these measures entail and the unfortunate results! 
attending their application, we could a t best re g a rd  themj 
not as a perm anent rem edy, but only as tem porary measures! 
designed to prevent a recurrence of open rebellion a n d  to give! 
the Jews tha t protection which, under the Mandate, th ey  have!
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a right to expect. They involve an efficient patrol force along 
ie frontier, with probably heavy expenditure on wiring parts 
it: a  large increase in the British Police: the rapid construc­
tion of barracks and m arried quarters: an  extension of wireless 
telegraphy: and the retention of a  strong British garrison. The 
entire cost could not be met from the revenues of Palestine: 
irants-in-aid from Y our M ajesty’s Government in the United 
bngdom would have to be on a generous scale. The 
immediate effect would be to widen the gulf that separates the 
Arab from  the Jew , with repercussions spreading far beyond the 
(orders o f Palestine.
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FINANCIAL AND FISCAL QUESTIONS.
i .  Many of the Jew ish witnesses complained that fa r  morel 
money should have been spent on national development and! 
social services. They advocated a  more dynamic p o lic y  in con-[ 
nexion with the settlement of the Jew s on the land. I n  order toi 
judge how far these alleged shortcomings were due to  adminis­
trative apathy or limitation of resources, we give the figures ofl 
Government revenue from Customs and from all sources sinci 
the beginning of the Civil Adm inistration: —
Total Total
Years. Customs. Revenue. Expenditure.
■ £ £ £
1.7.20 to  31.3.21 279,589 1,136,951 1,259,587
1921/22 . . .  ... 639,256 2,371,531 1,929,34!
1922/23 ................. 609,623 1,809,831 1,884,280
1923/24 ................. 494.131 1,675,788 1,675,105
1924/25 ................. 642,068 2,154,946 1,852,985
1925/26 ................. 886,312 2,809,324 2,092,647
1926/27 ................. 803,665 2,451,365 2,123,568
1927 (Apr. to  Dec.) .. . 569,935 1,739,380 !.9 4 4 , 3 9 7
1928 892,278 2,584.317 3 ,3 8 1 , 9 9 3
1 9 2 9 ............................... 917,050 2,323,572 2,140,032
1 9 3 0 ............................... 991,688 2,389.546 2 ,5 3 6 , 5 0 4
1 9 3 1 ............................... 922,080 2,333.895 2 ,3 7 4 , 8 6 7
1.1.32 to  31.3.32 257,107 657,289 5x1,656
1 9 3 2 / 3 3  ..... . . .  1,286,945 3,015,917 2 ,5 1 6 , 3 9 4
1 9 3 3 / 3 4  ................. "... 1,868,598 3,985,493 2,704,856
1 9 3 4 / 3 5  ................. . . .  2,600,370 5,452,633 3,230,010
1 9 3 5 / 3 6  ................. . . .  2,751,245 5.770,456 4,236,201
1 9 3 6 / 3 7 * ................. . . .  2,019,479 4,639,953 6 ,0 9 9 , 9 9 7
* Provisional figures.
These figures show th a t until recent years there w a s  no j 
scope for development in  the social services. The accumu 
tion of a  considerable surplus was a feature peculiar to  the foiij 
years beginning in 1932 and there were grounds, a s we 
show in paragraph 4 below, for a  conservative attitude towai 
this development.
2. As regards debt, there is no burden on the co u n try  exci 
the 1927 5 per cent, loan of £4,475,000 issued at i o o | ,  withj 
sinking fund of £1  6s. 2d. per cent, and guaranteed by ' 
U nited Kingdom Treasury. The effect of Treasury control 1 
been to secure in a young country w ith a  multitude of financii 
and economic problems a  conservative and sometimes a restai 
tive policy. On the other hand, where there is n o  Législatif 
Council to criticize expenditure and complain of taxation , sucj 
control m ay not be unwelcome to harassed Treasurers.
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3. It will be observed tha t in the last few years there has been 
a su b stan tia l surplus of revenue. On the 1st April, 1936, this 
surplus amounted to £6,267,000; bu t a deficit of £1,460,000* in 
the year 1936-37 has reduced it to £4,807,000. The accumula­
tion of so  large a surplus has been criticized on the familiar 
ground t h a t  a rieedless am ount has been drawn from  the t a x ­
payers o r ,  alternatively, tha t if raised it should already have 
been sp e n t on public works or services.
4. The Government felt th a t the receipts in the years since 
1932 were largely abnorm al, or tem porary, and th a t it would 
be unsafe to reduce taxation below a level which would en-
1 danger those receipts when boom conditions disappeared or 
to em bark on developments involving recurrent expenditure 
in excess of “  normal ”  revenue. There were m any demands 
for essential capital expenditure which it would be better to 
meet from  the proceeds of abnorm al receipts rather than from 
loans. T h e y  were reluctant to burden the future with the 
interest o r sinking fund of large sums until revenue receipts 
were m ore or less stabilized. The prima facie conclusion that 
the existence of a large apparent surplus balance reflects undue 
parsimony in recent years is, unfortunately, not borne out by a 
closer analysis. The entire surplus is found to be so heavily 
mortgaged that it is little more than a reasonable provision for 
lexisting commitments. For instance, if the £2,000,000 loan is 
potto be raised a sum of £1,942,000 m ust be deducted from 
[surplus balances to meet paym ents actually m ade (£1,185,782 
latthe 31st March, 1937) and treated as advances from, and not 
[charges to , Revenue Account, and to provide for the completion 
lof approved Loan W orks in progress and the execution of essen- 
Itial p ro jected  works for which the loan was to have been 
hised. The surplus is thus a t once reduced to about
13,000,000. In actual fact almost the whole of this is already 
lamiarked for various charges, including £917,000 of unavoid­
able expenditure on further works in progress or to which Gov- 
Imment is committed, £516,000 for arrears of railway renewals 
pd £500,000 for the necessary Treasury working balance. A 
proposal was under consideration for the creation of a Reserve 
p u d , of £3,000,000 in the first instance, to be utilized when 
p e  revenues of Palestine in any one year were insufficient to 
peet any of the following paym ents—
I [a) any sums required for interest or sinking fund pay-
! merits under any loan raised by the A dm inistration of 
I Palestine and guaranteed by Y our M ajesty’s Government in 
I the United K ingdom ;
I {b) any sums required for the paym ent of pensions or
I gratuities granted under the provisions of any Ordinance.
* Provisional figures.
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I t  was also proposed tha t the fund should be utilized withl
the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and
the U nited Kingdom Treasury for—
{a) any sums to be appropriated to supplement t h e  sink-1 
ing fund paym ents under any loan raised by the A dm inis-I 
tration of Palestine and by  Y our M ajesty's Government ini 
the United Kingdom o r to repay in whole or in part any!
such loan; o r 1
(&) any sums required to meet capital expenditure byl 
the Adm inistration of Palestine.
B ut the proposal has not yet received the approval o f  the) 
United Kingdom Treasury. I t  is now unlikely to materialize i 
the near future owing to the recent decline in revenue receipts] 
increased expenditure resulting from  the 1936 "  disturbances’ 
the great press of necessary works and the fact that the pro­
jected £2,000,000 loan has not been raised.
5. The figures quoted above show the very large contribution 
which Customs m ake to the general revenue. The great disl 
proportion between direct and indirect taxation was disturbinj 
and in 1934 the question of the introduction of an Incom e Ta: 
was exam ined. To assist the inquiry an officer of th e  Unitei 
Kingdom In land  Revenue D epartm ent came out to Palesjinj 
and was associated with a committee of local o ffic ia ls . I t wai 
originally thought by the Palestine Government that by th| 
imposition of a low rate of tax  the people would become familial 
with its principles, and tha t an increase in the rate could be mad 
if there was a falling off in Customs revenue. The evidencJ 
presented both to the committee and the United Kingdom official 
showed tha t the tax would m eet with strenuous opposition fronj 
almost everyone except the Moslem Arabs. I t  also appears 
certain tha t there would be widespread and systematic avoidanci 
and that the cost of collection would be out of all proportiod 
to the sum  raised. F or these reasons the United Kingdonf 
official presented a  report which was unfavourable to 
proposal and ultim ately the Government decided that 
such tax  should be imposed, a t any  rate for the present] 
A nother proposal, tha t undeveloped land in u rb a n  are 
should be taxed a t a higher rate, was vehemently opposi 
by  the A rabs, on the ground tha t more land would ’ 
forced into the m arket for the benefit of the Jews.
6. Palestine was m ainly an agricultural country before 
W ar, and those industries which existed were of an agricultv 
character. The m anufacture of soap in a primitive way asf 
wine were the only industries established on a large scale, 
large num ber of traditional industries in which hand or anin 
power was used in the process of m anufacture w ere  also
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e x is te n c e ,  and these included oil pressing, weaving of carpets, 
mats, Arab cloth and head-gear, textile dyeing, and glass 
making.
j , A fter the W ar, when Jewish immigrants brought into the 
country their industrial experience and capital, a  num ber of 
small factories producing a variety of articles and a few large 
factories for the m anufacture of cement, vegetable oils, flour, 
and stockings, were established.
8. In 1927 the policy of protecting local industry was 
initiated and the fam iliar phrase “ infant industries ”  became 
part of the fiscal language of Palestine. Machinery and certain 
raw and semi-manufactured materials im ported for use in pro­
duction were freed from duty, while in certain cases the charges 
on the finished article were increased. W here it is not possible 
to exempt from im port duty im ported commodities used in 
local production and the local industry is producing for export, 
a system of drawbacks perm its in approved cases a refund on 
exportation, representing a substantial part of the im port duty 
collected on the im ported commodities used in the locally pro­
duced article. The wide m anufacturing field now covers 
extraction of mineral salts from  the Dead Sea, food products, 
drinks, cigarettes, tobacco, building m aterials, metal-work, 
furniture, textiles, leather goods, artificial teeth, matches, wear­
ing apparel, and chemical and allied products. Thus a  useful 
outlet was provided for capital which m ight otherwise have 
been concentrated on the citrus industry. As a general rule 
the initiative in applying for protective duties is taken by  the 
industry itself. An application is subm itted to the Standing 
Committee for Commerce and Industry. I t  is then examined 
by the Director of Customs, Excise and Trade from the point 
of view of the effects on revenue. The quality of the local 
products, competition of similar im ported products and the 
degree of protection is also considered. W hen these points 
have been established the question is referred back to the 
Standing Committee. In  two cases in particular a different 
procedure was followed. Protection was considered and 
promised in advance of establishment for a  rice mill at H aifa 
and a brewery at Rishon. The world prices, transport and freight 
charges and the cost of local production were considered, 
and in the case of the brewery the possible effect on the older 
wine industry. We are inform ed that so far few, if any, of 
the protected industries can at present compete with im ported 
articles as regards price and quality, though a notable excep-
on is the Nesher Cement Company. The difficulties of access 
to foreign m arkets, competition of foreign products (disposed
f in some cases at uneconomic prices) and the com paratively 
all scale of production are among the contributory causes 
to this lack of success.
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g. The Census of Industries taken by  the Department of 
Customs, Excise and Trade in 1928 showed the annual value 
of industrial production a t that time to  be £3,886,149. The 
progress made since th a t date is illustrated by the f ig u r e s  com­
piled from official sources which are  contained in the following I 
tab le :—
Year. Reference.
Value of industrial 
production 
[millions of £).
1928 Industrial Census, p. 26, Table 2 (6) 3 - 8
(Estimated.)
1 9 3 3 1934 Annual Report, p . 197, para. 17 5 ' 5
1 9 3 4 1934 Annual Report, p . 15, para. 41 6-5
1 9 3 5 1935 Annual R eport, p . 22, para. 58 7-0
If  the estimate for 1935 m ay be taken as roughly correct, it I 
follows th a t in the seven years’ period 1929-35 there was an I 
increase of £3,200,000, or 84 per cent., in an industrial output I 
which had itself been built up from almost nothing since the| 
end of the W ar.-
10. We were inform ed tha t, a t present, there exist in Palestine I 
probably about 6,000 enterprises, of which 4,500 a re  handi-| 
crafts and 1,500 are industrial establishments, the fo rm e r  t 
enterprises in which less than  five persons, including th e  owners,I 
are employed. The to tal capital invested is in excess of I 
£10,000,000, and the num ber of workers employed probably I 
exceeds 40,000. Of the above totals, the num ber of n e w  Jewish! 
enterprises established in the period from 1920 to 1934-35 whose I 
date of establishm ent is known was 4,157, of w h ic h  1,246! 
are industrial establishments and 2,911 are handicrafts. The! 
capital invested in these enterprises am ounted ove;r th e  same| 
period to  £8,116,000.
11. The Jew ish Agency estimates th a t a t the end of 1935 the! 
num ber of Jewish industrial workers amounted to approxi-l 
m ately 32,000, which would represent a population (inclusive] 
of dependants) of a t least 80,000. No considerable export 
trade of locally m anufactured goods has as yet been built up.J 
The figures for the past six years are as follows : —
£
364,0001931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
435.000
406.000
404.000
478.000
547.000
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In order that the relation of exports of locally-manufactured 
goods to  total exports m ay be clear, we append the latter in 
respect o f  the same years* :—
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
£
1,572,061
2,381,491
2,591,617
3,217,562
4,215,486
3,625,233
12. In 1935 the value of dutiable imports was £10,724,000, 
on which the to tal duty  collected was £2,870,000. Roughly 
speaking, 80 per cent, of the duties were on a specific basis 
and 20 per cent, on an ad valorem. In  tha t year the total 
duty was about 27 per cent, of the value of the im ported 
dutiable goods, f  The fact th a t some of the duties are very high 
has provoked vigorous comment from the Arabs. W e m ight 
give as examples the duty of 70 per cent, on cement, 350 per 
cent, on matches in boxes and 90 per cent, on galvanized iron 
buckets not exceeding 28 cms. in diameter. The above figures 
are the ad valorem  equivalents of the specific duty for the most 
important competing im ports in each case.
13. The figures for dutiable and non-dutiable goods for the 
year 1935 are as follows : —
Classification.
I.—Food, drinks and tobacco
II—Raw m aterials and articles m ainly un­
manufactured ...
III—Articles w holly or m ainly m anufactured  
IV.—Miscellaneous and unclassified goods (ex­
cluding bullion and specie)
T otal .................
Non-Dutiable.
£
1.311.000
688,000
3.072.000
2.058.000
Dutiable.
£
2.336.000
6 3 5 . 0 0 0
7.718.000
35,00°
£7,129,000 £10,724,000
14. Though the A rabs control a substantial num ber of 
factories, the bulk of new industries established in recent years 
ire Jew ish , as we have already indicated. There is a definite 
limit to the num ber of Jews th a t can be settled on the land, 
even w hen the utmost use has been made of the w ater resources 
of the country. Hence greater attention has been paid to 
industrial development, with its more elastic dem and for workers 
and immigrants, than to the slower process of husbandry.
* These figures exclude exports in transit, exports from bond, re-exports of 
«reign goods and exports of specie.
t Corresponding 1936 figures are :—value of dutiable imports £7,010,000 ; 
toy collected £2,012,000 (i.e. 2 8 -6  per cent, of total value); 8 4 .4  percent. 
™ *he duties were collected on a specific and 15 • 6 per cent, on an ad valorem
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1 5 . The Jew s indeed m aintain that Palestine, th o u g h  it is 
deficient in raw materials, has the advantage of e a s y  access 
to the sea and is favourably placed for obtaining its require­
ments at a low cost. The Palestine Electric C o rp o r a t io n  can 
supply the power, and  the presence of the pipe-line may be 
of advantage in the future; labour is intelligent and adaptable 
and of a higher standard than is usually to be found in  states 
emerging from an agricultural economy. Many of the German 
immigrants, in particular, are well skilled in different processes 
of m anufacture and have been trained in a highly organized 
industrial state.
1 6 . But the most singular feature in the economy of Palestine 
is the vast am ount of capital which has been invested in  the 
country, for which no remittances abroad for interest a n d  sink­
ing fund are required. This feature sharply d if fe r e n t ia te s  the 
Jewish National Home from  other communities which h a v e  been 
created by a process of colonization and are burdened b y  charges 
on the capital obtained from overseas for their developm ent. 
The dangerous position of Jew s in Europe and the enthusiasm  
for settlement in Palestine have brought plentiful su p p ly  of 
capital, which has been invested in the country. Apart fro m  the 
£ 6 3 , 0 0 0 ,0 0 0  invested by private enterprise, some £14,037,000 
subscribed by  Jew s in their national funds has been devoted 
to the draining of swamps and the reclamation of la n d , the 
training of im migrants and industrial experiment. From 
the financial point of view, the position is so f o r tu n a t e  that 
the question is asked whether this state of things is  stab le  or 
perm anent. I t  m ay be argued tha t even a check to immigra­
tion, or the reduction of the num ber of newcomers with capital, 
or a slackening of interest in the Zionist movement, might 
only cause some readjustm ent in the economic equilibrium , 
and probably call out for capital investm ent some of th e  large 
deposits in the Palestine banks. The very large a d v e r s e  trade 
balance would be reduced; and the yield of the i m p o r t  duties 
would diminish. The following figures supplied by th e  Jewish 
Agency show a very close relation between capital investm ent 
and adverse trade balance :—
J e w i s h  C a p i t a l  I n v e s t m e n t  i n  P a l e s t i n e  a n d  t h e  E x c e s s  of
There is no reason why the removal of exceptional a d v a n ta g e s  
should result in penury; though there might be some re d u c tio n
I m p o r t s  o v e r  E x p o r t s .
Year.
C apital
Investment.
Adverse
Trade
Balance.
1932
1 9 3 3
1 9 3 4
1 9 3 5
3.000.000
6.000.000
10.000.000
11.000.000
£ £
5,387,429
8 ,5 3 i . 87 2
h , 9 3 5 . 2 I 9
13.638,007
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in the standard of living till the new economy was established. 
It will be  noted that the Government have to some extent pro­
tected themselves against these economic fluctuations by  estab­
lishing a distinction between “ normal ”  and “  abnorm al ” 
revenue. In the event, however, of a prolonged period of 
stagnant economic conditions in Palestine, particularly if accom­
panied b y  im provement in the position of Jews abroad, the 
danger of an exodus of capital cannot be altogether excluded. 
It is moreover a disquieting feature of the trade returns that 
total domestic exports in 1936 (£3,625,233) fell short of the 
amount required to pay  for im ports of food, drink and tobacco 
(j63.939*350).
17. The Arabs complain that, as most of the recently-protected 
industries are Jewish concerns and employ Jewish workmen, 
the increased cost of commodities must faU on the Arabs who 
form the mass of the rural population. To w hat extent there 
may be truth in this argum ent it is not possible in the absence 
of statistics to declare. The newly-formed departm ent has not 
been able to supply us with figures of the incidence of taxation. 
We hope that these enquiries m ay soon take place and that 
new duties will be considered in relation to the whole burden of 
taxation, and not merely as affecting the particular industry. 
Whether the Arabs have suffered or gained from the Jewish 
immigration has been dealt with in Chapter V above.* If  they 
have had to pay more for certain commodities, they have 
secured a better m arket for their agricultural produce. The 
Government has gained heavily by the Customs duties on 
imported Jewish goods, and been able to meet the cost of 
services which have im proved the general health of the country. 
The rapid rise in the price of land has filled m any A rabs' 
pockets, and enabled them  to sell p a rt of their holdings and 
improve the rest.
18. There rem ain certain aspects of the export trade to be 
examined. The large adverse balance of trade in Palestine can 
only be interpreted in the light of the other economic factors of 
the c o u n try . B ut there can be no question of the need of 
increasing the export trade of a country where the smallness of 
the market enhances the difficulty of economic production and 
where th e  citrus industry m ust find more purchasers for its ever- 
increasing output. In  1935, oranges, grapefruit and lemons 
constituted 84 per cent, of the total exports. We have received 
a paper f r o m  the Jew ish citrus growers in Palestine, which but 
for the disturbances would, we are told, have been signed by 
the A rab growers. The following figures are based on this docu­
ment. The total area of citrus groves has grown from 28,000 
dunums in  1919 to about 300,000 dunums in 1936. The total 
export in  the 1935-6 season was just under 6,000,000 boxes ;
46497
* Page 129.
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m  the 1936-37 season it was 10,750,000 boxes; the e s tim a te  for 
the 1937-38 season is between 10,000,000 and 12,500,000 boxes. 
I t  is estimated th a t in 1941, w ith an average output of 80 
boxes per dunum , there will be an export crop of 2 2 ,24 0 ,0 0 0  
boxes. As m any as 50,000 persons are employed as labourers 
and packers in the industry and in connected occupations. No 
further illustration is required of the dom inant part w h ic h  this 
industry plays in the export trade as well as in the internal 
economy of the country, or of the extent of the p ro b le m  of 
m arketing which is thereby created.
19. Of the present estimated total world production of
170.000.000 cases of oranges, "  winter oranges ” represent 
about 100,000,000 cases : of these, some 55,000,000 cases  are 
consumed locally in the countries of production, the rem aining
45.000.000 cases are exported and find m arkets, m a in ly  in 
the United Kingdom and on the continent of Europe. I t  is 
estimated that during the next ten years the world p ro d u c tio n  of I 
w inter oranges will increase by  about 30,000,000 cases—o r  about 
67 per cent.—which will be provided by the following 
countries : —
20. The per capita consumption of oranges in the w orld  at 
large m ay still be low and capable of expansion : b u t  when 
Palestine tries to increase its export, it comes into c o n ta c t, in 
m ost of its potential m arkets, with the great b a r r i e r s  of pro­
hibitive duties, barter arrangem ents and currency restrictions 
which have been built up in m any countries in r e c e n t  years. I 
Ita ly , Spain, the U nited States and other c itru s-p ro d u c in g  
countries can make their bargains and commercial treaties, 
while Palestine alone is stretched on the rack of th e  non­
discriminating injunction of the M andate—bound by a  rigid 
adherence to the policy of the open door.
21. T h e  Jew ish witnesses pressed strongly for the alteration 
or re-interpretation of Article 18 of the M andate. T h is  Article 
lays down the principle of the open door to the Palestine market 
for nationals of all countries tha t are members of the L eag u e  of 
Nations. I t  cannot have been the policy of the a u th o r s  of the 
M andate to ham per the norm al economic life of Palestine, and to I 
force on G reat B ritain the problem of squaring the circle by I 
insisting that, while the ports of Palestine m ust be kept o p en , no I 
method existed of obtaining reciprocal advantage fro m  the I 
foreigners. Larger m arkets were essential if Palestine, w ith  her I 
limited internal purchasing power, were to become an industrial I 
state.
P alestine . . .
U nited  States o f Am erica  
Spain
Cases.
15,000,000
7.000.000
5.000.000
Other countries (Cyprus, E gyp t, A lgiers, etc.) 3,000,000
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22. First of all the good offices of Great Britain as a guardian 
and protector m ight be invoked. W hy should not the ad­
vantages of Im perial Preference be extended to Palestine ? Some 
years ago His M ajesty’s Government were advised tha t Pales­
tine as an “ A  ” M andate m ust be regarded as a foreign state 
for these purposes, and th a t a  preference given to her, e.g. in 
respect of citrus fru it, m ust be granted also to Spain o r any 
other country entitled to m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent. 
Apart from this legal objection, members of the Em pire might 
question the propriety of this extension to foreigners, w hether 
it took the form of a  preference, or a grant representing the 
amount of the duty. I t m ight be more feasible to extend to 
the m o n th  of April the low duty rate (10 per cent, ad valorem) 
on oranges now charged in the United Kingdom during the 
months of December to March, and postpone the incidence of 
the high duty rate (3s. 6d. per cwt.) to the 1st of May. This 
change would scarcely affect South African trade, b u t an am end­
ment to the O ttawa Agreement with th a t country would be 
necessary.
23. A s an alternative, the citrus growers suggest tha t the 
Palestine tariff should contain m axim um  and minim um rates, 
the la t te r  applying to countries which took a certain proportion 
of Palestine goods, the form er to those whose purchases fell 
below th is  standard. The rate of reciprocity m ight be varied, 
subject to  the control of the League of Nations. I t  m ight be 
contended that this scheme would comply w ith the formal inter­
pretation of Article 18 but the point is by no means free from 
doubt. There are, however, grave objections to the plan. 
The maximum rate m ight be applied to countries from which 
raw materials or semi-manufactured articles of great im port­
ance to Palestine would norm ally be drawn, or again to Japan  
or In d ia , which are im portant suppliers to Palestine of the very 
cheap class of goods which the poorest elements in her popu­
lation require, bu t could not in any circumstances be im­
portant purchasers of her citrus fruit or other products. Thus 
the d a n g e r is very real th a t a  negligible increase in exports would 
be secu red  at the cost of an increase in the price or a reduc­
tion in the quantity  of very im portant classes of im ports. The 
cost, fo r instance, of wood for packing cases, chiefly draw n 
from Roumania, would be enhanced. I t  is worth noting tha t 
in the year 1936 only the United Kingdom, H olland and 
Norway would have qualified for the lower tariff even if 
the qualification for the more favourable rate of duty  had 
been p u t as low as the purchase of goods to the value of one 
half the  value of the goods supplied. The whole scheme, in 
fact, is f a r  too rigid to meet the constantly changing require­
ments of Palestine trade.
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24. On occasion an advantage has been obtained for Palestine 
as an appendix to a trade agreem ent between Great Britain 
and another country which has a favourable balance o f trade 
with the former. The foreigner m ay not w ant to purchase 
any more goods from  Great B ritain, bu t m ay be ready to  grant 
a  quota to a colony or a m andated territory as p a rt o f the 
bargain. This has actually happened in the case of Denmark 
and Poland.
25. Again it m ay be possible to make an arrangement, which 
though theoretically conferring an advantage on all the  world, 
yet, in fact, confines the benefit to the country concerned, 
especially if the tariff definitions are carefully arranged. In 
the case of France, a  quota for oranges was recently obtained 
by an adjustm ent of the tariff, which, though applicable to all 
countries, was of special advantage to French p e rfu m e ry .
26. B ut these expedients are not by themselves sufficient to 
solve more than a very small part of the problem of th e  need 
for larger m arkets. Greater opportunity for the sa le  of its 
m anufactures is essential for a country with an expanding 
population and a limited area of cultivation. The w hole  ques­
tion was considered by  the British Government on a  petition 
addressed to the Perm anent Mandates Commission of the League 
of Nations in April, 1936, by  the Jew ish Farm ers' F e d e ra tio n  of ! 
Palestine and the Jaffa Citrus Exchange.
27. The view of Y our M ajesty’s Government was expressed 
as follows : —
' ‘ H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent in th e  U nited  K ingdom  find themselves 
fu lly  in sym pathy  w ith th e  petitioners’ com plaints. T hey agree that 
it  cannot h ave been anticipated b y  those w ho framed the Palestine I 
M andate th a t the provisions contained in it  for non-discrimination in I 
m atters concerning com m erce, etc ., which were, presumably, designed I 
prim arily to  prevent th e  M andatory Governm ent from making I 
discrim inatory arrangem ents for its own comm ercial advantage in the I 
M andated Territory, w ould m ainly operate to  deprive the Mandated I 
Territory of alm ost all m eans of advancing its  economic interests by I 
tariff and other sim ilar negotiations and to  rem ove any possibility of I 
retaliation against unfair com m ercial treatm ent b y  other countries." I
And again, when summing up the question : —
“  H is M ajesty’s Governm ent do not propose to  discuss in detail I 
th e particular proposals pu t forward a t the end of th e  Memorandum, I 
b ut th ey  do n ot feel th a t th ey  could support them  in the ir present I  
form because th ey  are n ot satisfied th a t th ey  would not infringe the I  
non-discrim inatory provisions of th e  Mandate. On th e  other hand, if I  
th ey  were so modified as to  bring them  w ithin those provisions, they I  
would not, in  th e  opinion of H is M ajesty's Government, be of such! 
a  nature as to  be likely  to  afford any net benefit to  Palestine trade. I  
H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent have, in short, been unable to devise! 
m easures of econom ic defence for P alestine w hich are likely to bel 
effective and a t th e  sam e tim e com patible w ith  the term s of the! 
M andate, and in  th e  circum stances th e y  are n ot able to  offer any! 
advice upon th e  p etition .”  I
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28. We take the view that the provisions of Article 18 are out 
of date. Opinion m ay differ as to the value of economic 
nationalism : bu t its principles are wholly inconsistent with non­
discrimination and the open door. The application of the 
irinciple of the open door to m andated territories was certainly 
lever intended to have an injurious effect on their “  well-being 
and development." W e think it is clear that without an am end­
ment of Article 18 Palestine must continue to suffer from the 
restrictions which ham per international trade and we recommend 
hat negotiations should be opened without delay to pu t the 
tiestine trade upon a  fairer basis.
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THE LAND.
1.—The first problem : the dual obligation.
1. There are three m ain problems connected with the land 
in Palestine : —
(1) The fulfilment of the instructions in the Mandate 
regarding “  close settlement by Jew s on the land ” , com­
bined with the obligation of safeguarding “  the rights and 
position of other sections of the population.”
(2) The area available for cultivation by residents or 
im m igrants, due allowance being m ade not only fo r  waste 
land, b u t for tha t required for afforestation or g ra z in g  and 
the means by  which it m ay best be developed in th e  interests 
of both races.
(3) The extent to which extensive can be rep laced by 
intensive cultivation and the water resources in Palestine 
can be developed.
In  connection with these problems, we have also to consider 
certain grievances put forward by A rabs and Jews.
2. In  examining all these questions we follow a well-beaten 
track. W e have had  the advantage of reading many earlier I 
reports of various committees and experts. There have been no 
less than twelve such enquiries, apart from committees appointed 
to discuss agrarian legislation, which have dealt inter alia with 
the land, proprietary rights and  tenancy, and also with irrigation. | 
The series commenced in 1920, when a travelling L a n d  Com­
mission was appointed to advise on the registration, control, | 
and the closer settlement of State Domains. Two o th e r com­
mittees were appointed to discover and demarcate va ca n t and I 
escheated lands.
3. They were ham pered by the absence of any previous I 
survey, o r any record of boundaries. They were also regarded j 
with suspicion by  the Arabs. Thus in 1920 the Transfer o f Land 
Ordinance was enacted, requiring the consent of G o v e r n m e n t  
to all dispositions of immovable property and forbidding alien-1 
ation to others than residents in Palestine. This protective I 
legislation, it was stated by the Commission of E n q u iry  which I 
reported on the riots of ig2i(*) was regarded by the Arabs as I 
having been introduced to keep down the price of land , and I 
to throw land which was in the m arket into the hands of Je® I 
a t a low price. Throughout all these investigations, and indeed F 
throughout our present enquiry, the absence of final and reliable J
* P age 51 above.
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a ta ,  coupled with the deep-seated m istrust of the Arabs, has 
a d d e d  t o  the difficulty of an already difficult problem. The strik­
ing f a c t  t o - d a y  is that, after all these reports, covering a  period 
of f i f te e n  years, the Palestine Government are unable to state 
w ith a n y  degree of accuracy how much land they hold either 
as S t a t e  Domains or as waste land.
4. In  1923 a Commission was appointed by  the High Com­
missioner to examine the system of ownership known as m ashda ,  
under which the whole of the property in a village is held in 
common, the individual shares being revised and divided every 
two years, an obvious bar to any agricultural development, 
here c a n  be no incentive to plant trees or even to m anure the 
and when ownership is to be transferred a t an  early date. The 
endeavours to replace joint by individual ownership involve 
very lengthy negotiations, and are one of the causes of delay, 
n 1923, 56 per cent, of the villages were masha'a : in 1930, 46 
ier cent. I t  is believed that m any villages are m ashd  a in name, 
rat are actually cultivated as individual parcels. The system, 
îowever, can be invoked for purposes of delay or litigation. In
1930 it w a s  reported that, though this Committee had “  made 
certain radical proposals, including the recommendation that 
egislation should be introduced empowering the executive 
authorities to enforce partition, nothing had been done."  We 
endorse this criticism. Since then, efforts, partially successful, 
lave b e e n  made to effect amicable partition, bu t it appears evi­
dent th a t, in certain areas, the Arabs regard this system of 
tenancy, destructive as it is of all development, as a safeguard 
against alienation, and th a t the Administration have been 
reluctant for political reasons to abolish it by legislation. I t  is be­
ing b ro k en  up gradually by the partition of areas as the land 
comes under settlement operations after cadastral survey. Further, 
Government have a num ber of officers who are constantly tour­
ing the villages, placing expert assistance and guidance a t the 
disposal of the cultivators as to the best method of breaking up 
nasha'a.
Where it has been proved to be to the benefit of both Arabs 
and Jews that the land should be parcellated into individual 
ownership, we consider that the Land Expropriation Ordinance 
might be used with advantage.
5- In 1924 Sir E rnest Dowson, late Financial Adviser and 
)irector-General of Surveys to the Government of Egypt, was 
engaged to report on the co-ordination of the Survey, Land and 
Finance Departments, and to prepare a scheme of land settle­
ment operations with a view to obtaining an accurate record of 
rights. A programme for this was issued in 1926.
6. At the beginning of 1927 Lord Plum er appointed a  Com­
mittee, under the Chairm anship of the Attorney-General and
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with the Commissioner of Lands as one of its members, to 
consider (i) whether legislation for the protection of tenants 
from  evictions would be effective and beneficial ; (2) if such 
legislation is considered effective and beneficial, to re p o rt what 
form  it should take. W e discuss the resultant legislation la te r on. 
In  1928 experts were appointed by the Jo in t Palestine Survey 
Commision. They included Sir John  Campbell, a retired Indian 
Civilian with special experience in land administration in  India. 
Among other m atters they discussed the financial condition  of 
Jew ish settlements.
7. In  1930 a  Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir 
W alter Shaw, reporting on the disturbances of the previous year, 
dealt very fully with the land problem. As a result of their 
recommendations, Sir John  Hope Simpson, visited Palestine and 
made a thorough investigation into all questions connected with 
land and its possible development.
At the same time the H igh Commissioner had appointed a 
committee to enquire into the economic condition of agriculturists 
and the fiscal measures of Government in relation thereto, whose 
findings were used by Sir John  Hope Simpson. A n o th er Com­
mission, under Sir Samuel O’Donnell, reported on the revenue, 
expenditure and general organization of the Palestine Adminis­
tration, and exam ined the procedure for land settlement and 
the registration of titles.
8 .  In  1 9 3 2  Mr. Lewis French, of the Indian Civil Service, sub­
m itted two comprehensive reports on agricultural developm ent I 
and land settlement. Mr. C. F . Strickland also rep orted  in
1 9 3 1  and again in 1 9 3 3  on the co-operative movement, designed j 
to relieve the fellah of his heavy burden of debt. I n  1933, 
Government voted £6,000 to enable a  hydrographic su rvey  to J 
be undertaken.
9. Lastly, it has to be rem embered th a t every y e a r  the j 
Perm anent M andates Commission issued enquiries which usually 
contained references to the land policy of the A dm inistration. 
Each annual report of the Administration contains fu ll replies | 
to these references.
10. To all these enquiries and reports we are much indebted. 
Some of the proposals m ade have not been carried out: others| 
m ust take m any years to bear fruit. The statistics a n d  conclu­
sions derived from  them  in some of the reports h a v e  been 
challenged as inaccurate and unreliable. Though in so m e  cases I 
the lapse of time has justified the criticism, the general principles I 
enunciated have not in our opinion been materially impaired. 
They m ay be shortly stated as follows:—
(1) Unless there is a  m arked change in the m ethods < 
cultivation, the land in Palestine is unable to support a | 
large increase in the population.
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(2) Any such change m ust necessarily be a  very slow 
process spread over m any years, and depends largely on the 
extension of education in the A rab villages.
(3) The general indebtedness of the fellaheen is a  serious 
hindrance to the desired progress.
(4) I t  is on the extension of irrigation, combined with 
the regularized control of the w ater resources of the country 
by Government, th a t reliance must mainly be placed for 
any marked increase in the productivity of the land.
(5) The accurate recording of all rights in every parcel of 
land after a field to field survey is essential.
(6) There is already congestion on the land in the hill 
districts.
11. The chief problem in connection with the land lies in w hat 
is known as the “  dual obligation ” .
Under Article 6 of the M andate “  the Administration 
of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other 
sections of the population are not prejudiced . . . shall 
encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency . . . close 
settlement by Jew s on the land, including State lands and waste 
lands not required for public purposes ” .
Under Article 11, “  the Administration of Palestine shall take 
all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the commun­
ity in connection with the development of the country . . .  I t  
shall introduce a  land system appropriate to the needs of the 
country, having regard, am ong other tilings, to the desirability of 
promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the 
land
Article 17 (1) (a) of the Palestine Order in Council, as am ended 
in 1923, contains the proviso that “ No Ordinance shall be 
promulgated . . . which shall tend to discriminate in any way 
between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, 
religion, or language ” .
Article 2 of the M andate also places on the M andatory respon- 
bility for "  safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the 
abitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion ” , while 
der Article 15 "  no discrimination of any kind shall be made 
etween th e  inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, 
eligion or language ” . Even if it is held that Article 15 refers 
nly to matters connected with religion, freedom of conscience 
_ d education, Article 2, it is contended, prohibits any legisla- 
on which discriminates between persons of different races or 
eligions.
12. Whatever m ay be the proper construction of these articles, 
t seems clear that under the Order in Council quoted above the
>gh Commissioner cannot enact a law that in certain areas land
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m ay not be sold to Jews. N or could he reserve certain areas 
for Jewish settlements. A grarian legislation, whether pro­
hibitory or protective, m ust be of general and universal applica­
tion, exceptions to which can be allowed by the Administration 
to meet racial requirements. This appears to us to be a subter­
fuge, and consequently an unsatisfactory arrangement .
As it stands a t present, however, the M andate in one article 
imposes a  definite obligation as one of two main objects: yet 
another article is held to prevent the fulfilment of that obligation.
13. Here then, a t the outset, we are faced by a  fundamental 
difficulty. To quote the Shaw Commission : —
“ In view  of th e  obligation placed upon th e M andatory by Article 6 oi 
th e  M andate to  ‘ encourage close settlem ent b y  Jew s on the land ' on the 
one hand and on th e  other to  ensure * th a t the rights and position o[ 
other sections of the population are not prejudiced ’ the solution of the 
land problem  is obviously  a difficult and delicate task, but some solution 
is essential in  th e  interests o f the w hole population irrespective of creed 
and, unless one be found to  deal w ith  the situation  that we have 
described, th e question w ill remain a constant source of present discontent 
and a potentia l cause of future disturbance.”
If  under the M andate the Order in Council could b e  amended 
to empower the High Commissioner to prohibit the transfer of 
land in any particular area to Jew s, a solution might be found. 
I f  this is not possible, we are of opinion that in this respect the 
M andate should be amended. In  any case such an amendment 
would be desirable to remove any doubts which may ex ist as to 
the power of the M andatory in certain circumstances to carry  out 
his m ain obligations.
14. As a result, presum ably, of these restrictions, the Transfer 
of L and Ordinance, 1920, required that the c o n se n t of the 
Government should be obtained to all dispositions of immovable 
property ; it prohibited the transfer of land to “  o th e rs  than 
residents in Palestine ” .
The L and Transfer Ordinance of 1921, while repea tin g  the 
necessity for the consent of Government to any disposition of 
immovable property, added, in Section 8 (1), a proviso that such 
consent should only be given after the Director of L an ds was 
“  satisfied th a t any  tenant in occupation will retain sufficient 
land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself 
and his family
These Ordinances failed to achieve their purpose of safeguard­
ing Arab tenants and  cultivating owners. They proved in fact 
to be unworkable. N either vendor nor purchaser applied for* 
the consent of Government to the transaction. Owners and* 
tenants took the money for purchase or compensation a n *  
departed. The change in ownership was not discovered till some* 
months later. I
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15. These Ordinances were therefore replaced in 1929 by the 
P ro te c tio n  of Cultivators Ordinance, which provided for the pay­
ment of compensation, both for disturbance and for im prove­
ments effected by  them, to tenants who received a valid notice to 
quit t h e  holding of which they had been in occupation. I t  further 
p ro v id e d  for the constitution of Boards to decide disputes as to 
w h eth er or not compensation for disturbance or im provement 
was payable, and as to the am ount of any such compensation. 
The previous requirement, that a cultivator m ust retain a sub­
sistence area elsewhere, found no place in the new Ordinance. 
It also made no provision for sub-tenants, and this fact furnished 
a loop-hole for evasion. Lastly, as pointed out by  Sir John 
Hope Simpson in 1930, w hat was eminently required was not 
compensation for disturbance, bu t a  provision against 
disturbance.
16. This led to the Protection of Cultivators (Amendment) 
Ordinance, No. 1 of 1932, in which a tenant was so defined as 
to include a sub-tenant, and in 1933 a new Ordinance, No. 37, 
was enacted under the same title in a further endeavour to 
check the process of displacement of Arab cultivators. This 
again had to be amended in 1934. U nder this Ordinance the 
High Commissioner could appoint one or more Commissions 
to adjudicate on disputes as to whether a  cultivator was or 
was not a “  statutory tenant ” , as to who was landlord, and 
whether any person had exercised continuously “  any practice 
of grazing or watering animals or cutting wood or reeds or 
other beneficial occupation ” . An amending Bill has recently 
been published extending the rights and liabilities of the 
principal Ordinance to any statu tory  tenant who cultivates a 
holding for one year or “  for a period necessary to raise 
two successive crops ” . A new clause provides for the 
restoration to their holdings of displaced statutory tenants, and 
empowers special Commissions in certain circumstances to 
dismiss the claims of any person to the rights of a statutory 
tenant, where they are satisfied th a t he already possesses or 
retains elsewhere sufficient land for his maintenance.
17. In addition to the Protection of Cultivators Ordinances, 
in 1932 and 1934 the Land Disputes (Possession) Ordinances 
were enacted. The intention was to empower the District Com­
missioner to hold a sum m ary enquiry into any dispute regarding 
land, water or grazing rights etc. which was likely to cause 
a breach of the peace, and to decide which party  should be 
entitled to possession, or to exercise certain rights.
All these “  protective ”  Ordinances have been the subject 
of criticism and protest by the Jews, with which we shall deal
later.
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18. In  1920 an Ordinance enacted th a t illegal occupiers of 
land which had become vacant through death or abandonment 
of cultivation (known as mahlul) were to notify Government 
under penalty of fine. The same year a  Survey Ordinance 
was passed to facilitate entry into properties, and in 1 9 2 1  pre­
lim inary triangulation began as the first step towards the 
ultim ate cadastral survey and settlem ent of ownership. The 
same year saw the enactm ent of three Ordinances, one con­
stituting L and Courts to determine rights in  land, settle land 
disputes and dem arcate State Lands, another prohibiting an 
increase in rents, and the th ird  to protect State Lands {Mewat) 
from encroachment. I t  was not, however, till 1926, after the 
appointm ent of Sir E . Dowson as Commissioner of Lands that 
land settlem ent operations began in earnest, and a programme 
for land survey and settlem ent was draw n up.
19. In  1926 the Correction of Land Registers Ordinance was 
enacted, introducing a  unified system for the registration of 
land. In  1927 the tithes payable on holdings of land and 
collected in  land  were commuted for a  fixed money payment 
based upon averages and  allotted by a  village Assessment 
Committee.
20. In  1930, as a  result of the recommendations of the Shaw 
Commission, Sir John  Hope Simpson (to whose findings we 
have referred above in  paragraphs 4 and 7) made a thorough I 
investigation of the land problem  in Palestine, arriving at con-1 
elusions as to the land available for the settlement o f Jews, I 
and  subm itted recommendations for development, including I 
the acceleration of survey and land settlem ent, and the improve-1 
m ent of agriculture. W hile several of the statistics and con-1 
elusions based thereon have been challenged before us and I 
some require modification, his Report still rem ains an excellent I 
and comprehensive appreciation of the agrarian position ini 
Palestine a t the time of his inquiry. I t  is unfortunate that his I  
proposal for a Development Commission on which both Arab I  
and Jew  would be represented was not accepted by either. I
21. In  1933 the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was enacted I 
to facilitate the form ation of R ural Co-operative Creditl 
Societies, while the Land Law (Amendment) Ordinance gavel 
the H igh Commissioner power to declare land which had I  
become vacant {Mahlul) to be public land and auction it toi 
prospective cultivators. I
22. In  1935 a R ural Property Tax Ordinance was i n t r o d u c e d , !  
substituting a  single simplified tax in place of the Turkish T ith e !  
and House and Land Tax {Werko). This effected a  l a r g e  r e d u c - l  
tion, in some cases up  to 7 0  per cent., in the taxes p a y a b l e  b v l  
the peasantry, in the hope of so encouraging a g r i c u l t u r a l !  
developments. I
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23. The above sum m ary of legislative activity shows the 
efforts made by  the Administration to fulfil their obligations 
under Article 11 in circumstances of singular difficulty, not 
rendered any easier by  the unavoidable pressure of the Jew s 
for land purchase and consequent land speculation, and sadly 
hampered by the political outbreaks and consequent lack of 
funds, since revenue which might have been available for large 
schemes of development was diverted to expenditure on public 
security. A nd, largely as a  result, so it appears to us, of these 
difficulties, we have not now, after 15 years' adm inistration of 
Palestine by the M andatory Power, been presented with a  really 
final and reliable statem ent either of the waste lands, the Govern­
ment Domains, or of the cultivable area. Nor will this be 
possible until the survey and land settlement operations are 
concluded.
24. W hatever m ay be the cultivable area of Palestine, a 
matter we discuss later on, it is a t least certain tha t it is limited 
a n d  in a large m easure already in use. The systems of cultiva­
tion may be improved. I t  m ay be possible in certain localities 
to replace extensive by  intensive cultivation. An active policy 
of agricultural development having this as its object m ust, even 
allowing for the utm ost activity on the part of Government, take 
many years before its fulfilment can provide land for close 
settlement for both Jew s and A rabs. There appears a t present 
to be little hope of responsive co-operation on the part of the 
Arabs. I t  is feared tha t during this long period the further 
displacement of A rabs from the land m ay intensify political dis­
content, as evidenced by the dem and now made by the Arabs 
for a complete stoppage of the sale of land to the Jews.
I t  is, therefore, considered necessary by the Administration to 
protect the A rab against himself, not by  prohibiting sales, but by 
making it a condition of every disposition of rural land, includ­
ing sale, mortgage, gift, dedication of waqf, and lease for more 
than three years, tha t the person making the disposition should 
retain ownership of the minimum area necessary for his 
subsistence [lot viable). The size of the subsistence area would 
depend upon the nature of the cultivation, and might be varied 
from tim e to time as the land was im proved or its irrigation 
became possible. No restriction would be placed on the num ber 
of transactions to be allowed to each purchaser, o r on the 
number to be allowed to each vendor, provided tha t he retained 
the prescribed subsistence area. The High Commissioner would 
have the power to sanction the sale of a subsistence area in  
special cases. The following lands would be excluded from th e  
operation of the legislation :—all urban and town planning 
areas, the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District and all land  
planted with citrus a t the date of the enactment of the legisla­
tion. I f  the owner should desert his subsistence area, or other­
wise fa il to cultivate it, Government would have the right to
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resume ownership after it h ad  rem ained uncultivated for three 
years. I t  is proposed to introduce legislation to this effect.
25. We are doubtful whether any committee or a n y  indi­
vidual could satisfactorily prescribe a t any  given time a 
minimum subsistence area, even if based on the fertility of the 
soil as displayed in the various categories of the Rural Property 
Tax Ordinance. In  support of this we m ay instance the case of 
the Beisan land.* Secondly, any such legislation w ould in 
practice be difficult to enforce. I t  relies on the p re s e n t  land 
registry system, which we consider unsatisfactory a n d  over­
centralized. Thirdly, it is not clear tha t it makes a n y  allow­
ance for the natu ral increase of population. Fourthly, i t  appears 
to  be based on the assumption tha t the price received for the 
land sold, apart from  the lot viable retained for the cultivator 
and  his family, will not only free him  from debt, but also enable 
him  to adopt intensive cultivation, a process only possib le , so 
far as is a t present known, in the maritime and p la in  areas. 
Even there, the small cultivator would depend for the cultivation 
of his reduced plot of land on the sharing of a w ater su p p ly  with 
his neighbours. Lastly, it would result in the retention of a 
num ber of small A rab holdings in an area most of w h ic h  would 
be held by Jew s. I t  would thus provide a  fruitful source of 
friction in the m atter of w ater rights, access or grazing.
26. W e recommend elsewhere that survey and settlement 
operations should be completed with the utm ost despatch. Until 
this has been done and  their completion has provided both 
vendor and purchaser with an  accurate and reliable record of 
rights and there is suitable rural official m achinery to maintain 
it, we would welcome the definite prohibition of the sale of 
isolated and com paratively small plots of rural land to Jew s. We 
would prefer larger schemes for the rearrangem ent of proprietor­
ship under Governm ent supervision, both during th e ir intro­
duction and subsequent development, carrying with it the 
consolidation of holdings, recourse being had , if necessary, to 
the Land Expropriation Ordinance. The case of C aesarea  sand 
dunes, dealt with below, is an  illustration of the need for this 
procedure. In  this w ay we believe it should be possible to 
ensure an equitable distribution to A rabs and  Jews alike, such 
as is now in contemplation in the case of the Lake H uleh  area, 
providing subsistence for a larger num ber of A rabs th a n  were on 
the land before the sa le .f We would not exclude the possibility 
of combining a num ber of small holdings in  such a scheme as 
would result in an  area of not less than 500 dunums being avail­
able for distribution with a view to close settlement. N or would 
there appear to be any valid objection to the sale, with the prior j
* Paragraphs 126-133 below . f  See paragraphs 120-125 below.
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approval of the Government, of small holdings for the purpose 
of rounding off an estate o r to facilitate irrigation, and the High 
Commissioner should retain powers to perm it alienation in 
special cases, as has been proposed by Government in their Bill 
dealing with the possible sale of a  subsistence area.*
27. The criticism has been made tha t the provision of Article 
11 of the Mandate for the introduction of “  a land system 
ap p ro p ria te  to the needs of the country, having regard, among 
other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement 
and intensive cultivation of the land ”  has not been imple­
mented.
It is true that no new system has been introduced, no new 
land co de  has been enacted. The Ottoman Land Code has 
been retained, with all the difficulties involved in its various 
forms of ownership and tenure of land; several new laws have 
been passed to am end it, bu t it remains in essence the same 
complicated system, one which is not calculated to prom ote 
close settlement and intensive cultivation. Even with the am end­
ments which it has been found possible to introduce, it cannot 
be d eem ed  to be a satisfactory system in these respects, as will 
be seen from a perusal of this part of our Report. We m ay 
instance the difficulties with regard to m a sh d  a and the Protec­
tion of Cultivators Ordinance.
To this extent the Jewish grievance appears to us to be 
justified.
28. We have above referred to the difficult conditions which 
the Mandatory Power had to face. The Land Registries had 
to be closed for a  period, ownership was uncertain, the rtcords 
incomplete and unreliable. The era of speculation which 
started when the Jews began to purchase land was a further 
complication. In  1932 there were 18 ,392  transactions in land, 
registration fees am ounting to ^ 9 7 ,8 7 6 . In  1935 4 9 ,1 3 3  trans­
actions were registered, a t the cost of £ 4 5 5 ,1 4 6 . Obviously the 
Department of Lands was fully occupied and had no time to 
devote to  the codification of the land law.
29. The subject is one which seriously affects the proper 
developm ent of the country. But the formulation of a land 
code which can absorb the existing system and adequately 
meet th e  needs of the Bedouin population on the one hand 
and an advanced urban and rural population on the other is 
an exceedingly difficult m atter and one which the Attorney- 
General’s D epartm ent has never had the necessary time to  
undertake. In  our opinion, however, the time has now arrived 
at which the task should be undertaken. We recommend t h a t  
a com m ittee should be set up  to deal with it, a n d  should in c lu d e ,  
in add ition  to persons fam iliar with the present law a n d  local
* See paragraph 24 above.
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conditions, a t least one person who is an expert in lan d  law 
and  has had experience in drafting agrarian legislation and of 
land adm inistration elsewhere. W e understand that this matter 
has more than  once been the subject of consideration by the 
Palestine Government, which recognizes its importance and 
would probably welcome such action.
In  the words used by  Mr. Lewis French, we recommend that 
any such land code "  should be fram ed on the broadcast and 
simplest lines possible, all m inor details being left to rules and 
regulations ” , which would presum ably be published for 
criticism prior to adoption.
30. Before concluding this section, it is perhaps desirab le  to 
explain that “  survey and settlement "  are adm inistrative 
operations distinct from , although essentially necessary to, the 
close settlement of Jew s upon the land. The object of “ survey 
and settlement ” is the ascertainm ent of areas and boundaries, 
the preparation of m aps to display them , and the compilation 
of a record of rights, which usually in the British E m p ire  in­
cludes not merely a statement of the ownership of th e  land, 
bu t all the rights and easements connected with the use  of the 
land, such as tenancies and sub-tenancies, grazing, fuel o r irriga­
tion rights. Often this record sets forth any fiscal obligations 
attaching to the land, whether revenue payable to the Govern­
m ent or ren t payable to a landlord. In  Palestine, however, 
there is at present no connection between rural property taxation 
and land settlement.
31. From  any complete record of rights there should be com­
piled a  register showing, village by  village and plot by plot, the 
nam es of all owners and occupiers of land and their rights. 
The record should confer a  presumptive title contra mundum, 
and if the land registers both locally and a t headquarters are 
kept up  to date, and mutations are systematically reported and 
recorded, it should be a  simple m atter for anyone to discover 
a t once whether any person has or has not certain rights in any 
given plot in a village.
32. There are therefore two m ain branches in land settlement 
operations: first, the survey and m apping of land; secon d ly , the 
preparation of a  record of rights, which m ay or m ay not include 
the fixing of rents as between proprietors and tenants, or the 
settlement of land revenue.
Before a  land settlement survey can commence it is necessary 
to have a  triangulated fram ework of fixed points, accurately 
determined and perm anently m arked. This was com pleted™  
Palestine, excluding Beersheba, in 1 9 2 7 . The next stage is a 
traverse survey by theodolite of a  series of stations d em arca ted  
on the ground and the plotting of them on sheets, to  serve 
as a  framework on which the detailed or c a d a s t r a l  survey
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may be made. Map No. 2  at the end of this Report shows 
the extent to which this has been accomplished in Palestine. 
The plans prepared for the settlement survey were on the 
scale of roughly 2 5  inches to the mile. I t  should be 
added that a fiscal survey was commenced in  1 9 2 9  and 
completed in 1 9 3 4 , carried out by fairly rapid topographical 
methods on a smaller scale. All streams, roads, paths, and 
villages were surveyed, as well as the boundanes of the 
" localities ” which were used as fiscal blocks. The large scale 
cadastral survey did not start till 1 9 2 8 . Towns and villages 
which came under the urban  property tax  had  also to be 
surveyed, and every year fresh villages are added to the list. 
Triangulation survey has started in the Beersheba Sub-District.
33. The following statements show the progress m ade in 
survey and settlement. Survey commenced in 1 9 2 7  : settlement 
in 1928. There have been three breaks due to political disturb­
ances, in  1 9 2 9 , 1 9 3 3  and 1 9 3 6 .
Cost of S u r v e y  a n d  S e t t l e m e n t  B u d g e t a r y  p r o v i s io n .
Year Survey Settlement Total
£ £ £
1927 (9 months) 32.453 — 32,453
1928 44,217 10,953 55,170
1929 ................. 43,494 2 3 ,4 !° 66,904
1 9 3 °  ................. 48,637 23,289 71,926
1 9 3 1 ................. 49,410 24,893 74,303
1932 (3 months) 12,500 6,151 18,651
1 9 3 2 - 3 3 51.039 2 5 , i 8 3 76,222
1 9 3 3 - 3 4 63,693 29,083 92,776
1 9 3 4 - 3 5 67,933 30,088 98,021
1 9 3 5 - 3 6 69.151 28,071 97,222
1 9 3 6 - 3 7 68,332 3 5 , 0 6 5 103,397
£ 550,859 236,186 787,045
The following figures show the progress of survey and settle- 
ent since 1 9 2 7 :—
Year 
1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 0  ...
193 1.....
193 2.....
! 9 3 3  .................
1 9 3 4  .................
! 9 3 5  .................
1936.....
A rea Surveyed  
D unum s
332.600  
i 4 9 ,4 8 5  
3 9 9 , 3 3 1
424.600  
628,524  
36o ' 66o  
299,920
A rea Settled 
D unum s  
142,799
1 3 8 , 3 8 7
167,293
3 3 4 , 1 3 9
283,464
298,549
127,246
Total 2,595,120 1,491,877
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The aggregate area of all land taxed under the Rural Property 
Tax Ordinance of 1935 is stated to be 13,592,306 dunums 
Evidently, unless the operations can be expedited, completion 
of the settlem ent m ust take m any years.
34. Land settlement in Palestine differs materially from  that 
in the British Em pire, notably in India. I t  has nothing to 
do with the settlement of land revenue, the fixation of rents 
the fertility of the soil, or the recording of e a s e m e n ts , but is I 
restricted to judicial decisions, frequently in in tr ic a te  cases 
dem anding long judgm ents, of claims and title su its . The 
work is impeded by a large num ber of fictitious and frivolous 
claims, all of which have to be duly recorded, e x am in ed  and 
decided. This procedure inevitably provokes and multiplies 
litigation, especially in a country where there has been a sudden 
and abnorm al increase in land values. W hereas a t  first dis­
puted claims were about 10 per cent, of the total submitted 
to Settlement Officers, there is now reported “ a growing 
tendency to dispute every claim where there is a shadow of 
a  case, and often where there is not ” . F urther delay is caused 
by the detachm ent of the staff to deal with special enquiries, 
like the w ater resources survey, or surveys of urban areas like 
Tel Aviv in connection with the urban property tax, o r urgent 
cases where land disputes are, as a t Beisan, likely to  develop 
into riots on a large scale. W e were informed that of 134 
Surveyors not more than 80 or go were actually engaged on | 
settlem ent work.
35. Two maps appended to this R eport show the 
made with survey and land settlem ent to the end of 1936. Out I 
of some 400 villages (outside Beersheba and the hill districts), 
the Land Settlement Ordinance has been applied to 160: the 
work has been finished in 107 : in 31 villages disputes are under I 
trial prior to completion of settlement : in 19, the final stage of j 
investigation is in progress : in 3, prelim inary field investi-1 
gation has commenced. D uring the year 1936, owing to the I 
disturbances, it was only found possible to settle 1,490 claims j 
out of 9,333, leaving 7,843 disputes outstanding.
36. In  the absence of a  reliable record of rights for all 
the villages, instead of for one-quarter, it is evident that any I 
statistics relating to the possession of land must be read I 
as liable to considerable alteration when eventually settlement I 
proceedings are completed. The need for their expedition is J 
param ount. W e recommend th a t steps should be taken to I 
form three distinct settlement parties, one to deal with the I 
southern and another with the northern area of the Maritime I 
Plains, a third being available for special enquiries of the kind I 
referred to above. I t  will probably take two years to train I 
the staff, bu t once this has been accomplished, progress should
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be r a p id .  We suggest for the consideration of the Palestine 
G o v e r n m e n t  whether it might be possible to obtain the services 
of Settlem ent Officers and trained Surveyors with a knowledge 
of Arabic from India. In  the meantime the necessary topo­
graphical survey can continue and large-scale maps can be 
p re p a re d . I t  m ay be added that the work of the survey, as 
distinct fro m  settlement, is excellent.
37. The present system of Land Courts appears to us to be 
contributory to delay. There are four District Courts, each 
composed of a British President and two Palestinian Judges. 
Jurisdiction is given to these Courts, composed of the President 
and one or more Judges of the District Court, to sit as a  Land 
Court and to deal with questions of title to land. Such a  Court 
also acts as Court of Appeal from the decisions of Magistrates in 
respect of recovery of land.
We should prefer two or, if necessary, three separate Land 
Courts, a t  any rate until the land survey and settlement opera­
tions h a v e  been completed. These Land Courts should deal 
with all possessory rights and easements as well as questions of 
title demarcation and should be able to issue m andatory injunc­
tions or orders for specific performance. W e are aware that in 
1930 th ere  were two special Land Courts, one a t Jerusalem  and 
one a t Jaffa, and that the Financial Commission in 1 9 3 1  recom­
mended their abolition. T hat Commission held that “  the 
distinction between Land Courts and the other Civil Courts rests 
admittedly on no principle and should be abolished. Land 
Courts were established because it was believed that cases 
relating to  land were peculiarly difficult. I t is now recognized 
that this is  not so ."  Be tha t as it m ay, evidence was given 
before u s to the effect that "  the Land Courts are functioning 
very, v e ry  slowly, so that you are lucky if you get a case through 
in the L a n d  Courts in two years.”  Further, we can discern no 
advantage in having two Judges to decide these cases. One 
Judge, a  British officer with practical experience of Land Settle­
ment, sh o u ld  be sufficient. There should be an appeal to the 
Supreme Court on a  point of law.
38. A p a rt from the increase in the num ber of Settlement 
Officers a n d  staff, advocated in paragraph 3 6  above, we con­
sider th a t far more use should be made of the s e t t le m e n t  
procedure. I t  should not be limited as at present merely to 
ascertaining and settling disputes and claims. The aim should 
he the preparation of a  reliable and accurate record of rights 
of the k in d  described in paragraph 3 0 . W ith it should be com­
bined a plot to plot inquiry as to the fertility of the soil and the 
dassification thereof in the appropriate category under the R ural 
Property Tax. The Settlement and Assistant Settlement Officers
ould camp in the villages where operations are in progress 
tod hear all the claims and objections on the spot.
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39. Assuming that traverse survey has been completed, 
first stage in settlement proceedings would be the cadastral I 
survey on the spot, the preparation of the draft record 
for attestation being undertaken during the recess, when maps 
are checked and exam ined, areas of villages and various 
plots therein extracted and the lists of interested parties, their 
rights and areas of plots prepared. The second y e a r  should 
see attestation or the inquiry into the draft record and the settle­
m ent and decision of disputes. This also should take place in 
the presence of all parties interested. Slips would be distributed 
to all persons believed to have rights in  the land, landlords and 
tenants, showing the areas of all plots. D raft entries in the 
village register would be explained personally on the spot by 
the Assistant Settlement Officer, who would finally correct and 
attest them , after deciding all disputes as to status, possessoiyl 
rights or easements. W hen attestation is completed th e  record I 
of rights would be checked, corrected and prepared fo r draft I 
publication, when one m onth should be allowed during which 
the record would be open to inspection. Any objections filed I 
then should, after due notice of date of hearing, be tried | 
sum m arily on the spot.
40. On the completion of these steps, the record of rights I 
would be corrected and finally published, necessary certified! 
extracts being given to all owners and tenants. The final I 
record should then be sent to the Land Registry, where! 
necessary entries should be made as regards all the! 
various holdings, village by village. I t  should be pro-1 
vided, if necessary by  legislation, that every entry in the! 
record is to be presumed to be correct until it is proved! 
by evidence to be incorrect. There should then be n o  difficult)7! 
in allowing the police to decide w hether any given individual has |  
any rights in the land or is a trespasser. The m ain tenance <' 
the record by registering sanctioned m utations, i.e. transfers ( 
dispositions of property registered by  the Lands Department,! 
m ay be difficult under existing circumstances in P a le s tin e , where I 
the village tax collector or Mukhtar does not always possess suffi-1 
cient education. The remedy would seem to lie in th e  appoint-1 
m ent, where necessary, of village Registrars, as advocated  bj| 
Mr. Lewis French in 1931.
41. If  exception is taken to these proposals on the grounds oil 
expense, the reply m ust be that a contented te n a n t r y  and| 
peasantry will in the end be much cheaper to govern, and 
the absence of disputes regarding land, the prevention o f trespass! 
and the security of title conferred by  these operations should! 
conduce to the general prosperity and development of the! 
country. U ncertainty regarding the land and r ig h ts  thereml 
creates disputes, encourages trespassers and promotes a  feeling! 
of insecurity, which in tu rn  demands an ever larger po lice force I
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and results in increased litigation. In  this m atter of land settle­
ment, i . e . ,  the preparation for all the villages in the country of a  
reliable record of rights, the Administration, we consider, have 
not y e t  discharged their obligations under the Mandate.
2. The second problem : Cultivable area.
42. Remembering, then, that the settlement operations in five- 
sixths of the country m ay m aterially alter the present estimates 
as to ownership of land, it is now necessary to discuss the much 
debated problem as to how much of the land in Palestine is 
cultivable, and how production can be increased.
With the Sub-District of Beersheba we deal later. T hat is a 
separate problem depending, first, on the discovery of w ater and, 
secondly, on some arrangem ent which m ay induce the nom ad 
Bedouins to adopt settled cultivation.
43. The following is an account by a Jewish eyewitness of the 
condition of the Maritime Plain in 1913. I t  was, we believe, a t 
the tim e when it was written, a truthful and disinterested 
description.
The road leading from Gaza to  th e  north was only a  summ er track  
suitable for transport by cam els and carts. This track w as dry and open  
for travel in  the summ er m onths only. In  th e rainy season it  w as
impassable.
In the villages on both  sides of th e  track and as far as th e  hills to  
the east no orange groves, orchards or vineyards were to  be seen until 
one reached Yabna V illage. Trees generally were a rare sight in these  
villages. . . . Nor were there any vegetable gardens to  be seen in any o f  
these villages except a t Jora on th e  sea (Asqalan). In th e H awakir around 
the villages—sm all plots fenced around by cactus hedge— one could find  
in the winter green onions and in the sum m er cucumbers and water melons.
In all the villages dotting th e  plain betw een Gaza and Jaffa there w as  
only one well in a  village and in  the smaller villages there were no w ells 
at all. . . . N o t in a  single village in a ll th is area w as water used for
irrigation. W ater w as scantily  used for drinking purposes b y  m an and  
beast.
Houses were all o f m ud. N o w indows were anywhere to  be seen. T he  
roofs were of caked m ud. E very  house w as divided in tw o parts— one 
part slightly elevated above th e  other. T he fam ily lived  in th e  elevated  
part while in the lower part th e cattle were housed. The cattle  were sm all 
and poor. So were the chickens.
The fields were sown w ith w heat, barley, kursena and lentils in th e  
winter—and with dura and sesam e in th e  summer. F ields used for sum m er 
crops one year were sown w ith w inter crops the n ext year, and so in  
rotation. The ploughs used were of wood. European ploughs were not 
known in the whole area. N o t a v illage could boast of a cart. Sowing  
was done by hand; harvesting b y  th e  scythe and threshing b y  anim als. 
Fields were never manured.
The lands were all held in m asha’a ownership. E very  second year the  
fields were measured b y  stick and rope and distributed am ong th e  
cultivators. D ivision of land alw ays led  to strife and bloodshed.
The yields were very poor. W heat yield never exceeded 60 kgms. per 
dunum and barley about 100 kgm s. per dunum . T he w heat y ield  w ent to  
Government in paym ent of tithe and to  the effendi in p aym ent of interest 
°n loans. The fellah  h im self m ade h is bread from dura.
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T he sanitary conditions in the villages were horrible. Schools did not 
ex ist and the younger generation rolled about in  th e  m ud of the streets. 
The rate of infant m ortality  w as very  high. There was no medical service 
in any of the villages d istant from a Jewish settlem ent. In passing a 
village one noticed a large num ber o f blind, or half-blind persons. Malaria 
w as rampant.
Starting from Y abna one could see in some villages several wells, some 
orange groves and vegetable fields under irrigation. In the neighbour­
hood of W adi R ubin considerable quantities of vegetables, especially 
tom atoes, were grown. B u t th e  standing water in  th a t wadi devastated 
th e  w hole area, being a breeding place of malaria. A t W adi Hunein 
there were several orange groves belonging to  effendis. Most of them 
were in  a very neglected state. T hey were p lanted in irregular forma­
tion and irrigated in  a very prim itive manner. A t Ram leh and Lydda 
old olive plantations and orchards of apricots and mulberries existed. At 
B eit D ajan, Yazur and Jaffa considerable areas were planted with orange 
trees. The qu ality  of these groves was n ot superior to  those of Wadi 
H unein.
T he entire area of orange groves owned b y  Arabs before the War was
20,000 dunum s w hile the Jew s ow ned 10,000 dunum s. The export of 
oranges was as follow s :—
Cases.
. . .  4 8 9 ,9 9 2
... 4 1 8 ,8 3 5
. . .  4 9 0 , 3 1 7
... 628,013
... 624,198
... 803,620
•v 9I0.548 '
The area north of Jaffa as far as Hedera and Zichron Jacob, known as 
th e Sharon, consisted of tw o  d istinctive parts divided b y  a line from 
south to  north. T h e eastern part in th e  direction of the hills resembled 
in culture th a t of th e  Gaza-Jaffa area. There one could find many well 
populated villages w ith  th e  little  tow n of Tulkarm  as their centre. The 
w estern part tow ards th e  sea was alm ost a  desert. Sandy soil with 
num erous sw am py stretches such as th e A uja, Sidna Ali, Ramadan, 
K abani and Hedera swam ps and m any other sm aller swamps. The 
villages in  th is  area were few  and th in ly  populated. Many ruins of 
villages were scattered over th e  area as owing to  the prevalence of malaria 
m any villages were deserted b y  their inhabitants who migrated to the 
hills. T he few  patches in th e  w estern section  which under cultivation 
produced Turmos in  the w inter and w ater m elons in  th e  summer. The 
rest w as all covered b y  halfa and thorns.
44. The following figures as regards land areas were given 
us by  the Palestine Government as their latest estimate, based 
on their definition of “  cultivable land .”  This is held to  cover 
land “  which is actually under cultivation, or which can be 
brought under cultivation by  the application of the la b o u r  and 
resources of the average Palestinian cultivator ” .
The total area of Palestine is approxim ately 10,400 square 
miles or 27,009,000 dunums.
Excluding Beersheba, which has not been surveyed, bu t the 
area of which is estimated a t 12,577,000 dunum s, the land am 
of the rem ainder of Palestine is 13,742,000 dunums. T h is  omits
1908 .
1909 .
19 10 .
1911 .
19 12  . 
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the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee (690,000 dunums), but it 
includes the Lake of H uleh. The Administration regard
6.622.000 dunums as uncultivable, as being forest land, waste 
land, urban or village areas. They thus arrive a t a  total of
7.120.000 dunums as the “  cultivable area " .
45. In their evidence before us the Jewish Agency did not 
give any definite figures as regards the total area and estimated 
c u ltiv a b ility . I t  is stated, however, in Mr. Granovsky’s book 
The Land Issue in Palestine that “  figures arrived a t by  the 
Jewish Agency experts show tha t the cultivable area of Palestine 
comprises, exclusive of the Beersheba Sub-District, 9,197,000 
dunums, divided as follows : in the plains, 3,876,650 dunum s; 
in the hill and m ountain districts, 5,320,350 dunums ” . Hence, 
taking the total land area of Palestine, excluding Beersheba, 
to be 13,742,000 dunums, “  the uncultivable areas extend over 
4-545-44°  dunums These figures presumably include, as 
cu ltivable, forest areas, which are estimated b y  the Govern­
ment a t 695,000 dunum s and are in their estimate excluded 
from the cultivable land, so that the net difference between 
the Government estimate of cultivable land and the Jewish 
figures is 1,382,000 dunums. We think that in arriving at 
these figures it is not im probable that the Jews have envisaged 
the expenditure, in making land cultivable, of an am ount of 
capital which could not be justified on economic grounds.
D r. Hexter said: “  I  cannot give an estimate, because I am 
convinced an estimate of mine might e r r  in other directions, 
but m y point is simply that in any development possibilities 
in this country one m ust go from one place to another literally 
to see what can be done ” .
46. W e ourselves do not consider it possible a t any given 
date to  estimate with any accuracy how much land can be 
classed as “  cultivable This must depend, as is generally 
recognized, on irrigation and the improved use of available 
water supplies, on the draining of m arshy areas, and on the 
adoption of new methods of agriculture, more especially in the 
hills. These last in turn  depend on the am ount of capital 
available. The A rab peasant has a t present neither the capital 
nor the education necessary for intensive cultivation. The 
Jew has. But the lack of these two essential requisites does 
not justify the expropriation of the Arab to make room for 
the rich e r and more enterprising colonist, even though the 
Arab's conservative methods, and in some cases his system of 
land te n u re , m ay delay development. At a later stage we 
discuss the possibility of large scale development schemes.
47- A ll the estimates of cultivable land are challenged by 
the Jew ish Agency m ainly on two grounds. F irst, the definition 
adopted by the Palestine Government of "  cultivable ”  land 
would exclude m uch land already brought under cultivation,
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as well as land which can by  appropriate methods of agricul­
tu re  be cultivated. Secondly, sufficient allowance is not made 
for intensive cultivation, i.e. close settlement upon the land. 
This presupposes adequate irrigation, w ithout which, except in 
a  few specially favoured areas, intensive cultivation is 
impossible.
48. D r. Maurice H exter condemned the Palestine Govern­
m ent’s definition of “  cultivable land ”  because the figures, 
based on a fiscal survey, were necessarily falsified by the natural 
desire to evade the tax. They were compiled, he sa id , by 
surveyors unable to classify cultivability, and limited to record­
ing areas actually under cultivation, omitting fallow lan d s.
The estimate of Government, he said: —
"  excludes all or nearly all land not under cultivation; secondly, 
it  excludes all or nearly all land requiring considerable c a p i t a l  out­
lay ; th irdly, i t  excludes a ll land under water, such as Huleh; 
fourthly, it  does n ot distinguish betw een quality and p ro d u c tiv ity  
of th e  soil; fifth ly, th e  figures are still estim ates; sixthly, their 
present basis seem s to  us no more final than th e estimates which 
th ey  displace; and, lastly , th e definition is unrelated to realities, 
because i t  om its, as i t  shows b y  its very contents, technology, capital, 
education, skill and m arkets,”
We notice, however, that the Jewish Agency, when com plain­
ing of the small am ount of State lands placed a t their disposal, 
included, am ongst other deductions from the total, 22 p e r  cent, 
as “ uncultivable This was the average percentage arrived 
a t by the Government on approxim ate figures obtained from 
R ural Property T ax records, and was based on their definition, 
now im pugned, and on the enquiries of their surveyors, now 
discredited.
49. In  criticism of the Government estimates of cultivable 
land, it was pointed out that the total area of land under cultiva­
tion is shown as much greater than the total area of cultivable 
land—on the face of it an obvious error and tending to  show a 
serious underestim ate of cultivable land. We have 
ascertained however, tha t this discrepancy is accounted for by 
the fact tha t the estimate of cultivated land is increased because 
the same areas of land may appear twice in the figures owing 
to their having two crops upon them , e.g ., cereals planted 
between olives.
50. Dr. H exter claimed tha t the definition u nd erestim ated  
the future possibilities of rural development in Palestine, and 
th a t the cultivable area could only be ascertained by a 
“  detailed spot analysis ” . He regarded this matter as of 
prim ary im portance, since on the estimate of the land avail­
able for cultivation depended the admission of Jewish settlers, 
and because Sir John Hope Simpson’s conclusion, b ased  on 
th is definition, was tha t there was “  no m argin of land avail­
able for agricultural settlement by  new immigrants, with the
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exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish 
Agencies hold in reserve ” .
51. Dr. H exter's own definition was as follows:—
“ The word ‘ cultivable ’ does n ot describe an inherent or absolute 
attribute of land w hich determ ines the use to  w hich it  can be put.
‘ Cultivability ' is not the independent determ ining factor, but is 
itself determ ined b y  the inter-action of the physical properties of 
the land (including availab ility  of irrigation w aters), and the economic 
factors of production w hich are applied to  it  and m odify it. To w hat 
extent factors o f production can be applied depends on the economic 
progress of th e  country as a w hole, including possibilities of special 
products, and can on ly  be forecasted from tim e to  tim e. Land w ill 
be taken into cultivation  or subjected to  a more intensive or different 
form of cultivation as and when th e  supply of capital, labour, skill, 
and available m arkets warrant it. . . . For th e purpose of deter­
mining w hether particular land is cultivable or w hether, if cu lti­
vated, it  is capable o f more intensive cultivation , it  is  necessary to
 
have an analysis o f each particular project iin relation to  th e  
particular area in  qu estion .”
52. He realized tha t the determination of areas under his 
definition was “  an  extremely complicated process and a time- 
consuming process " ,  though he had already impressed on the 
Commission the fact th a t “  we in ou r search for land have 
not tim e: we cannot w ait Or as D r. Ruppin p u t i t :—
" It m ay be th a t we are im patient, but w e are being pressed  
very much b y  the Jew s w ho would like to  settle  here and w ho  
cannot settle here if th e  developm ent activ ities are not carried out in  
rather quick tem po ” .
And a g a in :
" Generally w hat is im portant is the question of tem po, and th e  
point of view  from  w hich you  look at it . I  have to look a t it  from  
the point of v iew  of our desire to  give a s m any Jew s as possible 
the possibility of settlin g  in agriculture. In th e  last 50 years w e  
were concerned w ith th e scarcity of land, and we understood th a t  
this scarcity could be overcom e on ly  b y  developm ent, b y  intensifi­
cation. My people are im patient. W e have to  b e .”
53. We are disposed to agree that no really satisfactory 
definition in advance can be found on which it would be safe 
to base an estimate as to the cultivable area. This m ust, we 
consider, and we hold this view also as regards the lot viable 
of the cultivator,* be discovered by experience, by  a system 
of “ trial and e r ro r "  in the different parts of the country. 
But we consider tha t, until the contrary is proved by experi­
ence and practical experiment, the Administration will be wise 
in adhering to their own definition in so far as it relates to 
an increase of im m igrants on the land. Until it has been 
proved that any particular area is capable of supporting further 
settlement, owing either to the discovery of irrigation facilities 
or to the application of new scientific methods, the present
* See paragraph 25.
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position is such tha t, in the words of the Shaw Commission 
Report, “  taking Palestine as a whole, the country cannot 
support a larger agricultural population than  it at present 
carries, unless methods of farming undergo a radical change ” , 
In  other words, the economic absorptive capacity of the country 
appears to us to depend, so far as the land is concerned, not 
on the mere hope of extending cultivation by  irrigation, but 
on the definitely ascertained existence of the various factors 
contained in the definition p u t forward by the Jewish Agency,
54. Before we discuss how best this object m ay be achieved, 
it is desirable to examine the complaint m ade by th e  Arabs 
tha t the Jew s had already received too much land, t h u s  creating 
a class of landless A rabs, and increasing “  la n d -h u n g e r" . 
Secondly, they complain tha t the Jew s now hold n e a rly  as 
much of the best land as the Arabs do, th a t classed in category 1 
for the R ural Property Tax, although the rural p o p u la tio n  of 
the Jews a t the census of 1931 was below 50,000, w hile the 
A rab rural population was about 590,000.
55. In  the m atter of land purchased by  the Jews th ere  was 
again a  dispute as to the accuracy of the figures, since th e  state­
m ent prepared by the Administration included land acquired by 
Jew s in pre-w ar days, and lands made over to companies, like 
the Palestine Potash Com pany, which are not entirely Jewish. 
In  the m atter of State Domains, for example, while the Govern­
m ent figures show a total of 1 7 5 , 5 4 5  dunum s, the Jewish Agency 
claim that the am ount which they have received for definitely 
Jew ish ownership, since the Mandate, is only 82,605 dunums. 
The point does not appear to us to be one of prim ary importance, 
and  depends chiefly on the method of calculation. W hile , for 
example, the Palestine Potash Com pany is not entirely Jewish, 
it is mainly Jew ish and was, in fact, quoted as an instance of | 
Jewish industrial enterprise. Similarly, whether land was 
obtained from the Turkish Government before the W ar o r  after­
w ards in fulfilment of an agreement made with that Government 
appears to us to be of less importance than the fact th a t  such 
land is actually to-day in Jewish possession. F or o u r  present 
purpose we are prepared to accept the figures submitted by the 
Palestine Government showing each year since O c to b e r , 1920, 
the land purchased by  Jew s. These total 682,865 d unum s, of 
which some 36,971 dunum s are in Beersheba, while pre-War | 
holdings am ounted to some 650,000, or a total of 1,332,865.
56. According to approxim ate figures prepared from the Rural 
P roperty Tax categories, Arabs hold 12,160,000 dunums, of 
which 6,037,000 are classed as cultivable, and Jews 1,208,000, 
with 939,000 dunums of cultivable land. In  category 1 (Citrus), 
with a  tax  rate of 825 mils (16s. 6d.) per dunum , or £3 6s. per 
acre, A rabs hold 106,400 and Jew s 102,000 dunums | 
respectively.
239 C hapter IX .
57. The point at issue is whether, as a  result of these pu r­
chases, the “  rights and position ”  of the Arabs have or have 
not been prejudiced, o r in other words, whether a  considerable 
number of Arabs have been displaced by Jew s and become land­
less. The Shaw Commission considered that this was likely to 
occur in the future. They reported:—
" Any com plete survey of the w hole country m ust take a very  
considerable tim e. In  th e  m eantim e th e  P alestine G overnm ent are 
confronted w ith  th e prospect of repetitions o f the situation  now  
existing a t W adi el H aw areth and of further calls upon th e  police  
to carry out evictions of large bodies o f cultivators w ith  no alter­
native land to  w hich th ey  can be m oved or upon w hich th ey  can  
settle. In th e  past, persons dispossessed have in  m any cases been  
absorbed in th e  neighbouring villages; w e were, how ever, told  th a t 
this process, though it  m ay have been possible four or five years 
ago, is no longer possible to-day; th e  point o f absorption has been  
reached. The plain facts o f the case are, so we are advised, th a t  
there is no further land available w hich can be occupied b y  new  
immigrants w ithout displacing th e  present population ."
Sir John Hope Simpson recorded his opinion as follows : —
“ I t  is clear, however, th a t of the land w hich remains w ith  th e  
Government a t th e  present tim e th e  area is exceedingly sm all, w ith  
the exception o f tracts w hich, until developed, are required in their  
entirety for th e  m aintenance of th e Arabs already in occupation. It  
cannot be argued th a t Arabs should be dispossessed in order th a t  
the land should be m ade available for Jew ish settlem ent. T hat would  
amount to  a  d istinct breach of th e  provisions o f A rticle 6 of th e  
Mandate.”
58. In the Statem ent of Policy issued by His M ajesty’s 
Government in 1930 it was s ta ted :—
" I t  appears th a t o f the 86,980 rural Arab fam ilies in  th e  villages, 
29-4 per cent, are landless. I t  is not known how m any o f these  
are families w ho previously cu ltivated  and have since lo st their  
land. This is one point, am ong others, upon w hich, a t present, 
it is not possible to  speak w ith  greater precision, b u t w hich will, 
it is hoped, be ascertained in  th e  course of th e Census w hich is  
to be taken n ex t year .”
Unfortunately, in the Census of 1931 this inquiry was never 
made. The proposal to hold a Census in 1936 was abandoned 
owing to the disturbances.
59- In 1931 Mr. Lewis French was appointed Director of 
Development, and one of his first duties was to prepare a register 
of “ landless ”  A rabs and to draw  up  a  scheme for resettling 
them.
In the inquiry which was the outcome of this instruction, the 
applications of Arabs, though in fact landless, were excluded if 
they came within any of the following categories : —
(1) Persons who owned land other than th a t sold which
they cultivated as tenants.
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(2) Persons who had  found land other than that from 
which they were displaced and were now cultivating it as 
tenants.
(3) Persons who, subsequent to the sale of the land from 
which they were displaced, obtained other land but, on 
account of poverty or other reasons, had since ceased to 
cultivate it.
(4) Persons who, at the time of sale, were not cultivators, 
such as labourers and ploughmen.
(5) Persons who had  themselves sold their land to Jews.
(6) Persons who, although landless, had  obtained equally 
satisfactory occupation.
Some of the grounds of exclusion appear to us to be unduly 
restrictive : for example, sales by Arabs to Arab m oney-lenders 
with vacant possession and subsequent sales to Jews w ere not 
recorded, as coming within exception (5) above. W e  regret 
further tha t the inquiry should have been based on the registra­
tion only of those A rabs who had  lost their land as te n a n ts  and 
cultivators and not also of those who had  lost their occupation 
on it as hired labourers. The official total of "  landless ” Arabs 
is often misunderstood by those who are unaware of the limited 
definition of the term. I t  should be clear tha t this to ta l  can be 
regarded as representing only a portion of the displacement of | 
A rab population resulting from  Jewish land purchases.
60. Although 3,271 applications for resettlement were received 
from landless Arabs up  to the 1st January , 1936, only 664 were 
adm itted to the Register, 2,607 being disallowed. G overnm ent I 
purchased lands at a  cost 0^72 ,240  for the resettlement of 
these proved displaced Arab cultivators, and at the time of our 
inquiry more than half of the 664 families had been provided | 
with land. Some of the rem ainder declined the land offered 
them  on the grounds that they were accustomed neither to  the | 
climate of the new area nor to irrigated cultivation.
6 1 . The Jews also submitted evidence that they had m ade a 
careful enquiry into the m atter of landless Arabs and th e y  had 
discovered only 6 8 8  tenants who had been displaced by the 
land being sold over their heads; and that of th e s e  so m e  400 
had found other land. This enquiry related t o  t h e  period | 
1920 to 1930.
62. I t  has further to be remembered tha t the Jews, in  their I 
policy of creating an agricultural Jewish population, have 
restricted the employment of A rab labour on lands h e ld  by 
them. In  February , 1935, an enquiry showed t h a t  in  the 
Jewish-owned orange groves 40 per cent, of the l a b o u r  was 
Jew ish and 60 per cent. Arab. The position is now reversed  
and  60 per cent, of the labour is Jewish and 40 per c e n t .  Arab. 
This is a  subject of keen discussion between the F e d e ra t io n
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of J e w is h  Labour and the F anners’ Federation. There has 
in fact been a movement to intimidate those Jew ish farmers who 
employ Arab labour. Picketing in the post-war settlements 
in the Sharon was on such a scale as to require legislation— 
the Prevention of Intim idation Ordinance of 1927 (amended 
in 1936).
Though this policy has not mcreased the num ber of landless 
Arabs, it has reduced the field of employment for labourers and 
the means of livelihood of those cultivators who depend on 
work outside their holdings to obtain an  adequate income.
63. The evidence we received from Government officers 
established the fact th a t up to 1930 or 1931 there was land 
available for displaced tenants, bu t th a t from 1932 onwards 
it has been extremely difficult for such people to find land. 
It is only right to say that the Jewish Agency disclaim any 
intention of displacing A rab cultivators. Thus Dr. Ruppin 
told us:—
“ There is no tendency on our part to  ou st Arab farmers from  
their holdings. The few  cases where Arab tenants were displaced, 
which I  m entioned yesterday, b y  Jew ish purchases are negligible 
in comparison w ith th e  m uch bigger num ber o f Arab farmers w ho  
have become landless b y  foreclosure of their holdings ow ing to  
debts to  Arab creditors. Our aim  is to  im prove agricultural 
methods, especially by  irrigation, and to  create new  possibilities 
for settlem ent o f Jew s w ithout prejudicing in an y  w ay th e  livelihood  
of the previous Arab cultivators. I  am  also of opinion th a t th e  
Arab farmer w ill have a better incom e . . . from  an irrigated
and intensive farm  of 20 dunum s, than  from 100 dunum s of unirri­
gated land as it  is in its  present form . W e accept, and have accepted  
since the tim e of Sir John H ope Sim pson, th e  form ula th a t in a ll 
cases of purchases o f land b y  Jew s th e  Arab cultivators should  
remain on the land and th a t their econom ic situation should not be  
worse, and I hope i t  w ill be better, than it w as before. W e agree 
to measures of control b y  th e  G overnm ent in respect o f the fulfilm ent 
of these conditions, b u t in order to  carry ou t a programme w hich  
will create new possibilities for Jew ish settlem ent w ithou t doing harm  
to the Arabs, a  m uch more active participation of th e  Governm ent 
in the developm ent activ ities is indispensable.”
64. We welcome this statem ent of policy. As will be seen 
when we deal with the Huleh project, it has in fact suggested 
a practical proposal. We also are of opinion tha t up till now 
the Arab cultivator has benefited on the whole both from the 
work of British adm inistration and  from the presence of Jews 
in the country. Wages have gone up : the standard of living 
has improved: work on  roads and  buildings has been plentiful. 
In the Maritime Plains some Arabs have adopted im proved 
methods of cultivation. B ut we are definitely of opinion tha t 
the greatest care m ust now be exercised to see that in the 
«vent of further sales of land by  Arabs to Jews, the rights 
°f any Arab tenant o r cultivator in the land should be pre­
served. Further, we are of opinion tha t this alienation of
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land should only be allowed where it is possible to replace 
extensive by intensive cultivation, which really means in the 
plains and not, a t  any rate a t  present, in the hills.
65. In  the pre-w ar days conscription and malaria kept the 
Arab population low. I t  is now increasing rapidly. The 
Jewish Agency in their m em orandum  state: *' A part from  more 
general considerations of a  m oral order, it is essential in the 
interests of the Jewish N ational Home tha t the fellaheen should 
be raised to a  higher standard of life. On a long view , the 
Jewish village cannot prosper unless the A rab village prospers 
w ith i t ."  We would endorse this statem ent, and add that in 
our opinion “  a  long view ”  m eans considering the interests 
of the next generation, or the effect of agrarian development 
30 years hence, by which time the Moslem population will 
have more than doubled, if the present rate of increase is main­
tained. The shortage of land is, we consider, due less to the 
am ount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the 
Arab population, as a  result of the causes to which we have 
referred.
66. The A rab charge th a t the Jews have obtained too large I 
a  proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of 
the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes o r  swamp 
and uncultivated when it was purchased. Though to -day , in | 
the light of experience gained by Jewish energy and enterprise, 
the Arabs m ay denounce the vendors and regret the alienation I 
of the land, there was at the time at least of the e a r lie r  sales 
little evidence tha t the owners possessed either the resources 
or training needed to develop the land. So far as th e  plains 
are concerned, we consider tha t, with due precautions, land | 
m ay still be sold to Jews.
67. We have above referred to certain precautions which I 
should be taken, by  which we mean measures to p ro tec t the 
Arab cultivator. The legislation already enacted has b een  given 
above, where we noted tha t the Jew s, who recognize the  need 
for protective legislation, criticize the present O rd in a n ce s  as 
failing to achieve their object, and as being actively harmful 
in prom oting litigation and causing insecurity of te n u re . We 
regard it as proved th a t recent alterations in the law  relating 
to the protection of cultivators, and  the machinery set u p  under 
the law, have led to grave abuse and to blackmailing claims | 
by  persons no t entitled to protection under that la w .
68. The Jews also complain of the difficulty in o b ta in in g  a I 
proper title to land purchased. Even after it has b e e n  regis-l 
tered in their nam e they are not able to enforce their possessory 
rights. An instance will be found in the case of th e  l a n d  at 
Caesarea given below in Section 4 of this Chapter. T o  d ea l with
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the complaints under this head in detail would necessitate set­
ting them out in extenso, the consideration of the evidence in­
volved, a discussion on the various interpretations pu t on the 
O rd in a n ce s  by the Government, the Jews and the Courts and 
on the various powers which the la tter could and should exer­
cise, a n d  by which of the Courts they could or should be exer­
cised. In our opinion the expenditure of the time so required 
would be out of all proportion to the value of any detailed 
recommendations which we might make and which, moreover, 
would not, we feel, be m ade with such a full appreciation of 
the lo c a l conditions and of the land laws in Palestine as would 
be essential.
In addition, they are all m atters which would form p art of the 
subject which would be dealt with by  the Committee on Land 
Legislation which we have recommended in paragraph 29 above.
69. As an example, we m ay mention the Protection of 
Cultivators Ordinance.
No objection is taken by  the Jew s to the general principles of 
the Ordinance, bu t they urge that as it stands, with its am end­
ments, and with the methods under which is is adm inistered, it 
affords too great an opportunity for bogus claims and puts a 
premium on trespassing, with the result that endless delays and 
great expense are incurred in resisting and buying off these 
claims before a  clear title and undisputed possession of land 
can be obtained.
We are satisfied th a t serious delays do occur, bu t the question 
of whether the present difficulties in the w ay of a purchaser can 
be reduced while at the same time ensuring proper protection of 
the cultivator is a m atter which will necessitate investigation and 
consideration by the Committee recommended by us, and also 
reorganization of the Courts and their procedure with a view to 
the speedier trial of land cases and to ensuring to a purchaser 
the possibility of establishing his title and of entering into posses­
sion with the minimum of delay .
Land settlement also enters into this question and where settle­
ment has taken place on the land in issue, if our recommenda­
tions in Section x of this Chapter are accepted, and during land 
settlement operations officers record all easements affecting the 
land, the problem of dealing with trespassers will be simplified.
70. Other grievances advanced by  the Jewish Agency appear 
to us to contain less just cause for complaint. The first relates to 
the “ vanishing millions of dunums "  owing, so it was alleged 
by the Jewish Agency, to the laxity or incompetence of the 
officers entrusted with the task of m aintaining the Governm ent's 
nghts in the land. Dr. B ernard Joseph, a member of the Pales­
tine Bar, who gave evidence on behalf of the Jewish Agency, 
referred us to the Governm ent’s Annual Report for 1920-1, in
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which the figures of 942,000 dunums of State land and two to 
three million dunums of waste land “  much of which is capable 
of improvement and productivity ”  are given.
71. At the present tim e the Government puts the approximate 
extent of State Domain a t 1,036,000 dunums, to w hich, it is 
thought, might reasonably be added 227,600 dunums of sand 
dunes which are being claimed a t Land Settlement. As regards 
mew at, or waste lands, the area throughout the country is 
unknown, bu t it m ay am ount to something considerable in the 
aggregate, made up of uncultivated land, sand dunes and scat­
tered rocky patches, over which it m ay be found, however, that 
villagers have established grazing or other rights. O w ing to the 
size and scattered nature of the lands adjudicated to Govern­
m ent, much of the area, it is believed, will be of little or no value 
for development purposes.
7 2 . At the time of the British Occupation the only a re a s  which 
were known to be Government property were those w h ich  were 
registered as such. W aste lands were not registered o r  recorded 
in any w ay; their location and boundaries were unknown, 
Since the occupation, endeavours have been made to  register 
unrecorded mahlul (vacant) and waste land in the n a m e  of the 
High Commissioner as miri land available for disposal.
7 3 . L and Settlement, as we have pointed out in S ection  1, is 
the only satisfactory process for the definition of the boundaries 
of State lands, and until it is carried out the position must remain 
unsatisfactory. Except for three villages in the hills, Settlement 
operations have so far been confined to the plains. If, however, 
the Land Settlement D epartm ent had  dealt with State claims to 
public lands before undertaking the settlement of land held by 
private title, it would have postponed the latter for two or three 
years, and would have justified the criticism that Government, 
in their own interests ,had delayed the development o f the  more 
fertile area of the countiy, and close settlement upon th e  land.
7 4 . Dr. Joseph declared that the shrinkage in the to ta l  area of 
State and waste lands was due to inadequate steps taken by 
Government to preserve its property, especially in e a r lie r  years. 
He stated that, in accordance with the Ottoman law, a m an  who 
had  cultivated State land for ten years can come to the State 
and dem and a  title-deed to th a t property. He alleged the I 
practice to be that a  m an came to the Land Registry, bringing I 
with him a certificate signed by the Mukhtar of his village anal 
two notables, to the effect tha t he had  been working a piece I 
of land contained within certain boundaries for the last ten years I 
or more, that no notice of such claim was given to th e  Govern-1 
ment, and that on the strength of this certificate the c l a i m a n t  was I 
granted a  title.
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75. We made careful inquiries into this complaint and are 
satisfied that all such claims are subjected in the Land Registry 
to a most critical scrutiny, a survey being first m ade, including 
a report on the state of cultivation. The Registrar visits the 
property, and taxation records are searched to ascertain whether 
tithe or tax has been paid. The Inspector of Agriculture is then 
asked for a report, and if this report is not clear it is referred 
to the Chief Agricultural Officer for his views as to the period 
and state of cultivation. The allegation that such claims were 
readily granted in the earlier years is refuted by the num ber 
of actions instituted against Government to establish title refused 
by the Land Registry. In  1924, for example, 106 such cases 
were entered against Government.
76. We ascertained th a t the total area in respect of which 
titles have been granted b y  the Land Registry from the 1st 
October, 1920, to the 30th November, 1936, is 248,118 dunums. 
This figure includes claims by  occupants against private property 
registered in the nam es of individuals and, although figures as to 
this are not available, it is considered probable tha t one-third 
of the above figure related to privately-owned land. I t  would 
seem, therefore, tha t not more than approxim ately 165,000 
dunums of unregistered State land has been affected by  claims 
of this nature, genuine or otherwise. A large area in Beersheba 
is included in tins am ount, as in that district there was no pre­
war registration, although the same families had been in posses­
sion of land there for centuries. While adm ittedly the ascer­
tainment and registration of Government ownership in land has 
been dilatory and even unsatisfactory, no useful purpose is 
served by exaggeration.
77. An equally groundless com plaint was made tha t Govern­
ment was not usually represented by competent lawyers in pro­
ceedings regarding the title of w hat might be State land. 
Actually we find that, though originally the Assistant Director 
of Lands personally represented Government in title suits, later 
on it was decided that this work should be done by  the Attorney- 
General's D epartm ent, who employ officers who, though not 
admitted to practise as advocates, are fully qualified for the 
work, which is carefully watched by the Attorney-General and 
has been well reported on by the Judges before whom they 
appear. Since these cases have been transferred to the Govern­
ment Advocate’s branch, thirty-six cases have been decided : 
twenty-two cases have been won for the Government, two 
withdrawn at the request of the Director of Land Registration, 
one settled in Court by  agreem ent and eleven lost. Such cases 
often turn on questions of fact as to occupation of land in the 
past, and Government is naturally a t a disadvantage in such 
matters.
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In  view of these facts we consider that there is no substance in 
this complaint.
78. A third general charge brought against the Mandatory 
Pow er by the Jewish Agency is tha t Government has failed ade­
quately to im plement its obligations under Article 6 of the 
M andate to m ake State and waste lands available for close settle­
m ent by Jews. The limited areas of State land leased to Jews 
were, it is said, for the most part either sand dunes o r swamps 
which could only be pu t to use by a large expenditure on 
reclamation.
79. The general position w ith regard to State and w a s te  lands 
has already been exam ined and stated. The bulk of the area 
claimed by Government as State Domain is, where cultivable, 
already occupied by A rab tenants. E xpert advisers consider 
th a t there is already a  scarcity of land in certain areas, notably 
the hill districts, for the indigenous population.
80. In  this connection it has to be remembered that la n d  placed 
by Government a t the disposal of the Jewish N a t io n a l  Fund 
becomes inalienable, in the same w ay as land acquired for a 
W aqf  by  the Supreme Moslem Council. Obviously in e ith e r case | 
caution on the p a rt of Government in dealing with such land is I 
desirable. I t  is true th a t Government now only le a se  and do 
not sell State lands. B ut for practical purposes a  long lease to 
the Jew ish N ational F und  or to a W aqf  estate may well be 
regarded as perm anent alienation to one race, even though the 
term s on which the land m ay be held might m any years later be | 
altered.
81. We are of the opinion that, pending survey a n d  land I 
settlement, the Administration wisely refrained from handing 
over land which, in the light of fuller knowledge, they might | 
find was essential for non-Jewish cultivators.
82. The Jew s have, we think, a legitimate grievance in the I 
failure of the Administration to arrange for the consolidation of I 
holdings for the concentration of Arabs in one block. A s stated 
above, we consider tha t recourse should be had, if necessary, I 
to the L and Expropriation Ordinance and that scattered indi-1 
vidual A rab holdings should not be allowed to interfere with the 
development of a  scheme which has been proved to th e  satis­
faction of Government beneficial to Jew s and  Arabs a lik e . The I 
argum ents for and against this procedure are given below in | 
paragraphs 86-88.
83. The rem aining grievances relate, first, to the inadequate 
steps taken to ascertain the* resources of the c o u n t r y  a n d  the I 
failure to establish irrigation schemes, a  subject dealt w ith  below 
in Section 3 ; secondly, to the dilatory proceedings of th e  Land 
Settlement D epartm ent. The second complaint, in our opinion, 
is justified. W e have suggested the rem edy in paragraphs 36-41
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of th is  chapter. Lastly, the request is made tha t the Govern­
m ent s h o u l d  facilitate the settlement of the Beersheba area by 
p lacing  a large tract of land at the disposal of Jewish colonizing 
bodies, s o  that an  organized effort m ight be m ade to discover 
w ater f o r  irrigation purposes. W ith this object, it is suggested, 
G o v e r n m e n t  should commence land settlement operations in 
the Negeb area.
84. It is obvious th a t a t present Government cannot spare the 
staff for settlement operations in Beersheba. F a r more urgent 
work in the Maritime Plains fully occupies their time. Further, 
the Beersheba question is a very difficult problem, which has not 
been fully examined and in regard to which we would, in view 
of the experience of the land settlement of the com paratively 
small area of Beisan, strongly deprecate haste. I t  appears to us 
that the first steps to be taken are to ascertain the attitude and 
desires of the Sheikhs of the various tribes, the rights enjoyed 
by the tribes, and their attitude towards changing a nom ad life 
for one of settled cultivation. H aste has been a potent factor 
in creating the troubles in Palestine, and no useful purpose would 
be served by introducing Jewish immigrants into the Beersheba 
area until the Government were assured that they would be 
amicably received. In  the meantime, we can see no objection 
to the Government or to the Jewish Agency exploring the possi­
bilities of a fresh w ater supply in any p art of that country. Any 
such action should be undertaken under the careful control of 
Government.
85. In view of the adm itted fact that intensive cultivation of 
the soil is only possible if sufficient w ater is available at low cost, 
we referred to the Administration for consideration a proposal 
placed before us for the creation of special Public Utility Com­
panies, rather on the lines of tha t suggested for Huleh (Section 4 
below). Under this proposal comprehensive schemes of develop­
ment in the interests of both the A rab and the Jewish communi­
ties could be undertaken under the close supervision of, and in 
active co-operation with, the Government. There would in such 
Companies be a Government director or directors, though not 
necessarily Government participation in the finance. The Com­
pany would undertake the discovery of sub-surface water 
resources, promote drainage, and rationalize the distribution of 
water. They would place their proposals, including their finan­
cial resources, before the Government, who would carefully 
examine both, obtain a report from their local officers as well as 
their experts on the condition of the land, its present occupants 
and the area which should be reserved for them . Government 
would also acquire the land, where the price had not been fixed 
by negotiation, under the Land Expropriation Ordinance, and 
take such steps as m ight be necessary to consolidate holdings. 
The Company, in return for its expenditure on the development
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of the area, would be given a  lease for such area as they might 
obtain, after the reasonable needs of present occupiers had been 
met, free of rent for 99 years, though the R ural Property Tax 
would still be payable and should be an  increasing source of 
income to Government. Arabs would get their leases direct from 
Governm ent: Jews from the Company. Government would, we 
suggest, retain control of the water rights, its distribution and 
price.
86. I t  is claimed tha t such a scheme would improve the lot of 
the Arab in the rationalization of his farm , and its crop rotation. 
B y the consolidation of A rab holdings in the area, possibly in 
three or four blocks, chances of friction would be diminished, 
and irrigation more easily introduced. I t  should help to avert 
land speculation, and both Arab and Jew  would benefit from the 
development of roads and, it is hoped in time, from co-operative 
m arketing methods.
87. The Palestine Government, while recognizing that such a 
scheme would provide a  place for additional Jewish settlers, 
doubt whether in  the aggregate the position of present Arab 
owners and occupiers of the land would be improved. They I 
foresee difficulties arising from  various causes.
First, there is the deeply-rooted aversion which all Arab I 
peasants have shown in the past to leaving the lands which they 
have cultivated for m any generations. They would, it- is 
believed, strongly object to a compulsory transfer, even from 
one part to another of the com paratively limited area envisaged 
in a scheme of this kind.
Secondly, the A rab cultivator finds it extremely difficult to I 
change his methods of agriculture: to adapt himself to cultiva­
tion by irrigation. Even with the scientific example of his I 
Jewish neighbours he would be unable to bring the land to its 
full productivity within m any years. The change from dry I 
farm ing and limited anim al husbandry to intensive irrigation I 
entails a complete change of the cultivator's habits, chief amongl 
whiçh stands the fact tha t he would have to work all the year I 
round, and  that his farm  would require daily attention instead 1 
of the leisurely annual disposal of cereal crops from dry fanning, |
Thirdly, the Palestine Government would have to assume, 
through its representative on the B oard of Directors, direct! 
responsibility for the welfare of each cultivator affected, ini 
allocating to him  a  fixed area, a  lot viable, sufficient for the I 
maintenance of himself and his fam ily, and impossible of enlarge-1 
m ent if he fails to win a  subsistence therefrom. Experience! 
elsewhere, as a t Beisan and also in Egypt, shows that in spite I 
of continual help and  supervision by  Government on ly  60 per! 
cent, of the tenants are even now beginning to appreciate the I 
necessity for unrem itting attention to their cultivation. Hencel 
Government anticipate m any calls for relief by way of remission I
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of rent or taxation, and “  a t times by  w ay of grants of seed and 
possibly of food or money I t  would induce a habit of 
dependence on Government.
Fourthly, they lay stress on the difficulty of determining the 
minimum area required by each existing owner or occupier, 
which once fixed could not be increased. If found to be 
definitely inadequate, it would be necessary to find land else­
where, thus involving a second compulsory transfer of the 
cultivator concerned.
88. Apart from these practical difficulties, they regard the 
political considerations, in the present circumstances of 
Palestine, as of still greater im portance. So far, it is urged, 
from meeting Arab dem ands to prevent the im provident land­
owner from selling his land to the Jews, this proposal contem­
plates the compulsory acquisition of A rab lands, in exchange 
[or other lands on lease, the rem ainder to be handed over to 
Jewish organizations. Any such proposal would place in the 
lands of Arab agitators a weapon against which logical argu­
ments as to the advantages of the scheme would be an in­
effective defence.
89. We have already placed on record our conviction that 
the Arab’s lack of capital and education does not justify his 
being deprived of land. W e have also stated th a t we should 
welcome the definite prohibition of the sale of isolated and 
comparatively small plots of land to Jews. We assume tha t, 
in a scheme of the kind under consideration, there would, as 
is doubtless contemplated in the Government’s proposals for 
the protection of small owners, be very careful and detailed 
enquiries before any land was acquired, any cultivator rem oved 
from his holding, or any  lot viable determined.
90. The Protection of Cultivators Ordinance defines sub- 
àstence area as such land as will enable the statutory tenant 
to maintain his custom ary means of livelihood in an  occupa­
tion with which he is fam iliar: the land must, as nearly as 
circumstances perm it, be in the vicinity of the holding from 
which the tenant is ejected. “  I t is believed that the Ordinance 
wiU prevent the creation of further landless Arabs by the 
eviction of agricultural tenants without provision on the land 
jor their subsistence, while a t the same time it places no obstacle 
in the way of the buying and selling of land where the transfer 
of ownership will not adversely affect the tenant. ' ’
91- The acceptance of the first two argum ents advanced by 
™e Palestine Government against the proposal, nam ely the 
aversion of the peasant to change of location or method of 
agriculture, combined w ith his dislike of continuous work, 
®eans a sheer negation of progress, and would render it im ­
possible for the M andatory Power to fulfil its difficult obligation 
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to encourage close settlement on the land. We consider that the 
responsibility of Government for the displaced, and perhaps 
discontented, cultivator should be held to have been discharged 
if and when they are satisfied th a t he has been given land 
sufficient for his maintenance. We can discern no difficulties 
in this direction th a t m ight not arise under the proposals of 
the Palestine Government for the protection of small owners by 
the reservation of subsistence areas.
92. Nor should such a scheme, adequately supervised, in­
crease the already existing tendency to the pauperization of 
the indigenous peasantry. Loans and remission of taxation 
have always been freely granted, as the following figures show.
In  1933, out of a dem and in respect of a winter payment 
of tithe of £157,405, it was found th a t remissions amounting 
to £105,150 were inevitable.
In  1934 the to tal remissions am ounted to £129,726, out of I 
a total aggregate tithe assessment of £245,000, or 53 per cent.
In  1935 the following figures give the amount of Rural 
P roperty Tax due on the 1st April, 1935, the amount collected | 
during the year 1935-6, and the am ount outstanding:—
£
Gross assessment a t 1st April, 1935 ... 222,276
Exem ption granted under Section 6 of the
Ordinance   53,650
Remissions granted during the year ... 14,058
Collected during the y e a r ............................. 100,671
Outstanding on the xst April, 1936 ... 53,897
In  1935-6 repaym ents of agricultural loans totalled ^7,2591 
and new loans for £6,562 were issued, leaving £168,943 out-" 
standing.
In  view of these figures before them , it is not surprising that I 
the Palestine Government view with dismay anything likely to| 
result in further claims upon their generosity.
93. The political difficulties form part of the general picture of I 
the adm inistration of the country, and we do not underrate them. I 
B ut we cannot blind ourselves to the fact tha t, if the Mandate is I 
to continue and the M andatory Power is to discharge its obliga-l 
tion, the pace of progress m ust not be determined by factious| 
agitators. W here, then, the following conditions are fulfilled,
(a) there is land available, and a  general willingness to| 
sell,
(b) it has been proved- suitable for intensive cultivation,| 
and
(c) satisfactory financial arrangem ents can be devised, 
we do not think tha t such a  scheme under Government super-] 
vision and control should be held up by  calculated obstruction.
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94. It is necessary, however, in order to prevent undue 
optimism, to state that in our opinion, at present, such areas are 
few, and, so far as we can see, are only to be found in the plains 
and not in the hill districts. In  the north of the Huleh area, for 
example, the num ber of A rab cultivators is so large that it m ay 
not be possible to obtain spare land, especially if, as already 
noticed by us, account is taken of the natural increase in the 
population. B ut this should not preclude careful and detailed 
examination of any scheme, towards the preparation of which 
Government might help. Nor, if the necessary financial resources 
are provided by a Company, should Government hesitate to give 
every assistance even for a  scheme which m ay not appear a t the 
outset to be from the point of view of its promoters an economic 
proposition. We have dealt with this proposal at some length as 
illustrating the grave difficulties that attend any attem pt to extend 
the cultivable area or productivity of the land in Palestine.
95. Such, we think, is the best policy that can be fram ed for 
dealing with the Land problem under the M andate, or under 
1 slightly amended form of it. B ut we wish to state definitely 
that in our opinion such a policy, though in the circum­
stances we consider it does justice to both Arabs and Jews, would 
not be accepted as just by  either race nor remove the griev­
ances they respectively entertain. The attitude of the Jew s to 
the restrictions on land-purchase already proposed by the 
Palestine Government makes it more than probable that they 
would oppose the greater measure of restriction which our 
policy involves. The Arabs, for their part, have told us that 
no more land a t all m ust be purchased by Jews. On neither side, 
therefore, would the adoption of our policy remove existing 
grievances.
3. The Third Problem: Irrigation.
96. This problem involves the proper conservation, control, 
development and  utilization of all the w ater resources of the
untry. In  Palestine there are four sources of irrigation to be 
nsidered—irrigation from rivers, from  springs, from wells, 
d from reservoirs.
I r r ig a t io n  f r o m  r i v e r s .
97. There are only two rivers worthy of consideration in this 
nnection, the Jo rdan  and the Auja. The latter is no more 
an a small river from which irrigation can only be effected by 
piping. A concession for this purpose has been granted to 
\ Rutenberg, the Managing Director of the Palestine Electric 
rporation, who a t present irrigates from it about 5,000 dunums
f land and proposes to irrigate another 700 dunum s. I t  seems 
robable that the surplus of w ater rem aining will be required for 
e water supply of Tel Aviv, as there is no other adequate 
rce available.
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98. The Jordan  is therefore the only potential source of river I  
irrigation. I t  presents two possibilities—the Huleh scheme I  
which is considered in paragraphs 120 to 125 below, and thé I  
possibility of a  canal from  lower down the river. Down the river I  
from H uleh, until a point some five miles below the Sea of Galilee I  
is reached, any project of this nature is prevented by the I  
Palestine Electric Corporation's concession, under which i tH  
would seem tha t nothing can be done in the way of drawing off I  
w ater above these works which would diminish the supply to ■  
them . The canal would therefore have to take off at a point I  
where the Jo rdan  runs in a deep trough and would have to run ■  
through some 30 miles of cutting before the water could beH  
brought on a level with the ground. The alternatives would be I  
a  very high dam , which would be very expensive and probably ■  
impracticable owing to the geological formation, and pumping, 1  
which would be ruled out by  the expense: even when the water I  
was brought on to the ground, further grave difficulties would ■  
arise owing to the configuration of the country, which would H  
necessitate drains every 1,000 yards or so apart being con-H; 
structed either under or above the canal to carry off flood water H i  
from  the Judaean  hills. The construction of such a canal* ; 
therefore appears impracticable. The only other possibility of^Ht 
irrigation from the Jordon would be by  pumping water at theHi 
points where it is required. I t  is very doubtful whether this*a 
would pay  owing to the very great height the water would haveM 
to be pumped. ■
Thus the prospects of irrigation from the Jordan in existing H .  
conditions appear to be exceedingly doubtful, as the situation®1 
above described applies to the whole valley down to the Dead*( 
Sea.
99. There are a  large num ber of springs in Palestine, esped-^P 
ally in the Beisan plain, the Jo rdan  valley, the Samarian andH( 
Judaean  hills; but, apart from two small schemes in Beisan and^F 
Jericho which are fed from  springs, nothing can be done bythe*- 
Government in irrigating land by  this means under the existing^ ® 
Ottoman law, under which the w ater in springs is the property ofH1 
individuals, who can sell it as they please, with the consequent* 
th a t nothing in  the w ay of preventing waste is possible. ■
100. W e consider that legislation vesting the surface water ofH  
the country in the High Commissioner is essential and we recom-* 
mend th a t the am endm ent of the Palestine Order in Council* 
which is necessary to enable this to be effected should be made* 
without waiting for other am endments which m ay be desirable.* 
Legislation of this nature has proved necessary in all countries*
I r r ig a t io n  f r o m  s p r i n g s .
where irrigation is of importance—in Australia, Canada, Ini
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and the drier States of America. I t  should enable the Govern­
ment to ensure in a large m easure the economical use of spring 
water; but the additional area of land which can be irrigated in 
this way will be com paratively small.
I r r ig a t io n  f r o m  w e l l s .
101. Irrigation from  wells is, and  likely always to rem ain, 
the chief source of irrigation in Palestine. Wells are frequently 
being deepened and new wells sunk. In  consequence the 
necessity of protecting existing well irrigation has been realized.
102. A complete survey of the coastal plain and the Plain of 
Esdraelon has been m ade and the water level in thousands of 
wells has been m easured. A t the present mom ent there is no 
reason to believe that there is any real diminution of the supply 
or any falling off in the level of the sub-soil water-table. B ut 
these dangers m ay arise a t any time. I t  is therefore proposed 
to legislate, in the first place, in order to obviate the necessity 
for periodical surveys, by prescribing that well-owners m ust 
report at stated intervals the depth of the w ater in their wells 
and, secondly, if the water-table should in any  case be found 
to be fa llin g , to perm it the Government to control the sinking of 
new, or the deepening of existing, wells, within prescribed 
areas.
I r r ig a t io n  fr o m  r e s e r v o ir s .
103. Investigation by the Government into the possibilities of 
irrigation of this nature has only recently been started; up to 
date the results have been most disappointing. A search for 
satisfactory sites for reservoirs is being m ade, so far without 
success. Further investigations, which are proceeding, m ay lead 
to better results, b u t the outlook is not hopeful.
104. A gauging station was constructed near Jerusalem  across 
the Wadi Suraa, which drains a large basin, and measurements 
f the amount of water running off toe brim  were taken. I t  was 
ound that owing to the enormously absorptive character of the 
il—a condition which applies to the whole country—99-5 per 
nt. of the rainfall was absorbed in the land as it fell, so that 
nly 5 of 1 per cent, ran  down the W adi.
105. In Beersheba a  dam  and reservoir were built. Only 
bout 7 per cent, of the w ater falling in the large catchm ent area 
hind them passed into the reservoir formed by the dam , and 
t the end of the rains there rem ained in the reservoir only ^ of 
per cent, of the w ater which had  fallen in the catchm ent area, 
e balance of the 7 per cent, having percolated aw ay into the 
eservoir bed, which is simply the natural ground, the area
ing too large for anything in the nature of water-proofing to 
e effected.
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106. From  w hat has been w ritten above it may be seen that 
the main sources of w ater for irrigation in Palestine are wells 
which are increasing in num ber and size in the areas in which 
w ater is known to exist. The problem of close settlement of 
the land depends in the m ain on the discovery and development 
of w ater supplies for irrigation. As stated by Dr. Hexter, on 
behalf of the Jew ish Agency, “  The intensification of agricul­
ture depends upon irrigation.”  Later in his evidence he 
endorsed a statem ent made by the Palestine Economic Corpora-1 
tion— “ Intensive cultivation of the soil is only possible if suf­
ficient water is available a t low cost If water could be dis­
covered in the Beersheba Sub-District enormous possibilities of 
development would be opened up, provided that such water 
could be brought into service a t a reasonable cost. The Sub-1 
District constitutes nearly half the total area of Palestine.
107. As Sir John Hope Simpson stated in his Report, “ Given I 
the possibility of irrigation there is practically an inexhaustible 
supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba area. Without irriga­
tion, the country cannot be developed. Up to the present time I 
there has been no organized attem pt to ascertain whether there is J 
or is not an artesian supply of w ater ” ,
108. Since the date of his R eport it appears that very little has I 
been done by Government to discover w ater in Palestine. Ini 
1931 the Government obtained a  boring plant for experimental 
purposes, another small plant was purchased in 1933, and in I
1934 and 1935 another plant was bought in each year. These I 
plants have been used to a certain extent for exploration pur-1 
poses. In  all, five purely exploratory boreholes have been 
completed, two of them  in "the Beersheba district, where work is I 
proceeding on yet another. The plants have also been used fori 
villages which had  no w ater supply, in Jewish settlements where I 
there was a drought, and for town w ater supplies.
109. The exploratory boreholes which have been made do not I 
afford sufficient data upon which an opinion can be reached asl 
to possible sources of w ater supply : much more work will have I 
to be carried out before useful knowledge as regards the Beer-1 
sheba district will be available. The problem is complicated by I 
the existence of saline and fresh w ater in different parts of the I 
district and it is not known which of the two is going to be found. |  
In  both the finished boreholes the w ater was salt.
110. The boring plants cost from £1,000 to £1,500 eachj 
according to the depth for which they are designed and the cor* 
of running a plant varies between £2,000 and £2,500 per annun 
The first borehole in Beersheba cost £ i ,9 9 4 >  being 1 ,1 7 ° “ |  
deep; the second cost £300, the depth being 375 ft.
h i . W e have received a considerable amount of evidenci |  
upon the subject of irrigation, both written and oral. Tbe|
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Jew ish experts have furnished calculations of the total 
a m o u n t of water available in Palestine and of the 
areas which could be irrigated. In  their opinion the
water resources in the country would be sufficient for the 
irrigation of a t least 1,500,000 dunums of land, as com­
pared with the 350,000 dunums a t present irrigated, without 
tak ing  into consideration the hill districts, in which irrigation is 
admittedly much more difficult, or the Beersheba area. One 
estimate for Palestine, excluding Beersheba and the south, puts 
the figure of irrigable land a t 3,500,000 dunums, after allowing 
water for the civil and industrial needs of a  population of
2,500,000 people.
112. We are not in a position to pronounce upon these esti­
mates nor do we consider it in any way necessary for us to 
attempt to do so. Much work remains to be done before any 
reliable estimate can be made of the approxim ate quantity of 
water available and still more to ascertain how much can be 
brought into use as an economic proposition. There are large 
districts, including most of the hill country, in which irrigation 
would be so difficult, even in the im probable event of w ater being 
available, that these districts should, in our opinion, be omitted 
in any calculation of irrigable area.
113. The main difficulty in any comprehensive extension of 
irrigation in Palestine is not so much the inadequacy of the 
supply of water as the cost of making it available for use. If 
the expense is high the question arises as to w hat crops can be 
raised which will justify the expenditure. We are in no way 
suggesting that all possible steps should not be taken to increase 
the irrigated area of the country, a  m atter of vital importance 
toits development and to the realization of close settlement; bu t 
the difficulty remains of making any estimate of the area of land 
which can be irrigated on an economic basis.
114. Our recommendations (besides that in paragraph 100)
are
(а) The transfer of those of the boring plants which are 
to be used for exploratory purposes from the Public W orks 
Department to the D epartm ent of Development, in order 
that the control of all m atters connected with irrigation 
may be in the hands of one Departm ent.
(б) The purchase of further boring plan t for exploratory 
work.
(c) The engagement of adequate staff—
(i) to secure the reasonably rapid development of 
the surface w ater of the country, and
(ii) to adm inister the Ordinance now in draft 
relating to wells, to maintain a continuous survey of 
sub-soil w ater conditions and to sink further bores for 
exploratory purposes.
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4. Four Examples of Land Problems.
115. We give in some detail action taken by the Administra- 
tion in four cases of settlement of land. These illustra te  in 
the case of B irkat R am adan successful co-operation; in  that of 
Huleh a large project beneficial to both Jew s and Arabs, which 
we were asked to examine and recommend : that of B eisan  was 
instanced by  the Jew ish Agency as mistaken policy; while the 
case of Caesarea lands was quoted as showing the difficulties 
experienced by the Jew s in obtaining possession of land 
delivery of which was due under an agreement.
116. In  the Tulkarm  Sub-District there were se v e ra l  Jewish 
settlements, N athanya, Hertzelia, Tel Mond, Even Yehuda, 
K adenia, as well as two A rab villages, Mesha and Umkhalid. 
All these were m alaria-ridden owing to the marsh o r swamp 
areas known as B irkat R am adan and Bass um el Alaq. Much 
of the land originally acquired by  Jewish bodies in ru ra l  areas 
was, according to Palestine standards, well-watered, a n d  suit­
able, therefore, for close settlement with irrigation facilities, but 
a t the same time malarious. In  1922 an Antimalarial Ordinance] 
was enacted, placing on the owner or occupier the onus of 
carrying out any measures which might be prescribed by the 
D epartm ent of Public H ealth to prevent the breeding of mos­
quitoes and to provide such drainage as might be deemed neces­
sary. The area which we are now considering was in fact 
offered to some of the Arabs displaced by Jewish purchasers 
but was declined by them . None of the registered “ landless 
A rabs ”  were willing to settle in that locality.
117. Plans for the drainage of the swamps were drawn up in 
1929, when it was discovered, as is not unusual in Palestine, 
that ownership was disputed, and it was decided to await the 
settlement operations, as a  result of which, six years later in I 
1935, the lands were declared to be p art of the waqf (dedicated 
land) of K halil el R ahm an, and should therefore be registered 
in the nam e of the Supreme Moslem Council as administrators 
of the waqf.
118. Action was no t taken under the Antimalarial Ordinance I 
of 1922, bu t negotiations were started by  Government, and the I 
Development Officer approached the N athanya Seashore I 
Development Com pany, who agreed to contribute £6,oooj 
towards the cost of drainage. The Supreme Moslem Council, as I 
adm inistrators of the estate, agreed to pay £4,500, while the I 
Government paid £7,500, m aking a total of £18,000. Thel 
w ork, which included the use of dynam ite in cutting drainage! 
canals, was visited by  us and we were able to appreciate thel 
m arked improvement. A scheme for the economic exploita-1
A.—B ir k a t  R a m a d a n .
tion of the w ater resources of this area has been drawn up by
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the Irrigation Officer, to be administered by a Committee com­
posed of the Development Officer, the Assistant District Com­
missioner and the Mamour Awqaf. Owing to the disturbances 
unhappily the Committee has been unable to function.
119. Thus an area of some 4,500 dunums, previously a source 
of malaria, has been turned into cultivable land which is also 
i r r ig a b le , at a cost of about £16 an acre. While the Jewish settle­
ments benefit both in health and in  the immediate capital 
appreciation of the value of their land, it appears to us th a t it 
is the proprietors, the Supreme Moslem Council, who derive 
the greatest benefit. And this land, it m ay be pointed out, is 
waqf property, and therefore inalienable. This is one of the few 
instances of that co-operation which in every enquiry has been 
reported to be so essential for future progress. I t also illustrates 
the advisability of Government taking powers to control and 
regulate water-supplies to which we refer elsewhere.
B .—T h e  H u l e h  S c h e m e .
120. Immediately below the Syrian border lies the Huleh 
basin, which, including a num ber of Arab villages and a large 
papyrus swamp draining south into Lake H uleh, is a triangular 
strip of land some 44 square miles in area. Ju st before the W ar, 
the Ottoman Government granted to two Beirut m erchants a 
concession of the lower portion for the drainage of the lake and 
adjacent marshes, the project entailing the deepening of the 
River Jordan. In  1918 this concession was transferred to the 
Syro-Ottoman Agricultural Company, but very little work was 
done, and eventually in 1934 the Palestine Land Development 
Com pany, a Jew ish Corporation, purchased the concession for 
£192,000. To the north  of the concession area are the Arab 
villages referred to above. I t  is estimated that some four to five 
thousand Arabs are now living on this land as tenants of 
absentee landlords. This tract is intersected by the rivers and 
springs which form the head waters of the Jo rdan  and is 
irrigated in a very haphazard  m anner by a  network of small 
primitive canals. I t  is, owing to over-irrigation, now the most 
malarious tract in all Palestine. I t  might become one of the 
most fertile.
121. Sir John Hope Simpson reported in 1930: —
"  The H uleh area is all irrigable. T he property m ight be a very  
valuable one and i t  is regrettable th a t th e  area owned b y  th e  Govern­
ment therein has passed alm ost in  its entirety out o f th e  hands of 
the Government in to  th e  hands of a  concessionaire . . . .  T he conces­
sion was originally m ade b y  th e Turkish Governm ent before th e  W ar, 
but was renewed b y  th e  G overnm ent of P a lestin e.”
" If the concession falls in , as is possible, i t  seem s essential th a t  
the Government should retain th e  proprietary right in  th e  area, for
development purposes................................... H  the H uleh area should revert
to the Government, a  technical study should b e m ade in order to  
ascertain th e actual cost of the suggested drainage.”
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This enquiry was held, and  negotiations with the new Conces­
sionaires have now been completed. The consent of the Palestine 
Government was necessary to the transfer of the concession 
and  one of the conditions attached to it was the reservation 
within the concession area of 15,772 dunum s for the Arab culti­
vators. U nder the original concession 10,000 dunums were to 
be reserved.
122. W hen Messrs. Rendel, Palm er and Tritton were asked 
to prepare the scheme, they pointed out that it was necessary to 
exam ine the whole area of the Huleh basin, and not merely the 
concession area. Government agreed to extend the terms of 
reference to the Consulting Engineers, whose report estimates 
the approxim ate cost of the scheme a t £933,000, allocating 
£222,600 of this to Government and £710,400 to the Conces­
sionaires. The concession area comprises 18,568 dunums of 
cultivable land, 21,453 dunums of marshes, and 16,919 dunums 
of lake, or a total of 56,939 dunum s. A part from this, the land 
to the north of the concession, between the head works and the 
concession area, will be brought under controlled irrigation and I 
drainage, while further north again there is the large area which, 
unless drained and  controlled, will rem ain a  source of malaria. 
If  this can be included in the scheme, as appears to us to be 
essential, it is estim ated tha t in all some 100,000 dunums of 
land will be benefited, of which two-thirds will be in Arab and | 
one-third in Jew ish ownership. The position now is that the 
Palestine Government have subm itted the scheme to Your I 
M ajesty’s Government in the hope of obtaining sanction to their | 
share of the expenditure.
123. I t appears to us th a t it is in  large schemes of reclamation 
of this kind that the M andatory Power can best fulfil its obliga­
tion of encouraging, “  in co-operation with the Jewish Agency,
. . . . close settlement by Jew s on the land The sum
proposed would be, we consider, a justifiable charge on public 
revenues for a scheme which eliminated m alaria from an exten­
sive tract, irrigated 60,000 dunum s outside the concession and, 
inside it, after reserving 15,772 dunum s to Arabs, provided
36,000 dunum s for Jew ish colonists. I t  was pointed out to us in 
evidence that, from the Jewish point of view, this was not “ a 
m oney-making proposition " ,  and that the most that the various 
Jewish companies which m ay combine as a consortium to 
finance this large undertaking can hope for will be a repayment 
of the capital invested over a long period. We agree that it 
indicates w hat can be done in special districts to provide new 
areas for Jewish colonists, while a t the same time benefiting and 
increasing the num ber of Arab cultivators. I t  is, however, right 
to point out tha t it commits the Palestine Government not only 
to heavy capital expenditure bu t to their share of the recurring 
charges necessary for maintenance of the irrigation system, and
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further, unless the whole region to the north of the H uleh marsh 
is brought under anti-m alarial operations and effective drainage, 
the scheme will be deprived of much of its value.
124. The net result, if the scheme comes to fruition, will be 
th a t land reserved for A rabs will cost Government some £13 
an acre as against £110 per acre charged against the consortium. 
T his means that to establish a Jewish family as colonists in this 
a rea , with buildings and the land prepared, will cost not less 
than £1,000. Expenditure on this scale is only possible in 
the exceptional circumstances which provide funds for the pur­
pose. It is obvious that philanthropy and enthusiasm overrule 
the desire for profit usual in an ordinary commercial under­
tak in g . We have no hesitation in commending the enterprise, 
even though the disregard of economic considerations does not 
d im in ish  the difficulty experienced by  the Administration in 
e s t im a t in g  “  the purely economic "  absorptive capacity of the 
c o u n try . I t emphasizes the need for calculating the num ber of 
im m ig r a n ts  to be adm itted for work on the land on the basis 
of ascertained facts, rather than on hopes, which m ay, or may 
not, be realized.
125. Should the scheme materialize, it is im portant tha t a 
careful record of rights should be prepared for all parties who 
have any interest in the land. In  addition, it will be necessary 
for Government to control the irrigation, and limit in the initial 
settlement the rights to w ater to be exercised by  any individual. 
The introduction of modern scientific means of collection and 
distribution of w ater should result in the irrigation of a con­
siderably larger area of land, and also remove the m alaria 
caused by water-logging. We have already referred to the 
necessity for legislation in this direction.
C.—B e i s a n .
126. _ One of the legacies of the Ottom an Government was 
the Beisan area—the Bethshan referred to in the F irst Book of 
Samuel—dating back to 1870, when the Turkish Government 
appointed a Commission to enquire into the reasons why a 
large amount of arrears of crops and land taxes had accum u­
lated. As a result, it was ordered tha t, with the exception of 
the land belonging to two Arab tribes, the whole area should 
be sold by public auction. Certain villages were purchased by 
Sultan Abdul H am id : others were registered in his name. He 
subsequently also purchased the lands of the two excepted 
Arab tribes. W hen the British took over they found the 
tracts (we quote from  the Report of Mr. Lewis French)
" inhabited b y  fellahin w ho lived  in m ud hovels, suffered severely  
from the prevalent malaria and were of too low  intelligence to be 
receptive of an y  suggestions for im provem ent of their housing, w ater  
supply or education. Large areas of their lands were uncultivated
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and covered w ith  w eeds. There were no trees, no vegetables. The 
feUahin, if not them selves ca ttle  th ieves, were alw ays ready to harbour 
these and other crim inals. T he individual plots of cultivation, such 
as i t  w as, changed hands annually. There was little  public security 
and the fellah in’s lo t was an alternation of pillage and blackmail 
b y  their neighbours th e  B eduin , . . T he Beduin, wild and
law less b y  nature, were constantly a t feud w ith  their neighbours on 
both  sides of th e  Jordan, and raids and highw ay robberies formed 
their staple industry : w hile such cu ltivation  as th e Beduin were i  
capable o f filled in  th e  intervals of more exciting occupation.”
The lands were nominally Jifttik o r State Domains.
127. The Commission appointed in 1921 to examine th e  ques­
tion of State Domains recommended that the tenants of Govern­
m ent Jiftlik areas should be given long-term leases, b u t  these 
the cultivators in Beisan declined, partly  fearing this might 
involve conscription for m ilitary service, partly  because they 
refused to adm it the legality of the ex-Sultan’s despoliation. 
They organized a hostile dem onstration. The land h a d  never I 
been surveyed: there had  been no census, and the registry 1 
lands gave no details as to the occupants. C o m p u ta tio n  of | 
num bers and areas necessarily was guess-work. The Govern­
m ent decided th a t confirmation in the occupancy of th ese  lands I 
in this wild and unsettled locality should placate th e  semi-1 
nom ad A rabs who were a t the time cultivating them. An I 
agreement known as the Ghor-M udawara (State Lands) | 
Agreement was signed on the 19th November, 1921.
128. This agreem ent m ade a  perm anent settlement of the | 
respective rights between the Government of Palestine and ' 
cultivators of the land. Each applicant was allowed the areal 
to which enquiries, m ade on such evidence as could be pro I 
duced, showed him to  be entitled on the ground that the family I 
had exercised for 10 years or more cultivation rights. Where I 
this was less than  150 dunums the allotm ent was increased to I 
tha t area. If a fam ily consisted of more than five individuals! 
30 additional dunum s were to be transferred for each addi-l 
tional member. U nder the agreement the transfer price to bel 
paid  to Government was 150 Egyptian piastres (£1 10s.) per I 
dunum  of irrigable land and 125 piastres 5s.) per dunum I 
of non-irrigable land, to be paid w ith the tithes, taken at nil 
per cent, of the produce, in 15 equal annual instalments.I 
Interest was payable at the rate of 6^ per cent, per annum at I 
the end of the fifth year on the instalments payable during thel 
last 10 years. No disposition of the land except by mortgage I 
to Government was to be m ade till the whole transfer price I 
had been paid. The Supreme C ourt, however, in 1932 held I 
that land in Beisan could be sold in execution of a decreel 
obtained by a creditor. A Commission was appointed toi 
dem arcate the areas to be transferred and the land to be leased I
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for grazing, consisting of a  representative of the Lands D epart­
m e n t ,  a representative of the District Commissioner and two 
representatives of the transferees. In  case of disagreement 
the members of the Commission were to appoint a  fifth member.
129. The Commission started work in 1921 and took no less 
than 10 years to complete their task. In  1934 the terms had 
to be revised in accordance with the advice of another Com­
mittee in the light of experience gained. The price was re­
duced, and the period of paym ent was extended to a m aximum 
of 3 0  years. The transferee was allowed on certain conditions 
to dispose of a  portion of his holding to persons approved by 
Government, who had as their object intensive cultivation.
130. The lands as finally settled by the earlier Commission 
covered an area of over 90,000 acres. The irrigable area 
amounted to 112,552 dunum s, non-irrigable to 129,696; 2,048 
dunums were classed as common land, and 137,910 as un­
allotted waste. There were 2,6x4 transferees, some of whom 
were family groups or tribes. Some were resident in Trans­
jordan. The rights of absentee landlords were recognised. 
The enquiries of the second Committee showed that land specu­
lation had begun and th a t 28,430 dunum s of irrigable and 
17,711 of non-irrigable land had been paid for an d  resold to 
outside interests.
131. Beisan is one of the few areas where irrigation from 
springs is possible. U nder the present system of distribution 
and topography the w ater available will, it is estimated, irrigate 
only some 35 per cent, of the irrigable area a t one time. Large 
tracts of land lie fallow under present methods of cultivation. 
Naturally the agreem ent has been subjected to severe criticism 
by the Jews, who considered tha t a unique opportunity of dis­
charging the obligations under Article 6 of the M andate was 
missed. They point out th a t Government had  to pay £72,240 
for the purchase of 17,868 dunum s in the Beisan and Jenin  
Sub-Districts to be used for the settlement of displaced culti­
vators, Land, therefore, which Government had  sold a t £ 1 10s. 
or £1 5s. a dunum  was resold to them  a t £4  and upw ards. 
They have themselves purchased approxim ately 24,000 dunum s, 
at an average price of over £ 4  10s.
132. Sir John Hope Simpson, while recognizing tha t “  it was 
probably politically desirable th a t the lands covered by  this 
Agreement should be settled with the Arab tenants who had un­
doubtedly enjoyed the use of the tract in  the time of the Ottom an 
Government,”  a t the same time pointed out tha t the agreement 
as modified in 1928 has
“ taken from th e  G overnm ent th e control o f a  large area of 
fertile land, em inently  su itable to  developm ent and for w hich there  
is ample w ater available for irrigation . . . T he w hole of th e  
Beisan lands have been d istributed, and large areas h ave already
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been sold. Further large areas are in  th e  m arket. The grant of the I 
lands has led to  land  speculation on a considerable scale. The 
custom  is th a t th e  vendor transfers to  th e  vendee th e liability f0l 
th e  price o f th e  land still ow ing to  th e  G overnm ent and in addition 
takes from  h im  a sum  varying from  three to  four pounds a dunum I 
for land in  th e  Jordan V alley. These proceedings invalidate thel 
argum ent w hich was used to  support th e  original agreement. It 
was m ade in  order to  provide th e  Arabs w ith  a holding sufficient 
to  m aintain a  decent standard of life, n ot to  provide them with 
areas of land w ith  w hich  to  specu late."
We* associate ourselves with Sir John  Hope Simpson's I 
criticisms.
133. This case has been explained at some length as it shows, 
in our opinion, an  error of judgm ent on the part of thé 
Administration. The original agreement in 1921 was hastily 
m ade w ithout sufficient exam ination. There was a disregard of 
possible development and unduly generous terms were given 
to Arabs, who were not in a position to take advantage of them, 
w ithout sufficient safeguards against abuse. Dealt with on the 
lines of the Huleh scheme, the position to-day would be very 
different. Even now, a t this late stage, it appears essential that 
Government should take over and regulate the water rights in| 
this area, where close settlement is possible.
D .—C a e s a r e a .
134. There are three tracts of land near the seashore halfway I 
between Tel Aviv and H aifa, known as Atlit, Kabbara and 
Caesarea. The Palestine Jew ish Colonisation Association I 
(commonly know n as the P .I.C .A .) were promised a  concession I 
in 1914 of the m arshes known as K abbara and this concession, I 
together with the sand-dunes of Caesarea, covered an area of 
25,510 dunum s or roughly 6,400 acres. The concession was 
confirmed by the Palestine Government by  an agreement dated I 
the 8th N ovember, 1921. The Com pany was, however, unable 
to obtain possession of the Caesarea area as it was claimed I 
jointly by A rabs in the vicinity, who m aintained that they were | 
proprietors of parts of the land and also had  rights of grazing.
135. The A rabs refused to institute any  action, and in 19281 
(the seven years ' interval was probably occupied by fruitless I 
negotiations) Government filed a  case in the Land Court claiming I 
the land as waste or unreclaim ed land {mewat). I t  was not til 
three years la ter th a t judgm ent was given. The two Judges of I 
the Land Court differed and the case was referred to  a  third I 
Judge. The upshot of the three judgm ents appears to  be that 
tiie A rabs were declared entitled to 2,655 dunums and Govern­
m ent to 6,470 dunum s of waste land. I t  is not p o s s ib le  from 
the judgm ents to discover the exact area affected by the  judg­
m ents. One Judge dealt with an area of 9,000 dunums. Another 
referred to a  claim of 32,000 dunum s, and  no decision w as given | 
as to grazing rights.
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136. This case was brought to our notice by the Jewish 
A g en cy , not only as an  instance of the law ’s delay and the diffi­
culty  of obtaining possession of land purchased, bu t as demon­
strating the need for compulsory parcellation. I t  appears to us 
evident that the various plots assigned to the Arabs should, if 
necessary, be acquired by Government. The A rabs should be 
offered in exchange a  consolidated plot of 2,655 dunums in order 
that the development of this large area near the sea m ay not be 
held up indefinitely.
137. This is one of the m any cases in which the Administration 
patiently await land settlement proceedings. I t  is reported that, 
as regards the K abbara area, land settlement has been completed, 
while the Atlit and Caesarea areas are being surveyed. The 
land settlement staff are fully occupied elsewhere in the regular 
settlement proceedings. This case therefore shows the need for 
a special staff, a peripatetic settlement party  available for special 
inquiries. We are of opinion that in this case the Jews have 
legitimate cause for complaint.
5. Land in the Hill Districts.
138. It will be seen th a t the instances we have given (B irkat 
Ramadan, Huleh, Beisan, and Caesarea) relate to areas either 
in the plains or irrigable. As regards land in the hill districts, 
there is, unfortunately, very little chance of irrigation. Thus 
Dr. Ruppin, who suggested th a t another million and a-half 
dunums of land m ight be brought under irrigation, confined 
the area to the M aritime P lain, the Jordan  Valley, the Vale 
of Esdraelon, and Galilee. W hen it was pointed out tha t this 
left out the hill districts, he stated th a t for them he had not 
yet any data.
139. Previous enquiries both by Sir John Hope Simpson 
and later by Mr. Lewis French have shown that there is con­
siderable congestion of A rabs in the hills, and tha t the land is 
insufficient to meet all their requirements under their present 
system of agriculture. Even so, it is to be feared tha t the 
jellaheen,
 under their crushing load of debt, will offer lands for 
sale. Mr. French reported
" the absorption, gradual b u t inevitable, o f th e  Arab peasant pro­
prietor by the Arab effendt or cap italist landlord ”
and
" the advance o f th e  Jew s, w ith ou t such noticeable progress and  
development as in th e  coastal plains, b u t w ith  sim ilar results in  
reinforcing the claim s of landless Arabs. B oth  facts need to  be faced. 
Some form of protection for th e  sm all owner appears v ita l in order 
to ensure that the concentration of num erous sm allholdings in to  the  
hands of large proprietors does n o t lead to  th e  sam e evil as is 
anticipated from excessive expropriation b y  the Jew s. In one Sub- 
District in the h illy  tracts it  is reported th a t in  a  decade no less than  
30 per cent, o f th e  land has passed from Arab peasants to  Arab 
capitalists.”
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140. Sir John Hope Simpson held out the hope that it might | 
be possible “ to im prove the method of cultivation of the Arab I 
fellah in the dry tracts, and also to extend irrigation wherever! 
th a t is possible, so th a t the fellah will be able to gain a reason-1 
able livelihood from a smaller area of land than that which has I 
been essential hitherto " .  He further added that any scheme! 
of development should provide for the settlement both of Jews\ 
and of Arabs  on the developed area and should take into con-| 
sidération the plans of colonisation of the Jewish agencies, [ 
in order tha t development by  those agencies and by the Com-1 
mission m ight be co-ordinated. I t  m ight well prove possible! 
to combine two schemes of development in certain areas with! 
m utual advantage and with considerable economy.
141. Dr. R uppin in his evidence agreed tha t development was! 
"  the main thing necessary for Palestine ” , and he w e n t on| 
to show how this development might best take place. Asl 
regards the plain areas it depended on irrigation, but in  dealing! 
with the hills he could only hold out hopes of more intensive] 
cultivation in the shape of mixed farm ing and the planting! 
of fruit-trees.
142. The agricultural population in the hill districts is  roughly! 
Jew ish 4,100, Arabs 355,000. There are some 25 Jewish settle-1 
ments in the hills and the am ount of land held by  the Jews atl 
present in the hills is 315,000 dunums. The hill d is t r ic t s  were! 
taken by Sir John  Hope Simpson to be 6,124,000 d u n u m s  ini 
area, of which 2,450,000 dunum s m ight be cultivable. Quite I 
apart from any question as to the reliability of these figures oil 
the actual size of the cultivable area, the problem in the hills asl 
regards the land is simply this. Is close settlement practicable?! 
Can it be introduced to the m utual benefit of Arabs a n d  Jews’I
143. W e visited two Jewish settlements in the h ills , which I 
were mentioned to us by several witnesses as being a m o n g  thrill 
successful enterprises. The first was A tarot, some sev en  miles I 
from Jerusalem , on which 24 agricultural families c o m in g  froml 
Poland, Russia and Germany had  been settled. T h e  total! 
area of this hilly land, certainly land which the ordinaryl 
observer would regard as unfertile if not uncultivable, was! 
1,700 dunum s, of which some 750 dunum s have up to  date I 
been brought under cultivation. Each settler has 15 dunums,! 
slightly less than  four acres. I t  is hoped eventually to  accom-l 
m odate 50 more families o r a  total of 74, which, allowing I 
15 dunum s for each fam ily, would absorb I , n o  dunums, apart|  
from  roads, forest, and  absolutely uncultivable ro c k -la n d .
144. £4,200 was spent b y  the Jewish National Fund in pur l 
chasing land for this little colony before the W ar. Immigrants I 
are expected to pay  2 per cent, on advances made to them.f 
A part from the cost of land it was estimated tha t nearly £àoo was I
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necessa ry  to provide the settler w ith a  house, two cows, cow­
shed, chicken-run, fowls, implements, working capital, etc. 
£0,260 were advanced for 18 settlers. Others came and in­
vested their own money. Thanks to the kind offices of Mr. 
J o s h u a  Gordon, we were given a  detailed inspection of the 
accoun ts and of the settlement. I t  appears that it was not till 
1936 that a  start was m ade in repaying the capital, bu t it was 
c o n te n d e d  before us in evidence tha t this provided a refutation 
of th e  following criticism by  Sir John Hope Simpson on the 
" uneconomic colony ” . In  the case of the Zionist settlements 
he h a d  reported tha t the system was
“ immensely costly . I t  dem ands very  litt le  from th e settler him self. 
Indeed, how ever hard a settler m ay work and how ever desirous he  
may be to  pay back sum s th a t th e  fund expended on  h im , b y no  
possibility can he arrive a t that result. T he debt w hich he ow es 
cannot be repaid by any effort on h is part. . . . ”
And again,
“ It is undesirable from th e  point of v iew  of ordinary m orality  th a t  
colonists should be allowed to  benefit b y th e large expenditure w hich  
has been made for their settlem en t and y e t to  escape paym ent of 
the am ount spent upon th em . . . .  If a  strong, h ealthy and self- 
respecting peasantry is desired in the Jew ish colonies in P alestine, 
it should be m ade qu ite clear to  th e settlers th a t th ey  are under 
the obligation to  repay th e  ou tlay  w hich has been m ade on their 
behalf.”
145. It will be seen tha t in the case of A tarot the total 
advances, including the cost of land, were £14,460. The Co­
operative Society has also paid  £2,600 for laying on w ater from 
the Jerusalem supply, on which the settlers pay a water-rate 
checked by meters. The mixed farm ing in the settlement depends 
chiefly on cows (fed on fodder purchased from the plains) ; 
these a re  Frisian, at an  average cost of between £60 and £70, 
on w hich  11 per cent, is paid annually, 10 per cent, for 
insurance, 1 per cent, for treatm ent. I t  is calculated tha t each 
cow g iv es a profit of £ 2  per month. The farm also includes 
poultry and fruit trees. Poultry  yield a small profit. The 
fruit tree s  are still in the experim ental stage. On spare land 
vegetables are grown for the family. There is also a kinder­
garten school in which there are 42 children, the teachers being 
supplied by the Labour Federation. Medical attendance is 
supplied from the sick fund, to which the average paym ent is 3s. 
a m onth. Accident insurance costs 17s. a year and a  special 
insurance fund of £1  14s. per year per family was created 
against the risk of being shot by Arabs. We regret to have to 
report that in this settlement there was one such claim.
146. The second settlement we visited was K iriyat Anavim, 
which is some nine miles outside Jerusalem  on the Jaffa road, 
with which it is connected by a  track of about half a  mile. The 
Jewish National Fund paid £11,406 for the land, totalling 4,151
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dunum s. 3,700 dunum s were acquired during the years 1920-7 
a t an average of £ 2  5s. per dunum . F or the land purchased in
1935 the price had  risen to nearly £7 . As regards the situation 
and  soil, this settlement was more favourably placed than 
A tarot. The settlement is run on the com munal principle. It 
was founded in 1920 with 40 members—men and women from 
Southern Russia and Galicia. In  1933, 40 immigrants from 
Poland joined the settlement and 20 from Germany in 1935. h 
1936, 28 boys and girls from  Germany were admitted for pur­
poses of education and  agricultural training. Of the 40 original 
members 32 have rem ained in the settlement to the present. 
There are now in the settlement 192 persons. W ater is obtained 
from  a  well south of the m ain road which is pum ped and stored I 
in a  reservoir in the centre of the settlement. There a re  also 
reservoirs for storing rain w ater. Some three years a g o  negotia­
tions were concluded for buying w ater from one of the neighbour­
ing A rab villages, a mile aw ay; bu t owing to the disturbances 
this w ater could not be obtained, and an arrangem ent w as made I 
with Government for the supply to the settlement of w a te r  from I 
the Jerusalem  w ater system a t 40 mils per cubic m etre  fori 
drinking w ater, which is double the cost of water fro m  localj 
supplies.
147. The Palestine Foundation F und  (Keren Hayesoi)\ 
invested in this settlem ent £20,593. This was su b s e q u e n tly  re-1 
valued by a committee of experts and the debt of the settlement I 
was reduced to £10,744, which is to be repaid by  the settlement I 
in the course of 40 years with, interest a t 2 per cent. H e re  again 
repaym ent of advances commenced only in 1936, 16 y e a rs  after 
the start of the settlement.
148. The dairy-farm ing is extremely well managed. The! 
settlement has a  dairy  containing a  cooling room a n d  a  small 
laboratory for analysing the milk. Poultry farming, bee-hives 
and  plantations of fruit-trees also contribute to th e  income. [ 
Food for cattle and  poultiy  has to be bought, and th e  cost of I 
w ater is an  expensive item, bu t we were told that the n e t profit] 
during the last five years w as:—
£
1930-31   444
1931-32   520
1932-33   5 2 8
1933-34   386
1934-35     3 6 1
The vines and fruit-trees which were first planted over 3001 
dunum s of terrace lands failed, and  b y  1926 only 50 dunums I 
of the vines and 10 dunum s of the fruit-trees had su rv iv ed . Al 
new experim ental orchard covering an area of 60 d u n u m s was 
then planted with some 700 fruit-trees of 185 different varieties. 
I t  is supervised by  the A gricultural Experim ental S ta tio n  of the
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Je w ish  Agency. H ere, as a t A tarot, we noticed tha t even under 
silled advice fruit-trees are still in the experimental stage. 
I t  h a s  t o  be remembered tha t experience of fruit cultivation on 
a commercial scale is extremely limited, especially as regards 
d e c id u o u s  fruits. The cows are imported from H olland, the 
jo u l t r y  from America, queen bees from  Italy . There are a t 
p re s e n t 103 Dutch and five Swiss cows. As at A tarot, there is 
no g r a z i n g  and not even an exercise ground. F ear of disease 
r o v e n t s  the farmers allowing the cows outside the farm yard.
149. Our impression, after seeing these two settlements, was 
that they were in every w ay a rem arkable testimony to the 
enthusiastic energy not only of the im migrants bu t of those who 
inanced and advised them. L and which under ordinary methods 
of cultivation would have given a precarious crop of cereals has 
jeen turned over to mixed farm ing; and, although these farm s 
cannot be judged on any ordinary economic basis, they are a 
valuable feature in the Jewish colonization as affording a  liveli- 
îood for settlers and training centres for young immigrants. I t  
is o bv ious, however, that any development on these lines is 
quite beyond the financial resources of any A rab small 
jroprietor.
150. Turning to D r. H exter’s definition of cultivable land, 
success cannot be ascribed to the “  interaction of the physical 
iroperties of the land, including availability of irrigation ." I t  
is true, however, that in these cases land was “  subjected to 
a more intensive or different form of cultivation as and when 
the su p p ly  of capital, labour, skill and available m arkets 
w arranted .”  I t  appears to us that m any decades m ust pass 
>efore there will be the necessary supply of capital, labour and 
skill on the part of the A rabs.
151. T h e  “  active policy of development ”  advocated by  the 
Jewish Agency contemplated generous loans to cultivators. Dr. 
Ruppin, for example, advocated planting the m ountainous area 
with deciduous fruit-frees, and  desired that Government should 
make lo a n s  to the farmers in the hills which they could start 
repaying after 15 years. In  a  subsequent letter he explained 
that w h a t h e  suggested was "  a mixed farm  in which, in addition 
to cereal growing, poultry and bee-keeping, from  3  to 10  
dunums should be planted with various fruit-trees and grapes
. . .  Most of the farm ers are so poor and so inactive that 
a powerful incentive is required to induce them  to action. There 
are two such incentives : the first is to enable those who have a 
surplus of land to sell tha t surplus, or p art of it, and to use the 
means so obtained for the planting of trees ; and , second, to 
grant to those who have no surplus of land a loan equal to half 
the a m o u n t required for the planting and cultivation of trees 
until th ey  reach the fruit-bearing stage.”  This would mean
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adopting the financial system which we saw a t work in these 
two settlements. Government would have to lend a  very large 
sum  of money either free of interest or a t an  extremely low rate 
on a speculative enterprise. I t  is adm itted tha t both fruit-trees 
and  cattle need constant scientific supervision, accompanied by 
a  system of insurance in the case of the latter. On the plantation 
there would be no repaym ent of the money advanced for 
15 years. Any proposal of this kind would, we feel sure, be 
heartily condemned by those Jewish witnesses who protested 
tha t revenues derived from Jew ish sources were being spent 
on Arabs.
152. A further difficulty is tha t in the hill districts a  large 
am ount of land is held in village ownership under the masha'a 
system, and D r. Ruppin himself noted tha t “  under existing 
conditions of land tenure in the hill villages it is practically 
impossible for the farm er to sell p a rt of his surplus la n d , since 
tha t land is either com munal property or divided into t in y  plots 
for which purchasers can either not be found a t all o r  only at 
a  veiy  low price.”  H e realized th a t it was essential to  have 
these villages surveyed and settled as soon as p o s s ib le . As we I 
have already seen, m any years m ust pass before this c a n  take | 
place.
153. H aving regard to all the foregoing considerations and to I 
the necessity of providing land for cultivators who may be dis­
possessed in order to meet the requirements of any adequate 
policy of afforestation, a subject with which we deal in  a  later 
Section, we are satisfied th a t there can be no expectation of 
finding accommodation for any large increase in the rural Arab 
population in the hills. W e therefore have no hesitation in 
saying that at present, and indeed for m any years to come, 
the M andatory Power should not attem pt to facilitate th e  close 
settlement of Jew s in the hilly districts generally, though in the 
immediate neighbourhood of Jerusalem  dairy and fruit farms [ 
m ight eventually prove self-supporting.
W e have reached this conclusion quite independently of a I 
consideration of the inadvisability on the grounds of security of 
scattered settlements of Jew s in the m idst of a hostile Arab [ 
population.
6. Agriculture.
154. The development of the D epartm ent of Agriculture has 
been rem arkable. The expenditure in the year 1924-25 was 
£35,691:; ten years la ter it was £147,286. The object was an 
active policy of agricultural development in the hope of facilitai- 
ing the close settlement of Jew s upon the land without | 
prejudicing the position of the A rab. I t  was hoped that intensive 
would replace extensive cultivation, and  tha t where an Arab
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held fifty acres, th irty  at any rate would be available for the 
Jewish im migrant. I t  is obvious that any such policy involves 
a radical change in the methods of cultivation by the fellah.
We were told by  an official witness : —
" The view  th a t th e  Arabs sell part o f their land and spend th e  
money in  developing the other part o f their land I  do n o t th ink  
is consistent w ith  the facts. Some years ago an enquiry w as m ade in to  
twelve villages w hich had sold a large portion of th eir land to  th e  
Jews and I  th ink  on ly  in  one or tw o  villages was any im provem ent 
made.”
155. We received evidence th a t the Jew s themselves would 
welcome “  a much more active participation by Governm ent ”  
in the attem pt to im prove the standard  of the A rab farm ers.
“ More than half th e  soil of P alestine is in  th e h ill country, in  
which I th ink there are b ig  possibilities, n o t y e t exp loited , b u t 
the Government m ust assist th e  farmers by cheap loans. The 
farmer has no capital to  invest for th e  cost of p lantations : he 
must ge t help in  th e  form of a long term  cheap loan ."
This witness also considered th a t the A gricultural M ortgage 
Bank could not meet indigenous requirem ents. The peasant 
who started a vineyard or an orchard would not be able to begin 
repayment of the capital expenditure till after fifteen years.
156. This statem ent was confirmed by  an Arab witness who 
told us that while it was true th a t in the citrus-growing area 
many Arabs had  adopted the im proved method of cultivation 
introduced by Jew s, several of them , owing to lack of capital, 
had become heavily em barrassed.
" The actual p lanting has a ll been done b y  borrowing. I  know  
one village, Yebna; a few  years ago I  used to  say ' L ook a t i t —  
a model of prosperity b u t th ey  are about £120,000 in debt. I 
think th irty  or forty , perhaps more, orange-groves are now  being  
put up for sale a t public au ction .”
157. It is frequently contended th a t the Arab has only to 
follow th e  exam ple of the Jew  to become prosperous. This is 
doubtless true of the relatively w ealthy and enlightened A rab 
landowners who have developed citrus plantations in the Mari­
time Plain. B ut the case of the A rab cultivator is very different. 
Unless h e  can be provided w ith the same resources, in the shape 
of capital, continuous help and advice, he cannot possibly com­
pete w ith  the Jew . I t  is also clear th a t w ith the heavy ex­
penditure on internal security, to which we refer elsewhere, it 
is im possible for G overnm ent to undertake the financial respon­
sibility involved.
158. Meanwhile the A gricultural D epartm ent, w ith its six 
branches, V eterinary (anim al husbandry), A gricultural (field 
and vegetable crops), H orticultural (fruit, etc.), Entom ological, 
Fisheries, and Education and Research, is doing excellent work. 
It is aided by a General A gricultural Council consisting of six
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A rabs, six Jew s, three others and three Government officials 
In  the various Committees there was more sign of co-operation 
between Jew  and A rab than in any other Department. It ÿ 
unnecessary for us to give a detailed account of the departmental 
activities as displayed in the different agricultural stations, the 
im provem ent of cattle, seed selection, and village demonstration 
plots. In  research it shares in the results obtained in the Jewish 
laboratories, a valuable privilege given in return for compara­
tively small grants-in-aid from  Government.
159. Some results of the D epartm ent’s enterprise are already 
apparent. M any A rabs now grow vegetables for th e  town 
m arkets; others find a new source of revenue in chicken farming 
and in apiaries. Inspectors distribute fru it trees and American 
vines and give advice on their cultivation. Veterinary Inspectors 
give instruction in anim al husbandry and com bat cattle disease. 
There are fifteen B ritish experts in this D epartm ent, com pared 
with a  total D istrict A dm inistrative British staff of twelve. We 
were told th a t the D epartm ental officers were welcomed in the 
villages and th a t they were able to tour freely throughout the J
1936 disturbances.
160. I t is in no w ay a  reflection on their efforts when we I 
emphasize the need for time to show any results on a large] 
scale. On one day we visited a  village, B arriye, in the Ramleh 
Sub-District, tow ards the im provem ent of which Government 
had m ade a  g ran t of ,£500. There were 80 families in this village, 
the population being some 400, who lived entirely on agriculture. 
The land cultivated by  the village was 740 acres. Usually the 
villagers needed all the crops they grew, cereals, for their own 
sustenance and little was left for sale. In  one respect this village 
had a  unique advantage. I t  was one of the first villages to start 
bee-keeping and is now able to dispose of spare hives to other 
villages. The sale of bees and honey brings in an annual income 
of £1,000. At certain times of the year the bees have to be 
transported to other places, as, for exam ple, orange-groves; 
hence a road connecting this village with the main road was I 
necessary. The villagers gave their labour free, and a bridge 
over a  stream , which filled during the rainy season, was being 
built from the Governm ent grant of £500. The surplus will be j 
devoted to an attem pt to provide the village with drains, 
which were obviously needed, and to afforest a portion of the 
land. There was no school, though the villagers had subscribed 
£75 tow ards getting one: there was no room for the children 
in the neighbouring village school. Their methods of cultiva­
tion were prim itive, the camel and the donkey being yoked 
together for purposes of ploughing. F arm yard manure was 
being collected in order tha t it m ight be stored for fuel. Irriga- j 
ti'on was impossible, and the village was dependent on a 
capricious rainfall. W ater was obtained in the summer from a
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neighbouring village half-a-mile aw ay. We were told th a t the 
villagers were short of land and that the surplus population 
had to go to the towns for work. Previously they had  held 
land in an adjoining village which had been sold to Jew s. The 
general impression we gained was tha t of congested poverty 
and ignorance, combined with an  almost sub-conscious desire 
for v illage  uplift.
161. T h e  same afternoon we visited the rem arkable labora­
tories a t  Rehovot developed under the personal supervision of 
Dr. Weizmann. H ere we saw the latest developments in 
experimental research on strictly practical lines designed to 
improve the productive capacity of the soil, raise the standard  
of the products, and discover, if possible, m arketable uses for 
by-products. Thus in plant-breeding experiments are being 
made to  produce a tobacco free from  nicotine. A new method 
is being applied to the problem of obtaining concentrated fruit 
juices without injuring the flavour or destroying the vitam in- 
content. The utilization of whey is being studied, and ferm enta­
tive m e th o d s  applied to the whey have given valuable results 
in the production of lactic acid. The conversion of technical 
proteins into a product which could serve as an  easily digestible 
foodstuff is another experim ent. In  the pharm aceutical 
laboratory substances were in preparation which are expected 
to prove effective against the most serious of N ear Eastern cattle 
diseases, nam ely, theileria. Soil analysis is being conducted by 
spectrographic methods.
162. We have referred in paragraph 7 of C hapter I I I  to “  the 
separation, almost, it m ight seem, by centuries ” , of the Arab 
from th e  Jew . These two visits to the A rab village and the 
Jewish laboratory illustrate its meaning. Y et when the villager 
is su ffic ien tly  educated to appreciate the value of the discoveries 
of the laboratory the hoped-for assimilation of the races m ay 
begin. The idea still prevails in some quarters th a t Palestine 
is a fe rtile  country, “  a land of milk and honey ” , whereas, for 
ten m o n th s  out of the twelve it is in if act for the most p art dry 
and b a r r e n .  Crops can only be obtained by hard  toil. M odem 
science m a y  promote fertility. W hether in relieving the Arab 
peasant of his indebtedness by  Co-operative Societies and 
A gricultural B anks, o r in persuading him  to irrigate his lands 
or to p l a n t  fruit-trees, several decades m ust pass before any 
narked change will be apparent.
7. Forests.
163. The fact has to be faced that there are to-day no real 
forests in Palestine and th a t if there is one country in the world 
m which afforestation is desirable tha t country is Palestine. A 
normal percentage of forest land com pared with the total area 
°f a country is said to be 15 per cent. In  Palestine there are
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only 76 square miles of scrub forest and plantations, out ot some 
6 ,250 square miles, which is the Governm ent estimate of the 
land fit for cultivation or afforestation, of the total of 10,400 
square miles of land area of Palestine, including Beersheba. In 
addition to this 76 square miles, there are a further 450 square 
miles which retain some forest characteristics, bu t they have 
been ruined by overgrazing, overcutting, and other misuse.
164. In  ancient times the hills of Palestine were protected by 
forests, which in the course of centuries have been cleared by 
m an in his search fo r agricultural land. As the population 
increased forests were cut down and the slopes cultivated with­
out terraces. As soon as one area had  been denuded of soil, 
it was abandoned and another plot cleared, cultivated and ulti­
m ately ruined. Finally, during the W ar large quantities of trees I 
were felled, including olives, which were one of the m a in  sources | 
of revenue.
165. The result is th a t the hills are largely barren and rocky, 
and the soil which rem ains is being washed aw ay by rainstorms, I 
Overgrazing prevents the growth of any vegetation which might! 
arrest the process of denudation. In  the plains the country isl 
also suffering seriously from  the absence of trees and vegetation,! 
which allows the sand-dunes along the coast to advance inland | 
and cover areas which have hitherto been cultivable.
166. After the W ar the A dm inistration began to take a c t io n  in I 
connection with forestry and the position in this connection was I 
described in 1925 in Sir H erbert Sam uel's R eport on the A d m in is -]  
tration of Palestine, 1920-5, as follow s:—
“ W ith  respect to  afforestation, th e work of the Department 1 
been severely restricted b y th e inadequacy of its  budget, but it 1 
dem arcated certain uncultivated  State lands as protected forest areas;! 
i t  has fostered regrowth from the stum ps still existing in the destroyed I 
forests, has planted  about a m illion trees, and, through th e  nurseries I 
i t  m aintains, has facilitated  p lantation  b y  others. Altogether four toi 
five m illion tim ber and fru it trees have been planted in these years I 
in  Palestine. The D epartm ent has conducted successful experiments! 
also in th e  p lanting of grasses and trees on sand dunes—a  matter of I 
great im portance, for th e  line o f dunes along th e  coast is slowly! 
advancing inland; i t  has already overw helm ed a considerable areal 
of cu ltivated  land, and, unless stopped b y  p lanting, will certainly |  
prove fatal to  th e  adjoining cu ltivation .''
167. In  1920 the F orestry  Section of the D epartm ent of Agri-I 
culture was established with one qualified Forest O fficer, who! 
was also D eputy D irector of the D epartm ent and in that capacity I 
was overwhelmed w ith agricultural adm inistration until 1929 I 
M oreover his staff h ad  received no training in the technical side I
* T he figures and areas given  in  th is section o f th e  R eport are approx im ate  I  
estim ates.
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0f their duties. In  the early years the m ain function of the 
Forestry Section was the protection of valuable trees on private 
property , which were liable to be prem aturely felled for fuel.
168. I t  was soon however realized th a t the protection of the 
remaining forest land was of even greater im portance, owing to 
the increased dem and for agricultural land due to the fact that 
large areas of steeply sloping ground had  been rendered useless 
by erosion. This dem and resulted in the destruction of forest 
vegetation. Consequently in 1926 an O rdinance was passed 
authorizing the establishm ent of forest reserves to include un ­
cultivated land which was not clearly private property. I t was 
intended that investigation by  Land Settlement Officers should, 
within a few years, clear up all questions of title, w hereafter such 
land as was proved to be private property was to be excluded 
from the reserves and the rem ainder was to be declared State 
orest and  brought under proper m anagement.
169. Up till the present tim e, although some 280 square miles 
ave been notified as Forest Reserve, owing to the slowness of
d settlement only a few square miles have been finally adjudi- 
ted as State Dom ain, and of these it has been found possible
0 gazette only 4,000 acres as “  closed Forest A reas ”  in which
0 grazing or felling is allowed. W ithout closure and effective 
pervision by forest guards to prevent grazing, no vegetation 
n grow , afforestation becomes impossible, and the land is 
enuded of soil. No im provem ent is possible where the goat— 
at " greatest enemy of prosperity ” —is perm itted to overrun 
e land.
170. The declaration of land as forest reserve had  the effect of 
ecking the rapid  clearing and cultivation of the land, but it 
as not found possible to check the dem ands of holders of rights 
or grazing and forest produce far in excess of the growth 
parity of the land, w ith the result tha t the condition of both 
U and vegetation is m ost unsatisfactory.
171. A s regards afforestation, owing to the local im portance of 
d fixation the first plantations were m ainly on the sand-
unes, of which, out of an  approxim ate total of 195 square 
'es, 17 square miles have been declared forest reserves, but of 
ese 4  ^ square miles a t Acre are being alienated to private 
terests. In  all, 750 acres of sand-dunes were planted in the 
lains. Later, attention was turned to the hills, where five 
uare miles of plantations have been established, m ainly near 
azareth and H ebron, and the Governm ent nurseries now pro ­
ice an average of 1,200,000 plants, of which some 200,000 are 
ued annually gratis to institutions and private individuals.
172. In 1929 a qualified Palestinian officer was added to the 
orest service, bu t he also was kept busy w ith adm inistrative
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work and unable to give any training to the staff. By 1933 » the 
unsatisfactory condition of m uch of the hill country had aroused 
general interest, and the need for re-afforestation w as widely 
adm itted. I t  was recognized that the area of forest was seriously 
deficient and the existing forests were suffering from neglect, 
and tha t consequently i t  was necessary to em bark w ithou t delay 
on a vigorous policy o f  afforestation, to rem edy these defects and 
to curtail the encroachm ent of sand-dunes. This, fu r th e r , would 
bring into economic use land  not suited to agriculture and  horti­
culture by  the production of tim ber, fuel and  other forest pro­
ducts, including large quantities of fodder.
173. In  view of the im portance of the measures to be taken, I 
it was resolved to establish a separate D epartm ent of Forests I 
w ith an increased staff. This D epartm ent was officially formed 
on the 1st A pril, 1935, and consists of four qualified officers,! 
20 junior officers and 58 other ranks, w ith a  budget for 1936-71
of £32,513-
174. The C onservator of Forests has recently su b m itte d  a I 
report on Forest Policy which is under consideration b y  thel 
G overnm ent. In  th a t report he states th a t afforestation is a il 
urgent necessity and tha t it should be continued on a moderate! 
scale, he does no t recom m end a large increase a t the moment,|  
because the staff is untrained, silvicultural technique needs toi 
be fu rther developed, prelim inary survey and c la ss if ic a tio n  isl 
required, and the shape, distribution and ownership o f  the forest I 
reserves are all unsatisfactory. H e recommends the closure of I 
considerable areas to allow them  to rest and in o r d e r  to im-| 
prove such vegetation as now exists, such action is a necessaiyl 
prelim inary to m ore intensive afforestation. H e further stronglyl 
urges the acceleration of land settlem ent in order that it may| 
be possible to bring suitable areas under management.
175. H is proposals w ould necessitate considerable land! 
acquisition by the G overnm ent. H e recommends that landsl 
under the control of his departm ent should be divided into| 
three categories:—
A. "  Forest lands ” , subdivided into Production Forests!
Village Forests and Protection Forests, totalling in all aboutj
390 square miles.
B . “  Fodder Lands " ,  of about the same area.
C. “ Protected Lands ” , of about 97 square miles,
- o  places where erosion is a danger, which should be te rrac e
and planted w ith fru it trees.
176. If  such an am ount of land were placed under the conti 
of the Forest D epartm ent, it would in all represent about 14 f 
cent, of the to tal area of 6,250 square miles which is estimated!
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by the Government as the extent of the land which is fit for 
cultivation and afforestation in Palestine, including Beersheba, 
but “ Forest Lands "  would only represent 6 to 7 per cent, of 
the to ta l area, as com pared with the area of forest land in 
Germany, which covers 15 per cent, of tha t country. The area 
of 390 square miles would be a minimum and would by no 
means supply the whole country with tim ber and fuel. I t  is 
emphasized tha t land under the Forest D epartm ent would not 
be lost to the com m unity, b u t would be usefully em ployed.
177. Another scheme for afforestation on a much larger scale 
is contained in a M em orandum  entitled “  An Afforestation 
Scheme for Palestine ”  subm itted to the Commission by Mr. 
Joseph Weitz, the Forestry Officer of the Jew ish N ational F und, 
in January of this year. In  it, he considers tha t 97J square 
miles of sand-dunes and 780 square miles in the hill country can 
and should be afforested. These areas com pare with the 
390 square miles of "  Forest Lands ”  suggested in the Forest 
Policy Report, as the m em orandum  does not deal with “  Fodder 
Lands ” or “  Protected L ands,”  on which under the R eport 
fruit-trees would be planted.
178. Mr. W eitz states th a t since the W ar, only a little over 
12 square miles have been afforested, whereas he considers th a t 
at least 15^ square miles should be planted every year w ith
6,500,000 forest and carob trees, the fruit of the la tter being 
for forage purposes. H e considers th a t this could be done if
d were expropriated by the Governm ent and leased to organi­
sons and individuals prepared to afforest them  a t their own 
ense, but under Governm ent control and restrictions; the 
vemment themselves being left to afforest only 4 square miles 
ch year.
179. We have m entioned these two proposals in order to 
ow how great is the need for afforestation in Palestine in 
e opinion of experts. W e fully realize the  ^ desirability of 
orestation on a  large scale and the advisability of a long-term 
licy on the subject. B ut, having regard to the conclusion 
hich we have reached as to the scarcity of suitable land in the 
'11s for the agricultural population, we cannot recom mend a 
licy which involves expropriation of cultivators on a large 
’e, unless and until o ther cultivable land or satisfactory
mployment on the land can be found for them . T hat there is, 
owever, in the aggregate a  very large am ount of land fit for 
"orestation but not for cultivation we have no doubt and, in 
y case, we strongly endorse a policy of (1) afforestation of 
“p hillsides to prevent erosion, (2) the prevention of grazing 
n land fit for afforestation, and (3) where practicable, the 
tablishment of village forests for the benefit of the neighbour- 
g cultivators.
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8. Co-operative Societies.
180. In  1930 a Committee was appointed by  the Palestine! 
G overnm ent to inquire into the economic condition of agricul- f  
turists. They investigated the position of about a quarter of the! 
total num ber of families engaged in agriculture, living in i0J  
villages (about 12 per cent, of the total num ber of villages) and I 
cultivating an area of 1^ million dunum s, or about 10 per cent. I 
of the total cultivable area. They found tha t the ordinary A rab !  
fam ily had contrived to live on a  net annual income of between! 
£25 and £30, bu t th a t there m ust have been m any families whol 
had been obliged either to lower their standard of living or toi 
fall into debt. They estim ated th a t the total debt of the agricul-l 
turists in the country m ight am ount to some £2,000,000. F o r  al 
few years after the W ar prices were very high, and the farmer I 
seemed to have cleared off his debts and  to have become com-l 
paratively prosperous, bu t when prices began to fall to their I 
natural level he failed to adjust his outlook or standard of livingl 
to m eet the changed conditions. Consequently, he began a g a in !  
to borrow  more heavily than  before a t an  exorbitant rate of| 
interest. I t  was reported th a t “  a  rate of 30 per cent, per annum 
is perhaps the commonest, bu t 50 per cent, for three months is| 
not unusual
181. The Committee recom m ended th a t Government shouli 
provide credit facilities, bu t tha t loans should normally be 
through the m edium  of a village group of a  co-operative nature, 
which would be responsible for the issue, control and repayment 
of loans.
182. Mr. C. F . Strickland, of the Indian  Civil Service, came| 
to Palestine to  study the problem  on the spot, and sub 
m itted a report a t the end of 1930, in  which he arrived at thel 
conclusion th a t “  the am ount of the fellah’s debt is not only! 
burdensom e and such as to ham per any attem pt at progressive] 
agriculture, b u t no sm all percentage of the cultivators 
entirely insolvent. N either co-operative credit nor any fori 
of State loans can place them  on a  solvent footing if the whole 
norm al claim of their creditors is to be p a id .”  As a resulfl 
of his recom m endations, a trained R egistrar was appointed 
with the necessary staff, a num ber of Co-operative Societies 
were established in  A rab villages, short-term  loans to culti­
vators during the years 1930-6 to the am ount of £189,934 were 
advanced, and a Loan Security Ordinance, 1935, enable)' 
approved banks and  com panies to extend short-term crei’ 
and seasonal loans against the security of the crop.
183. An am endm ent of the Im prisonm ent for Deb| 
Ordinances of 1931 and 1932 disallowed arbitrary7 imprison­
m ent and  provided th a t the Execution Officer must satisf"' 
himself th a t the judgm ent-debtor was in a position to pay. "*
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Jsurious Loans Ordinance of 1934 imposed a duty  upon the 
'ourts, when trying a claim for debt, to raise certain issues 
regarding the interest charged. Lastly, a  new B ankruptcy 
)rdinance of 1936 included cultivator debtors in the Law of 
bankruptcy.
184. The Governm ent found themselves unable to accept a 
proposal made by  Mr. Strickland for the sum m ary relief of 
ndebted cultivators by  the settlem ent of debts by special 
ribunals.
185. Mr. Strickland paid a  second visit to Palestine in  1933, 
to advise as to the first practical steps to be taken for the 
ormation of A rab societies and the im provem ent and  pro ­
motion of the extensive Jew ish co-operative movement already 
in existence. Largely on the basis of his recom m endations a 
new Co-operative Societies Ordinance was enacted.
186. There has thus been a m itigation of the burden of debt 
under which farm ers had laboured for m any years past, and 
there has been considerable propaganda to encourage co­
operation. Between 1933 and 1935 more than 200 Arab 
villages had been initiated in co-operative practice. In  60 
villages Prim ary Societies had  actually been successfully started, 
and preparations had been m ade to s ta rt 60 more in 1936.
187. As regards the Jew ish population the case is very 
different. Here Sir John  Hope Simpson reported th a t the 
co-operative m ovem ent had  "  not only been successfully 
launched am ongst the Jew ish population, b u t has already be­
come a highly im portant economic factor in its daily life. On 
the whole, the Societies are extrem ely well m anaged. . . . 
There can be no doubt th a t the Co-operative Societies are doing 
magnificent work and are a  valuable asset both to the villages 
and to the residents in the tow ns." He stated th a t the n e e d ; 
of the Arab population for sim ilar assistance was “  desperately 
urgent ” , and he pointed out the desirability of joint action 
between Jews and  Arabs.
188. While there is little evidence a t present to justify the 
hope that the co-operative m ovem ent m ay form the ground for 
mutual assistance and  benefit as between A rab and Jew , Mr. 
Strickland has stressed the im portance of an A rab co-operative 
movement as a m eans of strengthening the economic position 
of the Arabs, and thus rem oving or reducing their present belief, 
whether justified or no t, th a t they are fighting against superior 
forces in the economic field. "  If the A rabs ” , he reports, 
" hold this belief, they will regard it as inevitable th a t their 
land should eventually pass out of their hands and will seek 
to meet the dangers no t by  an economic effort b u t by political 
and even violent action. If  they felt themselves to be gaining 
ground economically, o r a t least so equipped th a t they could
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hope to retain their present ground, they m ight divert much I 
of their vigour into a cam paign of self-improvement, social and! 
economic, and the charge of neglect which is now brought (how-1 
ever unjustifiably) against the Palestine Administration would I 
be excluded.”
189. I t  is obvious th a t m any years m ust pass before the Arab I 
can hope th a t his Co-operative Societies can reach the standard 
necessary to give him  confidence. Meanwhile, the measures I 
taken by  the A dm inistration justify the hope that, given peaceful I 
conditions, the indebtedness of the A rab peasant should gradu-l 
ally be reduced. I t  is desirable th a t the R egistrar and his staff I 
should inspect and advise both Jew ish and Arab Societies. I 
There are m any difficult and specialized questions of co-opera-1 
tive principle and  practice which frequently arise in connection! 
w ith the Jew ish Societies. Secondly, it is desirable to develop I 
am ong the A rabs the u rban  as well as the rural, the social! 
as well as the directly economic, types of Co-operative Society! 
I t  is not, as is so often assum ed, the provision of facile credit! 
which will im prove the condition of the depressed cultivator! 
but his education in co-operative principles during a protractejj 
and perhaps unpleasant course of discipline.
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IMMIGRATION.
1, Description of immigration under the Immigration Ordinance.
1. The articles of the M andate specifically dealing with 
im m ig ra t io n  into Palestine are Article 6 ,  which enjoins the 
A d m in i s t r a t i o n  to facilitate Jew ish im m igration u n d e r  suitable 
conditions and to encourage close settlem ent by  Jew s on the 
land, a n d  Article n ,  in virtue of which a land system appro­
priate t o  the needs of the country is to b e  introduced, having 
regard , among other things, to the desirability of prom oting the 
close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.
2. The following statistics show the authorized im m igration 
from September, 1920, to the end of 1936:—
Recorded
Year.
Im m igration. 
Jew s. N on- Jews.
1920 (September—October) 5 , 5 1 4 202
1 9 2 1 ............................................. 9 , 1 4 9 190
1922 .. . 7 , 8 4 4 284
1 9 2 3............... 7,421 5 7 0
1 9 2 4............... 12,856 697
1 9 2 5............... 33,8oi 840
1926 ... • 13-081 829
1 9 2 7............... 2,713 882
1928 ... 2,178 908
1 9 2 9 ............................................. 5 - 2 4 9 1 , 3 1 7
1 9 3 0............... 4 - 9 4 4 1,489
1 9 3 1............... 4 - 0 7 5 1 . 4 5 8
1 9 3 2 ............................................. 9 , 5 5 3 1 , 7 3 6
1 9 3 3  ............... • 30,327 1,650
1 9 3 4  ............... 4 2 , 3 5 9 1>7 8 4
1 9 3 5  ............... ■ 61,854 2,293*
1 9 3 6............... . 29,727 I-9 4 4 Î
* Of these 903 were Arabs, 
f  Of these 675 were Arabs.
3. Poland supplied the largest proportion of these im m igrants, 
e countries next in order as sources of supply being R ussia, 
Germany, and R oum ania. In  recent years im m igration from 
Russia has almost entirely ceased, and her place has been taken 
by Germany, which comes second in the list of countries from  
which immigrants arrive. The D epartm ent of M igration esti- 
ates the numbers of the Jew ish community in Palestine in 
1936 at 370,483 out of a total population in th a t year of 
>336,518, or just on 30 per cent, of the population. To the 
bove-mentioned figure of 370,483 m ust be added a  considerable 
gure for the num bers of illegal Jewish im m igrants in Palestine, 
his figure has been variously estim ated, and one high authority 
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has pu t it a t 40,000. Jew ish witnesses themselves accepted 
w ithout dispute the figure of 400,000 as being the present 
num ber of the Jew ish population in Palestine. One recent 
publication has even p u t tha t figure at 420,000. The table of the 
recorded Jew ish im m igration given above shows that., with the 
exception of two periods, the annual volume of Jewish immigra­
tion into Palestine has been m oderate and not such as need 
have caused any serious uneasiness to the indigenous popula­
tion. B ut the years 1924-26 and 1933-35, especially the latter, 
were periods of heavy im m igration. ' 1
4. The pace and  extent of the developm ent of the Jewish 
N ational Home m ust obviously depend on the rate and volume 
of Jew ish im m igration over a  series of years. H aving regard 
to their real fear of being overwhelm ed and therefore dominated 
by  Jew ish im m igrants, the A rabs w atch the immigration figures 
with close and anxious concern. Official statistics show that 
in the four years 1933-36 there was an  increase of 164,267 
persons in the Jew ish section of the population. This shows 
tha t the Jew ish population as it stood in 1932 has very nearly I 
doubled in the last four years. The average Jew ish immigra-] 
tion for the period 1933-36 has been a t the rate of rather oveil
40.000 persons a  year. 1
5. The following tables prepared by  the Commissioner fori 
M igration and Statistics and based on a scientific formula showf 
the predicted A rab and  Jew ish populations respectively at inter­
vals of five years beginning with 1936 and ending with 1970.M 
The m agnitude of the Jew ish population is based on the assump­
tion (i) th a t the rate of Jew ish natu ral increase is 21-01 per!
1.000 per annum  and (ii) th a t Jew ish im m igration rates vary I 
from  nil to 60,000 per annum .
P r e d i c t e d  A b a b  P o p u l a t i o n .
Year.
1936
1940
1 9 4 5
1 9 5 0
1 9 5 5
i9 6 0
1 9 6 5
1970
A rab population  (ooo’s omitted) I
9 4 3  
1,038 
1,163 
1,290
1 , 4 2 5
1,558 
1,691 
1,821
* T he results o f these calculations are indicated  in  th e  accompanying I 
graph. T h ey are based on th e  assum ption th a t th e increase in Arab I 
population can be calculated on  th e  basis o f “  V erhulst’s lo g istic” . It I 
should be noted th a t (1) there is no certain ty  th a t th e  grow th of Arab I 
population actu ally  ob eys V erhulst’s law , although it  appears so to do I 
betw een th e  years 1920 and 1936; (2) th e  rate o f natural increase in the I 
Jew ish population w ill be sm aller for low er annual immigra tion rates than I 
for higher; and (3) th e general fiducial probability of th e  results should |  
n ot b e  projected beyond  the quinquennium  1945-1950.
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I t  has been estim ated that the A rab population is increasing at| 
the rate of 24,000 persons per annum . This is largely due to the I 
fact that, since the W ar, conscription has ceased and health and] 
sanitary  conditions have greatly im proved.
M id-year Jew ish  population  (000’s omitted).
Im m igration
rate. 0 10,000. 20,000. 30,000. 40,000. 50,000. 60
1936 3 7 ° 370 3 7 0 3 7 ° 3 7 ° 37°
1940 .................. 403 4 4 5 486 528 5 7 0 612
1 9 4 5  .................. 448 5 4 7 646 7 4 5 844 943 1
1950 .................. 4 9 7 660 823 986 1,148 1,311 1
1 9 5 5  ................. 5 5  2 786 1,019 1,253 1,486 1,720 1
i9 6 0  .................. 613 926 1,238 i , 5 5 o 1,862 2 , 1 7 4 2
1965 681 1,081 1,480 1,880 2,279 2,679 3
1 9 7 °  .................. 7 5 7 1 , 2 5 3 1 , 7 5 0 2,246 2,742 3,239 3
370
653
The com parative results of the above two tables are given ini 
the following table, which shows the years in which th e  Jewish! 
population will equal the A rab population according to the| 
annual rate of Jew ish im m igration :—
A n n u a l rate 
o f Jew ish  
im m igration.
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
Y ear in  which 
Jew ish  population  
is  equal to A rab  
population .
M id i9 6 0  . . .
E arly  1954 
E arly  1950 ... 
M id 1947 • • •
The magnitude o f the Arab - 
and the Jew ish  population at 
epochs in  which both are 
equal.
1.560.000
1.390.000
1.280.000
1.210.000
6. I t  m ust be observed th a t a sm aller population m a y  over-1 
take a larger population in num bers as time goes o n . This! 
depends on the relative age-constitutions and potential fertilities I 
of the two communities considered. Jew ish imm igrationl 
adds a yearly increm ent to the Jew ish population which isl 
potentially highly reproductive. The time m ight co m e some I 
scores of years ahead when the Jew ish natu ral increase exceeded! 
the A rab natu ral increase ; bu t it would take a very long  timel 
for the Jew s to obtain a m ajority  in Palestine by th a t  means! 
alone.
7. Since 1922 the criterion for the regulation of im m igrationl 
into Palestine has been the economic capacity of the country ail 
the time to absorb new arrivals. This principle was la id  downl 
in the Churchill Statem ent of Policy of tha t year, a n d  w as re-1 
affirmed in the letter from  the Prim e M inister to D r. W eizmannl 
dated the 13th F ebruary , 1931. The Im m igration O rdinan ce ofl 
1 9 3 3  is intended to give effect to the above-mentioned principle I 
and regulates im m igration into Palestine.
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8. Under the Im m igration Ordinance im m igrants are 
admitted in the following categories : —
A. Persons of independent m eans, which term  includes:
(i) persons in bona fide possession and freely dis­
posing of a capital of not less than  £1,000 ; and
(ii) members of liberal professions in possession of 
a capital of not less than  £500; provided th a t the 
Director, D epartm ent of M igration, is satisfied th a t 
the need exists in Palestine for additional members of 
such professions;
(iii) skilled craftsm en in possession of a  capital of 
not less than  £ 250; provided th a t the D irector, D epart­
m ent of M igration, is satisfied th a t the economic 
capacity of Palestine is such as to allow such persons 
to be absorbed in the practice of their trade or craft;
(iv) persons with a secured income of not less than 
£ 4  a  m onth, exclusive of earned income;
(v) persons in bona fide possession and freely dis­
posing of a capital of not less than £500; provided tha t 
the Director, D epartm ent of M igration, is satisfied 
tha t the capital of such persons is sufficient to ensure 
them  reasonable prospects of success in the pursuit 
which they intend to enter, th a t they are qualified and 
physically fit to follow their proposed pursuits, and  th a t 
their settlem ent in Palestine will not lead to the creation 
of undue competition in the proposed pursuits.
B.— (i) O rphans whose m aintenance in o r by  public 
institutions in Palestine is assured until such time as they 
are able to support them selves;
(ii) persons of religious occupations whose m aintenance 
is assured;
(iii) students whose admission to an educational institu­
tion in Palestine and  whose m aintenance is assured until 
such time as they are able to support themselves.
C. Persons who have a  definite prospect of em ployment 
in Palestine.
D. D ependants of perm anent residents or of im m igrants 
belonging to categories A , B and C.
9. Provision is also m ade for the admission of "  travellers." 
A “ traveller "  is a foreigner who does no t intend to rem ain 
in Palestine longer than  three months or to take up em ploym ent
there.
10. In practice, only three categories of im m igrants are now 
entering Palestine, i.e ., persons of independent means coming
46497 K  4
C hapter X . 284
within categoiy A (i) , those com ing in under the Labour I 
Schedule (categoiy C), and the dependants of permanent I 
residents o r im m igrants.
11. Im m igrants freely disposing of a  capital of not less than I 
£1,000 have an indefeasible right of entry after sa tisfy in g  the 
Passport Control Officers or His M ajesty's Consuls in their 
relevant country of origin tha t they do command th is sum. 
U sually there m ust be evidence of cash in Palestine, a n d  there 
has been a  good deal of abuse in this category of immigrants. 
The D epartm ent of M igration has often had  to seek information 
about the financial history of these persons in the countries 
whence they cam e, and  has had  to find out in v a r io u s  ways I 
their financial standing over a  period of years.
According to official figures, 17,653 persons possessing  a I 
capital of a t least £1,000 entered Palestine during th e  years 
from 1933 to 1936 inclusive, this figure am ounting to  about 
11 per cent, of the to tal Jew ish im m igration. A pproxim ately I 
one-third of these im m igrants were Germ an Jew s, 18 p e r  cent. I 
of the im m igrants from  Germ any in 1935 being of the capitalist I 
class. The m ajority of the rem ainder in this class c am e  fromj 
the U nited States of America.
I t is estim ated tha t m any of this class bring in far more than I 
£1,000. T heir capital m ay often am ount to £2,500, whilst I 
some are stated to have brought in as m uch as £10,000 or| 
£20,000.
12. The rem aining sub-categories of category A also have a I 
financial qualification, bu t for all general purposes th ey  are I 
closed. In  explanation of this we were inform ed that, during I 
the last two years, it becam e obvious th a t a  professional man I 
could not satisfactorily settle in Palestine with anything less I 
than £1,000, and since the D epartm ent of Migration h a s  discre-l 
tion in regard to th a t m atter and m ust be satisfied that the I 
relevant m em ber of the liberal profession can establish himself I 
satisfactorily, th a t category has h ad  to be closed. T h e  same| 
considerations apply to  category A (iii), bu t do not apply 
category A (iv ), which rem ains open, although there are not I 
m any people who come in under th a t category.
13. Category B m ight in some respects be d escribed  as I 
eleem osynary. The D epartm ent of M igration usually demands I 
the delivery of a  financial bond enforceable in Palestine given I 
by an  institution in Palestine, which guarantees th e  public I 
against persons adm itted in  this category becoming a public I 
charge. The categoiy has been abused on occasion, but it I 
is fairly strictly controlled a t the present tim e, a lth o u g h  the I 
position as regards the im m igration of students is n o t entirely I 
satisfactory, and certain reputable institutions have been  mis-j 
used in regard to this particular form  of immigration.
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14. Category D  includes dependants of perm anent residents 
or immigrants belonging to categories A, B (ii) and C. The 
Immigration O rdinance defines “  dependant ”  as follows : —
dependant m eans a  person w ho is, or w ho w ill on arrival in  
Palestine be, w holly  and d irectly  dependent for m aintenance and  
support upon an im m igrant or a perm anent resident, and is  related  
to such im m igrant or perm anent resident as being—
(а)  his w ife, or
( б)  his or his w ife’s parent or grandparent, or
(c) his or h is w ife's daughter or granddaughter, sister or niece, 
who is either unmarried or a w idow  or divorced, or
(d) his or his w ife’s son, grandson, brother or nephew , who 
is under th e  age o f eighteen years or, being over th a t age, is 
perm anently disabled and incapable of" supporting h im self.”
15. Many of the younger dependants in the above class after 
arrival in Palestine prove not to be directly dependent on the 
immigrant or perm anent resident for m aintenance and support. 
They do, in fact, enter the labour m arket. They are mostly 
unskilled and  their fate would be uncertain if there were a 
serious set-back in  the economic situation in Palestine, for in 
tot event the unskilled would suffer first and the capacity of 
people to m aintain their dependants would shrink.
16. A formidable proportion, 61 per cen t., of the peak immi­
gration into Palestine in 1935 was dependant im m igration. 
There is often a  tim e-lag between the arrival of an im m igrant 
in the country and the date on which he can send for his 
dependant or dependants. The system  in question, therefore, 
must tend to lead to very considerable fluctuations in the a n n u a l  
immigration figures.
17. Immigration in category C (Labour) is th a t of persons 
io have a definite prospect of em ploym ent in Palestine. The 
evidence of definite prospect of em ployment is provided by the 
respective em ployer, who guarantees the prospective im m igrant 
at he is in a position to em ploy him  a t a  stated salary  and 
ill continue to em ploy him  in th a t em ploym ent o r its equiva- 
ent for a minimum period of years. F o r purposes of adm inis-
tion employers of labour, therefore, make applications for 
e prospective im m igrant, and in the Rules under the Ordinance 
e Executive of the Jew ish Agency is a  kind of conglomerate 
mployer of labour. The m inim um  period for the guarantee 
f the employer of labour is one year.
18. The volume of im m igration is controlled by  a  Labour 
nedule prepared once in six m onths, in which is laid down 
e maximum num ber of persons, by sex, age, industries and
ngs, who m ay be adm itted w ith im m igration certificates 
nder category C during the period covered by the Schedule, 
he High ^ Commissioner approves the Schedule, which is then 
ublished in aggregate form  in the Palestine Gazette, after which 
becomes operative for the period to which it relates.
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19. The size of the L abour Schedule is determined by the 
H igh Commissioner after consideration of the request by  the 
Jew ish Agency fo r the introduction of labour immigrants and 
of the recom m endations m ade by the Im m igration Authority 
The Jew ish Agency, in collaboration w ith an officer of the 
D epartm ent of M igration, m ake a survey of the industrial 
economic an d  labour conditions of Jewish life in the country 
on which to base their request. The officer of the Departm ent 
reports independently to the head of the Department. In | 
addition, the D epartm ent m akes a rough survey of A rab  un­
em ploym ent a t the same tim e, and  also takes into account 
economic factors such as the m ovem ent of freights an d  the 
consum ption of electricity. The H igh Commissioner thus has 
before him  a survey of Jew ish conditions supplied by the Jewish 
Agency, a like survey m ade a t the same time and on th e  same 
m aterial by  a public officer, corrected and adjusted if need 
be b y  the head  of the D epartm ent, and a  rough survey of Arab 
unem ploym ent a t or about the same time. The H ig h  Com­
missioner then has the m aterial which enables him to give effect 
to  the prescriptions of policy in the W hite Paper of 1930, asj 
interpreted by  the Prim e M inister’s letter to Dr. W eizm an n  
the 13th F ebruary , 1931.
20. In  connection with the Labour Schedule, there are  tw o B ^  
m atters to which we desire to refer. F irst, we are n o t  satisfied 
th a t before m aking up the Schedule sufficient inquiries a re  made I 
b y  the M igration D epartm ent from  the D istrict Administra-[ 
tion. We th ink  th a t m uch more inform ation could be obtained I 
th an is being got a t present from  the District Commissioners,! 
A ssistant D istrict Commissioners and D istrict Officers. Their I 
local knowledge would be invaluable in checking th e  claims J 
m ade for labour in various industries and  o c cu p a tio n s , ini 
assessing the prosperity or otherwise of undertakings and! 
individuals, and also in reckoning the length of tim e over I 
which the em ploym ent suggested m ight last. Information I
from  the D istrict Officers would sim ilarly assist the Statistical! 
D epartm ent in fram ing its estimates of A rab unem ploym ent. I 
Secondly, we think th a t m ore should be done to  ascertainl 
w hether the im m igrants have in fact rem ained in  employ-1 
m ent and w hether or not the occupations to w hich  they! 
went have continued or come to an  end. W e d o  n o t sug-| 
gest tha t there is no checking done a t the present tim e nor ( 
we recom mend th a t the career of each individual immigrant! 
should be m eticulously followed up ; bu t, as a t each h a lf  yearinl 
the m aking up  of the Schedule the various o c cu p a tio n s  and! 
industries and the num bers required in each are set o u t, a  subse­
quent detailed inquiry as to the prosperity or otherwise of tr 
firms, com panies and individuals in these occupations an d  inda 
tries should be instituted before the next Schedule is issued.
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this too the fullest use should be m ade of any inform ation in the 
possession of the D istrict Adm inistration.
21. We would also suggest that the housing situation is an 
e co n o m ic  consideration to which greater regard should be given 
when considering absorptive capacity under the Labour 
Schedule. We were im pressed by the fact tha t during the past 
few years, particularly in Tel Aviv, the housing situation has 
been far from satisfactory. The M ayor of Tel Aviv told us tha t 
he had some thousands in his m unicipality who were living in 
huts and tents and we were given evidence th a t there is much 
overcrowding also at H aifa.
22. The preparation and  adm inistration of the Labour 
Schedules are founded on certain Rules under the Im m igration 
Ordinance. The periods of the semi-annual Schedules are 
April to September and October to March.
23. A small reserve of im m igration certificates for non-Jewish 
immigrants and for unforeseen emergency needs is kept a t the 
disposal of the D epartm ent of M igration. This D epartm ental 
reserve is of use in meeting specific applications for labour from  
employers.
24. The following principles have been adopted as a basis for 
the determination of the absorptive capacity of Palestine in 
respect of Jewish labour : —
(«) The Labour Schedule is deemed to cover only 
demands for labourers who are likely to enter perm anent 
employment. Dem ands for tem porary or seasonal labour 
are disregarded, unless there are reasonable prospects of 
transferring this form  of labour to reasonably perm anent 
employment.
(6) W hen a decision has to be taken w hether a certain 
field of employment is of a perm anent or tem porary nature, 
the probable future absorptive capacity of the industry in 
question is taken into consideration. In  other words, as 
far as possible, labour requirem ents are considered, in the 
long run, in the light of perm anent factors of development.
(c) No dem and for additional Jew ish labour is accepted 
when the intention of the prospective employers is to dis­
place Arab labour already employed. Deviations from  this 
rule have taken place in a  few cases where, as the result of 
a shortage of Jew ish labour, H auran and T rans-Jordan 
workers displaced Jew ish workers who left branches of 
work at low rates of wages for pursuits in which wages were 
higher.
25. The Labour Schedule a t present is composed of five
rts—-part A, for nom inated experts and skilled workers ; B ,
killed workmen not nam ed; C, relatives of working age; D,
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general labour including agricultural labour; and E , Depart-! 
m ental reserve. E ach of these categories includes definite I 
num bers of im m igrants.
26. The L abour Schedule having been approved, the Inimi-1 
gration A uthority prepares the necessary im migration certificates 
and issues them  in instalm ents to the Jew ish Agency, which then 
allocates them  to the several Zionist Palestine Offices in the world 
to be issued to selected im m igrants. In  the allocation of these 
certificates account is taken both of the relative strength of the 
several Jew ish parties which combine in the Jew ish Agency and 
of conditions in the countries from  which im migrants come.
27. I t  is understood that a t each Zionist Congress proportions 
of labour im m igration certificates are assigned to the several 
Jew ish parties as a  guide to the Jew ish Agency, which is the 
Executive of the Congress, in  the distribution of those certificates 
tha t are assigned to them  on the Labour Schedule. This 
procedure has led to com plaints of discrimination against 
them  on the p a rt, for instance, of the Berit Trampeldori 
Y outh O rganization (the “  B etar ” ) and the Central Agudath 
Israel and was the subject of correspondence between the 
Colonial Office and the New Zionist Organization, the former 
being unable to accept the view th a t the B etar should be recog­
nized as having any status in the m atter of the distribution of 
these im m igration certificates. *
28. The distribution of certificates according to countries is| 
related to the num ber of Jew s in a  country, the size of 
training centres and the economic conditions of that country. I 
Since October, 1933, 35-4 per cent, of the certificates have been I 
given to Poland. The Polish Jew ish community represents I 
3J million people and Poland has the largest training organize-1 
tion. There is great need for em igration from  Poland on I 
account of the economic conditions of the country. 26-6 peri 
cent, of the certificates have gone to G erm any, whose share I 
has increased since 1933 on account of the change in the| 
political regime which took place in th a t country in that year.
29. In  connection with the distribution of labour certificates! 
the Jew ish Agency in  Palestine is advised by  w hat is called the I 
Im m igration A dvisory Committee, which is composed of repre-l 
sentatives of all the economic sections of the Palestine com-f 
m unity. Members are appointed by  the Executive of the Va 
Leum i and they give advice to the Jew ish Agency as to the I 
sort of distribution of certificates they would like as between| 
different classes.
30. On receipt of the im m igration certificates the Jewish! 
Agency forw ards them  to the 12 m ajor Palestine Offices ini 
Europe, America and Aden. The largest of these Offices are atl 
W arsaw  and Berlin, in view of the fact th a t Poland and j
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Germany are the two principal em igration countries; These 
Offices, which are instrum ents of the Jew ish A gency,. having 
selected their im m igrant, present the im m igrant and the certifi­
cate to the Passport Control Officer. The Passport Control 
Officer then insists on the production of health certificates. He 
may insist on the production of police certificates in regard to 
moral and crim inal conduct. H ealth certificates are essential 
for the requirements of the Ordinance. Speaking generally, the 
Jewish Agency, which is the link between the Jew ish com munity 
in Palestine and W orld Jew ry, determines the character and 
quality of im m igrants coming in under the Labour Schedule.
31. The im m igrants selected by  the various Palestine Offices 
come from training centres, which, as D r. Senator, the D irector 
of Immigration in the Jewish Agency, inform ed us, are the 
result of a movement which originated during the W ar and was 
called “ H alutz.” i.e. “  P ioneer.”  The movement can be 
divided into three stages in its pioneer organization from the 
point of view of age—i.e. from  twelve to seventeen, which 
means that the youthful pioneers belong to w hat m ight be called 
a Youth Society, very often taking the form of a  Scout move­
ment; from seventeen to nineteen, between which ages the 
young men and women belong to local branches of the Pioneer 
Organization; and from  nineteen onw ards, when they enter 
the training cam ps. W e were inform ed th a t a t present the 
Jewish Organization has 24,000 Jew s in training. The training 
usually lasts for two or three years and is m ainly directed 
towards agriculture. There are also institutions for learning 
crafts.
32. W hatever m ay have been in the minds of those who 
drafted the M andate there is nothing in the relevant articles of 
that instrument to indicate the volum e of im m igration which 
they h a d  in mind. N or could they have foreseen the complete 
change in the situation which would be brought about by the 
drastic restriction of im m igration into the U nited States, the 
advent of the N ational Socialist Government in Germ any in 
1933 and the increasing economic pressure on the Jew s in 
Poland, where the rise of an  indigenous middle class is tending 
to displace the Jew s as middlem en and small shopkeepers. 
These th re e  m ain factors have, in our opinion, directly affected 
the volume and character of Jewish im m igration into Palestine 
and the rate of developm ent of the Jewish N ational Home.
2. Illegal Immigration.
(a) J e w i s h  I l l e g a l  I m m i g r a t i o n .
33- Jewish illegal im m igration has been going on side by side 
with authorized im m igration. This illegal im migration is
I effected by
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(1) illegal entry , i.e. evasion of frontier controls;
(2) legal entry by  travellers who overstay the period oi 
tem porary residence authorized; and
(3) m arriage of foreign women to 
(a) Palestinian citizens; and
(&) perm anent residents who are not Palestinian 
citizens.
34. Illegal entry by  Jew s was a  feature of the years 1933-4. 
They crossed the land frontiers from  Syria, Trans-Jordan, and 
occasionally from  E gypt; they also arrived in Palestine waters 
in  ships specially chartered and, in co-operation with Jewish 
residents in Palestine, landed on the shores after dark. Jewish 
public opinion has declined to assist public authority in  the 
detection of Jew ish illegal im m igrants. The volume of illegal 
im m igration appears to have reached its peak in 1933, and it 
was estim ated tha t, in the two years 1932-3, the number of un­
authorized settlers had  risen to 22,400. Of this figure, 17,900 
were travellers who rem ained in the country beyond the 
authorized limit.
35. The th ird  form  of Jew ish illegal im m igration is im m igra­
tion of women who, not being qualified as im m igrants under the 
Im m igration O rdinance, contract m arriages w ith Palestinians or 
perm anent residents who are not Palestinian citizens, these 
m arriages being form ally lawful bu t having no true m atrim onial 
intention. Such m arriages m ay take place in Palestine o r  beyond 
Palestine. W hen the m arriage takes place in Palestine, the 
woman has usually entered as a  traveller and has paid a  deposit 
on a traveller's visa, o r has entered into a bond to leav e  the 
country before a  certain date. U nder the Palestinian Citizen* 
ship O rder, 1925, the wife of a  Palestinian citizen is herself a 
Palestinian citizen and cannot therefore be deported. I n  other 
cases, the wom an beyond Palestine arranges through friends 
for a  Palestinian citizen or a perm anent resident to v isit her 
and contract m arriage according to Jew ish rites in the country 
in which she is living.
36. The law of personal status in Palestine is the law  of the 
religious com m unity, and m any Jew ish divorces have been  ob­
tained. We were inform ed tha t a class of "  professional hus-1 
bands ”  exists, who will engage in a series of formal marriages 
and  divorces so long as the fees and the pecuniary rem uneration 
are forthcom ing.
37. I t  m ay be m entioned tha t the ratio of recorded Jewish 
divorces to recorded Jew ish m arriages is 40 per cent., a n d  we 
are  of opinion th a t a substantial part of this abnormal divorce 
ra te  is due to the m arriages and divorces which enable foreign 
women to enter Palestine or rem ain in the country w h e n  other­
wise they would either be disqualified from  entering o r not 
qualified for admission as im m igrants.
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( 6 ) A r a b  I l l e g a l  I m m i g r a t i o n .
38. Arab illegal im m igration is mainly casual, tem porary and 
seasonal. I t is effected chiefly by illegal entry across the land 
frontiers of Palestine. Owing to the fact tha t the bulk of illegal 
immigration is unrecorded on entry and departure, since the 
Arabs d o not pass through the frontier controls, evidence as to 
the character of the im m igration of A rabs is not easily found in 
Palestine. In  consequence, it has been necessary to request 
authorities in the surrounding countries to supply notes as to 
the character of the m igration from  those countries into 
Palestine.
39. Before the W ar the Middle E ast, now described as Syria 
and th e  Lebanon, T rans-Jordan and Palestine, comprised 
roughly the Vilayets of B eirut and Damascus and the independ­
ent Sanjaq of Jerusalem . These Provinces being integral parts 
of the Turkish Em pire no special formalities were required by  
persons leaving one Province for another. The post-w ar settle­
ment of the Middle E ast created new boundaries between 
Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon, and similarly between 
Palestine and T rans-Jordan. As a consequence, persons cross­
ing from one country to another are now passing from  their 
" hom e "  countries to “  foreign ”  countries.
40. Under the Im m igration Ordinance persons habitually 
resident in T rans-Jordan m ay, unless the High Commissioner 
otherwise directs, enter Palestine direct from  T rans-Jordan
I although they are not in possession of passports or other sim ilar 
I documents.
41. Similarly, in virtue of an  O rder under the same O rdi­
nance, the inhabitants of the adjacent districts in Syria and the 
I Lebanon are free to enter the corresponding districts in Palestine 
I without special form ality, except that they m ust be in possession 
I of border passes issued under the Bon Voisinage Agreement 
I between Palestine and Syria m ade in 1926.
I 42. While these exceptional provisions take account of the 
I fact that the new boundaries cut across the tradition of free
■  movement between the several Provinces which existed in the 
I Turkish Em pire, it is certain tha t m any of the inhabitants of 
I Syria and the Lebanon enter Palestine w ithout form ality
■  although they are not inhabitants of the adjoining districts of 
I  Syria. Such entry is illegal. The result has been th a t there has 
I  been some im m igration from  the surrounding territories, which, 
I  since it avoids the frontier controls, is not recorded.
43- A large proportion of Arab im m igrants into Palestine 
I  come from the H auran. These people go in considerable 
I  numbers to H aifa, where they work in the port. I t  is, however,
I  important to realize th a t the extent of the yearly exodus from
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the H auran  depends m ainly on the state of the crops th e re . In 
a  good year the am ount of illegal im m igration into P a les tin e  is 
negligible and confined to the younger members of large families 
whose presence is not required in the fields. Most persons in this 
category probably rem ain perm anently in Palestine, wages 
there being considerably higher than  in Syria. A c c o rd in g  to 
an  authoritative estim ate as m any as ten or eleven thousand 
H auranis m ay go to Palestine tem porarily in search of w ork in 
a  really bad  year. The D eputy Inspector-G eneral of the 
Crim inal Investigation D epartm ent has recently estimated that 
the num ber of H auranis illegally in  the country at the present 
time is roughly 2,500.
44. The British Resident in  T rans-Jordan  has pu t on record 
th a t farm ers in T rans-Jordan  used to count for assistance in 
reaping their harvest on a seasonal m igration from  Palestine. 
To-day this migration has entirely ceased, and  it can o n ly  be 
concluded th a t the T rans-Jordan  population has increased suffi­
ciently to enable the larger local harvest to be dealt with without I 
outside help, or th a t there are now more attractive opportun ities 
of em ploym ent in Palestine. The num bers available to help  in 
the Palestine harvest are  m uch increased when the crops are a 
failure in T rans-Jordan , and when in a  year like 1934-5 the 
failure in a district is complete the m en take their women with | 
them  to save them  from  starvation.
45. The dimensions of the volum e of illegal immigration from 
neighbouring territories are no t known. There is evidence that 
m any of these illegal im m igrants have land in  the neighbouring 
territories and  leave their wives and families in those territories [ 
while seeking to augm ent their livelihood by labour in Palestine. 
There is evidence also tha t this form  of illegal immigration is I 
seasonal. I t  is probable th a t seasonal im m igration leaves a | 
residue in Palestine of people who have decided to se ttle  per­
m anently in  the country. There is no evidence a v a ila b le  to I 
show tha t this residue is so considerable as seriously to disturb] 
the general economy of Palestine.
( c )  P r o p o s e d  S t e p s  f o r  D e a l i n g  w i t h  I l l e g a l  I m m i g r a t i o n .
46. Suggestions have been m ade th a t the following steps might | 
be taken to prevent illegal im m igration:—
(i) Legalizing of the position of illegal immigrants already | 
in the country.
(ii) Institution of an identity card.
(iii) Enactm ent of an  Im m igration Ordinance placing the I 
onus of proof on the im m igrant to show tha t he is in the
1 country legally.
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(iv) Creation of a special frontier control force.
(v) A secret fund for intelligence.
(vi) Separate naturalization of wives.
We are not sure on the evidence before us w hether it is pos­
sible to enforce a  system  of identity cards. If the system is 
administratively possible, it is clear th a t the control of the police 
will be far more effective. W e are, however, prepared to 
endorse proposals ( i) , (iii), ( iv ), (v) and (v i) .
3. The Jewish Agency and its Grievances Regarding 
Immigration.
47. From the description of the Jew ish Agency in  Section 7 of 
Chapter VI above it will be seen th a t the Agency occupies a 
veiy special position under the M andate in connection with 
matters of im m igration. A com prehensive m achinery has been 
constructed to enable it to discharge its functions in this regard, 
the various activities being divided principally between a Politi­
cal Department, an Im m igration D epartm ent and  a Labour 
Department. The Va ad Leum i, representing the Jew ish com­
munity in Palestine, advises the Im m igration D epartm ent as to 
the distribution of the L abour Schedule after it has been received 
from the Government. The Agency is not bound by the advice 
of this body, but it takes th a t advice into consideration.
48. Eight m ain grievances on the subject of im m igration were 
set before us by  the Jew ish Agency : —
(i) that the A dm inistration has not adequately carried out 
the obligation to facilitate Jew ish im m igration im posed upon 
it by Article 6 of the M andate, no r has the policy of the 
Administration been in accordance with th a t obligation;
(ii) th a t the allotm ents of certificates for labour immi­
grants have been inadequate in the course of the last few 
years and continue to be so, the Governm ent having failed 
to take into account the country’s growing economic 
absorptive capacity;
(iii) tha t the restrictions which have recently been intro­
duced into Governm ent practice as regards the adm ission of 
dependants are unduly harsh;
(iv) that categories A (iii) and A (v), i.e. im m igrants 
with a  capital of ^250 and £500 respectively, are now 
practically inoperative;
(v) th a t it is unfair th a t perm its assigned to young 
students from  G erm any should be deducted from  the 
Labour Schedule;
(vi) tha t the Governm ent does not take into account the 
share due to  Jew ish labour on public works and services, 
when assessing the country’s absorptive capacity;
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(vii) th a t the G overnm ent has no t provided the Jewish 
Agency with inform ation as to the reasons for discrepancies 
between Schedules granted and  the A gency's applications'
(viii) th a t there is illicit infiltration of Arabs from 
neighbouring countries.
49. As regards the general com plaint tha t the Mandatory has 
failed to carry  out its obligations to facilitate Jewish immigra­
tion, the Jew ish Agency com plained th a t from  the o u tse t the 
M andatory Pow er had  never laid down a definite policy for 
facilitating Jew ish im m igration bu t had  left it to the Agency 
to devise and  give effect to schemes for bringing Jewish immi­
grants into Palestine and for settling and assisting them in  their 
w ork in the country. They stated  th a t the earlier colonists 
had  created their homes and  settlem ents unaided ex cep t by 
their own people and th a t m any had given their fives whilst 
converting m alarial districts into healthy and  fruitful planta­
tions. In  several cases prosperous Jew ish settlements had 
been developed on tracts of land and  parts of the country 
h itherto  considered uncultivable and no assistance h a d  been 
given by the A dm inistration to the early settlers and pioneers. 
The advance which had  been m ade in  the urban, ru ra l  and I 
agricultural developm ent of the Jew ish com m unity in Palestine! 
had  been solely due to  the capital provided by  th a t com m unity I 
and the w ork, energy and resolution of the Jew ish se ttle rs . The I 
Agency subm itted th a t the A dm inistration could h a v e  done I 
m uch m ore in the w ay of developing roads, public health,! 
education, housing and local governm ent. Such developments! 
would have m ade it easier for Jew ish im m igrants to  settle inj 
Palestine.
50. I t  should be a  m atter of pride to the Jews th a t  their I 
Home is one of their own building and we beheve it to  be ini 
accordance w ith the intention of the M andate tha t it should I 
be so. I t  m ust be rem em bered th a t the Administration is faced I 
w ith financial and o ther practical difficulties, such as inheriting I 
an  im poverished territo ry  and  the provision of the necessary! 
services for a  rapidly  increasing im m igrant population while,! 
a t the sam e tim e, safeguarding the position of the existing  in-1 
habitants. In  our view, having regard to these d ifficu lties, the! 
existence a t the present time of a Jew ish population of 400,000! 
persons in Palestine is, in itself, a  notable testimony to the I 
work of the Governm ent in discharging their obligations under| 
the M andate.
51. As regards the com plaint th a t labour schedules have been! 
inadequate in recent years, we m ay again point to an actual 
figure by  w ay of answer. The existence of 6 ,0 0 0  Jewish! 
unem ployed at the time of our visit to Palestine is some indica-| 
tion th a t any caution displayed by  the Government in approv-| 
ing recent schedules has not been w ithout justification.
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52. We were satisfied, m oreover, from  the evidence placed 
jjefore u s  tha t a t each half year the Jew ish Agency had  had 
every opportunity of subm itting to the A dm inistration the 
grounds upon which they claim ed th a t the Labour Schedule 
should b e  m ade up  to the figure stated by them  in their appli­
cation. The practice which was instituted in 1934, a t the 
request of the Jew ish Agency, for an officer of the D epartm ent 
of Migration to work in co-operation w ith an officer of the 
Jewish Agency in the determ ination of the Schedule has un ­
doubted advantages.
53. In every application the Agency set out long and reasoned 
arguments dealing w ith the Labour Schedule in the various 
trades a n d  industries. W ith the growing distress in the Jew ish 
Diaspora they not unnaturally  put their dem ands at the highest 
possible figure. F or instance, the latter consideration was 
actually mentioned in their claim  in April, 1 9 3 3 , but it is clearly 
inelevant to the absorptive capacity of Palestine.
54. We were satisfied from  the evidence of the G overnm ent, 
that the demands of the Jew ish Agency were most carefully con­
sidered, first by the D irector of M igration, and secondly by 
the H ig h  Commissioner himself, and th a t the figures in the 
Schedules authorized b y  the Governm ent have norm ally been as 
high as the position dem anded. The task of appraising the 
absorptive capacity of Palestine in relation to its labour require­
ments is no easy one, for fluctuations in the m arket, both adverse 
and favourable, cannot always be foretold over a period of six 
months. In  the middle of the year 1 9 3 4 , for instance, the High 
Commissioner revised his earlier estim ate and deemed it advis­
able on representations m ade to him  to approve a supplem entary 
Labour Schedule of 1,200 men.
55. The third Jew ish grievance is to the effect th a t the cate­
gory of dependants is now practically limited to young chil­
dren, wives and old parents. I t  was stated that parents who
ve not yet reached old age, as well as younger brothers and 
sisters, and other near relatives, are now refused adm ission, 
though they are in m any cases an  actual charge on the resi- 
ents in Palestine, who send m oney abroad to m aintain them .
56. In laying down a  definition of dependency, however 
casonable it m ay be, some cases falling outside the definition
y appear to be hard , bu t for all practical purposes i t  would 
m to be not unfair to define dependant im m igrants in the 
of an im m igrant head of a fam ily as wife, children under 
e age o f 1 8 , and old parents, in whose case some such mini­
um age as 55 m ight well be fixed. W e deal further w ith the 
efinition of dependency in paragraphs 8 3 -8 5  below.
57-. As regards the com plaint th a t categories A (iii) and A (v) 
re virtually inoperative, we have no evidence to lead us to
r
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dispute the view that persons possessing less than  £1,000 at 
their free disposal cannot in present circumstances satisfactorily 
establish themselves in  Palestine unless they belong to profes­
sions and crafts not strongly represented in the country. If 
the principle of economic absorptive capacity be the criterion it 
should apply to all categories and  no t only to the Labour 
Schedule.
58. As regards the fifth grievance, the im m igration of young 
people, both boys and girls from  the ages of 15 to 17, into 
Palestine for the purpose of training in agricultural schools and 
especially in  agricultural settlem ents, to prepare them  for work 
in Palestine, has become a  special feature in the immigration 
policy of the Jew ish Agency in the last few years. The move­
m ent is not absolutely new , but in 1933 its development was 
largely increased because of the conditions prevailing at the time 
in G erm any and in the course of the two and a-half to three 
years following some 1,400 young people were brought into | 
Palestine for training.
59. The Jew ish Agency subm it th a t there is no ground fori 
deducting these im m igrants from  the Labour Schedule, for ini 
the m easure tha t they complete their studies or courses of train-[ 
ing and  enter the labour m arket the vacancies filled by them do I 
not figure in  the estimates of absorptive capacity on the basis of I 
which the Jew ish Agency applies for new labour immigration | 
certificates.
60. The G overnm ent, on the other hand, take the v ie w  that I 
after these young people have had  their two years’ training in I 
a school or settlem ent, when they come on to the labour market I 
in  the ordinary course of events, some account m ust be taken  of I 
them  in assessing the num ber of certificates to be allowed in  the I 
L abour Schedules. The first large batch of these young immi-f 
grants, m ore particularly  from  G erm any, came into Palestine 
in  1933, and  it was not until 1936 th a t any deduction in  the I 
L abour Schedule was m ade on their account. The s a m e  prin-l 
ciple is adopted for all students adm itted as immigrants fori 
attendance a t an  educational institution. The summer Labour I 
Schedule is prepared in  M arch or A pril and the deductions made I 
by the A dm inistration are on an  estim ate of the n u m b e r  of I 
students who will have completed their course of study a t the 
end of the sum m er term . The Governm ent do not deduct from | 
the Labour Schedule the to tal num ber, bu t only a proportion. 
W e are of opinion th a t, in assessing the Labour Schedule, 
some regard m ust be had to those im m igrants who h a v e  com- f 
pleted their education or training and are entering th e  labour I 
m arket. I f  this form  of im m igration were continued an d  ex-1 
tended w ithout some check or control it m ight seriously challenge | 
the system  of economic absorptive capacity.
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61. We have pointed out elsewhere* the difficulty of the 
apportionment of A rab and Jew ish labour on public works, 
where considerations other than  mere dem ands for actual labour 
continually arise. W e think tha t in assessing the Labour Schedule 
account should be taken of em ployment on public works not on 
any fixed ratio or percentage bu t only in regard to the actual 
amount of employment which is or is likely to be available for 
Jewish labour.
62. The grievance th a t reasons are not supplied for discrep­
ancies between the Schedules approved by the H igh Commis­
sioner and the applications of the Jew ish Agency was not 
specifically dealt with in the oral evidence pu t before us, and 
we are of opinion th a t there is no substance in this com plaint.
63. The eight and last grievance relating to im m igration is 
that the Jewish Agency views with grave concern the large and 
continuous influx of unauthorized m igrants from  the neighbour­
ing countries which results from  the uncontrolled state of the 
land frontiers of Palestine. The Agency subm itted tha t this 
influx deprives Jew ish im m igrants of the opportunities of 
absorption created by  Jew ish effort and raises grave social 
and security problem s. The Jew ish Agency urged tha t effective 
measures be taken to pu t an  end to such infiltration. W e have 
already discussed the subject of illegal im m igration and  have 
mentioned certain suggested remedies in paragraph  46 of this 
chapter.
4. The Control of Immigration.
[a) T h e  C r i t e r i o n  o f  E c o n o m ic  A b s o r p t i v e  C a p a c i ty .
64. Under the M andate it is the duty of the A dm inistration of 
Palestine, “  while ensuring that the rights and  position of other 
sections of the population are no t prejudiced " ,  to “  facilitate 
Jewish im migration under suitable conditions In  other 
words, immigration is to be facilitated, bu t its flow m ust be sub­
ject to control. In  practice the A dm inistration has imposed such 
control by the application of the regulative principle of economic 
absorptive capacity.
65. This principle was clearly enunciated in the Churchill 
Statement of Policy of 1922 as follows : —
" F o r  th e fu lfilm ent of th is  p olicy  [th e  G overnm ent’s p olicy  w ith  
regard to  a Jew ish  N ation a l H om e] it  is necessary th a t th e  Jew ish  
community in  P alestin e should be able to  increase its  num bers by  
immigration. This im m igration can n ot be so  great in  volum e as 
to exceed w hatever m ay b e th e  econom ic capacity of th e  country  
at the tim e to  absorb new  arrivals. I t  is essentia l to  ensure th a t  
the immigrants should n ot be a burden upon th e  people of Palestine  
as a whole, and th a t th ey  should n o t deprive an y  section  of th e
* See page 321.
Chapter X . 298
present population  o f their em ploym ent. H itherto th e immigration 
has fulfilled th ese conditions. T he num ber of im m igrants since the 
B ritish  occupation has been ab ou t 25,000."  1
The principle was accepted b y  the Zionist Organisation in their I 
letter of the 18th June, 1922, in the following w ords: —
" T he E xecu tive further observe th at H is M ajesty's Government I 
also acknow ledge, as a  corollary o f th is right, th a t it  is necessary 
th a t the Jew s shall be able to  increase th eir num bers in Palestine 1 
b y im m igration, and understand from  th e  statem en t o f policy that 
th e  volum e of such  im m igration is to  be determ ined b y  the economic 
cap acity  o f th e  country from  tim e to  tim e to  absorb new arrivals. 
W hatever arrangem ents m ay be m ade in  regard to  th e  regulation of 
such  im m igration, th e  E xecu tive confidently tru st th a t both  His 
M ajesty's G overnm ent and th e  A dm inistration o f Palestine will be | 
guided in  th is m atter b y  th e  aforesaid princip le.”
I t  will be noted th a t the Zionist O rganization interpreted I 
economic absorptive capacity as the determining principle, 
w hereas Mr. C hurchill's S tatem ent only prescribed i t  as a 
m axim um  which im m igration m ight no t exceed. The latest 
official statem ent on this subject is contained in the Prime Minis­
te r’s letter of the 13th F ebruary , 1931, to D r. W e iz m a n n , in 
which he w rote th a t "  the considerations relevant to the limits I 
of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations ” .
6 6 . Throughout the duration of the M andate the p rin c ip le  of I 
economic absorptive capacity has been applied to Jewish immi-l 
gration. The elasticity of the principle and its c a p a c ity  fori 
varied interpretation m ake it very difficult to apply to th e  com-1 
plex economic situation in Palestine. Considering the difficul­
ties, we are satisfied th a t the original O rdinance and regulations 
as am ended from  time to time have adequately carried out the 
instruction laid on the M andatory. W e deal la ter in this chapter 
w ith the ways in which we suggest th a t the present regulations | 
governing im m igration should be altered and amended.
67. The question of the soundness or otherwise of the economic | 
situation in Palestine, as affected by the recent heavy immigra­
tion accom panied by  large im ports of capital, is of such import­
ance in connection w ith the principle of economic absorptive I 
capacity  th a t we m ay a t this point dwell briefly upon certain 
of its aspects m ore closely connected w ith immigration, even | 
a t the risk of some repetition.
68. Speculation in land  and  building has been a characteristic I 
of the recent wave of im m igration. This is not a  healthy 
sym ptom , for if from  some cause the flow of capital is seriously 
checked, a slum p in the building and allied trades w ill  probably 
supervene. M ushroom industries would be h it and th e  indus- 1 
tria l situation m ight have to be readjusted to a lower level.
69. A nother difficulty from  the economic point of view 
appears to be th a t Jew ish occupations are m ainly of an urban 
character, and th a t the town population of Palestine tends to
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become too large in proportion to the agricultural population, 
so that the products of town industry cannot find an  adequate 
market among the rural population.
jo. The rapid developm ent of Tel Aviv has already been noted 
and th e  Mayor hoped th a t th a t tow n would in time be as big 
as a young American city like Los Angeles. One of the Zionist 
leaders informed the Commission th a t he expected th a t H aifa 
would eventually hold a  million Jew s. The Commission saw 
the lay-out on spacious lines of a town south of Jaffa and there 
is talk  of urban developm ent a t other seaside places. If these 
projects come to fruition, there will be a  fringe of large towns 
along the coast ou t of all proportion to the narrow  hinterland 
given up to the cultivation of citrus fru it and cereals and 
backed by a range of m ountains which cannot be intensively 
cultivated .
71. Palestine is one of the smallest and also one of the least 
self-contained of all countries. M oreover, its economy m ay be 
seriously affected and even dom inated by events th a t are entirely 
beyond its own control and th a t are often of an  unpredictable 
character. The advent of the N ational Socialist P arty  to power 
in Germany in 1 9 3 3 , Ita lian  foreign policy in 1 9 3 5  and the 
Spanish civil w ar, for instance, are so m any factors which have 
had a  favourable or unfavourable repercussion on the economic 
situation of the country.
72. It is a truism  to say th a t peace is a  prerequisite of a sound 
industrial developm ent in such a  country as Palestine, and since 
the Arabs are hostile to Jew ish im m igration, the factor of 
“ hostility between the two peoples ”  necessarily assumes imme­
diate economic im portance. Capital cannot be reproductive in 
a disordered state.
73. Speaking generally, the A dm inistration so far as im m igra­
tion is concerned have taken no account of political, social, or 
psychological considerations and indeed estimates of any  such 
matters would have been directly contrary  to the instruction 
in the Prim e M inister’s letter th a t the “  considerations relevant 
to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic con­
siderations W e are satisfied however th a t the situation in 
Palestine is such th a t im m igration m ust be reviewed and decided 
upon all considerations and not on economic considerations only.
74. The continued im pact of a highly intelligent and enter­
prising race, backed by  large financial resources, on a  com­
paratively poor indigenous com m unity, on a  different cultural 
level, m a y  produce in time serious reactions. Can it be the duty 
of the M andatory or indeed is it in the interests of the N ational 
Home itself to allow im m igrants to come into the country in large 
numbers w ithout any regard to an increasing hostility which 
from time to time finds expression in violent disorder ? The 
issue is quite plain and should be squarely faced by everyone
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concerned. Do the Jew ish people really wish th a t Palestine 
should afford a  refuge to  the m axim um  num ber of J e w s  which 
can be economically absorbed if the result is constant rebellion 
an d  repression? A nd, determ ined as we believe they are to 
f u lfil the obligations undertaken in the M andate, do the British 
people really wish th a t B ritish lives should continue to b e  sacri­
ficed to th a t end ? We suggest th a t these questions can only be 
answered in the affirm ative if it can be dem onstrated beyond  a 
doubt th a t there is no other w ay in which justice can b e  done 
and  good faith  m aintained.
75. I t  m ay be beyond even the most inspired prophets to see 
far into the economic future of Palestine. Y et there are many 
dangers ahead, particularly  the fact th a t the economy of the 
country so largely rests on a  single industry. W e h a v e  dealt 
elsewhere with the financial and industrial position. W e  have 
not adopted the view of those who suggest that the immense 
expansion of citrus production will necessarily lead b e fo re  long 
to a  disastrous “  slum p ”  in tha t industry  or th a t the industrial 
expansion of Palestine is a  bubble which m ust collapse if the 
flow of new capital slackens; bu t it is clear from  our analysis 
th a t neither of these dangers can be regarded as impossible. 
M oreover, even if such disasters are avoided, it m ay still b e  that 
im m igration based on present economic dem and, s tim u la te d  by 
an  exceptional flow of capital, m ay be found beyond the absorp­
tive capacity of the country in  a  few years' tim e, when that flow 
has slackened.
76. The heavy im m igration in the years 1933*6 would seem 
to show th a t the Jew s have been able to enlarge the economic 
absorptive capacity of the country  for Jew s. The p ro c ess  can 
be continued for some tim e to come and it would a p p e a r  that 
its expansion need only be lim ited by  the am ount of th e  funds 
which Jew ish philanthropy and enterprise are prepared to  pour 
in to  the country. B u t such an expansion of the economic 
absorptive capacity is calculated to lead to a development of the 
Jew ish N ational Hom e which is no t organic bu t is unnatural, 
since it ignores one of the conditions of the environment of the 
H om e, nam ely, the hostile attitude of the A rab in h a b ita n ts  0 
Palestine.
77. Sum m ing up the argum ent of this Section, we m ay say 
th a t the principle of economic absorptive capacity, meanini 
th a t considerations of economic capacity  and these alone shouli 
determ ine im m igration, is a t the present tim e inadequate anc 
ignores factors in the situation which wise statesm anship cannot 
disregard. Political and  psychological factors should be taken 
into account. W e do not propose th a t they  should be made 
considerations in assessing the absorptive capacity of the coun­
try  nor do we suggest th a t in  th is respect the present Im m igra­
tion O rdinance should be revised, b u t we are impelled to  have
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regard to them  and it is on th a t criterion th a t we have based 
the over-riding lim it which we recom mend later in this chapter.
(b) T h e .C a t e g o r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  L a b o u r  S c h e d u l e .
78. Under the present Rules two of the principal categories 
of immigration— “ capitalists "  and dependants—are subject to 
no numerical lim itation so long as they satisfy the conditions 
aid down. The A dm inistration has, in fact, only retained a 
degree of control over about one-quarter of the Jew ish immi­
grants.
79. Subject to character and  fitness any Jew  who can prove 
that he has a disposable capital of ,£ 1 ,0 0 0  can enter Palestine, 
t may be said th a t if a  proper am ount of capital is prescribed 
or an immigrant, any person with such an  am ount or m ore m ust 
pso facto be absorbed in the country. So far as category A (i) 
s concerned, this w ould appear to be the principle governing 
the present position, b u t it is liable to misuse as will be seen 
from the following illustration. U nder another category, nam ely, 
A (ii), a m em ber of a liberal profession who is in possession 
of £500 m ay enter as an  im m igrant, provided th a t the D irector 
of the D epartm ent of M igration is satisfied th a t the need exists 
in the country for additional m em bers of the profession in 
question. Owing to the overcrowding of the m edical, engineer­
ing and other professions, the D irector decided to restrict the 
admission of persons under this category and in th e  years 1 9 3 1  
to 1935 inclusive only 1 4  Jew ish im m igrants were so adm itted, 
but this did not prevent very  large num bers coming in to  the 
country under category A (i).
80. The following Table shows the occupations of the settled 
population of these classes a t the census of 1 9 3 1  and  the stated 
occupations of im m igrants 1 9 3 2 - 3 6 ,  together with the percentage 
of immigrants 1 9 3 2 -3 6  to the settled population of the same 
occupation in 1 9 3 1 ._ _ _ _ _ _
Occupation.
S e ttled
p opu ­
Im m igration.
Percentage
of
im m igran ts
lation,
I 93I
Census 1932. 1933- *934- 1935- 1936.
T otal
1 9 3 2 -
1936.
1932-36  to 
settled 
population  
in  1931.
Physicians, Sur­
geons, Dentists 
Architects,
847 55 522 4 3 1 617 153 1,778 209-9
Engineers 1,081 59 296 392 347 147 1,241 114-8
Education 4,187 150 328 3 4 0 351 187 1,356 32-4
Arts 5io 8 58 81 1 3 7 «5 369 72-4
Other liberal pro­
fessions 2,290 49 293 400 292 269 1 , 3 0 3 56-9
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81. Evidence was given to us th a t in Tel Aviv a t th e  present! 
tim e there is one doctor for every 161  persons : in  Palestine as I 
a  whole there is one doctor for every 5 6 0  persons, while in the I 
U nited Kingdom there is one doctor for about 1 ,0 8 5  persons, a ) 
num ber of professional m en who entered under category A (i) [ 
have, we were told, abandoned their professions and h a v e  found I 
occupation in  agriculture, industry , commerce and general I 
labour. In  this sense it m ay be said th a t they h a v e  been I 
absorbed in the country, bu t they have not been absorbed in the I 
country in their own professions and are in reality an addition |  
to  the ordinary  L abour Schedule.
82. In  our opinion it is desirable that the M andatory Adminis-I 
tration should have direct control over the immigrants coming I 
in  under category A (i) and th a t there should be classes within I 
the category, just as there are in the L abour Schedule. Wei 
th ink, too, th a t the category should be dealt with in a  similar! 
m anner to the L abour Schedule. Any person who desires to I 
come into Palestine under th a t category should not only satisfy! 
the im m igration authority  th a t he is in possession of £ i,o o o l 
capital or over, b u t should also convince the same authority that! 
there is room  in Palestine for additional members in th e  profes-l 
sion, trade or business which he proposes to pursue. In other! 
w ords entry under this category should be regulated according! 
to the principle of the economic capacity of the country to absorb |  
such im m igrants.
83. W ith regard  to dependants, subject to character and fit-1 
ness any relative of a  Jew ish im m igrant or resident in  Palestine,| 
if w ithin the prescribed degree, can enter Palestine as a depe 
an t. The A dm inistration has no direct control over th is  class! 
of im m igrant. A gain, it m ay be pointed out that, w hen the! 
degree of relationship has been properly defined, if th e  country! 
can absorb the head of the fam ily his dependants are entitled to! 
come in  with him  or to jo in  him  after he is established there [ 
W e do not quarrel with this proposition, b u t we think that the! 
present definition of dependency is not satisfactory a n d  that| 
it should be revised.
84. D ependency is a question of fact. In  certain cases itl 
m ay be presum ed, bu t apart from  the cases where dependency! 
is presum ed it ought to be proved and the length of time of the! 
dependency will also have to be taken into consideration. Ini 
our opinion dependency can be presum ed in the case o f a  wife, I 
a  child, o r step-child, under 18 years of age, and a n  orphan! 
grandchild under th a t age; and on proof of such relationship! 
these persons should be adm itted as im m igrant dependants.! 
In  the case of all other relatives the question of dependency! 
should be proved by or on behalf of the applicant to the! 
satisfaction of the  Commissioner for M igration and Statistics. F
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In each case he will have to consider, no m atter w hat the age 
of the dependant, how long he or she is likely to be dependent 
after arrival in Palestine and  in m any cases w hether the 
applicant m ay no t be dependent throughout the whole of h is  
or her residence in Palestine.
85. The definition of dependency should therefore fall under 
two heads, the first, which would include those relatives who, 
dependency being presum ed, have a right to come in, and the 
second, all relatives other than  those under the first head in 
respect of whom the Commissioner is satisfied th a t they can 
ie maintained by  the im m igrant or perm anent resident in 
’alestine during such time as they are likely to be dependent 
or maintenance.
86. As regards other categories outside the Labour Schedule, 
we recommend as follow s:—Categories A (ii) (members of 
iberal professions with £500 capital), A (iii) (skilled craftsm en 
with £250 cap ita l), and A (v) (persons w ith £500 capital, 
judged sufficient to ensure a reasonable prospect of success in the 
mrsuit which they propose to enter) should be abolished. So 
aras categories A (ii) and A (v) are concerned, we are satisfied 
hat th e  sum of ^500 capital is not sufficient for the establish­
ment of an im m igrant in Palestine and th a t the sum  of ^1,000 
should be the m inim um . W ith regard to category A (iii), we 
think th a t  this should be included in category C and form  part 
of the Labour Schedule. P a rt A of the L abour Schedule is 
" ind iv idual skilled workers nom inated b y  individual employers 
for specified vacancies " ,  and we th ink  th a t in the present state 
of the country it is better th a t an im m igrant for whom employ­
ment has been specified should come in , ra th er than  a skilled 
workman who, although he has a capital of £250, has to find 
employment after he has come into the country. U nder this 
latter method there is no effective check to see if the im m igrant 
will in  fact get occupation in the trade in which he has been 
trained, and if he fails to do so he m ay drift into the general 
labouring class.
87. W e think th a t the definitions in category B (orphans, 
persons of religious occupation and students) should rem ain 
as they are, bu t th a t a much stricter control should be exercised 
by the Adm inistration, particularly  w ith regard to B  (ii), 
persons of religious occupation, and B (iii), students who will 
enter educational establishm ents.
(c) D is t r ib u t io n  o f  I m m ig r a t io n  C e r t i f i c a t e s  u n d e r  t h e  
L a b o u r  S c h e d u l e .
88. The Adm inistration of Palestine does not decide from  
which countries the im m igrants shall come. The D epartm ent 
°f Migration, so far as the Labour Schedule is concerned,
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m ay be inform ed of the country of origin of workers under 
P arts A and  B and relatives under P a rt C, bu t these are a  small 
proportion of the Labour Schedule itself, roughly 8 p e r  cent 
and the rem ainder of the certificates under the Schedule  axe 
issued in blank to the Jew ish Agency for them  to allocate to 
such countries as they think right. We have d esc ribed  the 
system of allocation by the Agency and the complaints to 
which this has given rise in paragraphs 26 to 28 of this chapter.
89. These questions of distribution are clearly of the utmost 
practical im portance to the growth of the N ational Home. They 
determ ine, for exam ple, the proportion, say, of Polish or of 
German Jew s entering Palestine or the proportion b e tw e e n  the 
more old-fashioned O rthodox Jew s of A gudath Israel and those 
of a  m ore secular or "  m odernist ”  outlook and mode of life. 
T hat these questions should be decided by a  body which is not 
only independent of the Governm ent of Palestine but is respons­
ible to an  international organization established by the Jews 
of the D iaspora is one of the m ost rem arkable features of the 
whole situation.
90. We know of no precedent for so complete a delegation 
by any  G overnm ent of control over the origin and composition 
of so large an addition to the population for which it is respons­
ible. B u t it m ust be rem em bered th a t the promise of a 
N ational Home was m ade to the Jew ish People; and, in the 
ordinary course, we do not question th a t it ought to be, in its 
hum an composition, the kind of Home the Jew ish People want, 
and th a t the Palestine Governm ent should not ordinarily he 
charged w ith the invidious task of deciding the distribution of 
certificates as between countries or communities. Nevertheless 
we can im agine circumstances in which the complete freedom 
of the Jew ish Agency in th is m atter m ight operate to prejudice 
the good governm ent of Palestine : and we recommend that the 
final allocation as determ ined by  the Jew ish Agency shouli 
be subm itted to the H igh Commissioner for approval.
5. Immigration and the National Home.
91. On the 3rd Ju n e , 1921, the High Commissioner in 
Palestine defined the words “  N ational Home "  as meaning 
th a t “  the Jew s, who are a people scattered throughout the 
* world, b u t whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, shoulc 
be enabled to found here their hom e, and that some amongs 
them , within the limits fixed by  num bers and the interests of 
the present population, should come to Palestine in order to 
help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to 
the advantage of all its inhabitants " .  The term  “ Centre 
with reference to the Jew ish N ational Home is used in the state-
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ment on British Policy in Palestine contained in the W hite 
Paper of June, 1922, which observes—
" When it  is  asked w hat is  m eant b y  th e  developm ent of th e  
Jewish N ational H om e in  P alestine, it  m ay be answered th a t it  is 
not the im position of a  Jew ish n ation ality  upon th e inhabitants of 
Palestine as a w hole, b u t th e  further developm ent o f th e  existing  
Jewish com m unity, w ith  th e  assistance o f Jew s in other parts of 
the world, in  order th a t i t  m ay becom e a centre*  in  w hich  th e  
Jewish people as a  w hole m ay  take, on grounds of religion and race, 
an interest and a  p ride.”
The Jewish people are recognized as being in Palestine as of 
right and not on sufferance, bu t it does not necessarily follow 
that any Jew at any tim e has a right to enter the country.
92. The Zionists had  always regarded the N ational Home as 
affording a measure of relief for the Jew s in Europe. B ut the 
serious deterioration in the situation of the Jew s in Germany 
L*m 1933 onwards, as well as the increasing economic pressure
which Jews in  Poland were being subjected, had  the effect 
altering the character of the N ational Home as defined above, 
t is no matter for surprise th a t the Zionist leaders should have 
elt the necessity of hastening the em igration of as m any Jew s as 
sible from G erm any and Poland. As the possibilities of 
ose settlement of Jew s on the land in Palestine are not infinite, 
ut, on the contrary, lim ited, industrial and town developm ent 
ered the only alternative for the absorption of large num bers 
f Jews. The purely Jew ish town of Tel Aviv, which has 
wn in such a spectacular m anner, is a  case in point. Founded 
n sand dunes in 1909, it now num bers 150,000 inhabitants, 
d its rapid rise has caused an ever increasing expansion in 
e building and other allied trades.
93. The Statem ent of British Policy in Palestine issued in 
une, 1922, contains the following passage: —
" During th e last tw o or three generations th e  Jew s have recreated  
in Palestine a com m unity, now  num bering 80,000, o f w hom  about 
one-fourth are farm ers or workers upon th e  land. T his com m unity  
has its own political organs; an elected  assem bly for th e d irection  
of its dom estic concerns; elected  councils in  th e  tow ns; and an  
organisation for th e  control o f its  schools. I t  has its  elected  Chief 
Rabbinate and R abbinical Council for th e  direction o f its  religious 
affairs. Its business is  conducted  in  H ebrew  as a  vernacular language, 
and a Hebrew Press serves its  needs. I t  has its  d istin ctive in tel- 
tectual life and d isp lays considerable econom ic a c tiv ity . T h is com ­
munity, then, w ith  its  tow n and country population, its  political, 
religious and social organizations, its  ow n language, its  ow n custom s, 
its own life, has in fact ‘ national ’ characteristics.”
94- By 1936 the Jew ish N ational Home had  practically 
wn into something like a  State within a State. The Jew ish 
mmunity in Palestine now num bers 400,000 persons, with its 
pital, Tel Aviv, the largest town in Palestine, its national flag,
* N o t italicized  in original.
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its anthem , its cultural system, its network of social services, and 
its economy divided into an  agricultural and industrial branch. 
I t  is linked to W orld Jew ry by  the Jew ish Agency, whilst thé 
in ternal affairs of the Home are m anaged by  a National 
Assembly and Council and a  R abbinical Council.
95. In  so far as im m igration has been the m ajor fa c to r in | 
bringing about this state of affairs we consider tha t th e  Man­
datory has so far fully im plem ented his obligation t o  facilitate 
the establishm ent of a  N ational Home for the Jewish p eo p le  in | 
Palestine. B ut this does not m ean tha t the National Home 
should be crystallized a t its present size. I t  will grow, in  the 
first place, as the result of the natu ral increase o f  the Jewish 
population, which is a t present estim ated a t 7,000 p e rso n s  a | 
year. Secondly, the Home will grow, if the present M andate 
is m aintained, b y  regulated im m igration. We cannot accept 
the view th a t the M andatory, having facilitated the establish ­
m ent of the N ational H om e, would be justified in s h u ttin g  its 
doors. Its economic life depends to a  large extent, as w e  have 
shown, on fu rther im m igration: and a  large am ount o f  capital 
has been invested in it on the assum ption tha t im m igration  
would continue.
9 6 . I f  im m igration under the existing M andate is  thus to I 
continue, its volume should no longer, in our view, be determined I 
solely by “  économie absorptive capacity ” . Earlier in this I 
chapter we pointed out the risks inherent in applying this I 
principle. B ut, as we then observed, a more serious weakness I 
in the principle lies in its exclusiveness. I t  ignores a ll other| 
than  the economic factors in the situation.
6. Conclusion.
97. In  view of the foregoing considerations we ad v ise  that I 
there should now be a  definite lim it to the annual vo lum e of I 
Jew ish im m igration. W e recom m end th a t Y our Majesty's! 
G overnm ent should lay  down a “  political high level ”  o f Jewish! 
im m igration to cover Jew ish im m igration of all categories.! 
This high level should be fixed for the next five years a t  12,0ml 
per annum , and in no circum stances during th a t period should! 
m ore than  that num ber be allowed into the country in  an y  one I 
year. The political m axim um  having been fixed th e  High I 
Commissioner should receive instructions to the effect that he I 
m ay use his discretion to adm it im m igrants up to the maximum I 
figure, bu t subject always to the economic absorptive capacity| 
of the country.
98. Im m igration is clearly an  outstanding factor in the I 
problem  of Palestine ; and to anyone who has not closely! 
exam ined the situation it m ight seem as if some restriction of I 
im m igration m ight go fa r to solve it. In  our view that is not I
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the case: and we do not regard the recom mendation we have pu t 
forward as more than  a palliative. I t  would not remove the 
“ grievance ”  of the A rabs in the m atter or “  prevent its recur­
rence F or in their eyes the Jew ish N ational Home is already 
too big. F our hundred thousand is a form idable fraction in 
a total population of 1,300,000. N or are num bers the sole 
consideration. In  education and enterprise, in the m odem  
methods he pursues and  the capital he can com m and, in the 
help he can get from  the Jew ish world outside, the average Jew  
is more than a  m atch for the average Arab. B ut even tha t is 
not the real crux. The difficulty has always been, and, if the 
Mandate continues, will continue with it, th a t the existence of 
the National Home, w hatever its size, bars the w ay to the attain ­
ment b y  the A rabs of Palestine of the same national status as 
that attained, or soon to be attained, by  all the other A rabs 
of Asia.
3°8
CHAPTER XI.
TRANS-JORDAN.
1. T rans-Jordan  is adm inistered under the M andate for Pales­
tine, bu t the Articles concerned w ith the establishment of a 
Jew ish N ational Home do not apply to it, and it is clear from 
our term s of reference th a t our inquiry into the operation of the 
M andate was not expected to extend to T rans-Jordan. Sug­
gestions, however, have been m ade and  were pu t to us in 
evidence th a t the solution of the Palestine problem  was to be 
found by bringing T rans-Jordan into the picture. In  that wide 
and undeveloped country, it is argued, there is room for multi­
tudes of Jew s w ithout prejudicing the interests of the existing I 
Arab population.
2. The area of T rans-Jordan  is about 34,000 square miles, and I 
its present population is estim ated a t about 320,000. Thus while 
the country is alm ost two and a half times as big as Palestine it 
contains only about a quarter of its population. That popula-J 
tion, m oreover, includes a large num ber of Bedouin, whose I 
pastoral life requires more land than  would be needed if in| 
course of time they were to settle down to agriculture.
3. The country has not been fully surveyed, and there I 
is not sufficient expert evidence available to form an estimate 
of the am ount of uncultivated land  which might be rendered 
cultivable. Opinions on the point tend to vary  with political 
prepossessions. The num ber of new settlers for whom room 
could be found in T rans-Jordan  is assessed by some Jewish I 
writers in m illions; by those who are opposed to Jewish immigra-1 
tion in  thousands. I t  is clearly desirable th a t this uncertainty | 
should be as far as possible rem oved, and  we recommend that, 
as soon as the financial position perm its, a  survey of Trans-1 
Jo rdan  should be m ade and a  scheme prepared for its irrigation | 
and developm ent.
4. Meantime we are not in a  position to fix even an approxi-1 
m ate figure for the possibilities of new settlem ent in Trans-1 
Jordan  : bu t, in view of the evidence given by  some o f those I 
who are acquainted w ith the country and from  what w e saw, I 
we consider the hope to be justified tha t, if fully developed , it | 
could hold a m uch larger population than  it does a t  present. 
Two of our num ber visited the ruins of Jerash , some 22 miles I 
north of A m m an, which was once a great and populous city I 
and one of several sim ilar cities which prospered in Trans-1 
Jo rdan  in classical times. In  the southern districts, north  oil 
A qaba, Lord W interton told us th a t T. E . Lawrence had I 
pointed out to him  the traces of extensive cultivation in the | 
neighbourhood of Rom an settlem ents.
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5. The process of development, however, is bound to be 
e x p e n s iv e ;  and the cost could not possibly be m et from  the 
e x ig u o u s  revenues of the T rans-Jordan Governm ent or even 
from  those of the Palestine Governm ent. Assistance would have 
to b e  provided on a large scale by the British Treasury. And, 
th o u g h  the developm ent of T rans-Jordan is a m atter which the 
M a n d a to r y  Adm inistration is bound to consider in due course, 
we c o u l d  only recom mend heavy expenditure for tha t purpose 
at th e  present m om ent if it could be regarded as an essential 
fa c to r  in the solution of the m ain problem  with which we are 
c o n c e r n e d .  U nder the present M andate system th a t is, in our 
o p in io n , not the case.
6. The development of T rans-Jordan can only help to solve 
the problem under the M andate if it opens the w ay to a sub­
stantial am ount of Jew ish im m igration, bu t, as we observed in 
Chapter V above, A rab antagonism  to Jew ish im m igration is a t 
least as b itter in T rans-Jordan as it is in Palestine. I t  was no 
easy task, as we pointed out, for the Governm ent to prevent 
the Bedouin from  crossing the river and taking p a rt in the dis­
turbances of last year. W e understand, moreover, that the 
Government of T rans-Jordan would em phatically refuse to en­
courage Jewish im m igration in the teeth of popular resistance; 
and it must be rem em bered tha t not only is T rans-Jordan free 
from those Articles of the M andate which apply to the establish­
ment of the N ational Hom e, bu t its Governm ent is recognized 
as an independent Governm ent, and the H igh Comm issioner, 
though he is entitled to  advise the Governm ent of T rans-Jordan , 
would scarcely regard this question of Jew ish im m igration as 
one on which he could press his advice.
7. In fact, the possibility of enlarging the N ational Home by 
Jewish immigration into T rans-Jordan rests on the old assum p­
tion of concord between Jew s and A rabs. If indeed harm ony 
could be established between the Jew s and A rabs in Palestine, 
the Arabs in T rans-Jordan  m ight presently acquiesce in , m ight 
ultimately even welcome, Jew ish im m igration. B ut, as we 
explained before, as long as Jew s and A rabs quarrel in Pales­
tine they are unlikely to agree elsewhere; and in T rans-Jordan  
as in other independent A rab States the door will only be opened 
to Jewish enterprise in so far as friendlier relations are 
established in Palestine.
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CHAPTER X II.
PUBLIC HEALTH.
1. Before 19x8 there was no organized State public health 
service in Palestine. M unicipalities possessed certain powers in 
this respect under the O ttom an Law , but apart from Municipal 
Medical Officers in certain of the larger towns and Municipal 
hospitals in Jerusalem  and N ablus, no organized sanitary, public 
health or medical services existed. A port quarantine service 
was controlled by the Constantinople B oard of Health, an inter­
national body whose headquarters were in Constantinople. This 
B oard was also responsible for the sanitary control and health 
supervision of pilgrim  traffic to and from  Mecca by the Hedjaz 
Railw ay, under the term s of the International Sanitary Conven­
tion. The rem ainder of the hospital services in the country were 
provided by religious and m issionary bodies. The majority of 
these hospitals were located in Jerusalem , b u t there were others 
in Jaffa, H aifa, N azareth, Tiberias, N ablus, Bethlehem, Hebron, 
and Gaza. The country had  been infested by disease for 
centuries, m alaria had  decim ated the population, epidemics of 
it a t times blotted out in a few months the inhabitants of whole 
villages and there were few regions which were free from it. In 
addition to m alaria, diseases such as typhoid, dysentery, 
trachom a, conjunctivitis and tuberculosis were very prevalent 
The Turkish G overnm ent had  done nothing in the way of ad 
vancem ent in m odern methods of hygiene; sanitation was prac 
tically non-existent except to some extent in the larger towns 
and the great bulk  of the A rab population, besides being ignorant 
an d  uneducated in m atters of health , were fatalistic in their 
attitude tow ards disease. The first steps in a health campaign 
were taken by  the A rm y a t the tim e of the conquest and a 
public health service was organized under the Occupied Enemy 
T erritory  A dm inistration. This became the Government Depart­
m ent of H ealth in  1920.
2. The policy of this D epartm ent as approved by the Govern­
m ent and the Secretary of State was defined as follows :—
( а )  T o concentrate on public h ealth , san itation  and th e  preven­
tion  of disease.
( б )  T o provide hosp ital accom m odation for dangerous, infectious 
an d  com m unicable d isease and m ental diseases.
(c) To lim it, as far as possible, th e  hosp ital accommodation pro­
v id ed  b y  th e  A dm inistration for general diseases to  th e r e q u i r e m e n ts  
o f G overnm ent officers and em ployees, m em bers of th e Police Force, 
prisoners, m edico-legal cases and accidents, and th e very poor.
(<?) T o provide hosp itals, or to  aid  M unicipalities to  provide hospi­
ta ls, for th e  needs o f th e  general population in areas where no 
provision or inadequate provision is  m ade b y  voluntary o rg an iza tions.
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The Departm ent was accordingly organized on these lines, and 
the policy adopted of leaving the general medical and surgical 
care of the public to private practitioners and private or charit­
able medical institutions. The fonctions of the D epartm ent of 
Health at the present time correspond generally to the organiza­
tion as it was originally laid down, and evidence as to these func­
tions and the m anner in which they are discharged w as placed 
before the Commission.
3. The burden on the D epartm ent of H ealth was from  the out­
set a heavy one and m uch was required to be done to restore and 
stabilize the health of the country. The Jew ish com munity 
which was in the country before 1914 suffered adversely from  
the effects of the W ar and the developm ent of its health service 
was arrested. In  1918 new Jew ish colonists started to come into 
Palestine and the num bers of the Jew ish com munity began to 
rise. It is no unusual thing for those who go as colonists and 
settlers to make some provision for their general health services 
and Jewish im m igration was no exception to this rule. In  
response to an urgent appeal of the W orld Zionist Centre in 
London, the American Zionists, prim arily the H adassah Organi­
zation, undertook to send to Palestine a  medical expedition, the 
American Zionist Medical U nit, composed of doctors, nurses, 
bacteriologists, sanitary engineers, etc., to organize medical ser­
vices on a country-wide scale. The unit entered Palestine in 
August, 1918, before General Allenby had  completed the con­
quest of the northern p a rt of the country, and im m ediately set 
to work at its task. Thus, side by side with the Governm ent 
Department of H ealth, there grew up in Palestine the Jewish 
Medical Service. In  their evidence the D epartm ent of H ealth 
acknowledged the great am ount of valuable work done by  the 
Jewish medical institutions in Palestine.
4. The Jew ish health system  includes the following under­
takings:—
(a) Services m aintained by H adassah.
(b) Services m aintained by  the local communities—the 
Municipality of Tel Aviv and the H aifa com m unity.
(c) Services m aintained by  the health insurance 
organizations.
(d) Services m aintained by  the Anti-Tuberculosis League, 
societies for care of the insane, the W om en’s Zionist Organi­
sation of America, etc.
5. The H adassah Medical Organization has developed a 
widespread system of clinics in Jew ish centres and hospitals 
in the principal towns and , pari passu w ith the creation of 
similar services by  the G overnm ent, a school medical service,
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including an ophthalm ological service and a  widespread infant 
welfare service. Though naturally  the Jewish population 
benefited most, the H adassah medical services were available 
to all the com munities in Palestine and m any of the poorer 
classes am ongst the A rabs received m uch assistance from the 
work of the organization. This disinterested philanthropy of 
H adassah deserves recognition : it was a  real step towards the 
prom otion of good feeling between the two races; bu t unhappily 
the effect of its work was im paired by  other influences. As the 
rift widened, the A rabs' attendance a t Jew ish hospitals and 
clinics becam e less and less.
6. In  recent years, certain of the activities of Hadassah have 
been taken over by  the health insurance organizations, viz., 
the Kupat Cholim  Medical Benefit Society and the Rural Sick 
Benefit F und. The K upat Cholim, the Sick Fund of the 
General Federation of Jew ish Labour, was instituted before 
the w ar and has since developed into a factor of prime import­
ance in the field of medical service. The Kupat Cholim is a 
voluntary health insurance society, and during its early years 
it received substantial financial assistance from  the Zionist 
funds. Beginning w ith the year 1927 the grants from that 
source declined until they ceased entirely about four years ago. 
In  1936 Kupat Cholim  provided medical service for over 100,000 
persons, or about a quarter of the entire Jew ish population. 
The R ural Sick Benefit F und  was organized in 1931 and it ex­
tends its benefits to farm ers and other elements not affiliated 
with the General Federation of Jew ish Labour. I t  operates in 
about 40 ru ral settlem ents in different parts of Palestine and 
has a total m em bership of 20,000 persons including the mem­
bers’ families.
7. The m aintenance budget of the Jew ish H ealth under­
takings for 1935 was stated to am ount to about £350,000, of 
which nearly £ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  was borne by  the health insurance 
organizations, £ 9 0 ,0 0 0  by local com munities and patients,
8. W e wish to associate ourselves with the view expressed 
to  us by the D epartm ent of H ealth as to the a m o u n t and 
value of the medical work which has been done by the Jewish 
medical institutions in Palestine. We would also ex p ress oui 
appreciation of the hospital and medical services of the religious, 
m issionary and philanthropic bodies who have done so much 
to  relieve suffering and com bat disease which is p rev alen t in 
Palestine.
£ 5 0 ,0 0 0  by  H adassah, the W om en’s Zionist Organisation of 
America and  o ther outside bodies and £1 0 ,0 0 0  by the Govern­
m ent.
1
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g. The appropriations for expenditure upon Public H ealth 
S e rv ice s  in the successive years since the inception of the Civil 
Administration have been as follows:—
Year.
Total
Government
Expenditure.
D epartm ent 
of Health 
Expenditure.
Percentage 
o f total 
Government 
Expenditure.
1921-22
1922-23
1923-24
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
11927 (9 mth
11928
11929 
1 193°
| i 93i
11932-33
1 1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936- 3 7 *
£
1,881,108
1,837 ,173
1 ,6 3 3 , 2 7 7
1,806,660
2,040,332
2,070,479
1,944-397
3 ,381 ,993
2,140,032
2 ,536 ,505
2,374,866
2,516,394
2,704,856
3,230,010
4,236,202
6,099,927
£
1 4 2 , 9 3 1
1 1 4 , 1 4 7
91,355
82,329
83,276
89,384
73,858
98,581
101,864
105,481
105,918
111,052
135,838
166,311
194,632
204,356
7 -6
6-2
5 - 5
4 -6
4-1
4 - 3
3*8
2 -9  
4-8 
4 -2  
4 ’ 5
4 - 4
5 -o 
5-1 
4 ' 6
3 - 3
* P rovisional figures.
10. These figures show the extent to which funds have been 
I allotted by the Governm ent for public health services from 
year to year. The services of the D epartm ent of H ealth have 
of necessity been restricted in accordance with the am ount of 
money which the Governm ent have been able to place a t its
I disposal, but with the funds available the foundations of public 
I health services have been successfully established and main- 
I timed and the country has been protected from  the m ore dan- 
jgerous epidemic diseases.
11. Government expenditure is about £180,000, excluding 
I the special expenditure on certain non-recurrent item s, whereas
Jewish organizations have well over £300,000 at their dis­
posal. The Arab relies very largely on the G overnm ent services 
I for his medical aid, together with the hospital service which 
has been provided by various charitable and religious organiza- 
Itions, whereas the Jew s have a more extensive medical service 
I mainly financed by  them selves and the Jew s in the Diaspora.
12; The division between Arabs and Jews is m arkedly shown 
I in hospital services. The non-Jewish hospitals and clinics 
I maintained by  religious and missionary bodies are open to all 
I communities. Before the W ar the bulk of those treated a t them  
I were Arabs and since the W ar this has continued to be the case.
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Jew s axe reluctant to go to  hospitals where there are Arab 
patients and conversely few A rabs now, save in exceptional 
circum stances, go to Jew ish institutions.
13. The Jew ish grievances with regard to Public and Social 
Services were explained by representatives of the Va ad Leumi, 
the General Council of the Jew ish Comm unity of Palestine.
Their first grievance was th a t the total Government expendi­
ture on these services is entirely inadequate to the health needs 
of the country. A part from  this general claim, other criticisms 
were m ade of the G overnm ent's work in anti-m alaria work, 
village sanitation, infectious diseases and tuberculosis. With 
regard to anti-m alaria work it was stated that the extensive 
drainage w ork carried out by  Jewish colonizing agencies had 
received no support w hatsoever from  the Government, and more­
over th a t the G overnm ent did not bear any of the cost o f the 
current active anti-m alaria control work carried out by settlers. 
This grievance is in the nature of the case a m atter o f degree 
and the scale of such work which the Government can under­
take is conditioned by  the funds available. The expenditure in I 
this connection b y  the Jew s is due to the rapid pace o f their 
colonization and to the fact th a t they purchased a large amount 
of land where m alaria had been rife for centuries. F ro m  the 
evidence subm itted to us we had no doubt th a t the Jewish 
organizations have achieved m arked progress against m alaria. 
W hilst recognizing the good w ork done by  various Jewish I 
bodies, we are satisfied th a t the Governm ent fully bears its 
share of the current active work of m alaria prevention and has 
assisted in drainage work where th a t is of general benefit to  the 1 
population a t large or to prospective development. Much of 
the work in the ru ral districts has been carried out vo lu n ta rily  
by  the A rabs themselves working under the D epartm ent’s advice 
an d  w ith its assistance.
14. A somewhat sim ilar com plaint was m ade in connection 
w ith the G overnm ent's work of village w ater supply a n d  sanita­
tion , and other m easures to deal with infectious diseases, 
nam ely, th a t the Jew ish section of the com munity benefited far 
less from  the G overnm ent expenditure than it should hav e  done. 
The work of w ater supply and sanitation is closely allied to the 
prevention of infectious diseases, since adequate arrangements 
for the form er will largely suppress and control the la tte r. Com­
pared with neighbouring countries Palestine, we were told, has 
been rem arkably free from  serious epidemics of preventable | 
disease.
15. W ith regard to tuberculosis another Jew ish grievance was 
th a t the Governm ent had not instituted an  active anti-tuber­
culosis program m e. W e understand th a t this subject has been |
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carefully exam ined and that- an expert report was subm itted 
to Government in 1935, on which it is intended to take action 
when funds are available.
16. The Va ad Leum i further com plained th a t the funds 
a llo ca ted  by the D epartm ent of H ealth to preventive medical 
work, that is to say, school hygiene and infant welfare work and 
ophthalmic service outside the schools, both am ong Jew s and 
A rabs, are extrem ely small in relation to other items of 
expenditure, and are insufficient to provide an effective service, 
in a country where the infant m ortality rate is so high. 
Moreover, although the Governm ent properly carries on an 
extensive ophthalm ic service am ong the Arab population, it has 
refused  even the minimum contribution for the support of the 
corresponding service of the Jewish com munity. We under­
stand that the D epartm ent has pursued the policy of expanding 
the Infant W elfare Services as rapidly as funds are available and 
of adding to the staff of the established school medical service 
as the school population increases. Ophthalmic service is pro­
vided at all hospitals and dispensaries in the country. In  all 
areas of mixed population the Governm ent clinics are open to 
both races. A special ophthalm ic service was created by the 
Government to endeavour to cope with acute epidemic conjunc­
tivitis, which is the cause of the high incidence of blindness in 
Arab villages of the Southern D istrict, but it is to be observed 
that there is no sim ilar situation to be dealt with am ongst the 
Jewish rural population.
17. The Government policy is to leave as far as possible the 
general medical treatm ent of the public to voluntary effort, but 
in order to enable the D epartm ent of H ealth to deal prom ptly 
with outbreaks of infectious disease it m ust have under its control 
hospitals in various parts of the country. In  1924 a municipal 
hospital system adm inistered by the Governm ent was introduced 
with the object of retaining for the m aintenance of the hospitals 
the revenue accruing locally from treatm ent fees. I t was hoped 
'that local interest would be stim ulated and Municipal H ospital 
Committees were form ed to adm inister the revenue, with the 
control of the technical services rem aining under the D epart­
ment. In the beginning the scheme showed some prospects of 
success, but growing political antagonism  caused a lack of co­
operation on the Committees and it had to be abandoned, and 
most of the hospitals are now under Governm ent control.
18. The Va’ad Leum i com plained tha t the Jew ish Hospitals 
and Dispensary Services are provided by local committees or 
organizations and tha t except for a grant to the Tel Aviv Hos­
pital they receive no assistance from the Governm ent. The 
Government has, however, assisted the Tel Aviv H ospital, the 
only Jewish hospital m aintained by a Municipal Council, by
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capital grants tow ards building and equipm ent and by annual 
grants tow ards m aintenance. The annual grant, which in 1935 
was £5,841, is the am ount which would be expended on the 
technical staff and technical services and equipment of a Gov­
ernm ent hospital of an  equivalent num ber of beds.
1 9 . The Va’ad Leum i com plained th a t there was no compul­
sory health insurance for w orkers and asked that in the absence 
of it the Governm ent should m ake a  per capita grant-in-aid at 
the rate of 5s. for each m em ber annually to the Jewish voluntary 
health insurance organizations. This they estim ated w ould  cost 
£15,000 a year. The question of com pulsory sickness insur­
ance was considered in 1 9 3 3  by a  Committee appointed b y  the 
G overnm ent, and the finding of the m ajority was that the scheme 
would entail annual recurrent expenditure by Government of at 
least £70,000; and tha t, in the present economic state o f indus­
try , commerce and  agriculture in Palestine the burden of even 
a  modified scheme would be prohibitive. The Committee further 
considered that any additional Governm ent funds which might 
become available for relief of sickness would be better spent in 
expanding the Governm ent services for prevention of disease 
than  in launching a scheme which would benefit only a  rela­
tively small proportion of the population.
2 0 . In  the D epartm ent of H ealth there are 7 4  senior officials 
and a com plaint was made by the Va1 ad Leum i that o f these 
only 1 0  are Jew s. The fact is tha t of the 74  senior appoint­
m ents referred to 11 are appointm ents in the Colonial Medical 
Service*and 2 3  are posts of M atrons, Superintendents of Mid­
wifery and British N ursing Sisters, the holders of w h ic h  posts, 
in  accordance with Colonial Office arrangem ents, m u s t be of 
B ritish nationality. The rem aining 4 0  posts m ay b e  filled by 
Palestinians, and 1 0  of these, or 2 5  per cent., are held b y  Jews.
21. F inally the Va’ad Leum i put before the Commission a 
sum m ary of the recurrent expenditure required to meet the I 
claims which they had  advanced. They asked that the Govern-1 
m ent expenditure on H ealth should be increased from £180,000 j 
to £260,000 and that the p a rt thereof assigned to grants-in-aidtol 
Jew ish H ealth Services should be increased from £10,000 toi 
£60,000.
22. The Jew ish "  grievances ”  in the m atter of public healthl 
m ay be briefly summed up as com plaints th a t not enough money I 
has been spent by the M andatory Governm ent to assist the I 
medical services established by  the Jew s from  their own re-1 
sources. The same com plaint, it will appear, was made with I 
regard to the Governm ent grant to Jew ish education. The social I 
services in general, or the aids to Jew ish social services, are I 
regarded as inadequate, especially in view of the fact that the I 
Jew s bear a larger share of taxation than the Arabs. I
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23. In a brief com ment on this attitude in an earlier chapter, 
We pointed out th a t it implies the violation of the principle of 
a common citizenship between Jew  and A rab; for, if the prin­
ciple were really accepted, services would be provided in pro­
portion to the needs of the com m unity irrespective of race, 
and indeed the Jew ish witnesses did not so m uch dem and a 
higher proportion of the grants allotted to particular services as 
an increase in the total grants. I t seemed clear, in fact, tha t the 
Jews expect that the Governm ent should help them  m uch more 
generously than in the past to m aintain and extend the highly 
modem and efficient services which they have done so much 
to establish by themselves. B ut w hat is given to one service 
must be taken from another: and we felt th a t the Jew ish w it­
nesses did not always rem em ber th a t Palestine, despite the 
economic development of the N ational Home, is still a relatively 
poor country. I t is true th a t the Jew s provide a disproportionate 
share of the revenue, bu t even so they are not taxed at any­
thing like the rate which is needed to m aintain the social equip­
ment and external security of an advanced European state. The 
taxation in G reat B ritain last year am ounted to about £20 per 
head of its population. In  Palestine, with its record budget of 
some £ 6,000,000, it was about £ 4  per head. Allow a  some­
what larger sum for the Jew ish taxpayer and there is still a 
great deal to be m ade up before Palestine can afford the social 
services of B ritain: nor should it be forgotten th a t the Palestine 
taxpayer, w ithout any  additional charge on him , is protected 
from external attack by the naval and other forces of the 
Mandatory Power.
24. The whole question illustrates the difficulty of providing 
services in one state for two distinct communities with two 
very different standards of living. On the accepted principle 
of proportional treatm ent in  accordance with the ratio of popu­
lation, the am ount allocated to H ealth Services m ight be roughly 
the same per head for A rab and Jew  or, in view of the Jewish 
contribution to revenue, it m ight be somewhat more for the 
Jew. But the Jew ish requirem ents are so much higher than  
those of the Arabs in general a t their present stage of develop­
ment that, reckoned in Concrete terms of medical equipm ent, 
the same money would provide far less for the Jew  than  for the 
Arab.
CHAPTER XIII.
PUBLIC WORKS AND SERVICES.
G o v e r n m e n t  D e p a r t m e n t s .
1. The evidence before us showed that during recent years I 
the A dm inistration of Palestine has m ade every endeavour to 
keep the ratio of em ploym ent of A rabs and Jew s in the Govern­
m ent D epartm ents generally as nearly as possible in accordance 
w ith their respective proportions in the population. T h e  Jewish 
Agency, whilst agreeing tha t the representation of Jews in 
Governm ent D epartm ents should be m aintained at a level 
approxim ately proportionate to the relative num ber o f Jews in 
the country, com plained th a t on this basis the present position is 
th a t Jew s in the Civil Service as a whole are not fully 
represented.
2. The total num ber of persons employed in the normal estab­
lishm ent of Government D epartm ents a t the 31st December, I 
1935, was 15,771, and the position with regard to th e  employ­
m ent of A rabs, Jew s and others is set out in the ta b le  below. I 
There are a large num ber of British officials in the Government 
service and in the table these are included under th e  heading I 
of “  Others
N um ber Cost
N um ber Percentage 
o f Total A m ount
Percentage 
o f  Total
A ra b s  ................... 10,721 68
L
1 ,010 ,930 54
Je w s 2 ,4 5 8 16 3 40 ,429 18
O th e rs 2 ,592 16 514 ,434 28
T o t a l ................... i 5 , 7 7 i 100 1 .865 ,793 100
The total of A rabs and Jew s employed is 13,179 and of thisl 
num ber the Jew s are 18-6 per cent. On the 30th J u n e , 1936,1 
in the total population of Jew s and A rabs in Palestine the Jewsl 
were 28-2 per cent. To achieve from year to year a n  exact pro-1 
portion in the Governm ent D epartm ents is not possible an d  with I 
the large influx of Jew ish im m igrants, some 100,000 during the! 
years 1934 and 1935, it is quite obvious tha t a discrepancy wasl 
bound to arise. If it be assum ed th a t the distribution of posts! 
as between the two races should be proportional to th e  size ofl 
their respective populations—and we have commented on that!
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a s s u m p t i o n  in an earlier Chapter*—we think tha t the Govern­
ment have fairly m aintained a due proportion in the Civil Service 
generally, although the rapid  expansion of the Jew ish com­
munity has m ade this extrem ely difficult.
3. In addition to their general grievance with regard to 
employment in the Civil Service as a whole, the Jew ish Agency 
c o m p l a in e d  tha t the attitude of the Government tow ards the 
e m p l o y m e n t  of Jew s is unsym pathetic and Jew s do not get a 
fair share of employment in the Public W orks D epartm ent, on 
the railways and a t the ports. The General Federation of Jewish 
L a b o u r ,  the Va ad Leumi, and Central Agudath Israel made 
s im ila r  complaints with regard to the Public W orks D epartm ent 
and t h e  railways. Central A gudath Israel also subm itted tha t 
their organization does not get a sufficient allocation of Govern­
m en t contracts and th a t more of their members ought to be 
e m p lo y e d  in the Post Office service. A grievance also was put 
f o r w a r d  by the A rabs th a t in the higher grades of t h e  Public 
Works D epartm ent only one A rab is employed.
4. The Jewish Agency rested their claim for a greater share of 
such employment on three m ain grounds.
The firs t ground was tha t they regarded the volume of employ­
ment in  public works and services as part and parcel of the 
country’s absorptive capacity; th a t volume of em ployment is  
being constantly expanded and is being expanded largely owing 
to Jewish efforts. From  the annual budgets it is clear tha t the 
amounts spent on public works, both in the ordinary budget and 
under loan schedules, are rising. They calculated th a t about 
65 per cent, of the railw ay receipts come from Jew s and tha t 
from 60 to 80 per cent, of the im ports coming into the country 
through the ports are Jew ish.
Their second ground was tha t opportunity for work in all 
occupations is a real test of citizenship and th a t this is not com­
plete unless Jew s have a  position in State services and  with 
regard to these the Governm ent do not give them  enough help.
Their third ground was th a t Palestine is a  country of two races 
and it is very im portant to m ake the public services proof against 
racial unrest. In  the recent disturbances, where the service was 
exclusively in A rab hands, as in the port of Jaffa, the service 
was completely paralysed : on the other hand, a t H aifa, where a 
arge number of Jew s are employed in the port, the strike was not 
ffective.
5- T he second and th ird  grounds of com plaint are really 
facial an d  political, and in some measure overlap. The urgent 
desire of the Jew s to bring m ore im m igrants into the country 
s largely responsible for this dem and for further employment
* P a g e  1 3 8 .
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in the public services. I t is no t possible in every case to  employ 
both Jew s and A rabs in the public services. For example 
despite a substantial proportion of Jew s in its population 
Jaffa is essentially an A rab town, while Tel Aviv is purely 
Jew ish, and it would in the existing circumstances be  just as I 
dangerous to employ a Jew ish lighterm an in Jaffa as a n  Arab 
policeman in Tel Aviv. Any attem pt to force Jewish labour 
on a purely Arab population or A rab labour on a purely Jewish 
population would only intensify the feeling between th e  two 
races and m ight precipitate a  crisis.
6 . On the evidence we had no doubt th a t the Government 
m ade no restrictions as to the em ployment of Jews in public 
services and, if in fact in some services Jew s were not employed, 
it was not from any lack of desire on the part of the Adminis­
tra tion , bu t arose solely from  the peculiar and difficult circum-1 
stances in Palestine.
P u b l i c  W o r k s .
7. In  any  em ploym ent in Palestine there are two f e a tu r e s  I 
which cannot be lost sight of—one, th a t the two races, with I 
few exceptions, are entirely antagonistic and the other t h a t  their I 
standards of living are very different. This difference i n  t h e |  
standard of living accounts for the fact th a t the wage o f  
unskilled A rab labourer is m uch less than  tha t of the Je w ish  I 
labourer and, although the actual rates of pay  vary in d if fe re n t  I 
occupations, it m ay be taken generally th a t the ratio i s  r o u g h ly |  
about five to three.
8 . A t the beginning of 1 9 3 3  the G overnm ent decided that I 
during the financial year 1 9 3 3 -4  from 3 0  to 3 3  per cent, of the I 
labour em ployed on public works should be Jewish, the  per-1 
centage being calculated on wages and not on the total number I 
of working days. The Governm ent accepted 3 7  per cent, as I 
the percentage of Jew ish contribution to public re v en u e  andl 
decided th a t th is factor m ust be taken into consideration. I 
R egard was also given to two other factors, namely, th a t thel 
Jew ish percentage of population was approxim ately 18 p e r cent. I 
and that the em ploym ent of more Jew s would involve higher I 
costs for the same am ount of w ork. I t was recognized that! 
the actual percentage would vary  in accordance with th e  naturel 
of the work, local conditions and costs. The works to  be done! 
were to be sub-divided on a geographical basis, works in pre-l 
dom inantly Jew ish areas being entrusted to Jews a n d  those! 
in predom inantly A rab areas to A rabs. W orks in mixed areas! 
were either to be left open to com petition or to be given toi 
one or other com m unity to the extent necessary to bring i t |  
share up to the prescribed percentage.
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g. During the next three years Jew ish labour was not in 
fact employed by  the Public W orks D epartm ent up  to the figure 
of 30 to 33 per cent, as laid down. This was due to the fact 
that during these three years there was increased prosperity, 
and building activity  in Tel Aviv and elsewhere was so intense 
that not only was there a  shortage of Jew ish labour for the 
Government works b u t the wages of Jew ish skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled w orkm en increased so largely tha t it would no t 
have been possible to  adopt the proportion laid down w ithout 
increasing the expenditure on labour on Governm ent w orks 
to an unw arranted extent.
10. The Jew ish Agency stated tha t if the w ork was given 
out on a piece price o r contract basis it could be done by Jewish 
labour at the same cost as by A rab labour, b u t the evidence 
was contradictory on this point.
11. In presenting their case to us, the Jew ish Agency 
estimated tha t a t the present time Jew s contribute m ore than  
60 per cent, to the revenue and tha t they are now about 30 per 
cent, of the population. They asked th a t the em ploym ent of 
Jews in the Public W orks D epartm ent should be based on 
man-days. On tha t basis they stated that if they were to get 
30 to 33 per cent, in m an-days, th a t would m ean th a t their 
wage bill would go up to 45 or 50 per cent, of the total paym ent 
of the Public W orks D epartm ent. A lthough in their view th a t 
percentage was m uch below their share of contribution to 
revenue, they were content th a t their share should be fixed 
at that point and asked th a t a procedure should be introduced 
of earmarking works a t the beginning of the year.
12. We are aware th a t Mr. M acDonald in his letter to D r. 
Weizmann in 1931 said “  W ith regard to public and municipal 
works falling to be financed out of public funds, the claim of 
Jewish labour to a  due share of the em ployment available, taking 
into account Jew ish contributions to public revenue, shall be 
taken into consideration ”  ; and  we have no doubt tha t the 
Administration when they fixed their percentage in 1933 m ade 
every endeavour to carry  out those instructions, bu t, as we 
pointed out, the percentage could not be m aintained owing to 
economic factors. The tru th  of the situation is th a t in Palestine, 
where there are two different rates of pay for unskilled labour, 
as between A rabs and  Jew s, and also frequent fluctuations in 
wage rates, it is practically impossible to m aintain em ploym ent 
in public works on any fixed proportion between the races.
13. The contract work of the Public W orks D epartm ent is 
carried out on the ordinary  principles of tender, the Govern­
ment receiving some eight to ten tenders for a specified piece of 
work and accepting the lowest tender. The Histadruth, the
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Jew ish L abour Federation, has a special D epartm ent for con­
tract purposes. D uring the years 1933 and 1934, and part of 
1935, owing to the am ount of w ork going on in other trades, 
particularly  the building trade, only a small proportion of thé 
contract work w ent to the Jew ish L abour Federation. As an 
illustration of this position, we were told tha t out of 13 invita­
tions sent to the Jew ish L abour Federation between April, 1933, 
and February , 1934, to undertake works costing over £500 thé 
Federation responded to one invitation only.
14. In  some cases, where the am ounts involved are small, 
direct contracts are given on a price list fixed by the Govern­
m ent. In  giving out such contracts the D epartm ent has, of 
course, to exercise its discretion as to w hat contractors should be 
em ployed, having regard to their efficiency and ability, and this 
discretion we have no doubt has been properly exercised.
15. In  the financial year 1935-36 the Public W orks Depart­
m ent estim ate th a t under contracts Jew ish labour amounted to 
■84,248 m an-days, w ith a to tal of wages of ,£38,367. Other labour 
n nder contract totalled 413,763 m an-days with a total amount 
of wages of £74,173.
16. W ith regard  to the A rab grievance th a t there is o n ly  one 
A rab em ployed in the higher grades of the P u b l ic  W orks 
D epartm ent, we were inform ed th a t this is so and  it is accounted 
for by  the reason th a t in the Public W orks D epartm ent th e re  are 
no A rabs sufficiently well qualified at present to be p ro m o te d  to 
a  higher grade. F our are now being trained and  being given 
experience in the various offices of the D epartm ent to become 
qualified for prom otion.
P o s t  O f f i c e .
17. The position in the Post Office a t the 31st December, 
1935, was th a t, out of a to tal of 1,471 employees, 714 were 
A rabs, 711 were Jew s, and the "  O th e rs"  were 46.
The grievance of C entral A gudath Israel was tha t more of their 
m em bers ought to be em ployed in the Post Office Service. 
The A gudath Israel is a com m unity num bering a b o u t  50,000. 
To them  the Jew ish Sabbath is not merely a  day o f  re s t  : they 
regard it as one of the foundations of the Jew ish fa ith  and 
m em bers of their com m unity do not work on Saturdays. It 
would seem th a t for this reason more members of th e ir  com­
m unity are not em ployed in such im portant public services as the 
Post Office o r on the railw ays, having regard to th e  public 
requirem ents.
R a i l w a y s .
18. The G overnm ent D epartm ent of the Palestine R ailw ays  
operates over 1,100 kilom etres of line, of which 203 kilom etres  
a te  in Sinai (Egypt) an d  are owned by the B ritish G o v ern m en t
1 '(
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and there are 323 kilometres of the H ejaz Railw ay in Trans- 
o rd a n . Of the 474 kilometres of line actually in Palestine, 
,ere are 144 kilometres of H ejaz Railway. W ith the excep­
tion of a few members of tra in  crews running through Sinai, 
no J e w s  are em ployed on the lines in Sinai and T rans-Jordan, 
ie employees being for the m ost part the people of these two 
c o u n tr ie s .  While there are no Jew ish workmen on the rail­
w ays i n  Sinai or T rans-Jordan and few on the H ejaz Railway 
in Palestine, the Jew s get a  certain share of the work of these 
ines i n  the m echanical workshops a t H aifa, where the m ain- 
e n a n c e  and repair of locomotives and rolling stock running 
over all three lines are carried out by mixed Jewish and A rab 
a b o u r .
19. The Jewish Agency complained th a t the proportion of 
ews employed on the railw ays was far too low.
The chief reason for the small num ber of Jews employed on 
ie railways is tha t the wages for the grades in which the 
majority of men are employed are too low to attract Jew s, 
'his applies not only to the lower paid grades bu t also to the 
ligher paid posts, because the Jew s will not accept the low 
rates of the learner stages, for instance, locomotive drivers 
who h a v e  to start as cleaners, then progress to firemen, before 
they are made drivers.
20. The railw ay operates a seven-day train  service and there 
is no difference in the goods and passenger trains tim e-table 
between Sundays and any other day in the week. F or this 
reason, Jewish employees are in most cases asked if they are 
willing to work on Saturday, and it is intim ated to them  th a t 
Saturday working will or m ay be required. The m anagem ent 
endeavours as far as possible to give the weekly day of rest in 
accordance with the religious confessions of their employees.
21. The operation of the railways a t the present time shows 
an annual deficit. The rates of wages are much higher than 
those in the neighbouring countries of Syria and E gypt, and 
all the wage grades on the railw ays are on increm ental scales.
P o r t s .
22. I n  the port of Jaffa , the porters are in direct Govern­
ment employment and lighterm en and stevedores are licensed 
by the Government to work in the port. The Jew ish Agency 
complained tha t they were unable to get em ploym ent for Jewish 
porters or licences for Jew ish stevedores or lighterm en. A fter 
negotiations w ith the Jew ish Agency, the G overnm ent decided, 
for reasons of security, th a t Jew ish porters should not be in tro ­
duced in to  the port of Jaffa o r licences issued to Jews as 
stevedores or lighterm en. In  October 1935 and F ebruary  1936-
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there were two lightning strikes a t the port of Jaffa and these 
two strikes were m arked symptom s of the general unrest which 
was growing in the country.
2 3 . In  the port of H aifa, a large proportion of the porters 
work for private firms. The bulk of export porterage, namely 
for citrus fruit, was and still is carried out by Jewish labour ! 
employed by  the fru it shippers. Jewish porters are also em­
ployed by  certain m erchants for the delivery, and placing  in | 
conveyances for w ithdraw al, of iron bars, joists, rods and pipes, 
loose roofing tiles, tim ber, etc.
24. The porterage work under the Governm ent is now under 
a  departm ental service, which was inaugurated on th e  1st July, 
1935. Two chief forem en were appointed a t £20  a  month 
an d  10 foremen a t £12  a m onth. These men are a ll Arabs 
who have been engaged on porterage w ork a t the p o rt for 
m any years. The whole of the labour is recruited d a ily  and 
paid  a  daily wage. Two rates of pay are granted, 280 mils | 
(5s. 7d.) a  day for experienced m en, who are limited to  100, 
and  160 mils (3s. 2d.) a day  for others. No discrim ination I 
is m ade regarding creed; bu t, although labourers are engaged I 
daily a t the gate of the p o rt area, no applications h a v e  been I 
m ade by  Jew s. This is accounted for by  the fact th a t  the I 
wages are not sufficiently high to a ttrac t Jew ish la b o u r  and I 
a  Jew  will no t join a  large force of A rab labour individually, [ 
but will only do so if he has a chance of coming in as a member | 
of a group.
25. Recently an  arrangem ent has been come to between the 
G overnm ent and the Jew ish Agency by which a  part of the^ , 
G overnm ent work a t the port of H aifa is to be allocated to 
Jewish labour on a piece ra te  basis.
26. W e do no t desire to m ake any recommendations r e g a r d -1 
ing the em ploym ent of Jew s and non-Jews in Government D e-1 
partm ents and on public works and services. We have r e fe r re d  I 
to the difficulties created by  the antagonism  of the two ra c e s ,!  
the differences in their standards of living and rates of w ages! 
and the additional com plication of three different holy day?. I 
W e are satisfied th a t the Governm ent have taken a broad view I 
in dealing with the situation and tha t there is no foundation fori 
the suggestion th a t the G overnm ent’s attitude towards the I 
em ploym ent of Jew s is unsym pathetic.
27. The Jew ish grievances seem m ainly to  be based on precise I 
m athem atical calculations as to the apportionm ent of work! 
between the two races. W e think th a t such calculations cannot! 
be applied to services so closely affected by economic factors! 
w ithout im pairing the efficiency and finance of the| 
A dm inistration.
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CHAPTER XIV.
THE CHRISTIANS.
X. T h e  attention of the world has been concentrated on the 
issue as between the Moslem A rabs and the Jew s in Palestine to 
the practical exclusion of the Christian communities. A nd yet 
the religious stake of the Christians in the H oly Places is just as 
great as that of the Jew s o r Moslems. The Christian com­
munities constitute between seven and eight per cent, of the 
population. The 500 million Christians in the world cannot be 
indifferent to the position and  well-being of their co-religionists 
in the Holy Land.
2. Although we had  not the advantage of hearing evidence 
from the heads of all the principal Christian religious communi- 
ies, our attention was draw n by authoritative witnesses to an 
apparent neglect on the p art of the Adm inistration to consider 
the position and rights of those communities.
3. We understand th a t it is a basic principle in the system 
of government of the country to leave all religious m atters 
to the various religious bodies to m anage for themselves. 
If these bodies mism anage their religious affairs the Govern­
ment can and does do nothing. The attitude of the Govern­
ment towards the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem was quoted as an  instance of their lack of interest 
in such questions.
4. After we had  returned to England we received a memo­
randum, dated the 16th F ebruary , 1937, from  the Executive 
Committee of the Second A rab O rthodox Congress, setting out 
the grievances of the (Greek) Orthodox Com m unity. This 
memorandum pointed out tha t Y our M ajesty’s Government 
had obligations not only tow ards the Moslem A rabs and Jew s 
hut also towards the A rab Orthodox Com m unity, num bering 
45,000 persons. One of the first m easures which the Man­
datory had taken after the establishm ent of the Civil 
Administration had  been to set up Commissions to enquire 
into the religious organizations of the Moslem and Jew ish 
communities. As a result, a Supreme Moslem Council had been 
constituted in 1921 to control the Shari’a C ourts, adm inister 
the Waqfs and appoint Muftis. The Adm inistration sim ilarly 
took measures to ensure the organization of the Jew ish com­
munity and an O rder dated 18th M arch, 1921, provided for 
the election of the Chief R abbis as well as a Rabbinical 
Council.
5. T h e  m em orandum  recognized th a t the Governm ent had at 
the beginning felt the urgent need of also regulating the affairs 
of the Orthodox Com m unity, which, owing to internal dissen­
sion, on the one hand, between the clergy them selves, and,
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on the other, between the lay  members of the Community and 
the Patriarchate, needed reform s m uch more urgently. A Com­
mission had  been appointed to enquire into and report on the 
controversies between the O rthodox Patriarch  and the members 
of his Synod and to advise the H igh Commissioner on the steps 
to  be taken to restore order in the affairs of the Patriarchate. 
A nother Commission was charged to investigate the  con­
troversies between the O rthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and 
the A rab O rthodox Com m unity. Although the reports oi both 
Commissions had  revealed a  deplorable state of affairs in the 
O rthodox P atriarchate and the urgent need for m easu res of 
reform , virtually nothing had  been done as the result of their 
recom m endations subm itted over eleven years ago.
6. I t  was pointed out th a t the death of the late Patriarch 
D am ianos in 1931 had  rendered the controversy m o re  acute 
and the proceedings taken to elect a new Patriarch had, owing 
to these controversies, been so fa r abortive. The controversy 
was first brought before the H igh Court in connection with the 
election of a Locum  Tenens of the Patriarchate. In com­
menting on the attitude of the Governm ent the Court observed
" W e know  noth ing of th e  reasons w hich, after th e  Administration 
had gone out o f their w ay to  appoint a  Commission, led apparently 
to  the pigeon-holing o f its  reports and of its  recom mendations fori 
nearly seven  years.”
The High C ourt severely criticized the Turkish Fundamental 
Law applying to the Patriarchate as—
" calculated  to  lead to  disputes and litigation  in  regard to  the election 
o f th e Patriarch of w hat is, a t  present, th e m ost numerous Christian 
C om m unity in  P a lestin e."
7. The second of the two Commissions referred to above had 
reported tha t—
“ th e  O rthodox population o f th e  country is  in fact the victim of 
an unfortunate h istorical developm ent. T his is th e reverse side of 
their privileged position  as residents of a  country w hich is the historic 
centre of C hristendom . . . . T he position  o f th e local population
as sp iritually  subject to  a  clergy alien  in  race and language calls for 
sym path y ."
The m em orandum  asserted th a t this same alien clergy, 
encouraged by the attitude of the G overnm ent, thus persists in 
a  policy of hellenizing the O rthodox Patriarchate w ith o u t regard 
to the welfare of the C hurch or its members and th a t ,  in their 
behaviour and conduct of the affairs of the Church, they are 
pursuing a policy intended to elim inate the A rab e le m e n t in the 
C hurch.
8. The A rab O rthodox Executive com plained that the laissé 
faire attitude of the G overnm ent was hardly  compatible with
th a t: —
the obligations contained in Article 16 of the Mandate to the
327 Chapter XIV.
effect that the M andatory shall be responsible for exercising 
uch supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all 
faiths in Palestine as m ay be required for the m aintenance of 
ublic order and good governm ent.
9. As we received this m em orandum  only after we had  left 
alestme, we had no opportunity of exam ining the question 
' detail; bu t we think it right to point out that the Financial
mmission appointed under the O rthodox Patriarchate 
dinance, 1928, has carried out an effective reform  of the 
atriarchate’s finances (settling debts am ounting to over 
59,000) and we understand th a t the reorganization of the 
ternal affairs of the P atriarchate, including the establishm ent 
-if a Mixed Council, has been discussed between the Govern­
ed, the Patriarchate and the la ity , and is a t present under 
onsideration by the Government.
10. Another question which, we were told, aroused m uch 
ling was that, owing to the very strict observance of the
ewish Sabbath and the fact tha t the Jewish Governm ent official 
oes no t work on S aturday, the result often is that the Christian 
fficial has to work on Sunday. The Christian official, in fact, 
equently has to do the work of the Jewish and Moslem A rab 
fficial on  his own nom inal day of rest. This state of affairs 
as criticized because it throws too much w ork on C hristian 
fficials and im pairs the spiritual influence of the Christian 
hurch. We are disposed to agree with this view, bu t the 
uestion is  an  adm ittedly difficult one in a “  land of three 
abbaths.”
11. Monsignor H ajja r, Melkite Archbishop of Galilee, accom- 
anied by Y aqub Eff. F arra j and the Reverend N .  M arm ura, 
ve ev id en ce  before the Commission on behalf of the Christian 
~abs. In a  w ritten statem ent supplem enting his evidence 
lonsignor H ajjar asserted th a t “  the Christians enjoyed privi- 
ges during the O ttom an regime which are now abolished ” . 
e C o u rts , as also the adm inistrative and m unicipal councils, 
ad been half Christian and half Moslem. Christian repre- 
ntatives had decreased and were about to disappear owing to 
ewish immigration. In  form er times the V ice-President of the 
lunicipal Council of H aifa was a Christian. He had been 
cently replaced by a  Jew . The Christians had no repre- 
ntative in the Safad M unicipality and M onsignor H ajjar 
emanded due representation of Christians in proportion to 
eir interests in Palestine and irrespective of their small 
umber.
12. H e asserted th a t the ultim ate aim  of the Jew s was to 
ke possession  of the Temple Area. He com plained tha t the 
rivileges which the religious heads had inherited from  the
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Ottom an G overnm ent had  been reduced by  the British Admin­
istration and  quoted as an instance the fact tha t on one occasion 
tha t A dm inistration had  forbidden a religious procession from 
proceeding from one of the Greek Catholic Churches to another 
for fear of trouble from  the Jew s.
13. Y aqub Eff. F a rra j, in his capacity as one of the 
representatives of the Christian A rabs on the Arab Higher Com­
m ittee, stated th a t all communities of the Christian A ra b  popu- 
lation of Palestine were in  full agreem ent with their brethren, 
the Moslem A rabs, with whom they form  a united national 
entity , as to all their claims and aspirations, whether political, 
civil, or economic. H e added th a t they supported all th e  state­
ments and  com plaints which had been m ade by the m em bers of 
the Arab H igher Committee to the R oyal Commission in  con­
nection with the establishm ent of the Jew ish N ational H o m e  am 
the developm ent of self-governing institutions in Palestine. The 
C hristian A rabs have, in fact, throw n in their lot with theii 
Moslem brethren.
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C H A PTER  XV.
NATIONALITY LAW AND ACQUISITION OF 
PALESTINIAN CITIZENSHIP.
1. Article 7 of the M andate provides that “  The Administra­
tion of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality 
law. There shall be included in this law provisions fram ed so 
as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews 
who take up their perm anent residence in Palestine.”
2. Palestine was one of the Asiatic territories renounced by 
Turkey as a consequence of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923. In  
these territories treaty nationalities were established under the 
provisions of Section I I  of that T reaty, which came into force 
on the 6th August, 1924. Effect was given in Palestine to the 
nationality section of the Treaty by  the Palestinian Citizenship 
Order, 1925, which cam e into force on the 1st August of that 
year. As it had no retrospective effect there was a gap of nearly 
one year from the date when there should have been treaty 
nationality and the date when it began to exist under local law; 
consequently on the 23rd Ju ly , 1931, the O rder in Council was 
amended to provide in effect tha t treaty  nationality should ran  
from the 6th August, 1924, in accordance with the intention 
expressed in the T reaty of Lausanne.
3. T h e  Order of 1925 is divided into four parts. P a rt I deals 
with treaty nationality, i.e ., nationality following the change 
of sovereignty over Palestine after the W ar and the renunciation 
of the territory by  Turkey. I t provides that Turkish subjects 
hab itu a lly  resident in Palestine on the 1st August, 1925, shall 
become Palestinian citizens; and the am endm ent of 1931 had  
the effect of providing tha t Turkish subjects who were habitually 
resident in Palestine on the 6th August, 1924, bu t ceased to be 
so h a b i tu a l ly  resident before the 1st August, 1925, were deemed 
to h a v e  become Palestinian citizens, unless before the 23rd Ju ly , 
1931, th e y  had voluntarily acquired another nationality. Under
I Part I virtually all the Arab population became Palestinian 
citizens, for although the O rder gave the right to opt for Turkish 
or other nationalities within two years the num ber of A rabs who 
availed themselves of this option was negligible.
I 4. Part I I  of the O rder prescribes w hat persons acquire 
I Palestinian citizenship by birth and  provides for the acquisition 
I of Palestinian citizenship in certain other cases of persons bom  
in Palestine before the date of the Order.
5. The other im portant part of the O rder is P a rt I I I ,  which 
I provides for the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by 
I naturalization and  this applies almost entirely to the Jewish
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p art of the population. U nder the provisions of the O rder the 
applicant m ust satisfy the following conditions : —
(а)  th a t he has resided in Palestine for a  p e r io d  of not I 
less than two years out of the three years im m ediately 
preceding the date of application;
( б)  th a t he is of good character and has an adequate 
knowledge of either the English, Arabic or Hebrew I 
language ;
(c) tha t he intends if his application is granted to reside I 
in Palestine.
In  special cases the High Commissioner is empowered to grant 
naturalization even if the period of residence has not been within | 
the three years preceding the application.
6. P a rt IV  deals with the status of m arried women and I 
m inors, and  with the loss of Palestinian citizenship by 
naturalization elsewhere and by declaration of alienage.
7. W e now tu rn  to the question of the position of Turkish I 
subjects bom  in Palestine who were and are habitually resident I 
abroad. An A rab witness p u t before us the case of A ra b s  who I 
had  left Palestine before the W ar intending eventually to  return I 
bu t had  been unable to obtain Palestinian citizenship. He I 
stated that there were about 4 0 ,0 0 0  of such emigrants, m ost of 
whom were in Central or South America, whither they h a d  gone I 
to sell the goods of Palestine, the products of the Holy Land. I 
They were loyal to the Ottom an Government until King Hussein I 
proclaim ed the revolution and  then they threw in their lo t with I 
the Allies. They intend ultim ately to return to Palestine, where 
m any of them  have relations and some of them  have property.
8. U nder the Lausanne T reaty , which came into fo rce  on 
6th August, 1924, Turkish nationals resident abroad w e re  given 
the right within two years from the date of the Treaty coming 
into force to exercise the option for the nationality o f  th e  terri-1 
tory  of which they were natives.
Article 2 of the Palestinian Citizenship O rder gave effect to I 
this provision of the T reaty , b u t gave the right o f option 
“  within two years of the coming into force of th is  Order ” 
nam ely from  1st August, 1925. This was contrary to the Treaty] 
and it was am ended by a later O rder made on the 
N ovem ber, 1925, by  which the right of option had to  be exer­
cised within two years from  the 6th August, 1924, the date of 
the Treaty. The result was tha t Turkish nationals bom in 
Palestine b u t resident abroad only had  nine months instead of | 
two years within which to exercise their option.
9. The witness stated th a t the O rder in Council w as not fully 
advertised and the wording of the application form was not 
clear. One of the questions on the form  of app lica tion  was, |
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“ Where do you intend to reside? ”  and most of the applicants 
read tha t as meaning, “  W here do you intend to reside at the 
present time? "  and so gave the country in which they were 
then living and not Palestine to which it was their ultim ate 
desire to  return. In  the result about 9,000 applications were 
made and of these not more than 100 were accepted.
10. H e complained tha t these Arabs are people in a foreign 
country who, owing to the Great W ar, through no fault of theirs, 
have practically ceased to have a country of their own. I t  is an 
undoubted fact that they receive no protection from  the State 
which governed their country before the W ar nor from th a t 
which governs it now; nor can they obtain such protection, 
except b y  giving up their business and proceeding to Palestine, 
a course of action which m any of them, doubtless, a r e  in no 
position to afford and which in any case is not required of a 
[national residing abroad who seeks his country’s protection. 
Apart from the question of protection, these people are  
hampered in their business, for, if they wish to travel from 
one c o u n try  to another, they are unable to d o  so, as they have 
no passport.
11. We understand tha t the objections to any revision of the 
law in th e  direction desired by the A rabs are as follows: (1) I t 
is u n d esirab le  to grant Palestinian citizenship to persons who 
have b een  absent from Palestine for several years and w h o  have 
no in ten tio n  of returning to Palestine within a  reasonable period 
and of residing there perm anently. (2) I t  is considered that in 
many cases the principal object of applicants in such cases is 
to obtain  British protection for the purpose of pressing claims 
against the Governments of the countries in which they reside. 
(3) F u r th e r , it is undesirable on general grounds to create a class 
of persons perm anently resident abroad who would be entitled 
to British protection.
12. We consider th a t though the grievance is felt by all the 
individuals concerned, it is a greater hardship for those who 
have n o t severed their connexion with the land of their birth
land in te n d  to return there in their later years. W e  suggest 
Ithat a t least those who are able to establish an unbroken 
[personal connection with Palestine and who are prepared to 
I give a definite formal assurance of their intention to return to 
iPalestine should be adm itted to Palestinian citizenship.
I 13. A s regards the Jew s, the legislation implements Article 7  
I of the Mandate, as it facilitates the acquisition of Palestinian 
I citizenship by providing that, so far as language requirements 
I are concerned, they are satisfied by a knowledge of Hebrew. 
I Applications for naturalization can be made at Jerusalem , 
I Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias, and in addition there is a N aturaliza- 
Ition F ie ld  Officer who visits outlying villages and settlements
Chapter X V. 332
and receives applications on the spot. Of the total of 6,007 
applications subm itted in 1935, 1,322 were accepted by this 
officer from  residents in 37 Jew ish settlements. The fee for 
naturalization is 500 mils (10s.).
14. In  the early years applications for naturalization were 
not made in any great num ber bu t recently there h a s  been an 
increase, due to the increasing num ber of persons possessing 
the requisite residential qualification and to a c a m p a ig n  of 
Jew ish representative institutions encouraging natu ra liza tion  
among members of the Jew ish com munity. A part from illegal 
entrants the total population of the Jew ish community w as esti­
m ated to be 384,000 a t 31st Decem ber, 1936. Of t in s  number 
about 92,000 were Jew ish im m igrants who came in d u rin g  the 
years 1935 and 1936 and were not then qualified f o r  naturaliza­
tion. Of the rem aining population of 292,000 about 166 ,000  had 
acquired Palestinian citizenship and the remaining 126,000 01 
about 43 per cent, of the qualified population, were n o t  Pales­
tinian citizens. The Jew s have not availed themselves read ily  of 
the opportunity afforded them  of becoming Palestinian citizens 
and this is accounted for b y  the fact that their chief in te rest is 
in the Jew ish community itself and allegiance to P a le s t in e  an 
its Governm ent are m inor considerations to m any o f  th em .
15. A Jew ish criticism was m ade th a t under the Municipal 
Corporations O rdinance of 1934 the right to vote in municipal 
elections and to become a  m em ber of a  Council was restricted 
to Palestinian citizens and it was suggested that the qualifica­
tion should be one of residence only and not citizenship. The 
suggestion which was m ade that the Ordinance had b e e n  framed 
in order to prevent Jew s from  getting a m ajority in certain 
towns is in  our opinion unfounded and  we think that th e  Ordi­
nance quite properly laid down the usual voting qualification. 
I t  is m ost desirable th a t all persons who intend to  reside 
perm anently in the country should become Palestinian citizens 
and this qualification for voting is a direct inducement to  them 
to do so.
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EDUCATION. 
1. Introduction.
1. It would be natural to suppose that in the field of education, 
more easily and effectively perhaps than  anywhere else, some­
thing could be done to bring the two discordant races of Pales­
tine n ea rer  together. B ut, in so far as any policy of th a t kind 
would tend to m oderate the full-blooded nationalism of both 
races, it would be vehem ently opposed by the spokesmen of 
both. When, a t one of our earlier sessions in Jerusalem , the 
question was put whether educational policy might not help to 
promote a  better understanding between Arabs and  Jew s, the 
mere question was greeted with pained surprise in the Arab 
Press; and we have little doubt that the Hebrew Press would 
have b e e n  equally unsym pathetic if it had  been thought that we 
were in a  position to recommend a  drastic change in the Jewish 
educational system.
2. In education as in other matters the M andatory’s hands are 
tied. Article 15 of the M andate requires that—
“ The right o f each com m unity to  m aintain its  ow n schools for th e  
education of its  own m em bers in its  ow n language, w hile conform ing 
to such educational requirem ents o f a  general nature as th e  A dm inis­
tration m ay im pose, shall n o t be denied or im paired.”
And the purpose of this provision is confirmed by  Article 22, 
which prescribes tha t Arabic and Hebrew as well as English are 
to be “ official ”  languages. An effective policy for bringing 
the races together would bring them  together in actual fact. The 
boys an d  girls of each race a t the prim ary stage would have to be 
taught in  separate schools or a t least in separate classes, because 
the la n g u a g e  of instruction would have to be their respective 
vernaculars, but great attention would be given to their m aster­
ing E n g lish , and a t the secondary stage they would be taught 
side by  side in the same schools and through the medium of 
English only. A t this stage an im portant part of the curriculum  
would be devoted to the languages, literature and history of both 
races. H ad it been practicable in Palestine, such a system, 
adopted at the outset and  consistently pursued, might have gone 
far in a  generation to break down the barriers between Jew  and 
Arab an d  to nourish a  sense of common Palestinian citizenship. 
But it w as not practicable. Article 15 precluded it.
2. Jewish Education.
3' As a result of Article 15 each of the two races has its own 
educational system and  organization. The Hebrew system is 
largely autonomous and  receives a  relatively small Government
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grant, while the A rab system is m ainly m aintained and admiois. 
tered by  the Government. The statutory basis of the Jewish 
system is the Religious Communities Ordinance of 1926, and the 
rules made under it in 1927 for the Jewish community, by  which 
the Va ad Leum i is entitled to require or authorize the local com­
munities to levy a rate, am ong other purposes, for education , and 
to supervise and adm inister communal institutions such as 
schools, subject to Governm ent’s general right of inspection 
Practically all Jewish children receive some elementary educa­
tion, and of those who receive it the m ajority attend schools con­
trolled by the Va’ad Leumi, though there are a few  private 
schools. The Va’ad Leum i school system includes, besides the 
General Schools as they are called, the M izrahi schools 
and those of the Jewish Federation of L a b o u r ,  whic 
lay  stress on religious observance and manual instractio 
respectively. The prim ary schools form the c o re  of the 
system and are widely spread. There are also three schoo 
offering a complete secondary course, besides various technics 
colleges. The standard  of education offered is on th e  who 
good, and among the points to be commended is the provisioi 
in the secondary schools for instruction in Arabic.
4. The degree of autonomy with which the Jewish schoo 
system is conducted is due not only to the statutory position 
of the Jewish com munity bu t also to its capacity to  pay its 
way. In  1934—5 £249,937 was spent on Jewish education 
(perceptibly m ore than the sum spent by  the Governmen 
D epartm ent of E ducation ), and of this by far the m ajo r par 
w as raised from  Jew ish sources, the Government g ra n t bein 
only £28,000. This grant is calculated annually by m eans of 
com parison between the relative school-age p o p u la t io n s  of the 
Jewish and A rab communities.
5. The m ethod of calculating this grant has been a  subjec 
of constant controversy. The Va’ad Leum i maintain that the 
g ran t should be increased in recognition of the fact th a t  a 
greater proportion of the Jew ish school-age population actual 
attend school than  of the A rab, and tha t the expense 0 
education per capita is therefore greater. They wish to 
m ake actual school attendance the basis of ca lcu la tio n , or 
alternatively they claim a supplem entary per capita g ra n t. This 
argum ent is based, as is the Jewish case on other social service 
questions, on the principle th a t Governm ent should subsidize 
Jew ish enterprise in proportion to its scope and quality .*
6. The A dm inistration's reply is again g e n e r a l  ; a policy 0 
“  levelling-up "  cultural standards requires tha t priority shou 
be given to the more backw ard Arabs. Out of a fixed total budge 
for education, therefore, expenditure divided between Jew
'* See pages 316-317.
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and Arabs on the principle of actual school attendance would 
accentuate the lead already taken by  the form er and thus tend 
to widen rather than to narrow  the cultural gulf. In  recent years, 
as will be pointed out later, Government has found the funds 
available quite insufficient to satisfy the A rab dem and for 
education of any kind, and has been compelled to reject m any 
applicants for entry into the schools. Therefore, until much 
more has been spent on the development of A rab education 
so as to place it on a level with th a t of the Jews, it is unjusti­
fiable substantially to increase the grant to the Va ad Leum i, 
however desirable tha t m ight be in other circumstances. W ith 
this argument we concur. We regard the extent to which the 
Jews have taxed themselves for education as one of the best 
eatures of the N ational H om e; and we think tha t such “  self- 
help " deserves all the support tha t Government can give. B ut 
t should not be given by altering the existing proportion 
letween the grant to the Jew s and the am ount spent on the 
irabs. It should result from the increase in the total expendi- 
iire on education which we recommend in a later paragraph.
7. The Jewish school-system, we were informed, is some­
what weak in its m ethods of discipline : bu t it is in general 
in efficient educational machine. I t  is inevitably, however, 
is we pointed out in Chapter V,* an  instrum ent of Jewish 
lationalism. Its prim ary purpose is to indoctrinate the ideals 
if the National Home, to fasten the child's m ind before all 
:lse on the traditions and achievements of the Jew ish people, and 
:o foster a sense of devotion to the task of rebuilding a Jewish 
lation in its ancient homeland. T hat is w hat the Jewish 
ichools were always intended to do; th a t is why the Hebrew 
anguage, in which all instruction is given, was entrenched in 
he Mandate. The teaching of history is a  clear illustration 
if this objective. In  one of the secondary schools it is not till 
he sixth form th a t the pupil emerges from  ancient history, 
n which two-thirds of his time have been given to tha t of the 
Jews. In the three upper forms more or less equal weight is 
liven to world-histoiy from the Rom an Em pire to the present 
lay on the one side and to the history of the D iaspora on 
he other. In  the teaching of literature the study of Hebrew 
iterature is given a still more predom inant place.
8. This nationalistic trend of education is common enough, 
if course, in other countries; and it is a natural, indeed an almost 
Heritable, product of Zionism in Palestine. We are only con- 
emed to point out that from the age of three or four years, when 
Mdren enter the kindergarten to be taught Hebrew if they do 
iot know it already, pride in the past of Jew ry and in the 
National Home as an exclusively and intensely Jewish achieve­
ment of the present is the dynam ic centre-point of their whole
* See pages 118-119.
Chapter X V I. 3 3 6
intellectual development. The idea tha t they are to sh are  their 
life in any w ay with the Arabs, that they are growing up  to be 
fellow-citizens with A rabs in a common Palestinian S ta te , is onlv 
recognized in the teaching of a  little Arabic in the secondary 
schools; and tha t provision, excellent in itself, is wholly insuffi­
cient as long as the rest of the teaching is inspired by a  purely 
Jew ish rather than  Palestinian objective. So far, in fact, from 
facilitating a better understanding between the races, th e  Jewish 
educational system is m aking it more and more difficult as, year 
by year, its production of eager Jew ish nationalists m o u n ts  up.
9. The apex of the Jew ish educational system is the Hebrew 
U niversity of Jerusalem . The main purpose of its foundation 
was as a  centre for post-graduate research in science and the 
hum anities; bu t the dem and for university education am ong the 
Jew s has been so great that there is now a considerable body of 
undergraduates. The University has departm ents o f Jewish 
Studies, Oriental Studies, General H um anities, Mathematics, 
Physics, Chem istry, B otany, and a num ber of allied sciences; 
also a special departm ent devoted to Cancer Research. There 
is a staff of 2 7  Professors, besides Lecturers and junior staff, and 
in 1935 there were 391 students, about 30 per cent, of w hom  had 
received their secondary education in Palestine, the remainder 
coming from  other countries, notably Poland. The University 
is relatively well provided with laboratories and c lass-ro o m s; its 
excellent library is constructed and catalogued on m o d e rn  lines; 
and  on its magnificent site on Mount Scopus it possesses ample 
room for further building when funds permit.
10. I t  is rem arkable to find on the fringe of Asia a university 
which m aintains the highest standards of western scholarship. 
On its staff are nam es well-known in Europe and A m e r ic a . Its 
research work can com pare with tha t of m any older institutions. 
The scope of this research is necessarily limited by th e  remote­
ness of Jerusalem  from  the centres of m odem  c iv i l iz a t io n ;  and 
the University wisely concentrates, therefore, in c e r t a i n  depart­
ments, on such an exhaustive study of Palestine and th e  neigh­
bouring countries as cannot be m ade elsewhere. In so doing 
it has m ade a valuable contribution to our knowledge of th e  Near 
E ast and in particular of A rab life and culture. A  notable 
instance of this is the recent publication by  the University Press 
of the text of the A rab historian, al-Baladhuri.
11. In  its devotion to scholarship and good le a r n in g  the 
Hebrew University sets an  example to all Palestine. But it is 
not a  Palestinian university. I t  is the crown of the Jewish 
educational system. All its teaching is in Hebrew. All its 
students are Jew s. Its spirit, it is true, is not the spirit of Tel 
Aviv. I t  stands a  little aloof from  the popular life of the 
N ational Home. I t  is associated, indeed, with an attitude of
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• d which regards the political side of Zionism as subordinate 
its spiritual and cultural ideals. We doubt, however, whether 
at way of thinking is widely shared am ong the students of the 
niversity ; and we are certain tha t it is not shared by  the great 
ajority of Jews in Palestine.
3. Arab Education.
12. Among the A rabs there is a  great demand for education, 
twas pressed on us by  the Arab witnesses, and it is evidenced 
y the number of applications made every year for entrance 
to the town and village schools. B ut, owing to their limited 
ources, the Arabs have been unable to meet this dem and, 
the Jews have done, by taking advantage of the m achinery
rovided by the Religious Communities Ordinance and organiz- 
g and maintaining their own educational system. Although 
ere are a few schools m aintained by Arab funds, such as the 
condary schools a t Jerusalem , Nablus and Bir Zeit, it has fallen 
' cipally to the Government to provide educational facilities 
r the Arabs ; and unfortunately the D epartm ent of Education 
as always been short of funds. An ambitious scheme of school 
pansion was proposed in the early days of the Civil Adminis- 
tion with the object of equipping all the Arab areas with 
rimary schools ; bu t it was soon curtailed by lack of money, 
n 1933 a similar scheme was put forward with a view to bring- 
g the Arab school-system nearer to the level of the Jewish 
tern; but again financial exigencies soon caused this pro- 
rame to be modified. Nor do the Governm ent's present 
eavy liabilities especially for security, make the educational 
utlook for the future more encouraging .
13. It is most regrettable tha t, after 17 years of M andatory 
le, the Government system  is able to satisfy no m ore than 
If the Arab dem and for education. Of recent years nearly
0 per cent, of the applicants for entry into schools, in areas 
here schools exist, have had  to be refused for lack of teachers 
d accommodation; and this makes no allowance for the un- 
tisfied demand in areas where no school has yet been built 
thin accessible distance. Out of an A rab population of school- 
ge estimated at about 260,700, only 42,700 approxim ately are 
t present accommodated in Government schools; and Arab 
toesses calculate that about 85 per cent, of the fellaheen are 
"1 illiterate. This is the more deplorable in th a t m any Arab 
liages are willing, if only Government will do its share, to 
ontribute towards the erection of school buildings. The in- 
dequacy of the schools was one of the points stressed in anti- 
ritish propaganda in Palestine during the Abyssinian crisis.
14- Although the principal A rab dem and is for prim ary 
ucation, the Governm ent secondary school system is inade- 
uate even for the limited output of the prim ary schools. The
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Government A rab College is the only establishment offering a 
full secondary course, though there are secondary classes at 1 
few other town schools. There are also certain technicà 
institutions, such as the Governm ent T rade School at H a i f a  
and the two A gricultural Colleges founded from  th e  Kadoorii 
bequest a t M ount Tabor and Tulkarm , which cater for Jewisl 
and A rab students respectively. These establishments, all toi 
few, provide a certain measure of secondary and  post-secondan 
education.
15. The supply of trained teachers is severely lim ite d . Thi 
output of them from the Government A rab College suffices fo 
the replacem ent of losses through illness or retirement 
but not for the full staffing of new schools. The constructioi 
of this College, approved by  the Secretary of State in  1928 
w as postponed by Government for one reason or another unti 
1935; only the first part of the plan has actually been com 
pleted, and until the Government rescinds its refusal to  counts 
nance any extension of the buildings, no effective increase ca 
be achieved in the output of teachers. The Governme 
W om en’s College is even less adequately housed in  hin 
buildings, and there is a more serious lack of women teachei 
than  of men.
16. The shortage of resources under which the D epartm ei 
of Education has constantly laboured, and from w h ic h  it stil 
suffers, m ay be illustrated by the following table, w h ic h  show 
the budget provision for education for the last six years a 
com pared w ith G overnm ent's total expenditure a n d  th e  pro 
vision for a  few selected other services—those of S e c u r i t y  (Polici 
and  Prisons D epartm ent), Public W orks and  Public H ealth
1 9 31 1 9 3 2 - 3 1 9 3 3 - 4 1934-5 1 9 3 5 - 6 I
T ota l E xpenditure
£
2 ,3 7 4 .8 6 ?
£
2,516,394
£
2,704,856
£
3,230,010
£
4,236,202 6,0
E xpenditure : 
P o l i c e  a n d  
Prisons 469,516 475.042 486,605 506,712 5 2 7 , 4 6 7
P ublic W orks .. . 3 3 4 , 3 5 3 3 1 7 . 4 5 1 373,224 540,697 991,824 1,11
D epartm ent of 
H ealth 105,918 111,052 135,838 166,311 194,632
D ep artm ent o f 
E ducation  .. . 146,988 159,520 179,635 201,498 221,087
P e r c e n t a  g e  o f  
to ta l spent on  
education 6-19% 6-34% 6-64% 6-24% 5 - 2 2 % 3'
* P rovisional figures.
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17. It seems to us unfortunate that the Administration has 
been unable to do more for education. Its share of the total 
expenditure is not only small, bu t the percentage has been per­
ceptibly falling since 1933. Of course there are other expensive 
services, with Security at. their head, for which the Government 
has been compelled to make provision; but we cannot help think­
ing that, if the claims of education had been rated as high as they 
deserved, more money m ight somehow have been found for it, 
at the expense, for instance, of such m aterial needs as public 
works of a not vitally urgent kind. I t  is not only the intrinsic 
value of education that should be considered. Any efforts to 
raise the material standards of life among the fellaheen, such 
as by instruction in im proved methods of agriculture, can only 
be successful if they have received sufficient mental training to 
profit from technical instruction. This fact was clearly 
emphasized by Sir John  Hope Simpson, who pointed out in his 
Report that
" In  every village com plaints are m ade on th e score of the  
inadequacy of educational facilities. . . . N o agricultural develop ­
ment is possible am ong th e  Arabs until steps are taken to  rem edy the
present sta te  o f affairs............................. U n til facilities for ordinary
primary education are more general than is th e  case a t present, th e  
fellahin w ill n ot be in  a position  to  benefit generally b y  an y  special 
agricultural education th a t m ay be offered."*
[he same writer advocated an ordered plan of expansion in 
ducation, and concluded that
" I t  is clear th a t th e  G overnm ent of P alestine m ust face very  con­
siderably increased expenditure on education, both  prim ary and  
agricultural. ” f
18. Though the A rab school system is a Government system, 
s nationalist character is quite as m arked as that of the non­
government Jewish system. The curriculum  both in prim ary 
nd secondary schools is m ainly concerned with the Arabic 
in g u ag e  and Arab tradition. There is no teaching of Hebrew 
nd l i t t l e  or none of Jewish history. The language of instruc- 
on is Arabic throughout. This is, of course, a necessity in the 
ir im a ry  schools; bu t the Government A rab College is, we 
elieve, the only secondary school m aintained by Government 
] a n y  territory under British rule in which the medium of 
is t ru c t io n  is not English. I t  is difficult, however, to quarrel with 
iis s t a t e  of things. I t  seems, indeed, an almost unavoidable re­
tit o f the provisions in the M andate which enabled the Jew s to 
stab lish  a n  exclusively national school system of their own. The 
la b s  f o r  their p a rt desired a similarly nationalist system, but 
'ey c o u l d  not pay for more than  a  fraction of its cost by
* Report on Im m igration, L and S ettlem ent and D evelopm ent, b y  Sir John  
ope Simpson (1930), Cmd. 3686, pp . 79 -80 .
t  Ibid. p. 81.
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voluntary self-taxation. The Government, therefore, since it I 
met the cost from  revenue, was in a position to impose abi-1 
national school system on the A rabs; but it could scarcely be I 
expected to do this unless at the same time it imposed a bi-1 
national system on the Jew s : and this, under Article 15, was and I 
is impossible.
19. The results of a purely national school system in Arab I 
Palestine have inevitably been the same as in the Jewish I 
N ational Home. W e pointed out in Chapter V  that the schools! 
have become seminaries of Arab nationalism ; that schoolmasters I 
are for the most p a rt ardent nationalists; and that during the I 
"  disturbances ”  of last year practically no work was done ini 
the Government schools. D r. Khalil Totah, who appeared before! 
us to give evidence on education on behalf of the Arab Higher! 
Committee, declared that it was impossible to control the inherent! 
nationalism  of these boys. “  On the second of November, [ 
Balfour D ay, we schoolmasters always expect a day’s strike.”! 
At the same time he complained tha t the Government schools! 
were not nationalist enough. The M andatory G overnm ent, htj 
said, is manifestly not interested in A rab education, as show 
by the shamefully small sum spent upon it, com pared, for 
example, with the free A rab country of 'I ra q , which spent nearly 
10 per cent, of its budget on education in 1933-4. “ A national 
Government would look a t the children differently, take more| 
interest in them. Now they are just step-children.”  D r. Totah| 
deprecated the official control of text books and the discourage! 
m ent given to the expression of national sentiment and thef 
fostering of indigenous A rab culture. He contrasted this 
the autonom y and  nationalist culture of the Jewish schools.
" I t  w ould seem  th a t Arab education is either designed to  recondlel 
Arab people to  th is po licy  [the establishm ent o f th e N ational Home]! 
or to  m ake th e  education so  colourless as to  m ake it  harm less, and 1 
endanger th e  carrying ou t of th is  po licy  of G overnm ent.”
20. I t  was p u t to D r. Totah th a t it was difficult for thej 
M andatory Government to stimulate in their schools an 
patriotism  which would be turned against themselves, and hej 
was asked whether in fact it was not an Arab Government hel 
wanted. He frankly answered, “  Yes ” . Dr. Totah is head-1 
m aster of the F riends' School a t Ram allah : he is not, therefore! 
in the service of the D epartm ent of Education ; but we had ampler 
evidence to  show th a t Dr. T o tah 's  official fellow teachers, though 
they m ay be less outspoken, feel at heart w hat he feels. “ Mjj 
confrère in Iraq  " ,  runs the argum ent, “  in charge of a Govern 
m ent school, stands on a  higher footing than I do. He tell 
his boys to hoist their national flag, to sing their national anlhemj 
to salute the portrait of their King. I  can ’t  do that. I ‘ 
a second-class Arab
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4. The Mixed Schools.
21. It remains to consider those schools, relatively few in 
number, which stand outside the Government system and th a t 
of the Va ad Leum i and which contain both Arab and Jewish 
pupils. Notable among these is a  group of schools under the 
control of the Anglican Church, of which four are for girls: 
the Jerusalem Girls' College, the English High Schools a t Jaffa 
and Haifa, and Christ Church Girls’ School, Jerusalem : and 
three for boys: Bishop Gobat School, Jerusalem , the Scots 
College, Safad (which will shortly be transferred to H aifa), 
-d St. George's School, Jerusalem . O ther schools of a  similar 
status are the Tabeetha Mission School at Jaffa, American 
Friends’ Mission Schools, the French Collège des Frères, &c. 
In these schools the races and religions are mixed in various 
proportions, Bishop Gobat School, for instance, having only 
five Jews among a  m ain body of Arabs, while the English High 
School, Haifa, limits non-Christians to one-third of the total, 
t is to that degree difficult to generalize concerning the mixed
ools; but they have certain features in common. They all 
contain secondary classes, and in most, if not all of them, a  
gh standard of educational efficiency is m aintained. Their 
curriculum is broader than that of the Jewish o r the A rab 
schools ; their educational ideals and methods are western, and, 
in most of them, a  specifically Christian type of character is 
aimed at. No encouragement is given either to Jew ish or to 
tab nationalism, not so much by suppression of these aspira- 
ons as by diversion of interest into other channels. Personal 
lations are norm ally good. In  all the schools friendships 
tween children of different races are common, and  they are 
ften received in one another’s homes. The unifying interests 
f school life have been found on the whole more powerful than 
e political antipathies of the parents.
22. During the "  disturbances ”  the mixed schools, with few 
ceptions, fared well. The High School a t Jaffa had  to  close, 
d there was a  tem porary strike of Arab boys a t two or three 
ther schools; bu t the rest rem ained open, with good attend­
ees, and in cases where children did stay aw ay this was 
ften due to “ picketing "  or to the parents’ fear of letting 
em go out in the streets when riots were expected. Political
:~g sometimes ran  high am ong the elder pupils and among 
abs on the staff; bu t a t least an appearance of norm ality 
was maintained, though there m ay have been tension 
demeath.
23. This is a notable achievement as far as it goes, bu t it has 
limitations. W hile the sons and daughters of m any politically- 
ded Arabs attend these mixed schools for the sake of the
ood education which they offer, the schools do not attract Jew s 
large numbers except a t Jerusalem . Little impression has
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been m ade, therefore, on Jew ish nationalism  as a w h o l e .  In 
the second place, we were inform ed that, common though in te r­
racial friendships are in school days, they often fail t o  survive 
the passage into adult life. The segregation of the races a n d  the 
pressure of home influence both operate powerfully on t h e  side 
of nationalism. We understand that more than one of t h e  ab lest 
young A rab nationalists were educated in these mixed sch o o ls . 
But, if in existing conditions these schools can do little t o  solve 
the problem of Palestine, they a t least provide a fine e x a m p l e  of 
w hat could have been achieved in happier circumstances. Foi 
w hat they have done and  tried to do they deserve high 
commendation.
5. Recommendations.
24. W e sympathize with the A rab “  grievance ”  th a t  not 
enough money has been provided for A rab education and, 
though all the social services would be bound to suffer from thé 
mounting cost of public security which the maintenance of the 
M andate m ust in our view entail, we think that, considering 
the inadequacy of the existing provision for Arab education and 
the wilhngness of the Arabs to m ake sacifices to increase it, the 
Administration should regard its claims on the revenue as 
second in im portance only to those of public security.
25. B ut the insufficiency of Arab schools is not the worst 
feature of the educational situation: it might to some extent 
be remedied in time. The worst feature is the nationalist 
character of the education provided, and for this we can see no 
effective rem edy a t all. Ideally, as we have suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, the system should be a single bi­
national system for both races; bu t under the conditions imposed 
by the M andate it seems virtually impossible to realize th a t ideal. 
I t  would involve a  radical alteration in the present administra­
tive organization. The lop-sided position under which the 
control of Jew ish education is m ainly in the hands of the Va ai 
Leum i and the control of A rab education almost wholly in the 
hands of Government would have to be redressed. M ore power 
over the form er would have to be assumed by  Government, and 
more power over the la tter devolved on A rab municipal and 
other local bodies. A bi-national curriculum  would have to be 
imposed on A rab and Jew ish schools alike. Those are  drastic 
changes, and, however carefully or gradually the attem p t were 
m ade to bring them  about, we cannot hold out hopes of its 
success. As we have more than once explained, the nationalism 
of Jew ish education has been from the beginning an  essential 
element in the life and purpose of the National H o m e. There 
can be little doubt tha t the Jew ish community would vehemently 
resist any  attem pt to deprive them  of their educational autonomy, 
and it cannot be done against their will without removing
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A rticle  15 from the M andate. As long as tha t Article remains, 
it w o u l d  be contrary to its intention for Government to bring 
p re s s u re  to bear on the Va ad Leum i for the purpose we have 
in d ic a te d  by withholding the Government grant for education; 
and i n  any case such pressure would not be very weighty since 
the Government grant provides less than one-eighth of the 
e d u c a t i o n a l  expenditure of the N ational Home. The A rabs for 
their p a r t  would no less strenuously oppose a bi-national system. 
A p r o p o s a l  to teach Hebrew, for example, in Arab schools would 
i r o v o k e ,  we were told, the fiercest indignation. And, though 
the p o w e r  of the purse would be more formidable in the case of 
he A r a b s ,  it could scarcely be employed to coerce them  as long 
as t h e  Jews retained their freedom. Nor, of course, in any case 
is c o e r c i o n  practicable in the field of education. The aims of 
e d u c a t io n a l  policy m ust be broadly acceptable to public opinion. 
T e a c h e r s  cannot be forced to teach, nor children forced to leam , 
a g a in s t  the will of the community .
26. Something, we think, could be done to m oderate the 
estranging tendency of the existing educational system. W here- 
ever it may be practicable, mixed education should be pro­
moted. New technical or trade schools, for example, established 
jy Government, should be open to both A rabs and  Jew s, and  
he instruction given in English : for the m aterial advantages to 
je gained from attendance a t such schools might well outweigh- 
the prejudices of national antagonism. The same argum ent 
applies to university education, and it is in this field that in our 
opinion the most effective means of checking the further growth 
of narrow and discordant nationalisms might be found.
27. The contrast between the Arab and the Jewish systems of 
education is most striking a t the top. The Jew s have a  univer­
sity and we have spoken of its high quality. The A rabs have 
none. A  substantial num ber of boys emerge every year from 
the Government secondary system and the mixed schools who 
are fully qualified to profit from further education a t a univer­
sity; bu t, since the Hebrew University is true to its name, they 
cannot obtain such further education in their own country. 
Over a hundred of them  on the average go annually to the 
American University a t Beirut which, as we have observed 
earlier in this Report, has done a great work for higher education 
in the Near East. Some go to universities on the Continent of 
Europe; a few obtain scholarships from the Palestine Govern­
ment to go to England. I t  seems to us regrettable th a t those 
Arabs, who constitute the young intelligenzia of the country, 
should be unable to complete their education without the cost 
and inconvenience of going abroad.
28. To establish a university only to meet the need of the 
Arabs of Palestine, when their school system is as yet so inade­
quate, would be to invert the educational pyram id; bu t the
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university we have in mind, while meeting that local need, would I 
serve a wider purpose. I t  would be a  British university and its 
doors would be open to all English-speaking students in the I 
N ear and Middle East. Jew s, we think, would come to it as I 
well as A rabs in Palestine and  the neighbouring Arab countries; [ 
for it should not compete, it should co-operate, with the Hebrew! 
University, and Jew s m ight attend it for post-graduate courses | 
or research work after taking their degrees a t the Hebrew Univer-i 
sity o r vice versa. W e are aware tha t the project of a  British I 
U niversity in the N ear E ast has been mooted in other quarters, I 
and we are not in a position to say how practicable it may bé I 
financially or otherwise; but we recommend that in any further I 
discussion of the project the possibility should b e  carefully I 
considered of locating the university in the neighbourhood of | 
Jerusalem  or H aifa.
29. In  the long run  we believe such an  institution would I 
have a far-reaching influence in blunting the edges of national I 
antagonism , in promoting the ideals of international co-opera-1 
tion, and in easing the contact between E ast and West: but I 
its cost would, of course, be heavy; it would take time to growl 
to its full stature; and the effect of it on the mind and temper oil 
the area it served would be slow to m ature. Meantime, the] 
educational outlook, determined as it is by  the provisions of I 
Article 15, is disquieting. The existing Arab and Jewish school I 
systems are definitely widening and will continue to widen the| 
gulf between the races.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
1. Article 3 of the M andate provides that
“ the M andatory shall, so far as circumstances perm it, 
encourage local autonom y.”
2. In practice local autonom y has been interpreted as m ean­
ing local governm ent on democratic lines; and Article 3 there­
fore is connected with "  the development of self-governing insti­
tutions " required in Article 2, to which it m ay in some respects 
be regarded as supplem entary. The extent and the quality of 
local autonomy in Palestine m ay be expected to throw light 
on the political capacity of its people; but it should be borne 
in mind that the well-known principle that education in self- 
government should work upwards through local to central 
institutions has not always been observed in other countries.
1. Rural Autonomy,
3. Under the Turkish regime the rural population had scarcely 
any voice in the control of their own affairs. In  theory village 
elders were supposed to co-operate with the Mukhlar in a  
Village Council; but in  practice the functions of the latter body 
were normally monopolized by  the Mukhtar. The British 
Administration felt the need for establishing local bodies of a 
more representative nature; and the Local Councils Ordinance, 
1921, was accordingly passed to enable the High Commissioner 
to confer legal status and powers on certain communities in 
the form of a Local Council. The regulations governing these 
Councils are not entirely uniform , minor variations of a general 
type of constitution being prom ulgated in each specific case. 
Both in size and resources the 20 Local Councils now existing 
are very diverse, ranging from villages with an annual revenue 
of a few hundred pounds to prosperous Jew ish settlements in 
the Maritime Plain.
4. Our inquiry shows tha t the A rab Local Councils have not 
on the whole been a  success. At the outset the Palestine 
Administration made no attem pt to investigate and revive any 
tradition there m ay have been of government by village elders, 
and the Councils bear the stam p of an alien polity imposed 
from above. The power of the District Officer, for instance, 
in the supervision of the Councils’ budgets, is very great. I t 
has been represented to us th a t this practice leads to higher 
efficiency; bu t it has resulted in making the Local Council 
more an instrum ent of the Central A dm inistration than  a real 
organ of local self-government. I t  is not surprising, therefore,
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to find th a t the villagers take little interest in their Councils; 
for, apart from their reluctance to pay rates for public services 
which they are slow to appreciate, there is little in the Councils 
to attract them. Few  new creations of Councils have been 
m ade of recent years; no less than  seven have been abolished 
a t their own request, the villagers representing that they per­
formed no useful function; another has ceased to operate and 
will presum ably be dissolved in the near future.
5. There has not been the same need for the Mandatory 
A dministration to encourage local autonomy among the Jews, 
since the latter, with their characteristic faculty for voluntary 
co-operation in small independent self-governing groups, have 
developed of their own accord an elaborate system of communal 
autonom y in the ru ral areas. Democratic control by the 
“  General Meeting ”  has been the m ain principle in nearly every 
Jew ish village com munity. Increasing population has brought 
a  proportionate com plexity and social stress; but the com­
m unities rem ain vigorous, and their activities cover a wide part 
of w hat is norm ally regarded as the S tate’s province, not only 
in religious affairs, bu t also as regards public works and social 
services. Y et it should be remembered tha t they have no 
legal status, and they have, in fact, shown little desire to acquire 
it, fearing th a t as Local Councils their budgets and policy would 
be subjected to Government control.
6. There are a t present only five Jewish Local Councils, but 
they rank almost next in wealth and population to the four 
m ajor municipalities of Jerusalem , H aifa, Jaffa and Tel Aviv, 
and have been active and reasonably efficient. No doubt in 
the past their enthusiasm  has sometimes outrun their discretion, 
particularly in m atters of finance, and the paternal control by 
the D istrict A dm inistration against which they chafe has had a 
salutary  educational value; but they have certain grievances 
against their present status with which we cannot b u t feel some 
sym pathy. In  general their powers under the Ordinance, being 
designed for static ru ra l communities, appear to be too vague 
and too small to satisfy the needs of a rapidly growing popula­
tion used to European standards of municipal service. They 
are not perm itted to undertake town planning, nor have they 
any monopoly of public utilities such as w ater or lighting. In 
particular they experience the same delay in securing Govern­
m ent approval of their estimates as do the municipalities, about 
which m ore is said below. I t  is most of all in the I 
sphere of finance tha t they find their activities restricted in a 
w ay which they claim  to be unjustifiable, and the Administra­
tion 's refusal to allow them  to raise development loans for capital 
im provem ents severely ham pers the work of providing neces­
sary amenities for their growing populations. Much of what 
will presently be said of Tel Aviv is true, mutatis mutandis, of I
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these Jewish Local Councils, and it will be convenient to defer 
an examination of the policy of the Government in relation 
to local finances until a la ter stage.
7. The Local Councils Ordinance and its operation have been 
described to us as "  defective legislation construed and enforced 
with exaggerated rigidity .”  W ithout entirely endorsing this 
charge, we are of the opinion that the present system of rural 
self-government falls short in two respects : first, in a  lack of 
flexibility—it is asking too much to attem pt to compress pro­
gressive townships and backw ard villages within the limits of 
a single legal framework—and, secondly, in undue centraliza­
tion and artificiality, in tha t sufficient use has not been m ade 
of such inherent self-governing impulses and institutions as the 
people possess.
2. The Municipalities.
8. Municipal organization of a sort existed in Turkish times, 
though in practice the O ttom an Governors exercised unlimited 
powers of interference in municipal affairs. The British Adminis­
tration at first attem pted merely to regularize the position of 
the municipalities and to impose fiscal reforms. The attitude 
of the Government a t that time m ay be summed up in the 
following extract from  the first Annual R eport of the Palestine 
Administration, for the period Ju ly , 1920, to December, 1921 : —
" The various M unicipalities ex ist for local governm ent of th e tow ns 
and for the provision of such public services as m ay be required b y  
their respective com m unities. T hey also serve as th e co llective  
mouthpiece o f the people tow ards th e D istrict Governors, and as th e  
means for carrying out th e general requirem ents of th e  A dm inistra­
tion . . .
They are perm itted  to  carry ou t their functions as independently  
as possible, b u t i t  is a t th e  sam e tim e essential th a t their activ ities  
should be carefully correlated w ith  those of th e  D istrict A dm inistra­
tion; and w ith  th is end in v iew  each D istrict Governor is responsible 
for the work of the local authorities w ith in  h is D istrict."
9. This has rem ained substantially the attitude of the Govern­
ment ever since. I t  was not until 1926 th a t the first new 
municipal elections were held, recourse having been had to 
nomination in the interim  for lack of suitable registers of voters. 
The Municipalities were still operating largely under Turkish 
law, and considerable further delay occurred before a new 
Ordinance was fram ed. Nevertheless the enactm ent of such 
an Ordinance was regarded as of considerable im portance, as 
a step towards the furtherance of racial co-operation, and as 
a prerequisite of the setting up of a  Legislative Council.*
The working of the Municipal Corporations therefore calls 
for study in two allied respects, as a milieu for racial co-opera­
tion and as an experim ent in self-government with national 
representation as its goal.
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10. In  January , 1934, after various local bodies had been con­
sulted, the Municipal Corporations Ordinance was at last 
enacted, and under it elections were held for 20 Municipal 
Councils. The franchise rem ained as in 1926, male Pales­
tinian citizens of 25 years and upw ards, with a small tax­
or rate-paying qualification, having the right to vote. The 
Ordinance provides in great detail for the conduct of municipal 
business. I t  enumerates the powers and obligations of the 
Council, the m axim um  rates it m ay levy, the services it may 
undertake, and the officials it m ay appoint. The annual 
estimates of Municipalities, as well as proposals to raise loans, 
are subject to the approval of the D istrict Commissioner, and 
accounts m ust be audited by an auditor appointed by the 
G overnment. In  examining in detail the present state of the 
Municipalities under this system, it will be convenient to deal 
first w ith those of wholly Arab or mixed Arab and Jewish 
population, which form  the m ajority and include the three large 
towns of Jaffa, H aifa and Jerusalem , setting aside for separate 
consideration Tel Aviv, the only purely Jewish Municipality 
until the recent elevation of Petah  Tiqva.
11. A sound, full-time municipal civil service is one of the 
necessary instrum ents of efficient local government, and the 
Ordinance of 1934 recognized this fact in providing that each 
M unicipality m ight appoint a num ber of local officials, such 
as a Town Clerk, Engineer, Medical Officer, &c. B ut, except 
in the three large “  mixed ”  towns, this provision remains 
practically a dead letter. Very few of the Arab towns, most 
of which are small and poor, can afford to appoint more than 
one official and five of them  have no perm anent civil service- 
a t all. Only in H aifa (apart, of course, from Tel Aviv) is there 
a  real Town Clerk, and he is an  officer seconded from the 
District Administration.
12. W ith this inadequate municipal civil service it is natural 
to find tha t, with the qualified exception of the large "  m ixed ” 
towns, the public services perform ed by the Municipalities are 
also limited. In  providing such fundam ental am enities as 
drainage and roads they seem to have been tolerably efficient, 
though according to some witnesses this efficiency varies in 
the case of the smaller A rab Municipalities with th e  degree of 
pressure applied by  the District Administration. B u t beyond 
this there has been little expansion of public services. Electric 
power, for exam ple, has not been developed as a municipal I 
undertaking because of the Governm ent’s policy of g ra n tin g  con-1 
cessions to private com panies; and there is no e v id e n ce  of enter-1 
prise in public transport or other utilities. Limited financial I 
resources are of course a  factor to be taken into account; but the I 
fact rem ains tha t there has been little attem pt, either among the I 
A rab or the "  mixed ”  Municipalities, to provide for m ore than I
349 Chapter X V II.
the strictly m aterial needs of their people. Both education and  
public health are centralized in their respective D epartm ents a t 
Jerusalem , and there are, therefore, no municipal Medical 
Officers. In  the past several Municipalities m aintained their 
own hospitals, bu t some of the smaller towns have been re­
lieved of this responsibility by the D epartm ent of Health. In  
fact, there is evidently little sense of municipal responsibility 
for the public welfare in the sense in which this would be under­
stood in  Europe. The average Municipality of Palestine is an 
authority which plans roads, provides w ater and conservancy, 
erects slaughter-houses and regulates m arkets; bu t it is not yet 
a corporate body expressing in its services the social sense of 
the community.
13. The municipal system is a recent creation and initiative 
and enterprise need time to develop; but, in the larger 
" mixed ”  towns at any rate, we think the growth of those 
qualities has been checked in some degree by the strict subord­
ination of the Municipalities to the District Administration. 
This is particularly m arked in the sphere of finance. The 
law and practice are th a t the annual municipal estimates 
prepared by the Council are forwarded for approval first 
to the District Commissioner, who later passes them  on 
to the Secretariat in Jerusalem , which invite the observa­
tions of the Treasurer; and lastly, since grants-in-aid to local 
bodies figure in the Palestine Budget, it is not till this Budget 
has been approved by  the Secretary of State th a t the local 
estimates can be finally confirmed. I t  is not surprising that this 
cumbrous procedure causes inordinate delays, even in normal 
years. For example, the budget of Jerusalem  for the financial 
year 1935-6 was not approved until August, 1935; and during 
the general dislocation of last year the m ajority of the municipal 
budgets for 1936-7 were still not approved by  January , 1937.
14. This delay has a twofold effect. In  the first place it 
compels the Municipalities to limit themselves, in the interim 
period, to recurrent expenditure based on the previous y ea r’s 
estimates; and consequently extraordinary works, involving 
Hew expenditure, are held up. This is the more unfortunate 
because the population of the more im portant towns is con­
stantly growing through im migration and therefore capital works 
of this nature are often of pressing importance. The working 
of the Ordinance in this respect really defeats its own object 
of financial control, as the more progressive Municipalities resort 
in exasperation to a variety of semi-legal devices to circumvent 
the delay and so press on with im portant works. The second 
effect of the delay in approving the estimates is therefore to 
alienate the very Municipalities which Government should wish 
to encourage; to inculcate a feeling of irresponsibility, destruc­
tive both of municipal self-respect and of the prospects of learn­
ing by experience; for where the control of the purse is kept
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closely in the hands of a central Administration, however 
paternal, the effective control of policy goes with it. It may 
well be true th a t the budgets of some of the weaker Municipal!, 
ties would not be balanced at all w ithout this pressure from 
above; bu t this applies much less, if a t all, in  the case of the 
larger and more active Councils.
15. This lim itation of power and responsibility largely 
accounts, we think, for the lack of interest shown by the towns­
people in most of the Municipal Councils. An indication of 
this m ay be found in the statistics of voting at municipal elec­
tions. The proportion of actual voters to those qualified to vote, 
a t the time of the last elections, was discouraging in the three 
large “  mixed ”  towns, Jerusalem  having the highest propor­
tion with only a little over a 50 per cent. poll. Unopposed 
elections were common, am ounting in H aifa to seven out of 
ten wards. In  the smaller and purely Arab M unicipalities, a 
fairly high proportion of those qualified did in fact exercise 
their votes; b u t there are certain indications which go to show 
that this can be attributed rather to personal rivalry for office, 
common in small communities, than to a genuine political in­
terest. Another indication of the way in which the Municipal 
Councils have failed to grip the public m ind is that in none 
of them  (always w ith the exception of Tel Aviv) has a proper 
party  system developed. Racial divisions, which will be con­
sidered in a later paragraph, are indeed only too common ; but 
of a genuine rivalry of political parties, presenting alternative 
m unicipal program m es to the electorate, there is no trace.
16. The history of the Municipal Courts affords another illus­
tration of the seeming lack of civic spirit. In  1921 benches 
of honorary, unpaid M agistrates were established for the purpose 
of taking over petty  judicial work of local interest an d  of 
associating the leading citizens with the work of the G overn­
m ent. Experience, however, showed their administration of 
justice to be unsatisfactory; the appointm ent of stip en d iaries  
to assist them  m erely resulted in their ceasing to sit and aband­
oning everything to the paid m en; and we understand th a t the 
M unicipal Courts will probably soon be abolished.
17. In  illustration of the w ay in which the present system 
is working in the larger Municipalities it is interesting to  note 
the evidence subm itted to us by  two well-informed witnesses 
in connection w ith the M unicipality of Jerusalem . Though 
one of these was an  A rab and one a  Jew , and they w ere speak­
ing independently, the general tenor of their c ritic is m s  was 
the same. In  the first place they represented that the  Muni­
cipal Council has insufficient power to be an effective body; 
it is reduced, they claim, to the status of a  mere debating society. 
And in the second place they agreed in attributing the retarded
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d e v e lo p m e n t  of municipal services to the strict financial control 
0f th e  Administration and to the insufficiency of the Govern­
ment grants-in-aid.
18. If public interest and civic spirit in regard to municipal 
self-government are to be aroused, the M unicipality m ust have 
sufficient powers and status to attract attention and excite 
ambition. The participation of the local governm ent authori­
ties in education, for instance, as is the English practice, is 
one way of enlisting civic interest and civic pride in a cam­
paign of general cultural improvement. The control of public 
health makes a similar appeal to the average townsman. B ut 
the awakening or strengthening of public interest in these 
“ interesting ”  social services is obstructed by the fact that they 
are virtually centralized in Jerusalem .
19. The deficiencies of the present system are therefore two­
fold; first, a lack of initiative on the part of the more backward 
Municipalities; and, secondly, the limitations set to initiative on 
the part of the more progressive Municipalities by the Govern­
ment’s centralized power and its monopoly of certain public ser­
vices. The first of these deficiencies can only be made good with 
time, but the second can be remedied to some extent without 
delay. The Municipalities, though varying greatly in size and 
resources, are all within one legal framework. The British 
Administration took over from the Ottoman regime, unchanged, 
the classification of towns possessing municipal status ; and the 
degree to which this classification is out of date m ay be 
measured, for instance, in the discrepancy between the popu­
lations of Jerusalem  (125,000) and Jenin  (2,700). The law 
and (equally im portant) the adm inistrative practice is the same 
for all, and of necessity has to be a lowest common denom inator, 
suited to paternal rule of the weakest rather than to free develop­
ment of the strongest. A t the end of this chapter we recom­
mend the enactment of a new Ordinance on a basis of differen­
tiation.
20. The “  mixed ”  Municipalities are of special interest as 
providing a field for racial co-operation, and here again the 
results are not encouraging. W hen the Municipal Corporations 
Ordinance of 1934 was fram ed, emphasis was laid on the fact 
that, in contrast to previous practice, the electoral wards were 
to be on a geographical and not a communal basis, with the 
excellent intention of encouraging corporate loyalty to the muni­
cipal “ body politic ”  as a whole rather than to a racial or 
religious community. Y et when the wards were actually de­
marcated, care was taken to make them  correspond as far as 
possible with racial divisions, so tha t the voting is still virtually 
communal. This has, of course, tended to eliminate political 
interest in the constituencies, to encourage unopposed returns,
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and to elect on to the Council groups of A rab and Jewish Coun­
cillors who are representatives first of all of their respective 
communities and only secondarily of any political interest. 
G ranted, then, a  Council fram ed on these lines—a n d  in the 
circumstances we do not suggest th a t any other method would 
be practicable—it is no t surprising to find that, although in 
quiet intervals the  two races can co-operate fairly amicably, 
in times of stress these “  mixed ”  Councils break do w n .
3. Tel Aviv.
21. I t  rem ains to investigate briefly the particular problems 
of Tel Aviv, the only purely Jew ish M unicipality u n til the 
Local Council of P etah  Tiqva attained th a t status only a few 
m onths ago. Tel Aviv has unique problems of its own causa 
by  the phenom enal growth of the town during the la s t five 
years. The over-rapid inflow of im m igrants has created an un­
precedented and urgent dem and for fundam ental public ser­
vices, and the strain on the organization and finances o f the 
town has been proportionately great. I t  m ust be rememberet 
th a t the M andatory Government “  facilitates ”  the entry o f these 
im m igrants into Palestine, and therefore cannot be ind ifferen 
to their welfare, particularly in the sphere of public health.
22. The people of Tel Aviv possess an intense civic 
spirit and a  confident belief in  the future of th e  town 
The M unicipal Council has always pursued an a m b itio u s  socia 
policy, and the municipal budget now balances a t o v e r half a 
million pounds, m ore than treble th a t of any other tow n in 
Palestine. The inelasticity of the present Ordinance is , there­
fore, the m ore irksome, and the necessity of o b ta in in g  the 
approval of the D istrict Commissioner for the m in u tia e  0 
governm ent has been a constant cause of friction. T e l Aviv 
accuses the Adm inistration of w ant of understanding in  the 
developm ent of m unicipal social services on Western lines; 
and in fact the Council commonly adopt the practice o f ignor­
ing o r evading the law, undertaking commitments w hich  are 
technically ultra vires and presenting the authorities w ith  a jait 
accompli for retrospective approval. On the side of the Govern­
m ent it is argued th a t an apparent lack of funds is the sole 
reason for restrain t or disapproval of the Council's activities 
and proposals ; and  th a t the only real quarrel over social services 
between Tel Aviv and  the Adm inistration is a question of 
finance. This m ay be briefly illustrated with reference to  health 
and education.
23. Tel Aviv, unlike m ost other Municipalities, provides its 
own hospital, which has to cater not only for the swollen 
population of the town, which now am ounts to about 150,000, 
bu t also for the population of the Jew ish settlements of the
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adjacent countryside, num bering approxim ately 75,000, for 
whom Government provides no hospital facilities. The Admin­
istration's grant towards the m aintenance of this hospital is 
jased upon a  fixed proportion of beds to population which is 
ess th an  half the custom aiy European standard. Tel Aviv 
complains tha t this is quite inadequate and dem ands a far higher 
standard of health services than Government can provide any­
where e ls e  in Palestine.
24. Similar difficulties have been encountered in the sphere 
of educa tion . Owing to the exceptional dem and, Tel Aviv 
as to le v y , and bears cheerfully, the m aximum legal educa- 
ion ra te , bu t even so finds it difficult to keep pace w ith the 
demands for school expansion. F or lack of capital resources 
they have been compelled to  rent school buildings, a wasteful 
method in the long run , instead of being able to  erect their 
own schoo ls ; and they complain th a t the Government grant 
which they receive (through the Va ad Leumi) is quite in­
sufficient for their needs, com pared not only w ith European 
iractice but even w ith w hat is received by  other towns in 
’alestine.
25. The Council claim tha t the general grant-in-aid from 
Government to the M unicipality should be a fixed sum calcul­
ated pari passu with the services perform ed. The present 
method of calculating the grant-in-aid is th a t of need. This 
means in practice tha t a backw ard township, which provides 
few services, is favoured a t the expense of a progressive one. 
A Municipality which balances its budget stands little chance 
of an adequate grant. M oreover, the present method of calcu­
lation introduces a large element of uncertainty into municipal 
finance, since the grant is not a  fixed sum that can be relied 
upon, but a variable quantity  which must be bargained for 
through the District Commissioner. The Adm inistration con­
tend, with some force, tha t it is the m andatory 's duty not to 
adopt a policy which would progressively benefit the richer and 
retard the poorer Municipalities, bu t to close the gulf between 
the tw o races by a process of m aterial and cultural “  levelling- 
up ” . We adm it the strength of this argum ent, bu t it remains 
questionable whether Tel Aviv, with its flood of W estern immi­
grants can afford to w ait to be caught up by  the rest of the 
country.
26. The Council's particular difficulty is in  finding the neces­
sary capital outlay for expansion, for in such circumstances 
there is bound to be a  time-lag before any growing community, 
however economically sound, can be properly self-supporting. 
Tel Aviv has complained more than  once of its having been 
allotted no share in the loan works under the proposed 
£2,000,000 Palestine Governm ent G uaranteed Loan. F or the 
past four years negotiations for a loan from private sources
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have been going on, bu t the A dministration have consistently 
dem anded that, on grounds of "  economy ” , the m a jo rity  of 
the loan works for which the M unicipality have submitted plans 
(hospitals, w ater supply, &c.) should be defrayed, if at a ll, from 
revenue. The Council represent with some reason th a t it is 
sound economic practice in such circumstances to tra n s fe r the 
burden of capital im provements to the future by means of a 
loan. I t  is contended by the Administration tha t the budget 
deficits which Tel Aviv has shown in recent years th ro w  doubt 
on its ability to repay interest on the loan, and are n o t likely 
to  inspire confidence in any com pany which might consider 
m aking an advance. B ut these very budget deficits have been 
due to the insistence by Governm ent th a t Tel Aviv should 
defray capital expenditure out of revenue. Thus the vicious 
circle is complete.
27. The objectives which the people of Tel Aviv have set 
before them  in the way of social services are in themselves 
adm irable, and the ratepayers have shown a  commendable 
readiness to bear high rates for their realization. The tow n has 
been faced with, and to a  considerable extent su rm o u n te d , ex­
ceptional difficulties, and that, as the Administration admit, 
w ithout seriously im pairing its financial position. That Tel Aviv 
should feel im patient with the slow rate of progress to  which 
Governm ent feels com m itted is readily understandable; and 
there is obviously a constant source of friction in the subjection 
of a highly educated and democratic com munity to th e  control 
of a D istrict Commissioner, who has m any other duties to 
attend to.
4. Recommendations.
28. The m ain difficulty of operating local government under 
the M andate is th a t it involves the conjunction of w ha t are 
virtually two civilizations in one system, and  thus reflects in 
m iniature the param ount problem  of the whole c o u n try . The 
sm aller A rab Municipalities require constant supervision and 
do not, we understand, resent it. In  the large "  mixed ” towns 
on the other hand , and more so in Tel Aviv, official contro l is 
disliked and to some extent evaded. There is thus an unsatis­
factory division of responsibility. The Government fa ils  to 
discharge it fully, while the Municipalities do not acquire a 
proper sense of it themselves. W e are aw are that to attempt 
to rem edy this difficulty b y  aw arding a  greater measure 
of self-government to certain of the larger towns, among 
which Tel Aviv would necessarily be the first, w o u ld  in all 
probability, provoke! the A rab towns to dem and the  same, 
although they are not fit for it and  apparently  do not w ant it; 
b u t we believe th a t some such discrimination is the o n ly  means 
of successfully encouraging the development of local autonomy.
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2g. W e  recommend, in the first place, th a t an attem pt should 
ie made to strengthen those few Local Councils which still 
gist in the A rab rural areas. D istrict Officers should be 
a str u c te d  to do all they can to stim ulate interest in the Council's 
(0rk and a sense of responsibility in its members. District 
ijjicers should avoid the tem ptation to keep the Councils so 
ouch in leading-strings for the sake of efficiency as virtually
0 do the work themselves. A t the same time we do not 
avour an attem pt at the present time to revivify Councils 
èich have broken down or to create new ones unless there
1 a genuine dem and for them . We think th a t there can be 
ttle really effective extension of village self-government until 
he provision of prim ary education (which, as has been seen, 
; still quite inadequate to the needs of the country) has had 
lore time to take effect.
30. Secondly, we recommend th a t the remaining, pre- 
onderantly Jewish, Local Councils, taken together with all 
ie present existing Municipalities, should be re-classified by 
teans of a new Ordinance into groups, according to their 
ispective size and im portance. There is scope for a t least 
to different grades of urban authority, w hether accorded the 
tie of “ Municipality "  or not; the highest grade would 
aturally be filled by Tel Aviv and a few large “  mixed "  
nvns. The degree of power and independence, and conversely 
le measure of adm inistrative control, could then conveniently 
e varied to suit each class of Municipality. W e suggest that, 
ir the first class of M unicipality, the powers provided under 
ie existing Ordinance are inadequate and should be extended.
31. Thirdly, we recommend th a t the general supervision of 
ical government should be entrusted to expert hands. A t 
resent undue centralization is combined with a diversity of 
iperior authorities : thus, ap art from the D istrict Commis- 
oners, the Secretariat, the Treasurer, and the A ttom ey- 
eneral (none of them  experts in this sphere), the D epartm ents
i Health, of Education and of Public W orks intervene in one 
r other aspect of local affairs, and there is no m achinery for 
iy effective co-ordination of their activities. Local Govem- 
ient is a highly technical subject, bu t there is no one in the 
dministration who professes to be an expert on it. The 
unicipalities need skilled advice, bu t there is nobody to give 
. We therefore recommend tha t the services of an expert 
iithority on Local Government should be tem porarily placed 
t the d isposa l of the Palestine Government to assist in drafting 
ie new Ordinance and  in im proving and co-ordinating the 
htions between Governm ent and the Municipalities, par- 
cularly the larger towns, with special reference to the need of 
moving the causes of the present delay in approving municipal 
udgets.
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32. Fourthly , we recommend th a t the need of Tel Aviv for ; 
substantial loan should be prom ptly and sympathetically 
reconsidered.
33. We believe tha t the adoption of these recommendation- 
would do m uch to "  encourage local autonom y "  in Palestini 
as required by the M andate. B ut it will still be difficult, if  no 
impossible, to realize the prim ary condition needed fo r thi 
successful operation of local governm ent in any country 
nam ely, a healthy and happy relationship between the Centra 
and Local authorities. The m ore advanced and  po litica lly  
m inded an A rab M unicipality becomes, the less ready w ill i 
be to acquiesce in control by the M andatory A d m in is tra tio n  
The Jewish Municipalities accept the M andate, but neverthe 
less, the bigger and older they grow, the harder it w ill be ti 
adjust their relations with the M andatory A d m in is tra tio n  
F or it is not the norm al relationship between central and loca 
organs of the same national and constitutional character. Oi 
the one side are highly dem ocratic Jewish bodies, on th e  othe 
a British Governm ent of the Crown Colony type.
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SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS.
1. Article 2 of the M andate runs as follows:—
“ The M andatory shall be responsible for placing th e  country under 
such p olitica l, adm inistrative and econom ic conditions as w ill secure 
the establishm ent o f th e Jew ish national hom e, as laid  dow n in  th e  
preamble, and the d eve lo p m en t of self-governing institu tions, and  
also for safeguarding th e c iv il and religious rights of a ll th e in ­
habitants of P alestin e, irrespective of race and relig ion .”
2. I t has been argued that, in the circumstances in which the 
Mandate was first drafted , the words we have printed in italics 
were intended to ensure the development of self-government in 
the Jewish N ational Hom e as the nucleus of a  “  Jewish 
Commonwealth ” , and the arrangem ent of the clauses has been 
held to strengthen this argum ent. B ut from  1923 onwards the 
words have always been given a  wider interpretation in authori­
tative quarters. Both the Perm anent M andates‘Commission and 
the Colonial Office have regarded the M andatory’s responsibility 
for developing self-governing institutions as extending to 
Palestine as a  whole. In  any case this point of interpretation 
seems im material. I t  is a basic principle of the M andate System 
that the M andates are "  trusts ”  which will term inate when the 
people of the m andated territory are “  able to stand by them ­
selves under the strenuous conditions of the m odern world ” . 
There was never, of course, any question of a time-limit; bu t it 
was naturally expected tha t the period would be relatively short 
in the case of the m andates for the countries freed from Turkish 
rule, and a clause in each of them definitely contemplated 
its termination. Article 19 of the M andate for Syria and the 
Lebanon begins "  On the term ination of the M andate ” ; 
Article 20 of the D raft M andate for Iraq  begins “  In  the event 
of the term ination of the M andate conferred on the M andatory 
by this D eclaration Article 28 of the Palestine Mandate 
begins, “  In  the event of the term ination of the m andate hereby 
conferred upon the M andatory Since, therefore, Mandates 
are intended a t some time or other to come to an  end and since 
their ending implies tha t the territory concerned becomes self- 
governing, it is clearly one of the M andatory’s general duties, 
whatever specific obligations m ay be laid on him , to develop 
the institutions by means of which self-government m ay one day 
operate.
3. In ‘Iraq  and Palestine, as in Syria and the Lebanon, 
“ the development of self-governing institutions ”  was taken to 
mean the development of representative governm ent on the 
lines of western dem ocracy. Elective Representative Councils 
were established in the Lebanon in 1922 and in  the States of 
Aleppo and Damascus (later am algam ated as “  Syria ” ) in
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1923, while in ‘Ira q  a  full-fledged parliam ent was set up in 
1925. And it was to a  sim ilar kind of parliam entary govern­
m ent th a t the A rab leaders in Palestine were encouraged to look 
forw ard in 1922.
4. I t  has been recorded in an  earlier chapter* that the reply 
to  the A rab dem and for “ a  national independent govern­
m ent ”  was that, though there was “  no question of treat­
ing the people of Palestine as less advanced than their 
neighbours in ‘Iraq  and  Syria . . .  the creation a t this stage 
of a national governm ent would preclude the fulfilment 
of the pledge m ade by  the British Government to the 
Jew ish people ” . I t  was thus clearly recognized that 
A rab antagonism  to the N ational Hom e was a bar to 
self-government in Palestine; bu t it was hoped, as has been 
seen, th a t th a t antagonism  would presently weaken; and the 
Churchill S tatem ent of Policy held out the prospect that, if 
all went well, full self-government would be attained by stages 
in course of time.
“ I t is th e  in ten tion  [it  sa id ] o f H is M ajesty’s Government to 
foster th e establishm ent of a full m easure o f self-governm ent in 
P alestin e. B u t th ey  are o f opinion th a t, in  th e special circum­
stances o f th a t country, th is  should be accom plished by gradual 
stages and not suddenly. T he first step  w as taken when, on the 
in stitu tion  of a c iv il A dm inistration, th e  nom inated A dvisory Council, 
w hich now  ex ists, was established. I t  w as stated  a t th e  tim e by the 
H igh Com m issioner th a t th is w as th e  first step  in  th e development 
of self-governing in stitu tions, and it  is now  proposed to take a 
second step  by  th e  establishm ent o f a  L egislative Council containing 
a large proportion o f m em bers elected  on a w ide franchise. It was 
proposed in th e published draft th a t three of th e  m em bers of this 
Council should be non-official persons nom inated b y th e  High Com­
m issioner, b u t representations h aving been m ade in opposition to 
th is provision, based on cogent considerations, th e Secretary of 
S tate is prepared to  om it it . T he L egislative Council would then 
consist o f th e H igh  Com m issioner as P resident and tw elve  elected and 
ten  official m em bers. T he Secretary of S ta te  is of opinion that before 
a further m easure of self-governm ent is  extended to  Palestine and 
th e  A ssem bly placed in  control over th e  E xecu tive, i t  would be wise 
to  allow  som e tim e to  elapse. D uring th is period th e  institutions 
of th e  country w ill h ave becom e w ell established; its  financial credit 
w ill be based on  firm foundations, and th e  P alestin ian  officials will 
have been enabled to  gain experience of sound m ethods of govern­
m ent. A fter a few  years th e  situation  w ill be again reviewed, and 
if th e  experience of th e  working o f th e  constitu tion  now to be 
established so w arranted, a  larger share o f authority would then be 
extended to  th e  elected  representatives o f th e  peop le.”
5. The A rabs, it will be rem embered, refused to co-operate 
in  establishing the proposed Legislative Council in 1923 and 
refused also to take p a rt in the enlarged Advisory Council. 
F o r ten years no further attem pt was m ade to develop “ self- 
governing institutions b u t in 1932, as has been seen, the
* See page 55 above.
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Ugh Commissioner, with the agreem ent of the Secretary of 
State, again took up the project of a  Legislative Council. Its 
imposed constitution as published in 1935 was m arkedly more 
iberal than that proposed in 1922. The num ber of officials 
iad been reduced from  11 to five. Of the rem aining 23 
members, n  would be nom inated and  12 elected. The Council 
ffas to perform the usual legislative functions, including the 
iassing of the budget, and would be entitled to question the 
Executive on m atters of adm inistration. B ut there were to 
ie certain limitations or “  safeguards ” , (1) No resolution
or amendment to a Bill would be perm itted which “  calls in 
uestion the validity of the M andate accepted by His M ajesty
1 respect of Palestine or suggests th a t the M andate should 
ie abolished or ought to be disregarded; or would be offensive
0 the Ruler or the Governm ent of any neighbouring territory, or 
any foreign State, in friendly relations with H is Majesty ” . 
2) The High Commissioner, besides his norm al right 
of veto, would be em powered, "  in the interests of 
mblic faith or good governm ent ” , to cause measures to 
ie introduced into the Council and, if not passed within such 
ime as he should prescribe, to declare th a t they should have 
effect as law. (3) In  case of “  urgent necessity ” , if the 
Council were not sitting, the H igh Commissioner would be 
able to legislate by ordinance. (4) He would continue to 
determine the labour im m igration schedules.
6. The opposition to this proposal in Parliam ent and the 
unfortunate effect thereof on A rab opinion in Palestine have 
been described in an  earlier chapter.* In  the light of our 
inquiry we cannot affect to be surprised a t w hat happened in 
those debates. F or such hopes as m ay have been entertained 
in 1922 of any quick advance towards self-government were 
evidently less tenable in 1935. The b a r to it—A rab antagonism  
to the National Home—so far from  weakening, had grown 
stronger with the growth of the Home. The only difference in 
the situation was, first, tha t the new proposals, by  substituting 
the principle of reservation, certification and veto by the High 
Commissioner for the principle of the official “  bloc ” , might 
seem to offer to the m ajority on the Council the possibility of 
exercising a little more power or influence than  they m ight have 
exercised under the old proposals: and, secondly, that the 
leaders of the five A rab Parties had  been persuaded, not without 
difficulty, to consider the new proposals. B ut, as we pointed 
out before, the Jew ish leaders had refused to follow suit. If the 
projected measure of self-government was to have any reality, 
if it meant a real increase of A rab power or influence on legis­
lation and adm inistration, then the Jew s believed—and in our
* See pages 91 and 92 above.
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opinion the belief was justified—that such power or influence 
would be used against the interests of the N ational Home.
7. On one condition, however, we were given to understand 
th a t the Jew ish leaders m ight acquiesce in the establishment of a 
Legislative Council—nam ely, if it were to consist of A rabs and 
Jew s in equal num bers. If  the A rabs would accept that equality 
of representation now, the Jew s for their p a rt were prepared to 
accept it in perpetuity. W hile unwilling, they said, to be 
“  dom inated ’ they did not wish to “  dominate In the 
event, therefore, of the Jew s becoming a  m ajority in Palestine, 
they would still be content with equal representation in thé 
Council. This device, which is known as P arity , has attracted! 
some favourable notice in this country; and, anxious as we have I 
been to follow any thread th a t seemed to lead towards a  lasting! 
settlement, we have carefully considered it; bu t in the result we| 
are convinced th a t Parity  is not a  practicable solution of the| 
problem.
8. In  the first place it is difficult to believe tha t so artificial a I 
device, even if the A rab leaders were willing to adopt it, would! 
operate effectively or last for long. Government by Parity is not! 
representative governm ent as it is understood in the democratic! 
world. I t  is applied, it is true, to the constitution of the Upper! 
Cham ber in the legislatures of the United States and other! 
federal democracies to provide for the equal representation oil 
the States or Provinces of which the Federation is composed.! 
B u t it scarcely need be pointed out th a t this concession to local! 
interests is m ore than  balanced by the representation of the! 
people as a whole in the Lower Cham ber and  that, if the United! 
States Congress were entirely based on inter-State Parity, it! 
would not exist for a day. O ther analogies, drawn from| 
European history, are equally inapplicable.
9. Secondly, we do not think that P arity , supposing again 
the Arab leaders would accept it, would tend to promote more 
amicable relations between the races. Fights are most 
stubborn when the two sides are equally m atched; and we 
believe tha t the regular outvoting of a m inority by a majority 
would actually engender less bitterness than a  permanent con­
flict between two parties of precisely equal strength. Parity, 
in fact, like too m any o ther devices which seem at first sight 
to offer a chance of escape from the impasse into which 
Palestine has drifted, depends for any success it might achieve 
on the old fundam ental assumption tha t, despite all the evi­
dence to the contrary, some m easure of compromise or recon­
ciliation between the races can be expected, that on vital 
issues some A rabs will be found to vote with Jews and some 
Jew s to vote w ith Arabs.
3bi Chapter XVIII.
10. But these speculations are of little value, for, in any case, 
Parity would undoubtedly be rejected by the Arab leaders, 
moderate and extremist alike. I t  implies w hat they refuse to 
a d m i t — the potential right of the Jews to an equal share with 
(hem in the governm ent of Palestine. I t  contemplates w hat 
they are determined to  prevent—the attainm ent by  the Jews 
of a majority of the population. And, while it deprives them 
of a real present advantage, it offers in return  an advantage 
ifhich, however sincere the Jew ish undertaking m ay be, is 
only prospective and will only materialize in circumstances 
iphich they (the Arabs) will do their best to preclude.
11. So nothing has come of the hopes entertained in 1922. 
He Arab leaders have been invited to look forward to the 
jradual evolution of the same process of developing self- 
joveming institutions which has operated under British auspices 
ilsewhere—a process which, starting with representative 
[overnment, advances to responsible governm ent and so on 
owards the goal of national independence under a parliam ent- 
uy system. B ut fifteen years have passed and the process has 
lot yet begun. Looking back across th a t period, we cannot 
ivoid the conclusion that, in the peculiar circumstances of 
tiestine under the M andate, this well-trodden track was not 
the right track to pursue. F or the successful working of repre­
sentative governm ent requires th a t the population concerned 
ihould be sufficiently homogeneous. Unless there is common 
[round enough between its different groups o r classes to enable 
he minority to acquiesce in the rule of the m ajority and to 
nake it possible for the balance of power to readjust itself 
rom time to time, the working basis of parliam entary govern- 
nent or democracy as we understand it is not there. The 
lost patent example of this in present-day politics is the im- 
lossibility of uniting all Ireland under a single parliam ent; 
md the gulf between A rabs and Jew s in Palestine is wider than 
that which separates N orthern Ireland from the Irish Free 
State.
12. If, then, the existing M andatory system is to continue, 
to do not recommend tha t any attem pt be m ade to revive the 
project of a Legislative Council; bu t, since it is obviously 
desirable that the Government should have some regular and 
effective means of sounding public opinion on its policy, we 
should like to see the Advisory Council enlarged by the addition 
of unofficial members who might be in a m ajority  and might 
be elected, who could m ake representations by w ay of resolu­
tions, but who would not be empowered to pass or reject the 
budget or other legislative measures. I t  seems clear, however, 
that the Arabs would be even less willing now to be elected 
to an Advisory Council than  they were to be nom inated to 
it in 1923. The Arabs acquiesced in the Legislative Council
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proposed in 1935 because the possibilities it offered of exercis- 
ing influence on Government seemed worth exploring. p0j 
th a t reason the Jew s rejected it. The Jew s might agree to 
an enlarged Advisory Council because it is only advisory. por 
tha t reason the Arabs, we have little doubt, would reject it 
Nor, in any  case, could a merely Advisory Council be regarded 
as a substantial step in “  the development of self-governing 
institutions "
13. We are confronted, therefore, with a  paradoxical situa­
tion. The A rabs of Palestine, it has been admitted, are as fit to 
govern themselves as the A rabs of ‘Iraq  or Syria. The Jews of 
Palestine, it is clear, are as fit to govern themselves as any 
organized and educated community in Europe or elsewhere. 
Yet, associated as they are under the M andate, self-government 
is im practicable for both peoples. Nowhere, indeed, in ah the 
fields in which the M andate operates is the deadlock so complete 
as in this last field. Nowhere is it more manifest that the Man­
date cannot be fully and honourably implemented unless by 
some means or other the national antagonism between Arab and 
Jew  can be composed. B ut it is the M andate that created that 
antagonism and keeps it alive; and, as long as the Mandat 
exists, we cannot honestly hold out the expectation that either 
A rabs or Jew s will be able to set aside their national hopes or 
fears and sink their differences in the common service of Pales­
tine. T hat being so, real “  self-governing institutions "  cannot 
be developed, nor can the Mandate ever terminate, without 
violating its obligations, general or specific. For at any given 
time there m ust be either an Arab or a Jewish majority in 
Palestine, and the governm ent of an  independent Palestine, 
freed from the M andate, would have to be either an Arab or a 
Jewish governm ent. In  the la tter event—assuming, we repeat, 
that the miracle of reconciliation has not happened and that 
politics are still conducted on fines of race—the general obliga­
tion implicit in all M andates that the people entrusted to Man­
datory adm inistration are to be enabled in course of time to 
"  stand by  themselves "  would not have been fulfilled. In the 
other event, the obligation in Article 2 “  for placing the country 
under such political, adm inistrative and economic conditions as 
will secure the establishment of the Jew ish National Home " 
would not have been discharged.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. We will now briefly recapitulate in pursuance of our terms 
reference the conclusions and recommendations which we 
ve set out in this part of our Report. The underlying causes 
f the disturbances, or (as we regard it) the rebellion, of 1936 
re, first, the desire of the Arabs for national independence :
ndly, their antagonism to the establishment of the Jewish 
ational Home in Palestine, quickened by  their fear of Jewish 
mination (Chapter IV , paragraph 43). Among contributory 
es were the effect on Arab opinion of the attainm ent of 
tional independence by  ‘Iraq , T rans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria 
d the Lebanon; the rush of Jew ish immigrants escaping from 
irai and Eastern Europe ; the inequality of opportunity 
oyed by Arabs and Jew s respectively in placing their case 
ore Your Majesty’s Government and the public : the growth 
Arab mistrust : Arab alarm  at the continued purchase of 
b land by Jews : the intensive character and the 
modernism ”  of Jew ish nationalism : and lastly the general 
certainty, accentuated by the am biguity of certain phrases 
the Mandate, as to the ultim ate intentions of the M andatory 
wer. This uncertainty has aggravated all the difficulties of 
situation and in particular has («) stimulated the Jewish 
' e to expand and consolidate their position in Palestine 
quickly as possible, and (b) made it possible for the Arabs 
interpret the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government 
d the sympathetic attitude of some of its officials as showing 
tthe British determination to implement the Balfour Declara-
0 is not sincere. (Chapter IV , paragraph 45.)
2. We have found that, though the Arabs have benefited 
the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, 
has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improve- 
t in the economic situation in Palestine has m eant the
ferioration of the political situation. (Chapter I I I , paragraph
3. The Palestine Government have attem pted to discharge the 
tradictory obligations of the M andatory under conditions of 
t difficulty by “  holding the balance ”  between Jew s and 
bs. Repeated attem pts to conciliate either race have only 
ased the trouble. (Chapter V, paragraph 55.) The situation
Palestine has reached a  deadlock. (Chapter V, paragraph 
•) The Administration has from  the start been driven to work 
high pressure under peculiar difficulties. (Chapter V I, para- 
ph 35.) The steps taken by  the Palestine Government to 
orce respect for law and order have proved ineffectual. The
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elem entary duty of providing public security has not L 
discharged. (Chapter V II, paragraph 54.) Endeavours to con 
trol the alienation of land by A rabs to Jews have not bet 
successful. In  the hills there is no more room for further do 
settlement by Jew s ; in the plains it should only be allowed und 
certain restrictions. (Chapter IX , paragraphs 64 and 1 5 3 . )  T h 6i 
has been great delay in the preparation of a record of rights! 
the ascertainm ent and registration of Government ownership J  
land has been slow and unsatisfactory. (Chapter IX , Section 2I 
The concession to the Palestine Electric Corporation has obstruct 
ed any development of irrigation from the River Jordan; an 
more m ight have been done to test the possibilities of irrigate 
in the south of the Gaza Sub-district and in Beersheba. (Chapte 
IX , Section 3 .) Great efforts are being made to effect a radie 
change in the methods of cultivation by the Arab fellah, 
this can only be accomplished after m any years and after s 
extension of prim ary education. (Chapter IX , Section 6.)
4. As regards im migration the M andate has been fully implJ 
m ented, bu t the attem pts to regulate it have been unsatisfactoq 
unacceptable to A rabs and  Jew s alike, and accompanied 
disconcerting variations in the num ber of immigranl 
(Chapter X .)
5. In  the m atter of finance, the revenues of Palestine 
increased rapidly, bu t far too large a  proportion has had to I 
devoted tow ards meeting the charges of public security.
18 of the M andate ham pers the trade of the country, 
apparently large surplus is little m oie than a  reasonable ba 
for existing commitments. (Chapter V III.)
6. The standard of social services in Palestine is higher I 
in the average British Colony or Indian Province, but the 1 
culty of providing services in one State for two distinct commui 
ities with two very different standards of living is apparer 
(C hapter X II.)  In  the m atter of roads, railways and ports! 
obligations of the M andate have been adequately discharged,' 
the problem of harbour facilities for Jaffa and Tel Aviv aw 
solution. (C hapter V I, Sections 4, 5 and 6.)
7. As regards the development of local autonomy and ! 
governing institutions, this also has been hampered by 
difficulty of combining w hat are virtually two civilizations^ 
one system. The restrictions which the M andatory Power foil" 
it necessary to impose in the interests of rural boards or ba 
w ard municipalities have been resented by the la rge r tow 
The attem pts to create a  local legislature have been unsuccer1 
and should not be revived. (Chapters X V II and XVIII.)
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Arab Grievances.
8, The Arab grievances m ay be summarized en bloc as a 
repudiation of the M andate and all that it implies, from which 
he following main grievances arise: —
(1) The failure to develop self-governing institutions.
(2) The acquisition of land by  the Jews.
(3) Jewish immigration.
(4) The use of Hebrew and English as official languages.
(5) The employment of British and Jewish officers, and 
exclusion of A rabs from the higher posts.
(6) The creation of a  large class of landless A rabs, and 
the refusal of Jew s to employ Arab labourers.
(7) Inadequate funds for A rab education.
9, Whilst we believe th a t these grievances are sincerely felt, 
re are of opinion that most of them cannot be regarded as 
■gitimate under the terms of the M andate and we are therefore 
it called upon to m ake recommendations on them. I t  is only
1 regard to the last that we are able to suggest any remedy. We 
ould welcome increased expenditure on Arab education, 
specially in the direction of village agricultural schools. These 
inancial claims should be regarded as secondary only to those 
if public security. The attitude of A rab officials precludes any 
xtension of their employment in the higher posts of the Admini- 
tration, including the Judiciary. (Chapter V I.) Self-govern- 
lg institutions cannot be developed in the peculiar circum- 
tances of Palestine under the M andate. (Chapter X V III, 
laiagraph 11.)
Jewish Grievances.
10, The main Jewish grievances are as follows: —
(1) Obstruction in the establishment of the National Home 
owing to dilatory action in dealing with proposals dem and­
ing executive action.
We consider that, apart from the general obligation to protect 
Irab interests, over-centralization and a  lack of co-ordination 
«tween the Secretariat, the various special D epartm ents, and 
lie officers serving in the Districts are contributory causes of 
lelay. W e recommend decentralization, as suggested by the 
inancial Commission in 1931. W e also consider tha t Assistant 
iecretaries should have had District experience. The Chief 
«cretary should not be the only channel of approach to the 
îigh Commissioner. (Chapter V I, paragraph 38.)
(2) The display of “  pro-Arab ”  proclivities by officials 
and their failure to carry  out the Mandate.
We recommend the careful selection of British officers intended 
or service in Palestine and a course of special training. 
Chapter VI, paragraph 43.) The ordinary term  of service in 
alestine should be not less than seven years. (Chapter VI, 
aragraph 44.)
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As regards A rab officials, the memoranda submitted t 
Government during the “  disturbances ”  last year (see page c 
and Appendix 2 ), and the difficulty of obtaining reliable inform; 
tion (Chapter V I, paragraph 34) would justify the appointing 
of British District Officers. (Chapter V II, paragraph 65.) Tt 
Government has m aintained strict im partiality, but th is  has ha 
no helpful effect on the relations between the two races. (Chapti 
V, paragraph 55.) There should be no hesitation in  removin 
any officer whose disloyalty is proved. (C hapter V 
paragraph 41.)
(3) G reat delay in the decision of civil suits; inefficienc 
in criminal procedure, as instanced by the fa c t that 8 
Jew s were m urdered during 1936, and  no c a p ita l sentenc 
was carried out.
W e find tha t the delays are due in part to the prescripts 
in the M andate of three official languages and three sets ( 
official holidays. (Chapter V I, paragraph 49.) We welcom 
the appointm ent of an additional British Puisne Judge: an 
we recommend the appointm ent of a British Senior Goven 
m ent Advocate (Chapter V I, paragraphs 46, 54) and tl 
establishment of two or, if necessary, three separate Lai 
Courts under British Judges. (C hapter IX , paragraph 37.)
(4) Toleration by the Government of subversive activities 
more especially those of the Mufti of Jerusalem .
W e regard it as unfortunate tha t no steps have been taken I 
regulate elections for the Supreme Moslem Council, which ha 
developed an imperium in imperio with an  irremovable Pres 
dent. (Chapter V I, paragraph 105.) The policy of conciliatioi 
carried to its furthest limit, has failed. (Chapter V, paragrap 
5 5 -) (5) As regards the land, failure to introduce a land systei 
appropriate to the needs of the country, the continuant 
of the system of Masha a, no arrangem ent for the consol 
dation of holdings, great delay in the ascertainment of right 
during land settlement, difficulty in obtaining a satisfactoi 
title to land when purchased; inadequate preservation 0 
Government rights in State and waste lands, and consi 
quent failure to m ake such lands available for Jewii 
settlem ent; insufficient encouragement of irrigation an 
drainage schemes.
Our recom mendations regarding the land are as follows:—
(i) An am endm ent of Article 17 (i)(a) of the P a l e s t i n e  Orde 
in Council 1922, and , if necessary, of the wording o f  Article
2 and  15 of the M andate, in order to provide l a n d  f o r  clos 
settlement by the Jew s, and  a t the same time to s a f e g u a r d  tl 
rights and  position of the A rabs. (C hapter IX , paragraph
(ii) Lim itation of the close settlement upon t h e  l a n d  to  th 
plains districts, where schemes dealing with areas of 500 dunum 
or upw ards m ight be prepared by Utility Companies. (C hapte 
IX , paragraph 93.)
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(iii) The Land Expropriation Ordinance should be used for 
the parcellation and  consolidation of holdings. (C hapter IX ,
paragraph 8 2 .)
(iv) As regards the hill districts, on a long view there is 
no la n d  available for any experiments in close settlement and 
mixed farming by  the Jews, except possibly in the vicinity 
of J e r u s a l e m .  (Chapter IX , paragraph 153.)
(v) Definite proof of irrigation facilities should be obtained 
before any additional settlers are allowed upon the land. 
(Chapter IX , paragraph 53.)
(vi) An expert committee should be appointed to draft legis­
lation connected with the land. (Chapter IX , paragraph 29.)
(vii) Settlement proceedings should be expedited, and the 
staff increased. (Chapter IX , paragraph 36.)
(viii) The record of rights prepared by  the Settlement Officers 
should include all possessory rights and easements.
(ix) Village Registrars should be appointed to m aintain the 
record of rights and report m utations of holdings. (Chapter IX , 
paragraph 40.) _
(x) Increase in staff and exploratory work of Irrigation 
Department (Chapter IX , paragraph 114).
(xi) Legislation vesting the surface w ater of the country in the 
High Commissioner is essential. (Chapter IX , paragraph 100.)
(xii) The scheme for the development of the Huleh area 
deserves financial assistance. (Chapter IX , paragraph 124.)
(6) Reluctance really to facilitate immigration, inadequate 
labour schedules (no reasons being assigned for reductions 
made), hardship to dependants, the omission of possible 
vacancies arising from employment on Public W orks, and 
uncontrolled illegal A rab immigration.
Our recommendations are : —
(i) Immigration should be reviewed and  decided upon politi­
cal, social and psychological as well as economic considerations. 
(Chapter X , paragraph 73.) A political "  high level ” should 
be fixed at 12,000 a year for the next five years, to include Jews 
f every category. (C hapter X , paragraph 97.)
(ii) The definition of dependency should be revised. (Chapter 
, paragraph 83.)
(iii) The abolition of certain categories dealing with members 
f the liberal professions and  craftsm en, and the revision of 
e conditions governing the free entry of capitalists. (Chapter X , 
aragraphs 8 2 , 8 6 .)
(iv) The final allocation of immigration certificates should be 
subject to the approval of the High Commissioner. (Chapter X , 
aragraph 90.)
(7) T rans-Jordan should be opened to Jewish 
immigration.
Under the Mandate T rans-Jordan cannot be opened com- 
ulsorily for Jewish im m igrants against the will of its Govem- 
ent and people. (Chapter X I.)
Chapter XIX. 368
(8) The necessary steps have not been taken to secure 
the rem oval o r alleviation of restrictions on the importation 
of Palestine citrus fruits into foreign countries.
W e recommend th a t steps should be taken to secure the 
am endm ent of Article 18 of the M andate and  place the external 
trade of Palestine upon a fairer basis. (Chapter V III, para. 
graph 28.)
(9) Progressive Jew ish Municipalities are unduly restric­
ted by Government rules and  regulations.
W e recommend the appointm ent of an expert to advise the 
Palestine Government with a  view to extending the powers of 
the larger Municipalities. W e suggest an early substan tia l loan 
for Tel Aviv. The causes of the present delay in approving 
Municipal budgets should be removed. (Chapter XVII.)
(10) Failure to ensure public security.
This we regard as the most serious as also the best founded of 
the Jew ish complaints.
O ur chief recom m endation is th a t should disorders break on 
again there should be no hesitation in enforcing m artial law 
throughout the country under undivided m ilita ry  control, 
(Chapter V II, paragraph 57.) In  this event the population 
should be disarm ed, a  special police patrol being stations 
on the frontier to stop gun-running. In  the absence of disarma 
m ent the system  of supernum erary Jewish police should con 
tinue. (C hapter V II, paragraphs 63, 64.) A strong Pres 
Ordinance should be effectively applied. (Chapter V II, para 
graph 28.) Collective fines should be limited to sura 
tha t can be realized. (Chapter V II, paragraph 30.) Central ai 
well as local reserves of the Police Force, with a  large mobile 
m ounted force, are required. (Chapter V II, p a rag rap h  46.) 
Police barracks in the large towns with adequate provision foi 
the wives and  families of members of the force shou ld  be bull 
as soon as possible. (C hapter V II, paragraph  48.)
11. These are the recommendations which we submit for 
dealing with the m ain grievances under the M andate put 
before us by the A rabs and  the Jew s; bu t they are not, in oui 
opinion, the recommendations which our terms of reference 
require. They will not, tha t is to say “  remove " the griev­
ances nor “  prevent their recurrence ” . They are  the best 
palliatives we can devise for the disease from  which Palestine is 
suffering, bu t they are only palliatives. They might reduce tte 
inflammation and bring down the tem perature, but they cannot 
cure the trouble. The disease is so deep-rooted tha t, in our 
firm conviction, the only hope of a cure lies in a  surgical 
operation.
PART III.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A 
LASTING SETTLEMENT
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by  the fact tha t Palestine is a  m andated territory; but, in the 
light of nationalist movements elsewhere, we do not think the 
situation would be very different if Palestine had been a British 
Colony.
10. Meantime the “  external factors "  will continue to play 
the p art they have played with steadily increasing force from 
the beginning. On the one hand, Saudi A rabia, the Yemen, 
'I ra q  and E gypt are already recognized as sovereign states, and 
T rans-Jordan as an “  independent governm ent.”  In less than 
three years’ time Syria and the Lebanon will attain their national 
sovereignty. The claim of the Palestinian Arabs to share in 
the freedom- of all Asiatic A rabia will thus be reinforced, 
Before the W ar they were linked for centuries past with Syria! 
and the Lebanon. They already exceed the Lebanese in num­
bers. T hat they are as well qualified for self-government as the 
A rabs of neighbouring countries has been admitted.
11. On the other hand, the hardships and anxieties of the 
Jew s in Europe are not likely to grow less in the near future. 
The pressure on Palestine will continue and might at any time 
be accentuated. The appeal to the good faith and humanity of 
the British people will lose none of its force. The Mandatory 
will be urged unceasingly to adm it as m any Jews into Palestine 
as the N ational Hom e can provide with a livelihood and to 
protect them  when adm itted from  A rab attacks.
12. Thus, for internal and  external reasons, it seems probable 
th a t the situation, b ad  as it now is, will grow worse. The 
conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will 
widen. j
13. I t  rem ains to consider the position of the th ird  party I 
involved in the m atter—the M andatory Pow er and its agents ini 
Palestine. The Governm ent of Palestine is of the Crown Colony I 
type, unsuitable in norm al circumstances for g o ve rn in g  edu-l 
cated A rabs or dem ocratic Jew s. B ut it cannot evo lve , as it I 
has elsewhere evolved, into a system of self-government, since I 
there is no such system which could ensure justice both toi 
the A rabs and to the Jew s or in which both the A ra b s  and thel 
Jew s would agree to participate. The establishment o f a Legis-I 
lative Council or even of an enlarged Advisory Council in i 
which both races would co-operate is thus impracticable. Nor I 
are other methods of consultation and  collaboration w ith thel 
representatives of both races feasible. Jew ish co-operation,I 
it is true, is required b y  the M andate, and is forthcoming! 
sometimes to an em barrassing extent. B u t Arab co-operation, I 
in any regular and continuous form , is unobtainable. Thus I 
a bureaucratic Governm ent m ust continue in being, unmodified! 
by any  representative institutions on a  national scale, and unable!
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to dispel the conflicting grievances of the dissatisfied and irre­
sponsible communities it governs. Nor will the Government be 
able to count on any inborn sense of allegiance to the Crown. 
It is the national leaders, not the M andatory Government, who 
make th e  first claim on the loyalty of their compatriots.
14. In these circumstances, we are convinced that peace, 
order and good governm ent can only be m aintained in Palestine 
for any length of time by a  rigorous system of repression. 
Throughout this R eport we have been careful not to overstate 
the facts as we see them  : bu t understatem ent is no less repre­
hensible; and we should be failing in our duty if we said any­
thing to encourage a hopeful outlook for the future peace of 
Palestine under the existing system or anything akin to it. The 
[ptimism which naturally  prevailed a t the outset of the enter­
prise was chilled by  the series of Arab outbreaks, but never 
xtinguished. In  each case it soon revived, and in each case it 
Loved false. The lesson is plain, and nobody, we think, will 
low venture to assert that the existing system offers any real 
prospect of reconciliation between the Arabs and the Jews. 
Hence the Government are faced with the unpleasant necessity 
pf maintaining security-services a t a  very high cost, with the 
result that they are unable to improve and expand, and may 
[ven have to curtail, the services directed to “  the well-being 
ind development ”  of the population which, in the words of 
fee Covenant, constitute their " sa c re d  t r u s t” . If “  distur- 
lances ” , moreover, should recur on a similar scale to tha t of 
pst year’s rebellion, the cost of m ilitary operations m ust soon 
Ixhaust the revenues of Palestine and ultim ately involve the 
British Treasury to an  incalculable extent. The m oral objec­
tons to maintaining a  system of governm ent by  constant 
Kpression are self-evident. N or is there any need to emphasize 
he undesirable reactions of such a  course of policy on opinion 
lutside Palestine.
: ■  15. And the worst of it is tha t such a  policy leads nowhere. 
iBowever vigorously and  consistently m aintained, it will not 
eH)lve the problem. I t  will not allay, it will exacerbate the 
rWiarrel between the A rabs and the Jews. The establishment 
i B  a single self-governing Palestine wall rem ain just as im prac­
ticable as it is now. I t  is not easy to pursue the dark  path  of 
expression without seeing daylight at the end of it.
gH i6. Those, in our judgm ent, are the circumstances which 
‘’■ o u r  Majesty’s Governm ent have to face in Palestine. 
l5* e  do not, of course, m ean to suggest by  anything we
■ v e  said that the British people would flinch from  bearing 
ieHe burden of governing Palestine under the existing system if
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they were in honour bound to bear it. They lack neither the 
power nor the will. B ut they would be justified in asking if 
there is no other w ay in which their duty can be done.
17. Nor do we suggest that the obligations Britain undertook 
towards the A rabs and the Jew s some twenty years ago have 
lost in m oral or legal weight through w hat has happened since, 
The trouble is that they have proved irreconcilable; and, as 
far ahead as we can see, they m ust continue to conflict. To'put 
it in one sentence, we cannot—in Palestine as it now  is—both 
concede the A rab claim to self-government and secure  the estab­
lishment of the Jewish N ational Home. And this conflict 
between the two obligations is the more unfortunate because 
each of them , taken separately, accords with British sentiment 
and British interest. On the one hand, the app lica tion  of the 
M andate System to A rab Palestine as a means of advancement 
to self-government was in harm ony with British principles—the 
same principles as have been put into practice since the Wai 
in different circumstances in India , ‘Iraq  and E g y p t. British 
public opinion is wholly sympathetic with A ra b  aspiration 
towards a new age of unity and prosperity in the A rab world 
Conversely, the task of governing w ithout the consen t or eve 
the acquiescence of the governed is one for which, we believe 
the British people have little heart. On the other hand, there i 
a  strong British tradition of friendship with the Jew ish  people. 
Nowhere have Jew s found it easier to live and prosper than 
in Britain. Nowhere is there a more genuine desire to do what 
can be done to help them  in their present difficulties. Nowhere 
again, w as Zionism better understood before the W ar or given 
such practical proofs of sym pathy. And British interest coin 
cides with British sentiment. F rom  the earliest days of 61 
British connexion with India and beyond, the peace of i  
Middle E ast has been a  cardinal principle of our foreign policy; 
and for the m aintenance of that peace British statesm anship car 
show an alm ost unbroken record of friendship with the Arabs. 
I t  is no less desirable now than it has always been that thi 
friendship should not be im paired. On the other hand, it il 
clearly a British interest to retain, as far as m ay be, the confi­
dence of the Jew ish people wherever they are. W e valued i 
highly in the W ar and we cannot disdain it in peace.
18. In  these last considerations lies a final argument for seek­
ing a w ay out, at almost any cost, from the ex isting  deadlock 
in Palestine. F o r a continuance o r rather an aggravation- 
for th a t is w hat continuance will be—of the p resen t situatioi 
cannot be contemplated w ithout the gravest misgivings. It wil 
m ean constant unrest and  disturbance in peace and potential 
danger in  the event of war. I t  will mean a steady 
decline in  our prestige. I t  will m ean the g r a d u a l  aliena­
tion of two peoples who are traditionally our friends: tor
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already the Arabs of Palestine have been antagonized and the 
patience of their kinsmen throughout the A rab world is being 
strained; and already the Jew s, particularly, we understand, 
in the United States, are questioning the sincerity with which 
we are fulfilling the promises we made and suggesting that 
negligence or weakness on our p a rt is the real cause of all the 
trouble. That is a  state of affairs which, we subm it, m ust be 
stopped from going on and getting worse if there is any just 
and practicable means of stopping it.
19. Manifestly the problem cannot be solved by giving either 
the Arabs or the Jew s all they want. The answer to the question 
"Which of them in the end will govern Palestine ?”  m ust surely 
be “ Neither ” . W e do not think that any fair-minded states-
an would suppose, now that the hope of harm ony between 
e races has proved untenable, tha t B ritain ought either to 
d over to Arab rule 400,000 Jew s, whose entry into Palestine 
s been for the most part facilitated by  the British Government 
d approved by the League of N ations; or that, if the Jews 
ould become a m ajority, a  million or so of Arabs should be 
nded over to their rule. But, while neither race can justly 
e all Palestine, we see no reason why, if it were practicable, 
ch race should not rule p art of it.
20. No doubt the idea of Partition as a solution of the 
roblem has often occurred to students of it, only to be dis-
ded. There are m any who would have felt an instinctive 
like to cutting up the Holy Land. The severance of Trans- 
ordan, th ey  would have thought, from historic Palestine was 
ad enough. On tha t point we would suggest that there is little 
oral value in m aintaining the political unity of Palestine at 
e cost of perpetual hatred, strife and bloodshed, and that 
ere is little moral in jury  in drawing a political line through 
alestine if peace and goodwill between the peoples on either 
de of it can  thereby in the long run  be attained. Others m ay 
ve felt th a t Partition would be a confession of failure. One 
f the finest and most characteristic features of the British Com- 
onwealth, they m ay have argued, has been the m anner in 
hich the conflicting claims of nationality have been recon­
ed within its  borders; and the hope of achieving a s im ila r  
ult in Palestine should not lightly be abandoned. To that 
e would reply that, where the conflict of nationalities has been 
vercome and unity achieved—in Britain itself, in Canada, 
South A frica—one of the parties concerned was English or 
ritish, and that, where tha t has not been so, as in the schism 
tween the Northern and Southern Irish or between H indus 
d Moslems in India , the quarrel, though it is centuries old, 
s not yet been composed. Others, again, if they thought of 
artition, dismissed it, no doubt, as impossible. The p ra c tic a l
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difficulties seemed too great. A nd great they unquestionably 
are. The closer the question is examined, the c le a re r they 
stand out. W e do not underestim ate them. They cannot be 
brushed aside. Nevertheless, when one faces up to th em , those 
difficulties do not seem so insuperable as the difficulties inherent 
in  the continuance of the M andate or in any other alternative 
arrangem ent which has been proposed to us or w h ic h  we our­
selves could devise. Partition seems to offer a t least a  chance 
of ultim ate peace. W e can see none in any other p la n .
< 9 p  f : ' y'  .A *
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CANTON ISATION.
x. The political division of Palestine could be effected in  a less 
final and thorough-going m anner than by Partition. I t 
could be divided as federal States are divided into 
provinces or cantons ; and this method has been so 
often mentioned and so ably advocated under the nam e of 
“ Cantonisation ”  as a  means of solving the Palestine problem 
that it is incumbent on us to discuss it before setting out the plan 
for Partition which we ourselves have to propose.
2. The essence of the Cantonisation scheme is, in the words 
of one of its principal advocates,
" that areas should be officially defined within which Jewish acquisition 
of land and close settlem ent would be permitted and encouraged in 
discharge of the positive obligation under the Mandate regarding the 
National Home, and without which the land would be reserved for the 
needs of the indigenous population.”*
3. The scheme m ay be form ulated in a  variety of ways; 
butin general it envisages the division of Palestine into a  Jewish 
and an Arab canton (the form er corresponding to the areas of 
densest Jewish settlement—more particularly the plain of 
Esdraelon, the coastal plain north of Tel Aviv and the old- 
established settlements centred on Rishon le Tsiyon and 
Rehovot), while the Holy Places of Jerusalem  and Bethlehem 
with the port of H aifa would be retained in enclaves under 
direct Mandatory adm inistration. I t  has been proposed that 
the area round Tiberias, Safad and H uleh might constitute a 
third “ mixed ”  canton. The Arab canton, it is suggested, 
might embrace not only the predominantly: A rab areas of 
Palestine proper, bu t also the whole of the present territory of 
Trans-Jordan.
4. It is contemplated tha t each canton would have its own 
Government, completely autonomous in such matters as public 
works, health, education and general adm inistration (including 
control of land sales and immigration), while the central (Man­
datory) Government, with the assistance presum ably of advice 
from representatives of the cantons, would retain control over 
such matters as foreign relations, defence, customs, railways, 
posts and telegraphs and  the like, and would continue to collect 
customs and postal and any  other federal revenues. Choice 
of official languages would be left to the cantons.
* Cantonisation : a Plan for Palestine, by Mr. Archer Cust, Journal of the 
Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. X X III, page 206.
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5- On behalf of such an  arrangem ent it is claimed that it 
would solve the three m ajor problems of land, immigration and 
self-government. There would, of course, be many difficult 
points to settle under each of these heads, bu t it can b e  argued 
that the scheme would give the Jew s in their canton th e  right 
to buy  as much land as they wished (subject no doubt to certain 
safeguards in the interests of existing non-Jewish owners) and 
to adm it as m any im m igrants as they themselves determ ined 
while the Arab canton within its own boundaries would be fee 
to impose any restrictions it pleased on the further extension 
of Zionist settlement. Each canton would attain self-govern­
m ent in all but the “  federal ”  sphere.
6. As against those apparent advantages there a re  certain 
obvious difficulties in  the scheme. In  the first p la c e , the 
drafting of federal constitutions is never easy. C om plicated 
questions are involved in the structure of the c e n t r a l  govern­
m ent and the division of function between it and the component 
units. There are constant dangers of overlapping a n d  of rival 
claims on the same field of authority. In  “  c a n to n is e d ” 
Switzerland and most other federations, federation w a s  the  act 
of a  num ber of separate units which bound t h e m s e lv e s  together 
for the furtherance of common objects. In  such federations 
the community of interest or tradition which has su p p lie d  the 
motive for union will also supply that element of reasonab leness 
and goodwill b y  which compromises m ay be a r r a n g e d  and 
friction overcome. In  Palestine no such element is  present. 
The “  interference ”  of the central Government w o u ld  always 
be resented by both A rabs and Jew s and, we f e a r ,  wherever 
possible hindered, as an  alien and unw anted intrusion.
7. Difficulties would arise, in particular, in the financial 
relations between the central Government and the cantons. 
W hether in the distribution between the cantons of a n  excess of 
federal revenue or in  the collection of contributions tow ards a 
federal deficit every assessment would give rise to fie rce  argu­
m ent and bitter recrimination. The financial consequences, 
moreover, of unfettered Jewish control of immigration into the 
Jew ish canton m ight be extremely em barrassing to  th e  federal 
Government, called upon to provide federal services fo r  a  popu­
lation increasing at a  far more rapid  rate than w h a t  it  might 
itself consider reasonable. Thus Cantonisation, though i t  would 
mitigate the difficulties caused by  Jew ish i m m ig r a t io n ,  would 
by  no means eliminate them. They would still h a v e  to be 
considered to some extent by  the M andatory G o v e r n m e n t  a t the 
centre, and  would keep alive the feud between Arabs a n d  Jews. 
Only, in fact, by  Partition can the problem of immigration 
be solved.
8. There is another draw back in the present situation which 
Cantonisation would do little or nothing to remedy. We have
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pointed o u t in Chapter V II how difficult and costly is the 
task of maintaining law and order and providing public security 
in Palestine. I t  would prove impossible, we think, to delegate 
that duty to the cantonal Governments except to a limited 
extent. The m ajor responsibility for keeping the peace would 
still fall o n  the M andatory Government.
g. In  any scheme of dividing Palestine the prim ary difficulty 
lies in th e  fact that no line can be drawn which would separate 
all the Arabs from all the Jews. Both under Cantonisation and 
under Partition a minority of each race remains in an area con­
trolled b y  a majority of the other. T hat is the cardinal problem , 
and fo r its effective treatm ent the boldest and most far-seeing 
statesmanship is needed. B ut the sort of measures which, as 
we shall explain in the next chapter, ought in our view to be 
adopted, would not be worth the hardship and the cost they 
would entail unless they opened up the prospect of a final and 
lasting settlement of the Palestine problem. A nd that, we 
believe, Partition does, and Cantonisation manifestly does not.
10. F o r  Cantonisation does not settle the question of national 
se lf-g ov ernm en t. Cantonal autonom y would not satisfy for a 
moment th e  demands of A rab nationalism ; it would not raise the 
status o f Palestinian A rabs to the level of tha t enjoyed or soon 
to be e n jo y e d  by Arabs in the neighbouring countries. N or would 
it give th e  Jews the full freedom they desire to build up  their 
National Home in their own w ay at their own pace, nor offer 
them th e  prospect of realizing on a  small territorial scale all tha t 
Zionism means. And in the background, still clouding and dis­
turbing th e  situation from year to year, still intensifying the 
antagonism  between the races, would remain the old uncertainty 
as to th e  future destiny of Palestine.
11. Cantonisation, in sum, presents most, if not all, of the 
difficulties presented by  Partition without Partition’s one 
supreme advantage—the possibility it offers of eventual peace.
46497
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A PLAN OF PARTITION.
1. We return, then, to Partition as the only method we are 
able to propose for dealing with the root of the trouble.
2. At the time of our appointm ent, while the g r a v i ty  of the 
situation in Palestine was to some extent, though not to  its full 
extent, appreciated in this country, we think that th e  continu­
ance of the M andate was generally taken for granted, a n d  our 
term s of reference implied the hope th a t we should b e  able to 
m ake recommendations which, if adopted, would in o u r  opinion 
m ake it possible to bring about a lasting settlement without 
abandoning the M andate. B ut, as our inquiry p ro c e e d e d , we 
became more and  more persuaded that, if the existing Mandate 
continued, there was little hope of lasting peace in Palestine, 
and  a t the end we were convinced tha t there was none. It was 
clear to us th a t only drastic methods of dealing with th e  problem 
offered any prospect of success and th a t one such method, 
very difficult though it evidently was, should not b e  regarded 
as impossible. In  those circumstances we felt that w e  should 
be failing in our duty if we did no more than d e m o n s tra te ,  as 
we have tried to do in earlier chapters of this R e p o r t ,  th a t  the 
situation in Palestine has reached a  deadlock. W e  believe 
th a t Y our M ajesty's Governm ent would wish u s  to  submit 
to them  any suggestions we m ay be in a  position to m a k e  as to 
how th a t deadlock m ight possibly be overcome. I t is  t ru e  that 
the bulk of the evidence we have heard  was not d ire c t ly  con­
cerned with Partition, bu t in view of the fact tha t most o f it was 
relevant, directly or indirectly, for forming a ju d g m e n t  on  that 
issue, and in the light of other inform ation we h a v e  obtained 
as to past and present conditions in Palestine, we fe e l justified 
in recommending tha t Y our M ajesty’s Government sh o u ld  take 
the appropriate steps for the term ination of the present Mandate 
on the basis of Partition.
3 .  W hile we do not think Y our M ajesty's G o v e r n m e n t  would 
expect us to em bark on the further protracted in q u i r y  which 
would be needed for working out a scheme of P a r t i t i o n  in full I 
detail, it would be idle to p u t forw ard the principle o f  Partition 
and not to give it any concrete shape. Clearly we m u s t show 
th a t an actual plan can be devised which meets the m a in  require­
ments of the case. There seem to us to be three e s s e n t ia l  features 
of such a  plan. I t  m ust be practicable. I t  must conform  to 
our obligations. I t  m ust do justice to the Arabs and th e  Jews.
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1. A Treaty System.
4. The Mandate for Palestine should term inate and be 
replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent 
set in Iraq and Syria.
5. A new M andate for the Holy Places should be instituted 
to fulfil the purposes defined in Section 2 below.
6. Treaties of Alliance should be negotiated by the M andatory 
with the Government of T rans-Jordan and representatives of 
the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist 
Organisation on the other. These Treaties would declare that, 
within as short a period as m ay be convenient, two sovereign 
independent States would be established—the one an A rab 
State, consisting of T rans-Jordan united with that p a rt of 
Palestine which hes to the east and south of a frontier such as 
we suggest in Section 3 below; the other a Jewish State con­
sisting of that part of Palestine which hes to the north and  west 
of that frontier.
7. T h e  M andatory would undertake to support any requests 
for admission to the League of Nations which the Governments 
of the Arab and the Jew ish States m ight make in accordance 
with Article 1 of the Covenant.
8. The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the pro­
tection of minorities in  each State, and the financial and other 
provisions to which reference will be m ade in subsequent
Sections.
9. Military Conventions would be attached to the Treaties, 
dealing with the maintenance of naval, m ilitary and  air forces, 
the upkeep and use of ports, roads and railways, the security of 
the oil pipe line and so forth.
2. The Holy Places.
10. T h e  partition of Palestine is subject to the overriding 
lecessity of keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem  and Bethlehem 
inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them  for 
til the world. T hat, in the fullest sense of the m andatory 
ihrase, is “ a sacred trust of civilization ” —a trust on behalf 
lot m ere ly  of the peoples of Palestine bu t of multitudes in other 
ands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places.
11. A new M andate, therefore, should be fram ed with the 
ixecution of this trust as its prim ary purpose. An enclave 
hould be demarcated extending from a point north  of Jerusa- 
em to a  point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should 
)e p ro v id ed  by a corridor extending to the north of the m ain 
oad an d  to the south of the railw ay, including the towns of 
-ydda a n d  Ramie, and term inating at Jaffa.
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12. We regard the protection of the Holy Places as a per- 
m anent trust, unique in  its character and purpose, and not 
contem plated by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
N ations. W e subm it for consideration that, in order to avoid 
m isunderstanding, it m ight frankly be stated that this trust will 
only term inate if and when the League of Nations and the 
U nited States desire it to do so, and tha t, while it w ou ld  be the 
trustee's duty to promote the well-being and development of the 
local population concerned, it is not intended that in  course 
of time they should stand by themselves as a w ho lly  self- 
governing community.
13. G uarantees as to the rights of the Holy Places and free 
access thereto (as provided in Article 13 of the exis ting  Man­
date) , as to transit across the m andated area, and as to non­
discrimination in  fiscal, economic and other matters should be 
m aintained in accordance with the principles of the Mandate 
System. B ut the policy of the Balfour Declaration would not 
apply; and no question would arise of balancing A ra b  against 
Jew ish claims or vice versa. All the inhabitants of the terri­
tory  would stand on an equal footing. The only “ official 
language ”  would be tha t of the M andatory Adm inistration. 
Good and just governm ent without regard for sectional in­
terests would be its basic principle.
14. W e think it would accord with Christian sentiment in 
the world at large if N azareth and the Sea of G alilee (Lake 
Tiberias) were also covered by this M andate. We recommend 
that the M andatory should be entrusted with the administration 
of N azareth and  with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of 
the w aters and shores of Lake Tiberias.
15. The M andatory should similarly be charged with the 
protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, u­
ments and places in the A rab and Jew ish States as are l 
to the Jew s and the A rabs respectively.
16. F or the upkeep of the M andatory Government, a certain! 
revenue should be obtainable, especially from the large andl 
growing urban  population in its charge, both by way o f customs-l 
duties and  by direct taxation; bu t it m ight prove insufficient! 
for the norm al cost of the adm inistration. In  that event, we 
believe tha t, in  all the circumstances, Parliam ent would bel 
willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit. I
3. The Frontier. 1
17. The natural principle for the Partition of Palestine is tol 
separate the areas in  winch the Jew s have acquired land ani 
settled from  those which are wholly or m ainly occupied b l 
Arabs. As shown in Map No. 4 a t the end of this Report!
the Jew ish lands and colonies are mostly to be found in the
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M aritim e Plain between Al Majdal and Mount Carmel, in the 
n e ig h b o u r h o o d  of H aifa, in the Plain of Esdraelon and the 
Valley o f  Jezreel, and in the east of Galilee, i.e ., south of 
T iberias , on the shores of the Lake, near Safad, and in the 
Huleh Basin. The rest of Galilee* and the northern p a rt of 
the p l a i n  of Acre are almost wholly in Arab occupation. So 
also is t h e  central hill-country of old Sam aria and Judaea— 
except f o r  Jerusalem  and its vicinity. The towns of Nablus, 
Jenin a n d  Tulkarm , the last an outpost on the edge of the 
M aritim e Plain, are centres of Arab nationalism. Except 
in a n d  near Jerusalem  and a t H ebron, there are practically 
no Jews between Jenin  and Beersheba. This A rab block 
extends eastwards to the R iver Jordan  between the D ead Sea 
and Beisan. In  the area stretching south and south-east of 
B eersh eb a  to the Egyptian frontier, the Jews have bought some 
isolated blocks of land b u t the population is entirely Arab.
18. This existing separation of the area of Jew ish land and 
settlement from tha t of wholly or m ainly Arab occupation seems 
to us to offer a fair and practicable basis for Partition, provided 
feat, in accordance with the spirit of our obligations, (x) a 
reasonable allowance is m ade within the boundaries of the Jewish 
State for the growth of population and colonization, and (2) 
easonable compensation is given to the A rab State for the loss 
if land and revenue. This last is one of the reasons we give 
a paragraph 23 below for suggesting the paym ent of a sub- 
fention by the Jewish State to the Arab State in the event of 
’anition coming into force.
19. A ny proposal for Partition would be futile if it gave no 
ndication, however rough, as to how the most vital question 
d the whole m atter might be determined. W ith the inform ation 
t our command, we are not in a position to assert that the 
toposal we have to m ake in this m atter is the only solution of 
n obviously difficult problem . B ut as one solution of it, 
ihich in  our judgm ent would be both practicable and just, 
fe submit the following frontier, based on the principle stated 
bove. I t  is not possible for us to draw  a precise line: for 
lat purpose we would recommend the appointm ent of a Frontier 
Commission.
20. S ta rting  from  R as an N aqura, it follows the existing 
orthem and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias 
nd crosses the Lake to the outflow of the R iver Jo rdan  whence 
continues down the river to a point a little north of Beisan. 
t then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern 
ige of the Valley of Jezreel and  across the P lain of Esdraelon 
) a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carm el ridge
* We use th e  te rm  "  G a lile e  ”  to  in c lu d e  th e  S u b -D is tr ic ts  o f  A c re , S a fa d , 
teias and N a z a re th .
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in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road. Having thus 
reached the Maritime P lain, the line runs southwards down its 
eastern edge, curving west to avoid Tulkarm , until it reaches 
the Jerusalem -Jaffa corridor near Lydda. South of the Corridor 
it continues down the edge of the Plain to a point about 10 
miles south of Rehovot, whence it tu rns west to the sea.*
21. In  term s of the present adm inistrative divisions of 
Palestine, this frontier would mean the inclusion in the Jewish 
Area of the Sub-Districts of Acre, Safad, Tiberias, Nazareth 
and H aifa and parts of the Sub-Districts of Jenin, Tulkarm, 
Beisan, Jaffa and Ram ie; and  the inclusion in the Arab Area of 
the Sub-Districts of Nablus, R am allah, Jericho, Hebron, Gaza 
and Beersheba, and parts of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Jenin, 
Tulkarm , Jaffa, Ram ie, Jerusalem  and Bethlehem.
22. We m ake the following observations and recommenda­
tions with regard to the proposed frontier and to questions 
arising from i t :—
(i) No frontier can be draw n which separates all Arabs 
and Arab-owned land from all Jew s and Jewish-owned 
land.
(ii) The Jew s have purchased substantial blocks of land 
in the Gaza Plain and near Beersheba and obtained options 
for the purchase of other blocks in this area. The pro­
posed frontier would prevent the utilization of those lands 
for the southw ard expansion of the Jew ish National Home. 
On the other hand, the Jewish lands in Galilee, and in 
particular the Huleh basin (which, as we have explained 
in an earlier chapter, offers a notable opportunity for 
development and  colonization), would be in the Jewish 
Area.
(iii) The proposed frontier necessitates the inclusion in 
the Jew ish Area of the Galilee highlands between Safad and 
the P lain of Acre. I t  will be rem embered that this is the 
p art of Palestine in  which the Jew s have retained a foot­
hold alm ost if not entirely w ithout a break from the begin-] 
ning of the D iaspora to the present day, and that thel 
sentiment of all Jew ry  is deeply attached to the " holjj 
cities ”  of Safad and Tiberias, f  U ntil quite recently, 
moreover, the jew s in Galilee have lived on friendly terms! 
with their A rab neighbours; and throughout the series on 
“  disturbances ” the fellaheen of Galilee have shown themj 
selves less am enable to political incitement than thosel 
of Sam aria and Judaea , where the centres of Arab nationaj
* S ee  M a p  N o . 8 .
•f S ee  p a g e s  11 a n d  12 a b o v e .
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lism are located. At Tiberias, on the other hand (which 
contains 6,150 Jew s and 3,550 Arabs) and a t Safad (which 
contains 2,000 Jew s and 7,900 Arabs) the outbreak of last 
year has led to serious friction. There has been trouble also, 
though not so acute, in the two other “  mixed ”  towns in the 
Jewish Area—H aifa (about 50,000 Jew s and 48,000 Arabs) 
and Acre (8,550 Arabs and 250 Jews). We believe that 
it would greatly prom ote the successful operation of P a r­
tition in its early stages and in particular help to ensure 
the execution of the Treaty guarantees for the protection 
of minorities, if those four towns were kept for a period 
under M andatory adm inistration.
(iv) Jaffa is an essentially A rab town in which the Jewish 
minority has recently been dwindling. W e suggest tha t it 
should form p art of the Arab State. The question of its 
communication with the latter presents no difficulty, since 
transit through the Jaffa-Jerusalem  Corridor would be 
open to . all. The Corridor, on the other hand, re­
quires its own access to the sea, and for this purpose 
a narrow belt of land should be acquired and cleared on 
the north and south sides of the town. This would also 
solve the problem , sometimes said to be insoluble, created 
by the contiguity of Jaffa with Tel Aviv to the north and 
the nascent Jew ish town to the south. If  necessary, 
Mandatory police could be stationed on this belt. This 
arrangement m ay seem artificial, bu t it is clearly practic­
able.
(v) While the M editerranean would be accessible to the 
Arab State at Jaffa and at Gaza, we think tha t in the 
interests of Arab trade and industry the Arab State should 
also have access for commercial purposes to H aifa, the 
only existing deep-water port on the coast. We recommend, 
therefore, tha t the Jewish Treaty should provide for the 
free transit of goods in bond between the A rab State and 
Haifa.
The Arab Treaty, similarly, should provide for the free 
transit of goods in bond over the railway between the 
Jewish State and the Egyptian frontier.
The same principle applies to the question of access for 
commercial purposes to the Red Sea. The use of that 
exit to the E ast m ight prove in course of time of great 
advantage to both A rab and Jewish trade and industry, 
and we understand tha t the construction of a railw ay down 
the Wadi A raba has been contemplated. H aving regard 
to these possibilities we suggest tha t an  enclave on the 
north-west coast of the Gulf of A qaba should be retained
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under M andatory adm inistration, and tha t the Arab Treaty 
should provide for the free transit of goods between the 
Jew ish State and this enclave.
The Treaties should provide for similar facilities for the 
transit of goods between the M andated Area and Haifa 
the Egyptian frontier and  the Gulf of Aqaba.
4. Inter-State Subvention.
23. As we have explained in an  earlier chapter, the Jews 
contribute more per capita to the revenues of P a lestine  than 
the A rabs, and the Government has thereby been enabled to 
m aintain public services for the A rabs a t a  higher leve l than 
would otherwise have been possible. Partition w o u ld  mean, 
on the one hand, th a t the A rab A rea would no lo n g e r profit 
from the taxable capacity of the Jew ish Area. On the other 
hand, (1) the Jew s would acquire a  new right of sovereignty 
in the Jew ish A rea: (2) that Area, as we have defined it ,  would 
be larger than  the existing area of Jew ish land and settlement:
(3) the Jew s would be freed from their present lia b ility  for 
helping to prom ote the welfare of A rabs outside that A rea. It 
seems to us, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest th a t the 
Jewish State should pay a subvention to the A ra b  State 
when Partition comes into effect. There have been recent 
precedents for equitable financial arrangements of th is  kind 
in  those connected with the separation of Sind from Bombay 
and of Burm a from  the Indian Em pire ; and in accordance with 
those precedents we recommend tha t a  Finance Commission 
should be appointed to consider and report as to w hat the 
am ount of the subvention should be.
24. The Finance Commission should, also, consider and re­
port on the proportion in which the Public Debt o f Palestine, 
which now am ounts to about £4,500,000, should be divided 
between the A rab and the Jewish States, and on the m anner in 
which any other “  financial obligations legitimately incu rred  by 
the Adm inistration of Palestine during the period o f the Man­
date ”  should be honoured in accordance with Article 28 thereof. 
The Commission should also deal with the financial questions in­
volved in the administration of the railways, ports and telegraph 
and telephone systems in the event of Partition.
5. British Subvention.
25. The Inter-State Subvention would adjust the financial 
balance in Palestine; bu t it m ust be remembered th a t the plan 
we are subm itting involves the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in 
the A rab State. The taxable capacity of Trans-Jordan is very 
low and its revenues have never sufficed to meet the cost of its
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a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  From  1921 to the present day it has received 
e r a n t s - i n - a id  from the United Kingdom, which have amounted 
to a total sum of £1,253,000 or an  average of about £78,000 
a year. Grants have also been m ade towards the cost of the 
T r a n s - Jordan Frontier Force, and loans to the am ount of 
£60,575, of which about £30,000 has been repaid, have been 
p r o v id e d  for earthquake-relief and the distribution of seed.
26. T h e  Mandate for T rans-Jordan ought not in our opinion 
to be relinquished without securing, as far as possible, that 
the s ta n d a rd  of adm inistration should not fall too low through 
lack of funds to m aintain it; and it is in this m atter, we subm it, 
that th e  British people might fairly be asked to do their part 
in fa c ilita tin g  a settlement. The continuance of the present 
Mandate, as we have more than once pointed out, would almost 
inevitably involve a recurrent and  increasing charge on the 
British Treasury. If peace can be prom oted by Partition, 
money spent on helping to bring it about and making it more 
effective for its purpose would surely be well spent. And apart 
from any such considerations we think that the British people, 
great a s  their financial burdens now are, would agree to a 
capital payment in lieu of their present annual liability, as a 
means towards honouring their obligations and making peace in 
Palestine.
27. We recommend, therefore, tha t in the event of the Treaty 
System coming into force, Parliam ent should be asked to make a 
grant of £2,000,000 to the A rab State.
6. Tariffs and Ports.
28. The Arab and Jewish States, being sovereign independent 
States, would determine their own tariffs. Subject to the terms 
of the Mandate, the same would apply to the M andatory Govern­
ment.
29. W e recognize the crux arising from the fact tha t the 
tariff-policies of the A rab and  Jewish States are likely to con­
flict. The prevention of smuggling might be difficult and costly. 
It would greatly ease the position and it would promote the in­
terests o f both the Arab and Jewish States if they could agree 
to impose identical customs-duties on as m any articles as pos­
sible, and if the M andatory Government, likewise, could assimi­
late its customs-duties as far as might be with those of one or 
both o f the two States.
We regard it as an  essential part of the proposed Treaty 
System that a commercial convention should be concluded with 
a view to establishing a common tariff over the widest possible 
range of imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible 
"terchange of goods between the three territories concerned.
. It would simplify the situation a t one point if it were provided 
the commercial convention tha t the town of Jaffa, while 
eated for all other purposes as an outlying part of the Arab
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State, should be treated for tariff purposes as part of the man- 
dated Jaffa-Jerusalem  Corridor. The customs-duties paid on 
goods destined for Jaffa would accrue to the Arab State, but 
the rates of duty would be those fixed for goods destined for 
the M andated Area.
30. I t  would prom ote, we think, the smooth working of Par- 
tition a t the outset if the collection of customs a t the ports 
were entrusted for a period to the M andatory Government. We 
suggest, therefore, tha t not only a t H aifa and Acre, which we 
have proposed should in any case rem ain for a time under 
M andatory adm inistration, bu t also a t Jaffa and Tel A v iv  and 
if it should be found necessary, a t other points, the Mandatory 
Government should collect the customs-duties a n d  rem it the 
sums paid on im ports destined for the Arab State, the Jewish 
State and the M andated Area to their respective Treasuries.
31. W e should regard it as highly undesirable th a t the pro­
vision recently m ade for loading and landing goods a t Tel Aviv 
should be expanded into a  substantial harbour q u ite  detached 
from Jaffa. I f  the need for a second deep-water p o rt besides 
H aifa be established, we recommend the adoption o f the plan 
for a  joint port for Jaffa and Tel Aviv. In  the  event oi 
Partition such a  port should be controlled by  a J o in t Harbour 
B oard, composed of representatives of the Arab and  Jewish 
States and presided over by  an officer of the Mandatory Govern­
ment.
7. Nationality.
32. All persons domiciled in the M andated Area (including 
H aifa, Tiberias, Safad, and  the enclave on the Gulf of Aqaba, 
as long as they rem ain under M andatory administration) who 
now possess the status of British protected persons would retain 
it; bu t apart from this all Palestinians would become the 
nationals of the States in which they are domiciled.
8. Civil Services.
33. I t  seems probable tha t, in the event of P a r ti tio n , the 
services of the A rab and Jew ish officials in the p re - e x is t in g  Man­
datory A dm inistration would to a large extent be req u ired  by 
the Governments of the A rab and Jew ish States respectively, 
whereas the num ber of British officials would be substantially 
reduced. The rights of all of them , including rights to  pensions 
or gratuities, m ust be fully honoured in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 28 of the existing M andate, it b e in g  borne 
in m ind that, under any  plan of Partition, there w ill be three 
Governments in place of the single Government o f Palestine 
which is contem plated in tha t Article as being established in the 
event of the term ination of the M andate. This m a t te r  should 
be dealt with by  the Finance Commission.
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9. Industrial Concessions.
34. In the event of Partition agreements entered into by the 
Government of Palestine for the development and security of 
industries (e.g., the agreement with the Palestine Potash Com­
pany) should be taken over and carried out by  the Governments 
0{ the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees to that effect should 
be given in the Treaties. The security of the Electric Power 
Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.
10. Exchange of Land and Population.
35. We have left to the last the two-fold question which, after 
that of the Frontier, is the most im portant and most difficult 
of all the questions which Partition in any shape involves.
36. If Partition is to be effective in promoting a final settle­
ment it must m ean more than drawing a  frontier and establish- 
ng two States. Sooner or later there should be a  transfer of 
and and, as far as possible, an  exchange of population.
37. As regards land, the Jew s on the one hand m ay wish
0 dispose of some or all of the lands now owned by them 
which he within the boundaries of the A rab State, and their 
Jewish occupants m ay wish to move into the Jewish 
State and resume their life on the land therein. The 
Arabs on the other hand m ay likewise be willing to sell 
the land they own within the boundaries of the Jewish 
State. But what is to become, in that case, of its occupants, 
whether owners or tenants or labourers ? W hether they rem ain 
in the Jewish State or move into the A rab State, where there 
is under present conditions no cultivable land to spare, there 
is a manifest risk of their becoming a “  landless proletariat ” .
38. The Treaties should provide that, if A rab owners of land 
in the Jewish State or Jewish owners of land in the A rab State 
should wish to sell their land and any plantations or crops 
thereon, the Government of the State concerned should be 
responsible for the purchase of such land, plantations and crops 
at a price to be fixed, if required, by the M andatory Adminis­
tration. We suggest that for this purpose a  loan should, if 
required, be guaranteed for a reasonable am ount.
39. The political aspect of the land-problem is still more 
important. Owing to the fact tha t there has been no census 
since 1931 it is impossible to calculate with precision the distri­
bution of population between the proposed A rab and Jewish 
areas, but, according to an approxim ate estimate supplied to us, 
in the area allocated in our plan to the Jewish State (excluding 
the urban districts which we suggest should be retained for a
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period under M andatory adm inistration) there are now about 
225,000 Arabs. In  the area allotted to the Arab State there are 
only some 1,250 Jew s: bu t in Jerusalem  and Haifa there are 
about 125,000 Jew s as against 85,000 Arabs. The existence of 
these minorities clearly constitutes the most serious hindrance to 
the smooth and successful operation of Partition. The “ Minority 
Problem  ”  has become only too fam iliar in recent years 
whether in Europe or in Asia. It; is one of the most
troublesome and intractable products of post-war nationalism' 
and nationalism  in Palestine, as we have seen, is at 
least as intense a force as it is anywhere else in the 
world. W e believe th a t Partition, once effected, might 
ultim ately moderate and appease it as nothing else could. 
But it is, of course, too much to hope tha t after Partition there 
would be no friction a t all between Arabs and Jews, no 
“  incidents ” , no recriminations, keeping open the wound which 
Partition m ust inflict. If  then the settlement is to be clean and 
final, this question of the minorities m ust be boldly faced and 
firmly dealt with. I t  calls for the highest statesmanship on the 
part of all concerned.
40. An instructive precedent is afforded, as it happens, by 
the exchange effected between the Greek and Turkish popula­
tions on the morrow of the Greco-Turkish W ar of 1922. On 
the initiative of D r. Nansen a convention was signed by the 
Greek and Turkish Governments a t the beginning of 1923, 
providing tha t Greek nationals of the Orthodox religion living 
in Turkey should be compulsorily removed to Greece, and 
Turkish nationals of the Moslem religion living in Greece to 
Turkey. To control the operation a  Mixed Commission and 
a group of sub-commissions were established, consisting of 
representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and of 
the League of Nations. The num bers involved were high— 
no less than  some 1,300,000 Greeks and some 400,000 Turks. 
But so vigorously and effectively was the task accomplished 
that within about eighteen months from  the spring of 1923 
the whole exchange was completed. Dr. Nansen was sharply 
criticized at the time for the inhum anity of his proposal, and the 
operation manifestly imposed the gravest hardships on multi­
tudes of people. B ut the courage of the Greek and Turkish 
statesmen concerned has been justified by the result. Before 
the operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a 
constant irritant. Now the ulcer has been clean cut out, and 
Greco-Turkish relations, we understand, are friendlier than 
they have ever been before.
41. U nfortunately for our purposes the analogy breaks dovffl 
at one essential point. In  N orthern Greece a  surplus of cul­
tivable land was available or could rapidly be made available 
for the settlement of the Greeks evacuated from Turkey, In 
Palestine there is a t present no such surplus. Room existe or 
could soon be provided within the proposed boundaries of the
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eivish S ta te  for the Jew s now living in the A rab Area. I t is 
ie far greater num ber of A rabs who constitute the m ajor 
roblem; a n d ,  while some of them  could be re-settled on the 
md v a c a t e d  by the Jew s, fa r more land would be required 
ir the re-settlement of all of them . On earlier pages of this 
eport we drew attention to the lack of adequate evidence on 
lis question, but such inform ation as was available seemed to 
s as we said, to justify the hope tha t the execution of large- 
ale p lans for irrigation, w ater-storage, and development in 
rans-J o rd a n —and the sam e applies to Beersheba and the 
ordan V a lle y —would m ake provision for a much larger popu- 
don th a n  exists there a t the present time.
42. T h e  immediate need, therefore, is for those areas to 
• s u r v e y e d  and an  authoritative estimate m ade of the practical 
jssib ilities of irrigation and development. This, we suggest, 
lould b e  undertaken a t once, and the requisite staff and funds 
•ovided f o r  its completion in  the shortest possible time. If,
1 a result, it is clear th a t a substantial am ount of land could 
imade available for the re-settlem ent of Arabs living in the 
iwish area, the most strenuous efforts should be m ade to obtain
1 agreement for the exchange of land and population. The 
ovision o f new land  would bring the position in Palestine and 
ans-Jo rdan  closer to w hat it was in 1923 in Turkey and 
eece, and the num ber of people involved would be very  much 
îaller. In view of the present antagonism  between the races 
id of the manifest advantage to both of them  of reducing the 
iportunities of future friction to the utm ost, it is to be hoped 
at the A ra b  and the Jew ish leaders might show the same high 
itesmanship as th a t of the Turks and the Greeks and m ake the 
me bold decision for the sake of peace. If an  agreem ent on 
ï question were secured, provisions should be inserted in or 
Ided to the  Treaties for the transfer, under the supervision 
d control of the M andatory G overnm ent, of land and popula- 
n to the extent to which new land is, or m ay within a 
isonable period become, available for re-settlem ent.
13;  We th in k  that in the event of Partition friction would be 
s like ly to  occur in the hill-country of N orth Galilee with its 
tolly A rab  population than in the plain-lands where the popu- 
ion is mixed. In  the form er area, therefore, it m ight not be 
cessary to  effect a greater exchange of land and population 
m could be effected on a voluntary basis. B ut as regards the 
iins, in c lu d in g  Beisan, and as regards all such Jew ish colonies 
remained in  the A rab State when the Treaties came into force, 
should be part of the agreem ent that in the last resort the 
iange would be com pulsory.
14- The cost of the proposed irrigation and developm ent 
lerae w ou ld  be heavier than the A rab State could, in our 
“ ion, be expected to bear. H ere again we believe that the
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B ritish people would be willing to help to bring about a settle- 
m ent; and we recom mend th a t, if an arrangement could be 
m ade for the transfer, voluntary or otherwise, of land and 
population, Parliam ent should be asked to make a grant to 
m eet the cost of the aforesaid scheme. '  J
45. If the results of the survey were favourable, the exe­
cution of the scheme would take a considerable time, and in all 
probability the proposed T reaty  System would come into opera­
tion before it was com pleted. I t  should therefore be laid down I 
in the Treaties th a t the full control of this work, as also of any 
such operations for the exchange of land and population as may 
be agreed on, should continue to be exercised by the Mandatory 
Governm ent until its completion.
46. If  irrigation and developm ent should prove practicable 
on such a  scale as m ay be hoped, it is clear th a t the work should 
be carried out with the least possible delay. The Palestine! 
Governm ent as a t present constituted could not be expected toi 
cope with it. I t  would try  beyond its strength an already! 
overtried adm inistration. W e think, m oreover, that some oi 
the ordinary rules of Crown Colony governm ent should be modi 
fied to meet this exceptional case. W e suggest that a nel 
Partition D epartm ent should be established a t Jerusalem tl 
deal with the irrigation and developm ent work and sudil 
exchange-operations as m ay follow on it. The Départi»! 
should be directly under the H igh Commissioner; the headol 
it should have the sam e status as the Chief Secretary; and il 
should possess a  reasonable m easure of independence in ill 
adm inistration of the funds voted by  Parliament. II 
seems to us essential th a t some special arrangement shone 
be m ade to prevent the inevitable and often protracted delaw 
which would arise if every item  of expenditure, however small 
had  to be referred either to the B ritish or the Palestine Treasure 
for sanction. The appointm ent of a  representative of the 
British T reasury as Financial D irector of the proposed Depart! 
m ent m ight perhaps meet the case. I
47. Such is the plan of Partition which we submit to the conl 
sidération of Y our M ajesty’s Government. We believe that! 
fulfils the essential conditions of Partition and demonstrates that! 
if Palestine ought to be divided, it can be divided. I
4 8 . I t rem ains to deal briefly with the m ain points th a t woule 
arise in the im m ediate future if it should be agreed to  terminate 
the M andate and  establish a  T reaty System on a basis of P a il 
tition. The new regime could not, of course, be in tro d u c e d * 
once. There would necessarily be a  period of tra n s itio n  before 
the new M andate and the Treaties came into force, and dun* 
this period the existing M andate would continue to  b e  th e gov* 
pin in g instrum ent of the Palestine Administration. B u t t i l  
recom m endations we m ade in P a rt I I  of this Report as to whe 
should be done under the existing M andate p r e s u p p o s e d  nfl
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c o n tin u a n c e  for an indefinite time. Clearly they would not as a 
whole a p p l y  to so changed a  situation as the prospect of P ar­
tition w o u l d  bring about. The character of th a t situation would 
largely d e p e n d  on the kind of scheme adopted; but under any 
scheme certain m ain questions would arise, and we think Y our 
M ajes ty 's  Government would wish us to express our opinion as 
to h o w  those questions should be settled.
4 9 . The following, then, are our recommendations for the 
period o f  transition.
(1) Land.
Steps should be taken to prohibit the purchase of land by  Jew s 
within the Arab Area (i.e., the area of the projected A rab State) 
or by Arabs within the Jew ish Area (i.e., the area of the pro­
jected Jewish State).
The settlement of the plain-lands of the Jew ish Area should 
be completed within two years.
(2) Immigration.
Instead of the political “  high-level ”  recommended in 
Chapter X, paragraph 97, there should be a territorial restric­
tion on Jewish im m igration. No Jew ish im m igration into the 
Arab Area should be perm itted. Since it would therefore not 
affect the Arab Area and since the Jew ish State would soon be­
come responsible for its results, the volume of Jew ish im m igra­
tion should be determ ined by  the economic absorptive capacity 
of Palestine less the A rab Area.
3) Trade.
Negotiations should be opened w ithout delay to secure the 
amendment of Article 18 of the M andate and to place the ex­
ternal trade of Palestine upon a  fairer basis.
4) Advisory Council.
The Advisory Council should, if possible, be enlarged by the 
nomination of A rab and Jew ish representatives; bu t, if either 
)arty refused to serve, the Council should continue as a t present.
5) Local Government.
The municipal system should be reformed on expert advice 
as recommended in C hapter X V II, paragraph 31.
6) Education.
A vigorous effort should be m ade to increase the num ber of 
Irab schools. The “  mixed schools "  situated in the area to 
>e administered under the new M andate should be given every 
support, and the possibility of a British U niversity should be 
considered (as recom mended in C hapter X V I, paragraph 28), 
since those institutions m ight p lay an im portant part after P ar- 
ition in helping to bring about an ultim ate reconciliation of the 
races.
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CONCLUSION.
1. “  H alf a loaf is better than no bread ”  is a peculiarly I 
English proverb; and, considering the attitude which both the 
A rab and the Jew ish representatives adopted in giving evidence I 
before us, we th ink  it im probable th a t either party w ill bel 
satisfied at first sight w ith the proposals we have subm itted  for I 
the adjustm ent of their rival claims. F or Partition means that I 
neither will get all it w ants. I t  means th a t the A rabs must) 
acquiesce in  the exclusion from  their sovereignty o f a piece of I 
territo ry , long occupied and once ruled by  them . I t  means that I 
the Jew s m ust be content w ith less than  the L and of Is rae l they | 
once ruled and have hoped to rule again. B ut it seems to us| 
possible th a t on reflection both parties will come to realize that| 
the draw backs of P artition  are outweighed by  its advantages. I 
F or, if it offers neither party  all it w ants, if offers each what it| 
w ants most, nam ely freedom  and security.
2. The advantages to the A rabs of P artition on th e  lines we| 
have proposed m ay be sum m arized as follows:—
(i) They obtain their national independence and  can co-j 
operate on an equal footing w ith the A rabs of the  neigh-1 
bouring countries in the cause of A rab unity a n d  progress. [
(ii) They are finally delivered from  the fear of being| 
“  swamped ”  by  the Jew s and from  the possibility 
ultim ate subjection to Jew ish rule.
(iii) In  particular, the final lim itation of ’ th e  Jewishl 
N ational Home within a fixed frontier and the enactment | 
of a  new M andate for the protection of the H o ly  Places, I 
solem nly guaranteed by the League of N ations, removes all 
anxiety lest the H oly Places should ever come u n d e r Jewish | 
control.
(iv) As a  set-off to the loss of territo ry  the A r a b s  regard I 
as theirs, the A rab State will receive a subvention from  the 
Jew ish State. I t  will also, in view of the backw ardness I 
of T rans-Jordan , obtain a grant of £2,000,000 fro m  the 
B ritish T reasury; and, if an  arrangem ent can b e  m ad e  for 
the exchange of land and population, a f u r th e r  grant 
will be m ade for the conversion, as far as m a y  prove 
possible, of uncultivable land in the A rab State in to  pro­
ductive land from  which the cultivators and the S ta te  alike | 
will profit.
3. The advantages of P artition  to the Jew s may be sum-1 
m arized as follows :—
(i) P artition  secures the establishm ent of the  Jewish 
N ational Home and relieves it from  the p o s s ib ility  of its | 
being subjected in the fu ture to A rab rule.
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(ii) Partition enables the Jew s in the fullest sense to call 
their National Home their ow n: for it converts it into a 
Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to adm it as m any 
Jews into it as they themselves believe can be absorbed. 
They will attain  the prim ary objective of Zionism—a Jewish 
nation, planted in Palestine, giving its nationals the same 
status in the world as other nations give theirs. They will 
cease at last to live a  "  m inority life.”
4. To both Arabs and Jew s P artition  offers a prospect—and 
e see no such prospect in any  other policy—of obtaining the 
e s t im a b le  boon of peace. I t  is surely w orth some sacrifice 
n both sides if the quarrel which the M andate started could
ended with its term ination. I t  is not a natural o r old-stand- 
g feud. An able A rab exponent of the A rab case told us 
at the Arabs throughout their history have not only been 
e from anti-Jewish sentim ent bu t have also shown th a t the 
irit of compromise is deeply rooted in their life. And he went 
to express his sym pathy with the fate of the Jew s in Europe.
' There is no decent-m inded person ," he said, “  who would 
ot want to do everything hum anly possible to relieve the dis- 
ess o f those persons,”  provided th a t it was “  not a t the cost 
f in flicting a corresponding distress on another people.”  Con- 
dering what the possibility of finding a refuge in Palestine 
eans to many thousands of suffering Jew s, we cannot believe 
t the “ distress ”  occasioned by Partition , great as it would 
, is more than A rab generosity can bear. And in this, as 
so m uch else connected w ith Palestine, it is not only the 
pies o f that country tha t have to be considered. The Jew ish 
oblem is not the least of the m any problem s which are dis­
hing international relations at this critical time and obstruct- 
g the path to peace and prosperity. If the Arabs a t some 
crifice could help to solve tha t problem , they would earn 
e gratitude not of the Jew s alone b u t of all the W estern 
orld.
5. There was a  tim e w hen A rab statesm en were willing to 
oncede lit t le  Palestine to the Jew s, provided th a t the rest of 
■ab Asia were free. T hat condition was not fulfilled then, 
lit it is on the eve of fulfilment now. In  less than three years’ 
; e a ll the wide A rab area outside Palestine between the 
editerranean and the Ind ian  Ocean will be independent, and, 
Partition is adopted, the greater p art of Palestine will be 
dependent too.
6. There is no need to stress the advantage to the British 
ople of a settlem ent in Palestine. W e are bound to honour
0 the utmost of our pow er the obligations we undertook in the 
xigencies of w ar tow ards the Arabs and the Jew s. W hen
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those obligations were incorporated in the M andate, w e  did not! 
fully realize the difficulties of the task it laid on us. W e have! 
tried  to overcome them , not always w ith success. T h e y  have! 
steadily become greater till now they seem almost insuperable I  
P artition  offers a  possibility of finding a w ay through them! 
a  possibility of obtaining a  final solution of the p r o b le m  which! 
does justice to the rights and aspirations of both the A rab s andl 
the Jew s and discharges the obligations we undertook toward* 
them  tw enty years ago to the fullest extent th a t is p ra c tic ab le  ini 
the circum stances of the present time.
7. N or is it only the B ritish people, nor only the nation 
which conferred the M andate or approved it, who are troublet 
by  w hat has happened and is happening in Palestine. Number-1 
less men and women all over the world would feel a sense oil 
deep relief if somehow an end could be pu t to strife and bloodj 
shed in a thrice hallowed land.
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R . COUPLAND.
A PPE N D IX  1.
MANDATE FOR PALESTINE.
T E X T  OF A RTICLES NOT QUOTED IN  CHAPTER || zpAB 
GRAPH 40) TO G ETH ER  W IT H  A NOTE BY T H E  SECRETAR 
GENERAL OF T H E  LEAGUE OF NATIONS RELATING TOTH 
APPLIC ATIO N  OF T H E  M A ND ATE TO T H E  TERRitor 
KNOW N AS TRANS-JORDAN, UND ER  T H E  PROVISIONS 0 
A R TIC LE  25.
A rtic le  5.
T he M andatory shall be responsible for seeing th a t no Palestine  terri 
shall be ceded or leased to , or in  an y  w ay placed under th e  control 
th e G overnm ent o f any foreign Power.
A rtic le  8.
T he privileges and im m unities of foreigners, including th e  benefits 
consular jurisdiction and protection as form erly enjoyed by Capitula1' 
or usage in  th e O ttom an E m pire, shall n ot be applicable in Palestine.
U nless th e  Pow ers w hose nationals enjoyed th e  afore-mentioned pri 
leges a n d  im m unities on A ugust 1st, 1914, shall have previously renoun 
th e right to  th eir re-establishm ent, or shall have agreed to  their b 
application for a specified period, th ese privileges and immunities 
a t th e  expiration of th e  m andate, be im m ediately re-established in 
en tirety  or w ith  such m odifications as m ay have been agreed upon be 
the Pow ers concerned.
A rtic le  10.
P ending th e m aking of special extradition  agreem ents relating 
P alestin e, th e  extrad ition  treaties in  force betw een th e M andatory 
other foreign Pow ers sh all app ly  to  P alestine.
A rticle  12.
T he M andatory shall be entrusted w ith  th e  control of th e  forei 
relations o f P alestin e and th e  right to  issue exequaturs to  ar~ 
appointed b y  foreign Pow ers. H e shall also be entitled  to afford dr 
m atic and consular protection  to  citizen s o f P alestine when outside ' 
territorial lim its.
A rtic le  14.
A  special Com m ission shall be appointed b y  th e  M an d a to ry  to stu 
define and determ ine th e  rights and claim s in  connection w ith  the Hoi 
P laces and the rights and claim s relating to  th e different religious 
m unities in  Palestine. T he m ethod of nom ination, th e composition 
the functions of th is  Com m ission shall be subm itted  to  the Council of 
League for its  approval, and th e  Com m ission shall n ot be appointed 
enter upon its  functions w ith ou t th e approval of th e  Council.
A rticle  17.
T he A dm inistration o f P alestine m ay organise on  a  voluntary basis 
forces necessary for th e preservation o f peace and order, an d  also for 
defence o f the country, subject, how ever, to  th e supervision of 
M andatory, bu t shall n o t use them  for purposes other th a n  those abo 
specified save w ith  th e  consent of th e M andatory. E x cep t for sa 
purposes, no m ilitary, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained 
th e  A dm inistration of P alestine.
N oth in g  in  th is  article shall preclude th e  Adm inistration of Pales 
from  contributing to  th e  cost o f th e  m aintenance of the forces of 
M andatory in  Palestine.
T he M andatory shall be en titled  a t a ll tim es to  use th e roads, railwa 
and ports of P alestine for th e m ovem ent of arm ed forces and the 
of fu el and supplies.
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A rtic le  1 9 .
He Mandatory shall adhere on behalf o f the A dm inistration o f P alestine
0 any general international conventions already existing, or w hich m ay  
s concluded hereafter w ith  th e  approval of th e  L eague of N ations, 
gpecting the slave traffic, th e  traffic in  arms and am m unition, or the  
jjfic in drugs, or relating to  com m ercial equality, freedom  of transit 
nd navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless 
ommnnication or literary, artistic or industrial property.
A rtic le  20.
The Mandatory shall co-operate on  behalf o f th e A dm inistration of 
destine, so far as religious, social and other conditions m ay perm it, in  
ie execution of any com m on p o licy  adopted b y  the L eague of N ations 
jr preventing and com bating disease, including diseases o f p lants and
limais.
A rtic le  21.
The Mandatory shall secure th e  enactm ent w ith in  tw elve m onths from  
fe date, and shall ensure th e  execution  o f a  Law  of A ntiqu ities based on 
ie following rules. T h is law  shall ensure equality  of treatm ent in  the 
atter of excavations and archæ ological research to  th e  nations o f all 
totes Members of the L eague of N ations.
(1)
" Antiquity ” m eans any construction or any product o f hum an activ ity  
irlier than the year a .d . 1700.
(2)
The law for the protection of antiqu ities shall proceed b y  encouragem ent 
ither than by threat.
Any person who, having discovered an an tiq u ity  w ithout being furnished 
ith the authorisation referred to  in  paragraph 5 , reports th e sam e to  an 
Ecial of th e  com petent D epartm ent, shall be rewarded according to  the 
due of the  discovery.
(3 )
No antiquity m ay be disposed o f excep t to  th e  com petent D epartm ent, 
less this Departm ent renounces th e  acquisition  of any such an tiq u ity .
No antiquity  m ay leave th e  country w ithout an export licence from  the  
id Departm ent.
(4 )
Any person w ho m aliciously or negligently destroys or dam ages an 
itiquity shall be liable to  a p enalty  to  be fixed.
(5 )
No clearing of ground or digging w ith  th e  object of finding antiquities 
all be p e rm itted , under pen alty  o f fine, except to  persons authorised  
p the com petent D epartm ent.
(6)
Equitable te rm s shall be fixed  for expropriation, tem porary or perm anent, 
lands which m ight be of h istorical or archæological interest.
(7 )
Authorisation to  excavate shall on ly  b e granted to  persons w ho show  
■Scient g u aran tees of archæ ological experience. T he A dm inistration  
Palestine shall not, in  granting these authorisations, act in  such a w ay  
; exclude scholars of any nation  w ith ou t good grounds.
(8)
The proceeds of excavations m ay be divided betw een th e  excavator 
id the com petent D epartm ent in a proportion fixed  b y  th at D epartm ent, 
division seems im possible for scientific reasons, th e  excavator shall 
cave a fair indem nity in lieu  of a  part o f th e fin d .
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A r tic le  2 4 .
The M andatory shall m ake to  th e  Council of th e L eague of Nation 
an anual report to  th e satisfaction  o f th e  Council as to  the measures takei 
during th e  year to  carry ou t th e  provisions o f th e m andate. Copies of al 
law s and regulations prom ulgated or issued during the year shall t> 
com m unicated w ith  th e report.
A rtic le  26.
The M andatory agrees th a t, if an y  dispute w hatever should aria 
betw een th e M andatory and another M ember of th e L eague of Nation 
relating to  th e  interpretation or th e application o f the provisions of th 
m andate, such d ispute, if it  cannot be settled  b y  negotiation, shall b 
subm itted  to  th e  Perm anent Court of Inem ational Justice provided for b 
A rticle 14 o f th e  C ovenant of th e L eague of N ations.
Note.
G e n e v a ,
September 23rd, 1922.
A R TIC LE 25 O F T H E  P A L E ST IN E  MANDATE.
T erritory known as Trans-Jordan.
N o t e  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y -G e n e r a l .
The Secretary-G eneral has th e  honour to  com m unicate for the inform 
tion  of th e  M embers of th e  L eague, a  m em orandum  relating to Article ! 
of th e P alestine M andate presented b y  th e  B ritish  Government to tl 
Council of th e  L eague on  Septem ber 16th, 1922.
T he m em orandum  w as approved b y  th e Council subject to the decisio 
taken  a t its  m eetin g in  London on  Ju ly 24th, 1922, w ith regard to tl 
com ing in to  force o f th e  P alestine and Syrian m andates.
M e m o r a n d u m  b y  t h e  B r i t i s h  R e p r e s e n t a t iv e  .
1. A rticle 25 of th e  M andate for P alestin e provides as follows : —
" I n  th e  territories ly in g  betw een th e  Jordan and the eastei 
boundary o f P alestin e as u ltim ately  determ ined, th e Mandatory sb 
be en titled , w ith  th e  consent o f th e Council o f the League of Natioi 
to  postpone or w ithhold  application  o f such provisions of this Manda 
as he m ay consider inapplicable to  th e  ex isting  local conditions, ai 
to  m ake such provision for th e  adm inistration of th e territories as 1 
m ay consider su itable to  th ose conditions, provided no action shall 1 
taken w hich is  in consisten t w ith  th e provisions of Articles 15, 
and 18.”
2. In  pursuance o f the provisions o f th is A rticle, His Majesty 
G overnm ent in v ite  th e  Council to  pass th e  follow ing resolution:—
“ T he follow ing provisions o f th e M andate for Palestine are » 
applicable to  th e  territory know n as Trans-Jordan, which compris 
a ll territory ly in g  to  th e  east o f a  line drawn from a point two mil 
w est of th e  tow n of A kaba on th e  G ulf of th a t name up the cent 
of th e W ady A raba, D ead  Sea and R iver Jordan to  its junction wi 
the R iver Yarm uk; then ce up th e  centre of th a t river to the Syri 
F rontier."
P ream ble .— R ecitals 2 and 3.
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Article 2.— The words " placing th e  country under such political 
administrative and econom ic conditions as w ill secure th e  
establishment of th e Jew ish national hom e, as laid  down in  the 
preamble, and
Article 4.
Article 6.
Article 7.— The sentence “  There shall be included in  th is law  pro­
visions fram ed so as to  facilita te th e acquisition of P alestinian  
citizenship b y  Jew s who take up th eir perm anent residence in  
Palestine.”
Article 11.—The second sentence o f th e first paragraph and th e  second  
paragraph.
Article 13.
Article 14.
Article 22.
Article 23.
In the application o f th e  M andate to  Trans-Jordan, th e action  w hich, 
in Palestine, is taken b y  th e  A dm inistration of the la tter country, w ill 
k taken by the A dm inistration o f Trans-Jordan under the general super­
vision of the M andatory.
3. His M ajesty's G overnm ent accept fu ll responsib ility as M andatory 
Trans-Jordan, and undertake th a t such provision as m ay be m ade for 
the administration of th a t territory in  accordance w ith  A rticle 25 of the  
Mandate shall be in  no w ay inconsistent w ith  those provisions o f th e  
Mandate which are n ot b y  th is resolution declared inapplicable.
A PPE N D IX  2.
REPRESENTATIONS ADDRESSED TO T H E  H IG H  COMMISSIONER  
BY T H E  H IG H E R  ARAB OFFICIALS. '
Jerusalem ,
30th June, 1936.
We, the undersigned, Arab officers in  th e  first d ivision  of th e  Service, 
feel it our urgent du ty  to  bring th e  follow ing m atters to  Y our E xcellen cy's  
notice.
2. In addition to our general duties as c iv il servants, a  particular du ty  
lies on us as Arab officers, w hich is th a t of serving as a link betw een  
Government and th e Arab population w ith  w hom  we are naturally in  
doser contact, of interpreting to  th e  public th e acts of G overnm ent in  
their true light, and o f explain ing to  G overnm ent th e  feelings and needs
oi the Arab population. W e have alw ays been given  to  understand th a t 
that aspect of our d uties, especially  in  v iew  o f th e  non-existence of 
representative institu tions, w as an  essential one; and we have alw ays 
regarded it as such. I t  is in  pursuance o f th a t conception of our duties 
that we venture, w ith  all respect, to  subm it th e follow ing : —
3- The underlying cause of th e  present d iscontent is th a t th e  Arab
"Filiation of all classes, creeds and occupations is anim ated b y  a profound  
jwse of injustice done to  them . T hey feel th a t insufficient regard has 
paid in the p a st to  their legitim ate grievances, even though  those
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grievances had been inquired in to  b y  qualified and im partial official investi 
gators, and to  a  large ex ten t v ind icated  b y  those inquiries. As a result 
tiie  Arabs have been driven in to  a sta te  verging on despair; and th 
present unrest is no m ore than  an expression o f th a t despair.
4. T he fa c t m u st be faced th a t th a t feeling of despair is largely to b 
traced to  loss of fa ith  on th e  part o f th e Arabs in the value of officia 
pledges and assurances for th e  future, and to  th e  fact th a t  they an 
genuinely alarm ed a t th e  ex ten t to  w hich H is M ajesty’s Governm ent hav 
from  tim e to  tim e given  w ay to  Z ionist pressure. Their confidence wa 
severely  shaken as far back as 1931, w hen th e Prim e M inister's letter t 
D r. W eizm ann w as issued as an interpretation of th e  W hite Paper of iq» 
B u t more recen tly , w hen th e  projects regarding th e  L egisla tive  Counci 
and th e restriction  of sales o f land were h o tly  challenged in Parliament 
their loss o f confidence turned to  despair.
W e  should be doing a  disservice to  G overnm ent and a n  injury to on 
consciences if w e were to  conceal our belief th a t th e  Arab complaint 01 
th is head is  sub stan tia lly  justified.
5. W e have endeavoured since th e outbreak of th e  p re se n t disturbance 
to  use our influence, each o f us w ith in  th e  scope of his functions, i 
bring about a  return to  norm al conditions, and more particu larly  afte 
th e announcem ent was m ade th a t H is M ajesty’s Governm ent had decide 
to  send o u t a R oyal Com m ission. W e h ave been a t pains to  emphai 
th a t a  return to  norm al conditions w as a condition o f the appointment 
a  R oyal Com m ission. B u t a ll our efforts have proved unavailing. \i 
m et everyw here w ith  a  sceptical d isbelief in  the sincerity of the  Govet 
m en t’s offer, and our endeavours a t peace-m aking have only  earned 
odium  and suspicion. I t  has becom e im possible for us to  continue to ac 
usefully  as a  link betw een  th e A dm inistration and th e Arab population.
6. W hen w e consider th e  depth  and the spread o f th e feeling animatiii 
the Arab population to -d ay , w e are driven to  th e  conclusion tha 
G overnm ent does n ot perhaps sufficiently appreciate a ll th e  underlyii 
factors of th e situ ation . Our warrant for th is apparently presumptnoi 
statem ent is th a t we are naturally in  closer contact w ith th e  intimât 
thoughts o f the Arab population th an  even  Y our E x ce llen cy ’s closes 
advisers. In  particular, we believe th a t one fundam ental aspect of tl 
unrest is being overlooked, nam ély th a t th e  present feeling is not on 
th a t can be crushed b y  force. The G overnm ent has enough resources a 
its  d isposal to  be able in  course o f tim e to  deal w ith the insurrectioi 
B u t th e feeling w ill rem ain, and rem ain a  constant source of trouble an 
disturbance. I t  cannot be stam ped o u t b y  force. The on ly way in whit 
it  can  b e  rem oved is  b y  rem oving th e  causes w hich have b ro u g h t it about 
W e have so far seen no practical evidence th a t G overnm ent have graspe 
th a t aspect of th e  situation .
7. The G overnm ent h ave, it  is true, announced th a t a Royal Commissia 
w ould be appointed to  inquire in to  th e grievances and make recon 
m endations. W e are n ot, how ever, concerned now  w ith  ultim ate policy 
but w ith  th e  im m ediate situation  in  w hich lives and property  are beii 
destroyed every day. T he announcem ent o f a  R oyal Commission has no 
allayed  th e  d iscontent, precisely because o f th a t loss of confidence 1 
w hich w e have referred. W hat is w anted , therefore, is some act whic 
w ould go to  restore to  the Arabs th e  confidence th ey  have lost and pi 
an end to  th e present deadlock.
Speaking n ot as partisans, b u t as responsible public servants mindft 
of our obligations to  G overnm ent and to  th e  country as a whole, we fa 
th a t, in  th e  circum stances, th e  in itia tive  for ending th e  deadlock can onl 
com e from  the G overnm ent, and th a t i t  m ust com e from Govermnei 
w ith  th e lea st possible delay.
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g The deadlock in  its  present phase turns exclu sively  on the issue of 
immigration. In other words, th e  choice betw een an im m ediate return 
to normal conditions and an indefinite continuation of th e  present dis­
orders and bloodshed depends n ot on  a m atter o f policy  or principle, bu t 
solely on a m atter o f provisional regulation, nam ely th a t of w hether or n ot 
immigration is to  be stopped. Perhaps it  is n o t superfluous to  p o in t ou t 
that foremost am ong th e subjects w hich w ill fa ll sub judice  during the  
proposed inquiry is th a t very  subject of im m igration. W e w ould add th a t 
there are very good precedents for such a stoppage o f im m igration in  
the fact that before th e  inquiry in to  th e  disturbances o f 1921 such im m i­
gration was stopped, and in  th e riots o f 1929 im m igration w as n o t only  
popped but th e im m igration certificates w hich had already been issued  
wre withdrawn.
9. After a great d eal of careful and conscientious consideration, w e have 
no hesitation in recom m ending th e  stoppage of im m igration as th e  on ly  
[air, humane and honourable solution  of th e present deadlock.
10. It will be  argued, w e know , th a t prestige is a t stake and th a t 
vemment cannot y ie ld  to  violence w ith ou t losing prestige. W e would  
ngly have supported th a t argum ent had  it  n o t been for our b elief th at
-vemment is itself in  part to  blam e for th e state of m ind w hich has 
ught about the violence. W e y ie ld  to  no one in upholding order and  
ority as the foundation of a ll good governm ent. B u t authority  
plies justice a ll round, and when justice is  denied, or w hen confidence 
its impartiality is shaken, th en  authority becom es underm ined; and it  
ows a mistaken notion  of prestige to  suppose th a t i t  can b e restored by  
use of force.
In this case, th e  prestige and au thority  of G overnm ent w ould n o t on ly  
tlose, but would gain b y  a tim ely  act o f conciliation.
11. Your E xcellency w ill, w e trust, n ot m isapprehend the m otives which  
ve prompted us to  subm it th e present m em orial. T hey are above all 
otives of conscience. D uring these painful w eeks, w hen fellow -
trymen and m aybe relatives o f ours have been losing their lives  
ery day, we have m ade every effort to  rem em ber our obligations as 
bUc servants and contribute, in  our sm all w ay, to  th e restoration of 
-e. B ut alongside of our obligations as c iv il servants are the d ictates 
our consciences. W e feel th a t we m ust conscientiously raise a  protest 
st the present p o licy  of repression w hen there ex ists a  fair and 
nourable way of im m ediately ending th e  present unrest w ith  its growing 
of death and suffering.
12. We are forwarding th is  m em orial in  quadruplicate so th a t i t  m ay  
duly transmitted to  th e Secretary of S tate for th e Colonies. In  view , 
wever, of th e  seriousness of th e  situation  and th e  difficult position  in  
xh we find ourselves, w e w ould request Y our E xcellency to  cable the 
tance of th is m em orandum  to  th e  Secretary of State and favour us
a reply a t your earliest possible convenience.
A P P E N D IX  3.
enue, Expenditure and Trade per head in Middle Eastern Countries,
1935.
Country
t
(Levan
estine
sns-Jordan
States)
Revenue Expenditure Exports Im ports
per head per head per  head per  head
£ £ £ £
2-08 2-08 2-32 2-04
1-62 I . 7 1 i - i i 2-09
1 . 74 1-62 1-02 2 - 5 3
4 - 7 5 3 - 4 § 3 - 5 3 14 .9
1-05 1-26 — —
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A PPE N D IX  4.
A REA  A N D  POPULATION OF DISTRICTS AND SUB-DISTRICTS. |
Figures taken from 1931 Census Report.
Districts and
Area in 
square
Population by Religion. Total
Popula
tion
N i)
Sub-Districts. kilo­
metres. Moslems Jews. Christ­ians. Others.
I. Southern District 14,217 267,587 78,723 1 5 , 1 5 5 3 3 2 361,797
1. Gaza Sub-district
2. Beersheba „
3. Jaffa
4. Ramie „
1,196
11,872
3 3 5
814
9 3 . 3 1 5
50,907
6 5 . 4 7 8
5 7 . 8 8 7
421
1 7
69,789
8,496
8 9 7
1 5 3
9,921
4,184
1
5
3 1 4
12
9 4 ,%
51,082
HWa
70,579
II. Jerusalem D istrict ... 4.278 1 7 3 . 0 1 9 5 4 , 9 5 9 38,488 9 6 266,561
5. Hebron sub-district ...
6. Bethlehem „ ...
7. Jerusalem „ ...
8. Jericho „ ...
9. Ramallah
2,120
520
420
676
5 4 2
67,364
1 3 . 0 4 7
5 7 . 7 6 2
2 , 9 4 9
3 1 , 8 9 7
1 3 5
42
5 4 , 5 3 8
2 4 3
1
124
10,628
20,309
263
7,164
8
8
52
28
67,631
23,721
132,661
3,483
39 ,o6i
III. Northern District ... 6,988 319,106 40,928 3 7 , 7 5 5 9,673 407,462
10. Tulkarm Sub-district
11. Nablus „
12. Jenin „
13. Nazareth „
14. Beisan
15. Tiberias „
16. Haifa „
17. Acre
18. Safad
7 5 1
1,618
800
507
3 9 5
4 5 3
1,022
7 3 0
712
4 5 , 2 9 0
6 7 , 3 1 4
4 0 . 5 5 5
18,019
12,672
16,546
52,830
31,905
3 3 , 9 7 5
666
10
4
3 . 1 7 2
1 , 9 5 0
7 . 7 8 5
23,367
296
3.678
3 5 6
1,214
851
7 . 3 8 4
4 7 7
1 . 7 3 4
16,492
7,672
1 , 5 7 5
16
168
1
I?
24
910
2,783
5.269
4 8 5
46,328
68,706
41,411
28,592
15,123
26,975
95,472
45,142
39,ra
(8/37) (464971:—10) Wt. 1790—2045 1000 12/37 P  St. G. 335
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Approximate Populations 
Palestine 1,340,000 
Trans-Jordan 300,000 
French Mandated Territories:-
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ROYAL COMMISSION
Minutes o f evidence heard at Public Sessions 
(with index). Colonial Office [ColonialNo. 134).
T his volum e contains the fu ll evidence of the 62 
witnesses given a t the 66 public meetings held by the 
Commission together w ith the speeches made at the 
opening session on N ovem ber 12, 1936,
F ’cap fol. 408 pp.
Price £  1 155. net. By post £  1 1$s. 6d.
Memoranda prepared by the Government o f  
Palestine. Colonial Office (Colonial No. 1 3 3 ) .
A m ine of inform ation regarding the administration 
of Palestine since the Civil A dm inistration was estab­
lished in 1920. T he statistical inform ation given in 
the volum e covers an extrem ely wide field and will be 
found invaluable to those interested in the “ plan of 
partition ”  proposed by the Royal Commission.
F ’cap fol. 207 pp.
Price 9*. By post Q.y. 6d.
His Majesty’s Stationery Office,
L o n d o n  : Adastral House, Kingsway, W .C .2  ;
E d in b u r g h  2 :  1 2 0  George Street; M a n c h e s t e r  i  : 2 6  York Street!
C a r d i f f  : 1 St. Andrew's Crescent; B e l f a s t :  8 0  Chichester Street;
or through any bookseller
